# Gendered Institutional Change in South Africa: The Case of the State Security Sector

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| ANC | African National Congress |
| ANCWL | African National Congress Women's League |
| APLA | Azanian People's Liberation Army |
| Armscor | Armaments Corporation of South Africa |
| AU | African Union |
| AWB | Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging |
| BCM | Black Consciousness Movement |
| CEDAW | Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women |
| CODESA | Convention for a Democratic South Africa |
| COPE | Congress of the People |
| COSATU | Congress of South African Trade Unions |
| DA | Democratic Alliance |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration |
| DI | Discursive Institutionalism |
| DoD | Department of Defence |
| DRW | Descriptive Representation of Women |
| ECC | End Conscription Campaign |
| EOCD | Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate |
| FEDSAW | Federation of South African Women |
| FF+ | Freedom Front Plus |
| FI | Feminist Institutionalism |
| FLS | Front Line States |
| FPS | Feminist Political Science |
| GA | General Assembly (United Nations) |
| GAD | Gender and Development |
| GEAR | Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy |
| HI | Historical Institutionalism |
| HSP | Human Security Paradigm |
| ID | Independent Democrats |
| IFP | Inkatha Freedom Party |
| MK | Umkhonto we Siswe |

| | |
|---|---|
| MPNF | Multi Party Negotiation Forum |
| NA | National Assembly |
| NCACC | National Conventional Arms Control Committee |
| NEC | National Executive Committee (of the ANC) |
| NEPAD | New Partnership for Africa's Development |
| NI | New Institutionalism |
| NP | National Party |
| OAU | Organisation of African Unity |
| PAC | Pan African Congress |
| PCRD | Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development |
| RDP | Reconstruction and Development Programme |
| SACP | South African Communist Party |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SADF | South African Defence Force |
| SANDF | South African National Defence Force |
| SANNC | South African Native National Congress |
| SASOL | South African Coal and Oil |
| SCOPA | Standing Committee on Public Accounts |
| SCR | Security Council Resolution |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| SRW | Substantive Representation of Women |
| TBVC | Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, Ciskei (Homelands) |
| UDF | United Democratic Front |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| US | United States |
| WID | Women in Development |
| WNC | Women's National Coalition |

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## ABSTRACT

Where do the opportunities for gendered institutional change lay in post conflict transitional states? In particular, what processes explain the transformation of gender roles within traditionally male-dominated sectors such as security? The post-conflict South African State provides the institutional backdrop against which the gender equality gains of women in the security sector are explored. The rare opportunities presented in the transitional context are a key factor in understanding the promises and limits of gendered change within the institutional arena, both in terms of the descriptive and substantive representation of women.

This thesis explores the processes of gendered institutional change from a feminist institutional perspective, incorporating a range of normatively nuanced variables that examine the mechanisms by which socially-constructed gender norms are altered within the security sector, situating power at the heart of the contextually driven analysis.

The thesis argues that the paths which emerged over the course of the liberation struggle as a result of three key historical legacies enabled a transformation of gender roles and institutional norms with respect to security. Specifically, the intertwined legacies of an equality-based liberation movement, the continuous increase in women's autonomy, and the legacy of militarisation all contributed to the opening of spaces for women's strategic action. Through process tracing methodology, the thesis reveals how South African women strategically wielded their power to consolidate gender gains embedded within the foundational documents of the new democratic regime. In so doing, women capitalised on a range of timeous exogenous influences within the broader feminist movement, particularly the global shift towards institutionally-focused gender mainstreaming strategies.

The focus on the security sector is viewed as a litmus test for the advancement of gender equality within the institutional structures of South Africa, given the rigidly patriarchal and masculine norms permeating the security arena. Among the contextual considerations which produced openings for the gendering of State security structures was the adoption of the human security paradigm, which called for a holistic, people-

centred vision of security centred around development and stability. The resulting overhaul of the security sector, and the repositioning of the South African military on the national and regional stage, presented further opportunities for strategic interventions by women to transform the institutional culture of the State security structures. Bolstered by exogenous influences such as innovative regional and international instruments and organisations, a new military culture began emerging in South Africa, with women positioned to play a central role in its development. The manner in which women engaged with this process is a demonstration of the extent to which gendered norms have become entrenched in the institutional structures of the post-conflict South African State, revealing the constraints of inherited structures, and the power of institutional layering in restructuring women's security roles within the State.

The successes and failures of the gendering of the security sector are embodied within the complex case of the arms acquisition. This example is analysed as a "case study within a case study", and clearly highlights the intersection of the multiple variables discussed in the thesis, revealing the manner in which evolving institutional norms promote and foreclose gendered change, and the implications of the struggle between old and new gendered legacies. The infusion of gendered norms into the security sector is also considered through the perceptions of government and civil society respondents, as an indicator of the "stickiness" of the gender equality rhetoric, and of the progress made towards transforming the masculine domain of the security arena.

The unique attributes of the South African case yields insights into the opportunities and constraints of post-conflict institutional change, contributing to the broader feminist institutional literature through the focus on the complex processes of gendered institutional change and continuity within the overlooked security structures of the State.

## DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work, except where otherwise indicated and acknowledged. This thesis has not been submitted for any other degree or qualification.

Lara Monica De Klerk Date

# 1

# INTRODUCTION

South Africa has been lauded as a political 'miracle', the 'rainbow nation', a model for a peaceful transition to democracy in a continent that is blighted by civil war and unrest. Often described as "two nations" in one state[1], South Africa is characterised by deep economic, political and social divides, presenting a range of challenges and opportunities to the democracy building exercise that has been underway for the last decade and a half. Prime among these are the difficulties faced in bringing about broad-based empowerment and development while ensuring that security needs are met and do not impede the process of democratic consolidation.

In part, democracy and good governance could be seen as striving for the attainment of representativeness of elected officials and constructing an enabling environment for participatory governance in which all stakeholders have a voice. While women constitute more than half of the population, they have been consistently under-represented in formal decision-making bodies, particularly in the "higher" offices and in certain portfolios, such as Defence. The historical subjugation and institutionalised exclusion of women from positions of authority is a universal predicament, and is an ongoing concern in developing states, particularly as gender inequality has been identified as a significant obstacle to the attainment of development goals.

The inability to solidify the gender gains made during periods of strife in the post-conflict period has proved to be a commonality across varied historical and ideological contexts. As Waylen (2007a: 521) explains, most transitions have been unable to deliver the expected "positive gender outcomes" although "the South African case has been seen as an exception". Contending with the various historical legacies impacting on gender equality in the economic, social, and political sphere, South African women have

[1] This description was made by Thabo Mbeki in his opening statement for the National Assembly session on "Reconciliation and Nation Building" in 1998 (Mbeki, 1998).

made tremendous gains in the attainment of descriptive and substantive equality within general government structures.

From the inception of the new democratic regime women have maintained positions of influence and prominence, including traditionally male-dominated posts such the vice-presidency, security, and foreign affairs. Following the meteoric increase in women's parliamentary representation in 1994 from 2.7% to 27%, the latest elections places South Africa 4th globally with 43%, behind Rwanda (56%), Sweden (47%) and Cuba (43.3%) (GenderLinks, 2009). After the 2009 elections, women comprised 42% of the Cabinet, including as Ministers for portfolios such as Agriculture, Defence, Energy, International Relations, Mining and Public Enterprises (Mbola, 2009). Four of the nine provincial premiers are women, the official opposition is led by a woman, as are a number of other political parties. Even the notoriously patriarchal Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) put forward a woman for its stronghold of KwaZulu Natal (GenderLinks, 2009). Female combatants[2] who had actively participated in the armed struggle for democracy entered formal State institutions in esteemed positions - a rarity in sub-Saharan Africa.

As Graph 1.1 shows, the parliamentary representation of women in South Africa over the last 15 years has been consistently higher than that of both the regional and world average. How was this achieved? What factors account for these gender gains? Where did the opportunities in the transition to democracy lie? How were these opportunities grasped and consolidated into gains, particularly within the State security structures?

[2] The majority of female combatants discussed in the research are drawn from the African National Congress (ANC) and their armed wing, *Umkhonto we Siswe* (MK).

**Graph 1.1 Increase in Women's Parliamentary Representation 1995-2009**




Adapted from UNSTATS (2009: *Table 6a Women in Parliament*).

Considering South Africa as a "best case scenario" in a number of respects, the thesis focuses on understanding how institutional change is gendered and specifically how gendered institutional change was instigated within the security structures of the democratic South African State. Acknowledging that a number of fortuitous conditions existed at the time, which may not be replicable elsewhere, the achievement of significant gender gains may also prove attainable in other developing world contexts by gaining a clearer understanding of *how* these processes of change occurred and the manner in which gender gains were consolidated.

By highlighting the strategies pursued by women in South Africa, and exploring the mechanisms by which gendered change was affected, the thesis adds to the body of knowledge on gendered institutional change, particularly within State security structures. Given the diversity of problems faced by South Africa in terms of development and security challenges (akin to other states in the developing South), the array of institutional mechanisms geared towards enabling the substantive participation of women calls for a deeper understanding of how these structures were established, and what lessons can be learnt from the South African experience. The unique attributes of the South African case could therefore yield insights into the opportunities and constraints of post-conflict institutional change and the processes by which the institutional culture is gendered, particularly in the security sector, providing some best practices for other post-conflict developing states.

## 1.1 The Research Question in Broader Perspective

The central research question explores the consolidation of gender gains within the security structures[3] of post-conflict South Africa from a feminist institutionalist (FI) perspective, asking "*how* did gendered institutional change happen in the State security structures?". Within this focal question, the research seeks to answer these subsidiary issues: How were women's roles within the security sector expanded? Are women's roles in post-conflict South Africa's security institutions indicative of substantive gendered change? Are there mechanisms for participation that enable women to influence the decision-making process in the security sector?

The research aims to uncover the means through which women consolidated gender gains within the State security structures by exploring the historical legacies that impacted on women's autonomy and power, while incorporating the internal and external influences on the paths set in motion by these historical legacies. The progress made in terms of gendering the institutional structures of the security sector is measured in terms of both the descriptive and substantive representation of women within these structures, utilising the measures provided by the gender mainstreaming strategy. In other words, seeking evidence of women's full and meaningful participation in the decision-making processes of the State, both through the attainment of positions of influence and authority, the existence of functioning gender machineries that facilitate the consideration of gender differentiated needs during policy formulation, the promulgation of policies that address gender inequality, and other such measures that point to a changing institutional culture.

Approaching the investigation of the complex interplay between historical legacies and institutions from a New Institutionalist (NI) perspective blurs the conceptual divide

[3] Throughout the thesis, the use of "security structures" refers to all the institutions directly associated with State-run security concerns: those bodies and positions wherein national security decisions are made and which implement the defence mandate of the State. These structures include the Armed Forces (army, navy, air force and police), Department of Defence (DoD), Department of Foreign Affairs/International Relations, the Presidency, Cabinet, and the parliamentary committees associated with security. Where the influence of related bodies is relevant to the discussion, such as that of the Department of Finance, oversight bodies such as the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), or other associated parliamentary committees, these structures and mechanisms will be specifically identified, and are not included in the admittedly broad definition of "security sector" adopted for the purposes of this research.

between institutions and culture (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 947) when considering how these interactions both promote and foreclose change, and the opportunities which arise for the institutionalisation and consolidation of gender gains. Gender gains in this sense are taken to include the descriptive and substantive representation of women in the decision-making structures of the State, the creation of mechanisms for sustainable participation, and the measures to transform the formal institutional rules and informal norms and values that perpetuate gender inequality. The framework for analysis considers the opportunities and constraints of transitional institutional restructuring and layering, particularly the prospects for and limits of continuously contested change.

The focus on the security sector draws in further considerations, such as the evolution of gender roles in relation to security, the formal recognition of these roles, and the contributions that women make to the security goals of the State. The security aspect of the research question echoes the New Institutionalist (NI) approach as it considers the impact of timing on the consolidation of gender gains. The potential for affecting meaningful change through the layering of pre-existing and new institutions, and the manner in which institutional design and reform can be gendered during this transitional process, form a key part of the FI approach and facilitates the consideration of influence, access and power in relation to the gendering of State security structures.

### 1.1.1 Gender Gains: Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women

What is meant by gender gains? Varying definitions of the descriptive and substantive representation of women are explored within an extensive body of feminist literature, with varying interpretations of the links between the two concepts, and their relationship with institutional structures and broader societal forces. In a general view, descriptive representation considers the impact of "numbers" in terms of the representation of women in government. Substantive representation is concerned with the extent to which women's interests are effectively represented and seeks evidence of meaningful gains in gender terms with respect to policy outcomes and institutional change. The use of gender mainstreaming policies can thus be seen as a sign of the gendering of institutional processes (Sorenson, 1998; Heinecken, 2002; Lowe Morna,

2003; Rai, 2004; Hassim, 2004; Daly, 2005; Koen, 2006; Subrahmanian, 2007; Celis & Childs, 2008; Mackay, 2008; Gouws, 2008b; Waylen, 2008, amongst others).

Within this broad characterization of the descriptive representation of women (DRW) and the substantive representation of women (SRW) exists a plethora of overlapping theories concerned with issues such as the "politics of presence" and the nature of women's contributions (Mackay, 2008). Critical mass arguments form part of this debate, arguing that women need to be represented in significant numbers in order to both affect change and bestow legitimacy upon democratic political institutions.

Essentially, such investigations are aimed at determining whether (and to what extent) women "act for" women, the impact of mitigating factors such as differences in identity based on experience and political agendas, and the influence of institutional factors (Young, 1994; Mansbridge, 1999; Mackay, 2004; Puwar, 2004; Bratton, 2005; Childs & Krook, 2006; Batliwala & Dhanraj, 2007: 32; Waylen, 2007b: 15; Gouws, 2008b; Annesley & Gains, 2010). While women may bring a particular perspective to the policy and governance process, they are not a homogenous group with a unified view or a singular purpose. Thus, the focus of SRW is less concerned with the numbers of women, and more focused on how women participating in the process gain and wield power to affect change, and the role that numbers plays within this process.

An integral part of this approach is the assessment of the gendered institutional environment and its complex web of formal and informal rules and structures that impact upon the power dynamics and resource allocation required for affecting change (Lovenduski, 1998; Seidman, 2001; Mackay & Meier, 2003; Chappell, 2006; Kenny, 2007; Galligan & Clavero, 2008). The difficulty lies not only in identifying the causes of continuity and change, given the intricate inter-weaving of many variables, but also in assessing the impact of SRW and how gender issues are kept on the agenda (Fraser, 1995; Sawer, 2002; Goetz, 2003; Daly, 2005; Mackay, 2008; Waylen, 2008).

The increasing awareness and understanding of how institutional factors affect the DRW and SRW is amply demonstrated within the growing body of FI literature, which is elaborated upon in the following chapter. The issues outlined above are incorporated

into the model for analysis, enabling the consideration of factors such as the "politics of presence", gendered power dynamics, and women "acting for" women. Particular attention is paid to the presence of women in positions which command power and resources by virtue of their location within the institutional structure, and the effect this has on the institutional gendering process.

For purposes of clarity, "gender mainstreaming" will refer to the strategies aimed at achieving both DRW, in terms of numbers, and SRW, measured in terms of substantive changes to the institutional environment, such as: the creation of gender machineries, the implementation of strategies aimed at gendering the policy-making process (such as Women's Budgets), the crafting of gender-aware policies, and the presence of women in positions of influence and power. These indicators inform the assessment of the gendered institutional change of the South African security sector, providing tangible and identifiable criteria on which to chart the progress of women within both the general governance structures of the State and the security sector of post-conflict South Africa.

The way in which women in South Africa self-consciously organised around gender issues as part of the State-building exercise had a significant impact on the process of consolidating gender gains within the security sector. Examining how this was done reveals the forces at play in the gendering of institutions, enriching the understanding of how these processes of gendering and change are played out within the security structures of the State, as this sector represents perhaps one of the most daunting challenges for the consolidation of gender equality. The timing of the transition to democracy played a critical role in the evolution of women's strategic organising in South Africa. The evolution of the broader feminist movement, considered in conjunction with the shift in security thinking in the developing world, contextualises the research question and highlights the unique moment captured by South African women.

### 1.1.2 Timely Transitions: South Africa and the Global Feminist Movement

From a gender perspective, the transition to democracy in South Africa occurred at a fortuitous time in relation to the global feminist movement, which had acquired a decidedly more structural focus in the 1990s than in preceding eras in terms of targeting State institutions as key arenas for affecting change. The waves of feminism, which began with the suffrage movement at the turn of the 20th century, initially focused on legal equality and the attainment of fundamental political and economic rights. The focus then shifted towards the construction of identity and difference between the sexes, and means of mitigating the stigma attached to the "weaker sex" with respect to political participation (West, 1997; Jackson & Pearson, 1998; Gaitskell, 2002; Cornwall, 2003; Haslanger & Tuaba, 2004; Kolmar & Bartkowski, 2005; Squires, 2007).

These efforts were aided by the successive United Nations (UN) World Conferences on Women, and the scores of protocols, agreements and declarations that aided activists' efforts in lobbying governments to begin entrenching gender rights within their legislation. Among the notable instruments that emerged during this time (and within which the evolution of the gender debate can be charted) was the UN General Assembly Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which formalised legal and political equality, and the UN General Assembly Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979), which dealt more explicitly with women's rights and measures that states should undertake to ensure the full and equitable participation of women in all spheres (UN, 1948; 1979). A defining moment occurred at the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) wherein twelve areas of concern were highlighted (including issues related to the participation of women in the security sector), and more far-reaching interventions on the part of the state were called for (UN, 1995a).[4] The language utilised in this instrument, in particular the framing of the issues, represented a significant shift in the gender debate, moving towards a relational understanding of gender inequality.

[4] An overview of these agreements, as well as the regional and continental instruments which charted the evolution of the gender debate, are included in Appendix 1 – Timeline of Gender Agreements.

The failure of women-centred approaches in addressing the power relations between the sexes which maintain gender inequality, as well as the cultural norms which support them, thus led to a shift towards a new epistemological approach which focused on gender relations, and moved the debate beyond being a "woman's" issue (Baden & Goetz, 1998: 19; Jackson & Pearson, 1998: 5; UN Women Watch, 2000; Sardenberg, 2007: 58).This stemmed from the concern about the fundamental exclusion of women from the creation of knowledge within society, whether this knowledge relates to the manner in which their societies function, the mode of decision making, or even what constitutes "gender". The one-sided production of knowledge ensures that the status quo (generally accepted as being patriarchal and hierarchal) is preserved. Without addressing contextual factors (including ethnicity, culture and economic status), the continued casting of women as lesser citizens would continue unabated (West, 1997: xii; Steans, 1998; Cranny-Francis, Waring & Stavropoulos, 2003: 2; Haslanger and Tuana, 2004; Kolmar & Bartkowski, 2005: 45).

Recognizing that gender inequality is created through deeply rooted societal practices, and is further entrenched in the imbalances in the structures which govern society, it was imperative that any approach aimed at overcoming this inequity acknowledged more than the lack of women in decision-making structures (Cranny-Francis *et al*, 2003: 49; Kabeer, 2003: 2; Subrahmanian, 2007: 112; Svensson, 2007: 13). It was also necessary to address the under-valuing of women's knowledge, experience and needs in the construction of public policies and programmes, enabling their voices to be heard in a manner that influenced the discourse of the State. This shift in the framing of the gender equality discourse signalled the transition from the "*Women* In Development" (WID) approach towards the more holistic "*Gender* And Development" (GAD) strategy.

The acknowledgment of the sway held by institutional, social and cultural beliefs in terms of the impact on collective and individual decision-making practices was a significant development in the evolution of feminist theory (Seidman, 2001; Cranny-Francis *et al,* 2003: 49; Daly, 2005), particularly in the view that gender inequality is a societal construct which transcends formal laws and is maintained through the interactions of individuals and structures within society (Kabeer, 2003: 2; Puwar, 2004: 77; Daly, 2005; Svensson, 2007: 13).

The focus on institutional mechanisms for change, together with the socially-constructed nature of norms, prioritises the redefinition and reconceptualisation of women's relationships to the State and their societies, particularly for women embroiled in nationalist movements as the transitional period offers a rare opportunity to transform the perceptions of gender roles within the structures which create and maintain societal norms (West, 1997: xiii; Seidman, 2001; Vincent, 2001; Waylen, 2007a, 2007b).

The integrationist gender mainstreaming strategy promulgated by GAD identifies the State as the key actor for affecting substantive change (Subrahmanian, 2007: 112). As a result of its legitimating power, the State can bring its weight to bear in altering the structural inequalities of society. This State-centric focus is shared by feminist institutionalists such as Chappell (2011: 165) who considers the means through which institutions advance gender goals, asking "to what extent has past gender norms and practices been carried forward in their design and operation?". In other words, recognising the role institutions play in gendering the norms and rules while maintaining an awareness of the historical legacies that impact on the gendering process are interlinked concerns, and are explored further in the following chapter.

It was at this juncture in the mid-1990s, as GAD was gaining prominence following the 1995 Beijing Declaration that women in South Africa were participating in the shaping of a new democratic dispensation in the post-conflict State. The GAD strategy, which advocates a normative and structural focus for addressing gender inequality, was evident in the manner in which South African women approached the new dispensation. A mixture of WID and GAD tools were employed, as advocated by the gender mainstreaming approach which was gaining prominence across the world. This strategy included the use of quotas and positive action, the establishment of gender machineries, and the use of policies such as gender budgeting. All of these measures had a decidedly structural goal in terms of transforming the institutions which perpetuate gender inequality, and the inclusion of gender mainstreaming policies as a variable for measuring gendered institutional change is therefore well suited for inclusion in a FI-oriented analytical model.

### 1.1.3 Shift in Security Thinking: Placing People First

Timing is a critical consideration from the security standpoint of the research question as well, given that the transition to democracy in South Africa occurred at a crucial juncture in global security thinking. The paradigm shift in security thinking (particularly in developing states) from a State-centric to a people-centred model was a significant development in the re-structuring of the new democratic South Africa. Focusing on the inter-connection between development, stability, and democracy the Human Security Paradigm (HSP) advocates addressing the personal, community, economic, food, health, environmental and political factors that contribute to the rise of instability, and utilising a contextually-driven approach towards attaining socio-economic centred security (UNDP, 1994; Schoeman, 1998; Acharya, 1999; Stewart, 2006; Hendricks, 2007; Clarke, 2008; Jones, 2009; Tshitereke, 2009, amongst others). The participation of a range of stakeholders at various levels is thus seen to be essential to the successful implementation of such an ambitious endeavour. Therefore, the provision and protection of human rights forms an integral part of this process.

The ascendance of the HSP at the end of the Cold War played into the interlinked historical legacies of militarism and women's autonomy which affected the process of re-positioning the role of the military within South Africa, and the manner and extent to which women participated in this process. The central philosophy of the African National Congress (ANC) was closely aligned with the HSP approach in its emphasis on broad-based empowerment and development, and it therefore provided an useful focal point around which the restructuring of the armed forces of the State could be organised, as well as creating openings for women's strategic action as a result of its emphasis on equality.

The established links between development and a stable security environment necessarily impact upon the attainment of a secure democracy and the realisation of good governance ideals (Bell, 2000; Stott, 2002; Maclean, Black & Shaw, 2006; Stewart, 2006; Hendricks, 2007; Svensson, 2007; Tieku, 2007; Spears, 2007; Hutton, 2009; Jones, 2009; Makinana, 2009, amongst many others). Yet the role of women in shaping post-conflict developing world societies in terms of security at the State level is a relatively

new research concern[5]. The paucity of research is partly due to the protracted violent conflicts that followed the wave of independence movements sweeping across Africa in the late 1960s. Indeed, many states across Africa remain embroiled in violent altercations.[6] New accounts continue to surface about the evolving roles women are playing during and after conflicts, lending credence to the view that conflict presents an opportunity for the transformation of gender roles (see for example Cock, 1991, 2009; Cockburn, 1998; Strickland & Duvvury, 2000; Heinecken, 2002, 2009; Nzomo, 2002; Pillay, 2006; Koen, 2006; Motumi, 2006; Svensson, 2007, 2008; Clarke, 2008). However, West (1997: xiv) points out that "academia has not caught up with women in current political struggles … Women remain invisible, subsumed under the 'fraternity' of nation".

The adoption of the HSP by the democratic South African regime thus provides another layer of analysis when considering the claim by Svensson (2007: 3) that revealing the power structures that both define and operationalise concepts within the security arena lies at the heart of feminist security research: understanding how security is being reconceptualised to meet the demands of a new century enables feminists at various levels to engage more effectively with the structures as they are being transformed. The assertion made is that "if women's perspectives – as well as their kinship, trading, and distribution networks – were taken seriously, perhaps security itself would be reconsidered and incorporated into the reform of security structures" (Clarke, 2008: 60-61).

The role of women within the State security structures is also a crucial consideration. Feminists themselves are divided as to what roles women should play within the armed forces of the new democratic State, with disagreements on various issues including physical ability, social and cultural expectations and military and tactical concerns (Enloe, 1989; Modise & Curnow, 2000; Tickner, 2001; Heinecken 2002: 715; Cohn,

[5] As authors such as Waylen (2003) have pointed out, even where some research into the role of women in transitional situations has been carried out this has been emphatically gender-blind, and often does not incorporate the necessary level of nuance with regards to the relationship between the women's movement and the changing political context. Some of the authors who have started addressing this gap include Cock (1991, 2007, 2009); Heinecken (2002); Hassim (2004); Cherry (2007); Suttner (2007); Clarke (2008); and Hendricks & Hutton (2008).

[6] See Appendix 2 - Conflicts in Africa for an overview of the conflicts afflicting African states in the decades since independence.

2004; Cherry, 2007; Suttner, 2007; Cockburn, 2007; Clarke, 2008). The post-conflict experiences of women have also had a bearing on the roles undertaken, as Modise and Curnow (2000: 40) point out:

> "women who fought in the struggle are stigmatised, especially by their male comrades. For some inexplicable reason she feels they have been tainted by their fight ... Modise identified a similar marginalisation among Mozambican, Namibian and Zimbabwean women former freedom fighters. They too fought a two-pronged battle, similar to that of Modise and her comrades; the dual oppressions of colonialism and misogyny. ... Modise believes that ex-women soldiers and prisoners are still being marginalised within the ANC".

This points to the complexity of the roles that women have had to play within the South African liberation struggle, and the extensive ramifications on the functions they now fulfil in the fledgling democracy. Black women in particular have had to fight a war on many fronts; against cultural patriarchal traditions, colonial subjugation[7], the inhumanity of the Apartheid system which restricted the fulfilment of day to day responsibilities, and finally against the very system which they helped to put in place. As Cock (1991: 26) points out, the "triple oppression of black working class women in South Africa, who are located at the intersection of three lines along which privilege runs – gender, race and class" face a greater disadvantage in the battle for power and access. Similarly, Britton (2002) expands on the concept of "double militancy" present in many liberation struggles, including in South Africa, wherein women fight both within a system for broader change as well as against the system for gendered change. These layers of oppression influence the viewpoints and strategies of both civil society and government, as there are starkly contrasting views on how to pursue equality across all divides.

The focus on the security structures of the State therefore provides a useful case study of how women utilise a variety of contextual factors (from historical developments, exogenous events, timing, and evolving social norms) to negotiate entry into a sphere that has been historically hostile both to women's concerns and their presence within the structure. Further, the security arena represents a set of institutional norms that are under-explored in political studies in general, and feminist institutionalist studies in particular, especially given its importance in the context of transitional states. The

[7] West (1997: xiv) asserts that "patriarchal nationalism was disseminated through colonialism", which can certainly be substantiated through the history and experiences of many sub-Saharan states. However, cultural and social traditions pre-dating even the earliest colonial settlers were decidedly patriarchal, characterised by an unequal division of labour, and lack of property and personal rights in most tribal and cultural groupings throughout Sub Saharan Africa, as Gasa (2007) also discusses.

examination of the security structures of the post conflict South African State is seen as a means of understanding the complex interplay between historical legacies and institutions, and how these various factors interconnect and interact to promote and foreclose the opportunities for the consolidation of gendered gains – and the impact this has on gendered institutional change. Central to this discussion are feminist institutionalist concepts such as institutional layering and "nested newness" (Mackay, 2010; Chappell, 2011) which have particular utility for case studies such as this, as will be discussed in Chapter Two.

Thus, the focus on the gendering of State security structures has the potential to reveal the mechanisms by which meaningful institutional change is wrought and can facilitate a deeper understanding of the manner in which sustainable transformations of gender norms could be achieved, filling a gap in the literature. Specifically, how have women gained access to these State security institutions? How have their experiences throughout the militarised process of democratisation shaped their entry into these bastions of masculinity? Have they retained their pre-transition power to enact change within these most gender-biased of State structures? What factors account for their advancement in these structures? Finally, what do the answers to these questions reveal about the processes of gendered institutional change?

## 1.2 Structure of Thesis Text

The thesis is divided into four parts, dealing respectively with the theoretical foundation underpinning the research (Chapter Two), the historical context informing the legacies of militancy and autonomy within general governance structures of the State (Chapters Three, Four and Five), the security dimension of the research question (Chapters Six, Seven and Eight), and concluding with the summation of the findings (Chapter Nine).

Part I situates the research within the broader NI/FI literature, and facilitates the construction of the analytical framework utilised in the research. Chapter Two, *Feminist New Institutionalism and Transitional States,* demonstrates the utility of an institutionally-focused gendered approach towards the understanding of the processes, promises and limitations of institutional change. This framework enables the systematic consideration

of the variables with respect to the South African case study, as well as being compatible with the incorporation of the security focus as an additional dimension to the investigation of gendered processes of institutional change.

The methodological issues affecting the research are assessed, noting the manner in which biographical and autobiographical accounts were utilised together with primary data derived from questionnaires and interviews to aid the process tracing approach adopted. Challenges arising from an investigation of the security sector are addressed, in terms of access, negotiating the political climate[8], the challenges (and opportunities) of context, and the interpretation of the responses received.

Part II considers the historical context informing the progression of women's autonomy and power within South Africa, and the manner in which the exogenous influences and key moments of the past have impacted on the gendering of institutions in the transitional post-conflict state. Chapter Three, *Learning from Legacies: Women and South African History,* and Chapter Four, *Transition to Democracy: Women Organising to Consolidate Gender Gains*, chart the gender gains of women with specific examples tied to the course of the liberation struggle. By demonstrating the influence of the historical legacy of militancy which permeates South African society, the importance of timing on the increasing autonomy of women is also made apparent. The variables identified within the framework are utilised to account for the position of women at the time of the transition to democracy, and how the historical context provided opportunities for effecting gendered institutional change. Chapter Five, *Women and the First Democratic Regime,* looks at how these historical trends were manifested within the general governance structures of the State, asking: How did women consolidate their gains within the formal governance structures? What accounts for their descriptive and substantive gains? Part II serves a dual purpose in providing both a historical context and serving as a bridge to the specific case study of the security sector.

[8] Fieldwork was conducted during an election year that also saw deep divisions within the ANC: the resignation of President Thabo Mbeki, and the establishment of a breakaway political party that resulted in resignations and restructuring at the highest levels of government. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.

In order to address this question, variables such as the process of institutional layering, timing, and informal rules are explored. The perceptions of parliamentarians (derived from the interviews and surveys) are also utilised in order to construct a better understanding of the underlying norms which continue to influence the process of gendered institutional change within the structures of governance. The picture which emerges serves as a helpful comparison for the later analysis of the gendering of the security structures of the State. Although DRW represents an easily traceable indicator of progress in women's representation, the focus of this thesis is on the SRW, which is focused towards gendered changes in institutional norms and rules. The integration of subjective views, such as those of parliamentarians and civil society practitioners, aids in the analysis of whether the intangible institutional norms are evolving to create an environment that is more open to gender claims. These are considered in conjunction with the existence of structural mechanisms such as gender machineries, and gendered processes such as the Women's Budget.

Part III deals specifically with the security dimension of the research question, exploring the opportunities for gendered transformation of the security sector as a result of, amongst others, the shift in security thinking towards a holistic, rights-centred approach. Chapter Six, *Evolving Notions of Security: Opportunities for Transformation,* outlines the underlying philosophy of the Human Security Paradigm, and shows how the emphasis on stability, development and security created openings for the consolidation of gender gains within the security sector. Further, the policies pursued as a result of the adoption of the Human Security Paradigm, primarily Security Sector Reform (SSR), enabled women to participate in the re-construction of the institutional structures of the State and influence the normative development of the new security apparatus of the State. This is considered in detail in Chapter Seven, *Institutional Gendering and the South African Security Sector*, which illustrates how the convergence of the historical legacies of militancy and autonomy with the gains made in the transitional period enabled women to push for the consolidation of gender gains within perhaps the most masculine of State structures. The exogenous influences which played a role in the transitional process are also shown to have a bearing on the developments within the security arena, particularly in terms of the new mandate for the security sector and the role which women play within it. However, the limits of the transformation process must also be

considered, and are encapsulated within the "case study within a case study" presented in Chapter Eight, *Lessons from the Arms Deal*. The complex saga of the Arms Deal demonstrates the difficulties in overcoming entrenched normative rules within institutions, and highlights the manner in which the factors identified in the analytical framework, such as power, informal rules, coalitions and institutional layering, are both a hindrance and a boon in the process of effecting institutional change, particularly with respect to gender. The case study asks: What are the nuances of the institutional gendering exercise? What are the partial successes and setbacks which exemplify the experiences of women within the South African security sector?

Part IV draws the central arguments of the sections together in Chapter Nine, *Conclusion: Gendered Institutional Change in the South African Security Sector*, leading to the emergence of a picture of how women in South Africa approached the consolidation of gender gains within the security sector. The application of the FI-based model allows the findings to be dissected in a manner which depicts the various factors impacting on the trajectory of women within the new democratic dispensation, and highlights the central features of the strategy utilised by women in affecting change within the security structures of the State. The concluding chapter also situates the research findings within the broader FI literature.

# 2

# FEMINIST NEW INSTITUTIONALISM AND TRANSITIONAL STATES

## 2.1 Introduction

How does gendered institutional change occur in post-conflict transitional states? What variables account for the gendered processes of institutional continuity and change? The explicit linkage of gender and institutions, evident in contemporary Feminist Political Science (FPS)[9], increasingly highlights the importance of the institutional context and its impact on women's descriptive and substantive representation, drawing on the many complementary aspects between New Institutionalism (NI) and Feminist Institutionalism (FI) (Kenney, 1996; Goetz, 1997; Hawkesworth, 2003, 2005; Mackay & Meier, 2003; Martin, 2004; Chappell, 2006; Kenny, 2007, 2011; Waylen, 2009; Annesley & Gains, 2010: 4; Franceshet, 2011; Krook and Mackay, 2011).

The normative slant of FI blurs the "conceptual divide between 'institutions' and 'culture'", necessitating explanations of institutional change to incorporate elements of both organisational norms and broader cultural beliefs (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 947; Mackay & Meier, 2003: 15; Kenny & Mackay, 2009: 276; Mackay, Monro & Waylen, 2009; Krook & Mackay, 2011). The intertwining of sex and gender with other constitutive elements of identity (including race, ethnicity and nationality) "are interpreted according to cultural codes that have implications for masculinity and femininity as well as for institutional behaviour", since "organisations are built around such masculinities and femininities" (Lovenduski, 1998: 348; Hawkesworth, 2003, 2005).

The assertion is that the relations between actors and institutions (and their formal and informal rules and norms) are central to "explaining patterns of institutional creation, continuity and change, as well as the scope for agency within institutional constraints"

[9] The incorporation of FPS with the central tenets of NI will hereafter be referred to as Feminist Institutionalism (FI), representing an approach that considers the gendered aspects of institutional theory.

(Krook & Mackay, 2011: 13; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Kenny, 2007; Mackay *et al*, 2009: 254; Freidenvall & Krook, 2011). By providing a means to "conceptualise and understand the imbalanced structure of gender relations", this FI approach can reveal "patterns of distribution advantage ... [and] makes power a central analytic focus" (Mackay & Meier, 2003: 15-16; Kenny, 2007: 96). It also offers a means to methodically analyse the manner in which power is gendered within institutions and uncover how change and political outcomes come about. This, in turn, provides clearer "understandings of (institutions as) rules of the game; the implications of nested institutions and rules and the ways in which symbols and cognitive scripts might be reframed to incorporate new values and meanings" (Mackay & Meier, 2003: 13).

Institutions are thus the arenas within which prejudicial norms and values interact, providing the environment within which power relations are exercised (and created). The gendered view of institutions that emerges from this rich literature forms the central tenets on which the analytical model utilised in the thesis is based, given its utility for tracing the processes of gendered change in post-conflict South Africa.

The model is premised around the normative notion that institutions are altered by the dominant ideas that are maintained or changed through social interactions and relationships. These relations are governed by shifting power between actors within the institution, and influenced by historical legacies (and path dependencies), key moments and exogenous influences resulting in institutional change (or continuity). The purpose of this chapter is to explain the concepts and variables employed within this eclectic model, clarifying the terminology used and demonstrating how these variables are positioned in order to address the research question.

First, the theoretical framework of the model is unpacked through an exploration of the gendered view of institutions put forward by FI scholars. The starting point is the view of the relational power between the sexes as affected by the norms of institutions, which "prescribe (as well as proscribe) 'acceptable' masculine and feminine forms of behaviour, rules and values for men and women within institutions" (Chappell, 2006: 226). The outcomes emerging from these institutions then "re/produce broader social and political gender expectations" (Chappell, 2006: 226). For example, according to

Lovenduski (2011: ix), the NI view of institutions as constraining actors through the 'rules of the game' leads to an underrating of agency. The addition of agency into the toolkit of NI is one area in which feminists can enrich explanations of institutional change. The importance of structure, agency and power is thus dissected in order to understand gendered processes of institutional change and continuity (Streeck & Thelen, 2005: 18-19; Kenny, 2007; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Krook & Mackay, 2011: 6-7; Waylen, 2011: 151-152). This investigation of power contends that this variable lies at the heart of institutional gendering processes, and thus forms the lynchpin of the model.

The next section considers the contributory causes of institutional change, classified as historical legacies, key moments and exogenous influences. These classifications of variables aim to provide a holistic model to explain the processes and causes of gendered institutional change. They create an analytic framework that aids the understanding of how women in South Africa negotiated entry into the security structures of the State and consolidated the gains made incrementally over decades of strategic organising. The chapter concludes with a description of the methodology employed in the study, and the methodological challenges anticipated and encountered in the collection of data.

## 2.2 A Broad View of Institutions

> "Institutions are the rules that structure political and social life ... they are the configuration of ideas and interests" (Lovenduski, 2011: viii)

Expanding on the disaggregated conceptualisation of institutions put forward by sociological institutionalists (Ikenberry, 1994; Hotimsky, Cobb & Bond, 2006; Lovenduski, 2011), FI goes beyond the traditionally narrow definition of formal institutions and structures to include "rules, informal structures, norms, beliefs and values, routines and conventions, and ideas about institutions" (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 2; Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938; Mackay & Meier, 2003: 6; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Kenny, 2007). This web of formal and informal structures serves as the institutional arena for political action, providing both constraints and opportunities for actors (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938; Mackay & Meier, 2003: 9; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Leach & Lowndes, 2007: 184-185), allowing access for some (and not others), thereby

maintaining certain political values (Mackay & Meier, 2003: 9). The FI view is thus that by uncovering and understanding how institutions are created and maintained and, crucially, how gender (and gender inequality) is embedded within institutions, it would be possible to "illuminate and change the status of women" (Lovenduski, 2011: vii).

Notably, informal structures are given as much credence as formal institutions when explaining institutional continuity and change, and are defined as "socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels" (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 726-727; Kenny, 2007; Leach & Lowndes, 2007; Freidenvall & Krook, 2011; Franceschet, 2011: 61-62; Krook & Mackay, 2011: 4). Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 726-727) assert that these informal structures "shape the performance of formal institutions in important and often unexpected ways" and are also "often critical to explaining institutional outcomes".

The inclusion of informal structures is critically important when analysing gendered institutional relations. Firstly, women tend to organise informally when institutional structures are hostile to their demands, and secondly, the historically entrenched "old boy's networks" are omnipresent in many institutional structures (Franceschet, 2011: 62; Annesley & Gains, 2010: 11). These "old boy's networks" are particularly evident within State security structures, which are infused with patriarchal norms. Accounting for the influence of the informal networks and rules within institutions is crucial, as while informal rules might not be explicitly acknowledged or sanctioned, "non-compliance might involve ... being shut out of informal power networks" (Franceschet, 2011: 62), which would effectively limit access and therefore diminish capacity to affect substantive change. The inclusion of informal structures and networks is therefore an important component of the model in order to successfully explain the processes of institutional change within post-conflict South African security structures.

### 2.2.1 Normative Nuances of New Institutionalism

One of the merits of the expansive definition of institutions put forward by FI is that the inclusion of "norms, values and ideas, incentive systems and its ability to explain the persistence of social structures" facilitates the integration of a gendered viewpoint into institutional analysis (Lovenduski, 2011: ix; Ikenberry, 1994; Hotimsky *et al*, 2006; Kenny, 2007: 95; Kenny & Mackay, 2009: 272; Waylen, 2011: 152). As Chappell (2006: 223) asserts, the gendering of institutional norms is not considered within mainstream neo-institutionalist literature, despite its 'normative turn', and "a more nuanced understanding of the 'logic of appropriateness' underpinning political institutions … will contribute not only to knowledge about the internal operation and effect of institutions, but also about how institutional gender patterns shape external social relations".

The inherently patriarchal nature of institutions as being representative of the norms and values prevalent within a society, and the manner in which these beliefs are manifested in the structures and relationships which define that society, are discussed by many feminist scholars including White (1994: 517), Cranny-Francis *et al* (2003: 13), Hawkesworth (2003, 2005), Kabeer (2003) and Daly (2005: 447). The consensus is that political equality cannot be attained "without changing the existing institutional framework and the political culture dominated and defined by men" (Marques-Pereira & Siim, 2002: 177; Peterson, 1992: 1; Goetz, 1997; Hawkesworth, 2003; Chappell, 2006: 224; Kenny, 2007). Thus, explaining the processes through which institutions are gendered requires uncovering the "submerged values" of institutions, and acknowledging the intertwining of the political and social contexts which create and uphold unequal gender relations (Mackay and Meier, 2003: 9), reflecting a focus shared by FI and NI strands such as Historical Institutionalism (HI) and Discursive Institutionalism (DI).

The focus on normative concepts allows for the scrutiny of the relationship between structure and agency, and how this impacts on the manner in which institutions are gendered (Waylen, 2011, 149). The institutional 'turn' in feminist research therefore begins addressing the gendered dimension of the interaction between society and the

State (Kenney, 1996; Goetz, 1997; Mackay & Meier, 2003; Hawkesworth, 2003; Chappell, 2006; Kenny, 2007; Krook & Mackay, 2011, amongst others).

This work builds on the social constructivist assertions put forward by Berger and Luckmann (1966) that knowledge is dynamically created through the social experiences and interactions of groups and individuals. The norms and values of society thus generate the norms and value of institutions (and vice versa). Extending this philosophy towards the gendering of institutions, the manner in which contextual variables impact on the gender relations within institutions starts becoming apparent. Understanding these institutional gendering processes is, according to Mackay and Meier (2003: 2), "central to understanding the practices, ideas, goals and outcomes of politics; the dynamics of change (and continuity); and ... the ways in which institutions reflect, reinforce and structure unequal gendered power relations".

The normative slant of the wider FI definition of institutions permits the emphasis on ideas in the toolkit of variables explaining change. Discursive institutionalists argue that institutions are predicated on ideational influences, and that these determine the shape, design, and development of institutions (Schmidt, 2008; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 15; Hall & Taylor, 1996: 936; Chappell, 2006: 226; Leach & Lowndes, 2007: 185; Krook & Mackay, 2011: 10;). Institutional norms and values are reflections of these "ideational influences", and are sustained through the inherently hierarchical and asymmetrical power relations between actors within institutions (Kabeer, 2003: 47-49; White, 1994: 517). Changing the status quo is therefore reliant on altering the power dynamics within the institution by infusing prevailing norms with new ideas. Competing and complementary notions of power within the gendered institutional context are discussed at greater length later in this chapter.

While NI contends that institutions provide the structures or "arenas" in which political events occur, institutions are "never the sole 'cause' of outcomes" (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 3; Hall & Taylor, 1996: 942). There is a reciprocal relationship of influence between actors and institutions, actors and society, and institutions and society. Further, the State is not a "neutral broker among competing interests but [a] complex of institutions capable of structuring the character and outcomes of group conflict" (Hall

& Taylor, 1996: 938). Thus, institutional change has an impact not only on the institutional context and its formal rules, but also on the actors within them and the society within which it operates. This correlates with Waylen's (2009: 247) assertion that "institutions operate not just as constraints but also as strategic resources for actors" – institutions operating as both dependent and independent variables in explaining change.

### 2.2.2 Institutional Layering

The complementary relationship between NI and feminist research is apparent in the multiple nodes of commonality described above, and in the myriad of ways in which the two approaches bring valuable insights to the consideration of institutional change. This section considers the addition of another set of variables that allows for the specific analysis of institutional change in transitions. In particular, the HI concept of "layering" adopted by FI, in which institutions are not wholly replaced or displaced but rather added to and modified (Mackay & Meier, 2003; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Waylen, 2009; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 16; Schmidt, 2010). This draws heavily on the disaggregated institutional definition, put forward above, which gives equal prominence to formal and informal structures.

The addition of new rules and norms to existing institutions alters the opportunities and constraints offered by the particular institution. Incremental changes can result in significant adjustments to the status quo, and, in certain cases, lead to the transformation of the institution over time (Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Schmidt, 2008: 317; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 17). The motivations behind institutional layering vary between contexts, and can result from one set of actors striving to maintain the status quo, new actors attempting to displace entrenched norms or values, or as a complementary system of filling gaps in the institutional structure. This is an especially useful concept within the context of transitional states. In states like South Africa, the new regime does not start with a 'blank slate'. Instead, some institutions (and the norms and values they embody) will remain largely unchanged, while some wholly new structures are added. Both the 'old' and 'new' institutions will be operated by a combination of 'old guard' and incoming actors, bringing discordant ideas and values

into conflict which must compete for prominence. The intersecting spheres of influence between these 'old' and 'new' institutions will also create openings, contested spaces wherein new norms can be entrenched. The idea of institutional "conversion" is also of importance here, as it is characterised by the "redeployment of old institutions to new purposes" (Streeck & Thelen, 2005: 31). The possibilities for institutional change presented within such "layered" and "converted" structures are further widened when taking into consideration the informal structures which accompany the range of 'old' and 'new' structures.

Three concepts are carried through from the above definition of institutions that permeate the new model explaining gendered institutional change. Firstly, the normative focus that encompasses the explicit and implicit norms of institutions. This acknowledges the socially constructed nature of the values and ideas that mediate the relationships within the institution, and thus impacts upon the gendered nature of institutions. Secondly, a contextual focus that takes formal and informal structures into consideration, and which has a bearing on explanations of power distribution and the susceptibility of institutions to change. Lastly, the notion of institutions as presenting both opportunities and constraints for actors seeking change, whether of a gendered or any other nature. Institutions are thus arenas for continuously contested change. The next section outlines the causes of institutional change: the events that interact with institutional norms and values and thereby affect the gendered power relations that uphold the status quo.

## 2.3 Explaining Institutional Change

Understanding the causes of institutional change is central to answering the research question at the heart of this thesis: *how* did gendered institutional change occur in South African security structures? In addition, unravelling the contributing factors to these causes of change aids the identification of opportunities for gendered transformation, particularly in transitional contexts where widespread institutional restructuring takes place, such as in the post-conflict South African security structures. Building on the definition of institutions as a normatively bound web of formal and informal structures that provide both opportunities and constraints for the actors operating within their

spheres of influence, the next layer of analysis considers various explanations for the *sources* of institutional change. Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 16-17) identify four "empirically intertwined" yet distinct causes of change: the introduction of new actors who have attained power into existing institutions; changes to existing institutions without necessarily introducing new actors; 'old' actors in 'new' institutions; and changes causing dormant institutions to gain prominence and thereby alter the political environment.

Thelen's model of "dynamic constraints" asserts that "strategic manoeuvring by political actors ... *within* the institutions in response to these external events [demonstrates that] actors [are] capable of acting on 'openings' provided by such shifting contextual conditions in order to defend or enhance their own positions" (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 17). This demonstrates that institutional change occurs both from outside (exogenous influences, key moments) as well as from within (actors, historical and political legacies), and that actors utilise their power and influence to capitalise on these changes by using the "shifting contextual conditions" to push their ideas onto the agenda and thereby alter institutional processes. This will be shown to be particularly relevant to the Security Sector Reform processes in post-conflict South Africa.

Chappell (2006: 231) cautions that permanent change is rare, and that "positive advances can only come about at those times when there is an alignment of political opportunities – for instance, a responsive government". In addition, while drastic changes to the system such as "crises or shocks ... can induce an acceptance of different or new norms", the process of change is "often driven by 'policy entrepreneurs' or innovators working from within or outside institutions to change the rules" (Chappell, 2006: 230).

This alludes to the complicated and sometimes ambiguous sources of institutional change, which can rarely be attributed to a single factor. Instead, a confluence of events can be accountable for the change, sometimes internally and externally generated, occurring over a long period of time or as a relatively sudden event, all of which collude to produce an alteration in the system, sometimes with unexpected results (Pierson, 2000b). The role of actors in affecting change or maintaining continuity is discussed in a

later section, and forms another key variable that interacts with the categories of change described here, as it speaks to the need for actors to construct alliances in order to initiate certain events. This will be shown to have been the case in South Africa's Security Sector Reform process.

The causal events that can result in institutional change are categorised into three groups, which, while drawing from NI concepts (particularly HI and DI) and considering the FI view, are somewhat more broadly defined and depart in some respects from the traditional definitions. The manner in which the three groupings of historical legacies/path dependency, key moments, and exogenous influences were defined (as will be described below) was necessitated by the atypical nature of the South African case, and the desire to incorporate a range of events in a systematic and categorical manner.

### 2.3.1 Historical Legacies and Path Dependency

Political and historical legacies fundamentally shape notions of citizenship and identity in all arenas; private, political, institutional and societal. Their influence cannot be disregarded when attempting to comprehend how current institutional formations came into being, nor can their impact on shaping the behaviour of actors within those institutions be ignored. During the 1980s and 1990s, feminists looked closely at concepts of identity and difference (Haslanger & Tuana, 2004). The underlying logic was the perceived tension between attaining equal treatment while still recognising the differences between the sexes, which Squires (2007: 9) describes as "oscillating between demands for inclusion into existing institutions according to existing norms, and an assertion of the limitation of these institutions and norms, which have frequently been formulated such that they structurally disadvantage women". The fear of assimilation was at the centre of this wavering focus – that by absorbing women into a fundamentally unchanged patriarchal structure would not result in change at all.

The political legacies of institutions entrenched binary views of differences between the sexes (Cranny-Francis *et al*, 2003: 2), and these views were reinforced as continuity within institutional norms was maintained by those actors holding the power. This

power was wielded through the policy outcomes produced by the decision-makers, feeding into societal values and further entrenching the status quo.

Considering institutions as the "political legacies of concrete historical struggles" (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 7), new institutionalism provides the means for a contextualised gender analysis which considers the events that shaped institutional norms and values, and enabled the continuity of the status quo. Understanding the manner in which these norms and values are maintained enables the formulation of a strategy for recasting the way in which masculinity and femininity are viewed, particularly within the security arena.

Historical legacies are based on the notion that "past events influence future events" (Mahoney, 2000a: 510). A similar view is taken by other historical institutionalists that the "contextual features of a given situation [are] often inherited from the past ... Institutions are seen as relatively persistent features of the historical landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development along a set of 'paths'" (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 941). This does not imply that path dependencies result in pre-determined outcomes, but rather that within the evolution of institutions "unintended consequences ... result from such historical development" (Schmidt, 2010: 10). To some extent, the paths created are one of the factors structuring "a nation's response to new challenges [due to] ... the impact of existing 'state capacities' and 'policy legacies' on subsequent policy choices" (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 941).

It is especially important to pay attention to historical and political legacies when considering "layered institutions", described by Waylen (2009: 247) as "new institutions added on to existing ones". In other words, wholly new structures are not created; current institutions evolve and are added to over time. This will be clearly shown to be the case in South Africa – inherited institutions transformed through both path dependency (incremental change over time) and the critical moment of democratic transition, with some structures being amended rather than replaced (Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Waylen, 2009). The layering of institutions also raises issues about the schism between intention and outcomes, as discussed by Chappell (2011: 164), which arises due to the influence of past legacies on institutional design. In other words, not only does

the past matter in the evolution of institutions, it matters to the creation and functioning of new institutions as well – as is explored in practical terms in Chapter Eight.

Path dependency falls within this inclusive category of historical legacies, the "'"idea that choices made early in the life of an institution, system or a policy (historical legacies) will routinely determine subsequent choices unless 'sufficiently strong political force' counteracts this" (Peters, 1999: 19)" (quoted by Mackay & Meier, 2003). This category thus focuses on endogenous institutional influences, from the historical legacies that gradually shape institutional norms to the day-to-day manoeuvrings of actors to either maintain or alter the paths that govern the institutional environment (Kenny, 2007; Schmidt, 2008; Krook & Mackay, 2011).

While the concept of path dependency is utilised within NI (particularly HI), the range of events that are considered "path dependent" vary widely. Pierson (2000a: 252) outlines the various conceptions of path dependence, from broad to narrow, including the deterministic notion of "increasing returns" whereby certain courses become self-reinforcing (Pierson, 2000a: 262; Mahoney, 2000a: 507-8), discussed later in this section.

While narrower definitions certainly have utility for various kinds of institutional research, this particular study benefits from a broader conceptualisation. As Pierson (2000a: 252) points out:

> "... we cannot understand the significance of a particular social variable without understanding "how it got there" - the path it took. Previous events in a sequence influence outcomes and trajectories but not necessarily by inducing further movement in the same direction. Indeed, the path may matter precisely because it tends to provoke a reaction in some other direction".

Given the multiple (and contested) definitions attached to the idea of path dependency (Pierson, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2004; Mahoney, 2000a; Waylen, 2009: 247, amongst others), the broader category of "historical legacies" is understood to incorporate all prior events that contributed to the institutional environment under investigation, while those which had a clearly discernable knock-on effect in steering institutional continuity or change are described as a "path". Thus, multiple events input into the system (historical legacies), some of which are "stickier" than others. These events, usually in

conjunction with a series of related events (path dependency), can explain a moment of change.

Consequently, this broader conceptualism conceives path dependency as the cumulative events that have produced certain values and norms within an institution. It is not seen as a deterministic trajectory immune to influence from either internal or external events, but as an explanatory series of occurrences. Multiple paths may be present within each formal and informal institution, presenting various opportunities and constraints for change where these two spheres overlap. This notion of "multiple paths" is explored by Lieberman (2002: 704), although the emphasis of his perspective is on the opportunities that arise as a result of the friction and uncertainty resulting when these paths are not concordant. This tracks with the view of institutions as "historical creations of human agency whether intentional or unintentional", although it is also noted that "once created, institutions can be difficult to change and are an important structuring context within which political action occurs" (Mackay & Meier, 2003: 9). In other words, while the institutional procedures constrain behaviour and structure the interactions of actors within the institution, they remain dynamic in evolving to reflect the context (and society) in which they operate.

The possibility of unintended consequences is a critical consideration (Pierson, 2000b, 2004; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Waylen, 2009; Krook & Mackay, 2011) as it could conceivably be a factor within any of the three categories of change. For example, Pierson (2004: 10) observes that relatively minor interventions can have a wider impact than anticipated at a later stage in the "path". This is partly due to self-reinforcing processes, referred to above, which he argues are also applicable to unequal power relations, where seemingly unimportant inequalities gradually become entrenched in institutional processes (Pierson, 2004: 11; Mahoney, 2000a: 509).

These unintended consequences could be due to the unexpected ways in which actors react to events, or due to the timing of events, constituting a critical consideration according to Pierson (2000c; 2004), Mahoney (2000a) and Waylen (2009). Two of the four features of self-reinforcing processes described by Pierson relate to this: *contingency*, where "relatively small events, if occurring at the right moment, can have large and

enduring consequences", and *timing*, which argues that "*when* an event occurs may be crucial. Because early parts of a sequence matter much more than later parts, an event that happens 'too late' may have no effect, although it might have been of great consequence if the timing had been different"(Pierson, 2004: 44).[10] This view is shared by North (1999: 316) in his statement that "without a deep understanding of time, you will be lousy political scientists, because time is the dimension in which ideas and institutions and beliefs evolve" (quoted by Pierson, 2004: 1). The *sequencing* of events is also emphasised (Pierson, 2000b, 2000c) because the order in which events occur impacts on the self-reinforcement of the path.

A potentially useful distinction between event sequences and chains is drawn by Pierson (2004: 68). Chains are described as "tightly linked causal connections unfolding over time" and are not contingent on sequential order to reach a particular outcome. Sequences, however, are "cases where different temporal orderings of the same events or processes will produce different outcomes" (Pierson, 2004: 68), reiterating that *when* matters as much as *what*. Therefore, these *chains* and *sequences* represent two examples of paths that may be present concurrently within institutions, some with overlapping events. Whether these individual events form part of a sequence is determined by when they occur in relation to other events. *Causal chains* are equally important as they are useful in "contexts where political actions have *multiple* consequences, and major long-term outcomes are by-products rather than the principal focus of intended actions" (Pierson, 2004: 88). This will be shown to be particularly relevant for the gendering of security structures within post-conflict South Africa.

Historical legacies are especially important when considering gendered institutional change, as inherited patriarchal structures with entrenched norms and values that privilege the masculine undoubtedly impact upon relations between women and men in institutions, as has been discussed. When analysing security structures, the deeply ingrained masculine norms governing institutional interactions are particularly relevant in explaining gendered institutional change. The range of events that influence this type

[10] The remaining two features are *multiple equilibria:* "under a set of initial conditions conducive to positive feedback, a range of outcomes is generally possible"; and *inertia*: "once such a process has been established, positive feedback will generally lead to a single equilibrium. This equilibrium will in turn be resistant to change" (Pierson, 2004: 44).

of case study thus necessitates a broad definition of historical legacies and, within that, path dependency. Acknowledging the agency of actors within institutions also calls for a less deterministic view of these concepts. As Streeck and Thelen (2005: 18) point out

> "... enterprising actors often have enough 'play' to test new behaviours inside old institutions, perhaps in response to new and as yet incompletely understood external conditions, and encourage other actors to behave correspondingly".

Thus, historical legacies as a category considers prior events in the institutional and societal history that have impacted upon the norms and values governing institutional behaviour, and created opportunities and constraints for the exercising of power. Within this broader category, path dependency is then understood to be a series of causally-related events happening within a specific space and time, and which can be shown to be the most likely factors bringing about a specific change, based on a subjective interpretation of the outcomes. Consequently, even seemingly insignificant events, when considered together with more far-reaching events, can provide the confluence of factors that assist in transforming an institutional norm, or even a set of institutions.

### 2.3.2 Key Moments

Within the model, key moments are conceptualised as the junctures at which institutional operations are fundamentally altered, transforming the norms and values governing actors' behaviour (Thelen 1999; Grace: 2011: 97). Such moments can be initiated externally or internally to the institution, reflecting broader societal upheavals (such as the transition to democracy) or representing the cumulative effects of an internal (path dependent) series of events which result in a major reconstruction of institutional norms.

The significance of context within FI allows for the consideration of more than local factors: international influences are afforded a space within institutional analysis as well. Waylen (2009: 248; 2011, 152) argues that HI in particular is "already in a good position to understand and demonstrate that, because in national contexts distinct mechanisms of reproduction sustain different institutions, common international trends can have divergent domestic consequences. Additionally, sequencing and timing can play a central role in ensuring that factors play out differently across distinct contexts". Similarly, the

actions of critical actors must also be considered within context as "this both enables and constrains their ability to make substantive policy changes" (Annesley & Gains, 2010: 5), particularly when investigating how institutions are gendered. Sources of change must therefore be contextualised in order for meaningful conclusions to be drawn.

Although some actors may persist in attempting to preserve the institutional status quo, these key moments require some sort of transformation to be effected in order to restore balance to the system. In other words, key moments can interrupt or redirect path dependencies within institutions "because institutions continue to 'evolve in response to changing environmental conditions' (Thelen 1999: 387)" (quoted by Grace: 2011: 97).

Within the broader canon of FI literature, the concept of key junctures that signal a critical shift in norms and rules is most often characterised as a "critical juncture", as described by Mahoney (2000a), Thelen (2000), and Pierson (2000c), amongst many others. These seismic shifts in the institutional environment indicate a decisive change, usually with wide-ranging consequences – moments of no return. For example, in the South African case, the transition to democracy would constitute a "critical juncture" as it represented a fundamental transformation of the State and society.

However, this conceptualisation does not accommodate the inclusion of significant events which altered the trajectory and development of the historical legacies and path dependencies outlined earlier in this chapter. Some occurrences had a considerable impact on the narrative of both the liberation struggle and the women's movement, but are too "small" to fit into the conceptualisation of "critical junctures" as put forward by FI. Thus, this study has adopted a somewhat wider definition, akin to that put forward by Haydu (1998) and Haskova and Saxonberg (2011), which considers such events as part of a series of moments that contribute to the development of a broader legacy or legacies. In other words, these "key moments" signal events of significance that punctuate broader historical legacies, indicating important shifts in formal or informal rules and norms. By using "key moments" as opposed to "critical junctures", seminal

moments that shaped the rise of women's autonomy and equality are captured within the analytical model as explanatory factors for gendered institutional change.

### 2.3.3 Exogenous Influences

The understanding of "exogenous influences" [11] utilised by the study refers to external influences not originating from the local environment or society, not instigated by actors within institutions, and to events not occurring due to the legacies or natural evolution of the institution. These events have the potential to profoundly affect institutional structures by altering the paths within them, prompting new paths, or by contributing to key moments. In other words, exogenous influences serve as generators of new ideas, which, if introduced into the institutional process by actors with power, can contribute to institutional change. For example, exogenous influences would include changes made to institutions as a result of compliance with regional and international treaties and protocols to which the state is party, obligations and opportunities that arise as a result of regional memberships and aspirations, and the influence of other states and organisations.

A specific example from the South African case study (which will be extensively elaborated upon in Chapters Six and Eight) refers to the fluctuations of power within State structures dealing with security as a result of the Executive's campaign to reposition South Africa within the region. The internal shift to democracy (which had repercussions on the values pursued by the State), coupled with commitments as a result of African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC) membership (exogenous influences), could be viewed as a critical juncture in the State's defence policy, marking a definitive shift in the positioning of the role of the military within the State and the region. The new focus on peacekeeping enabled the maintenance of a somewhat altered version of the status quo in terms of military size and defence system acquisitions, where the requisite changes to conform to international and regional demands of the security system would not diminish the power and influence of institutional elites. From a theoretical perspective, this is explored by Thelen and

[11] Although some NI models privilege exogenous factors as explanatory of institutional change, Schmidt (2010: 5) argues that endogenous variables are present within all NI strands, whether it is the self-reinforcing processes of Rational Choice or the layering and conversion of HI.

Steinmo (1992: 21) who show "how institutional change results from deliberate political strategies to transform structural parameters in order to win long-term political advantage". This demonstrates how a combination of the categories of change, identified in the model, work in tandem to bring about institutional change, even if that "change" is oriented towards maintaining continuity.

Further, exogenous influences such as treaties and protocols are used as tools for actors to instigate changes. For example, the agreements emerging out of the various UN World Conferences on Women (especially the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action), from other multilateral bodies such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), or regional proclamations such as the AU's Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD), all enabled women to call on the State to fulfil their obligations to gender equality. They served as an opening for access into discussions, a means to get onto the agenda.

Each of the categories of change described above relies on some measure of gendered power to be sustained, and eventually entrenched, within the institution. While institutions are not static, the evolutionary process in path dependence is slow, and even the more sudden changes wrought by key moments require adroit manoeuvring by actors to influence the agenda with their ideas and interests. Key moments could be viewed as the dramatic culmination of various historical legacies and path dependencies within institutions and/or society, as will be shown to be the case in the South African example, with exogenous influences also contributing to the trajectory of path dependencies. Historical legacies (and, within that, path dependency) are thus utilised most heavily within the model as an explanatory factor in understanding gendered institutional change.

The next section considers the relationship between institutions, ideas and power. In particular, how institutions shape the objectives of actors and their power to achieve them (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 6) as well as prescribing the resources (human and otherwise) available for their attainment. The redistribution of power that occurs through this process has a direct bearing on how the ideas of actors can shape institutions. Indeed, Waylen (2009: 248) argues that institutions "reflect, reproduce and

magnify particular patterns of power". A deeper understanding of how institutional change is affected within the State security structures in South Africa can be attained by clarifying how power and ideas are conceived.

## 2.4 Institutional Transformation: Power in Action

> "So when does an idea's time come? The answer lies in the match between idea and moment. An idea's time arrives not simply because the idea is compelling on its own terms, but because opportune political circumstances favour it. At those moments when a political idea finds persuasive expression among actors whose institutional position gives them both the motive and the opportunity to translate it into policy - then, and only then, can we say that an idea has found a time" (Lieberman 2002: 709).

The model for analysis revolves around the following key factors: the centrality of power, and its relation to ideas within the institutional decision-making process. The possession of power, relative to other actors or groups of actors within institutions, determines the range of change possible, as well as whether the status quo can be maintained. Continuity and change are dependent on who has the power and how they choose to wield it.

Despite criticisms of NI regarding the poor prominence of power, particularly in terms of race and gender (see Hawkesworth, 2003; Kenny & Mackay, 2009: 275), the approach has been recognised as having immense potential for feminist analysis. As Kenny (2007: 96) points out, the 'tools' offered by the approach provide "important insights into how gender norms operate within institutions, and, therefore, offers a greater understanding of the interaction between institutions and institutional actors". This is achieved by finding likely sources of institutional change, sources which go beyond "exogenous shocks or environmental shifts" (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 3), and consider subtle internal changes and the manoeuvrings of actors within institutions. While the categorisation of sources of change utilised in the study (historical legacies, key moments and exogenous shocks) constitute events that impact upon institutions, thereby bringing about change, it is in essence the shift in power amongst actors that produces change. In other words, the opportunities that arise as a result of institutional events, whether externally or internally generated, need to be seized by actors in order to result in change. Actors utilise their power to bring about institutional change, or to

maintain the status quo: the existence of the opportunities arising from these events is not necessarily enough to bring about change.

Elements of power are discussed to some extent within traditional NI theory, particularly HI, which cites the relational power between actors, and between actors and institutions, as an explanatory factor when describing the manner in which actors establish and describe their goals, including party system structures and the relationships between government structures (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 2; Pierson, 2004: 36-37; Franceschet, 2011: 65). For example, the use of the proportional representation system based on party lists (together with the use of gender quotas) is of significant import to the South African case study, as the power of the party over representatives both increases and decreases their individual agency to bring about change, particularly in the case of women. This manner of selecting representatives influences the stated goals of party members in order to advance up the list, and further ensures that deviance from the party line is minimised in order to retain position, power and privileges. An overt "feminist" agenda would decrease their power within the party if it is deemed to be in conflict with the interests of party elites, making their reappointment (and the retention of their power to affect change) unlikely. These issues became apparent in South Africa, particularly in the post-conflict security structures, and will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

This emphasis on differing and conflicting interests in political organisations is discussed by Lukes (2005: 20) and Franceschet (2011: 65) as indicative of the "mobilisation of bias"[12] within the system, which is maintained through the "socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups and practices of institutions" (Lukes, 2005: 26). The norms, values and interest of elites are maintained to the detriment of lower-ranking groups with less relational power (Mahoney, 2000a: 521; Lukes, 2005: 21; Franceschet, 2011: 65). The norms and values of institutions also impact upon the *type* of power that certain groups can exercise. Annesley and Gains (2010: 5) argue that prevailing cultural expectations of women "impact on their capacity

[12] The concept of "mobilisation of bias" is based on the work of Schattschneider (1975), who asserted that "organisation is itself a mobilisation of bias" as it serves as a forum through which political action is mediated (Schattschneider, 1975: 30). In other words, institutions influence the manner in which participants interact due to its inherently value-laden nature.

to operate at this level [the core executive]. The gendered disposition of these institutions acts as a constraint to feminist actors seeking policy change".

The HI view of relational power, or "asymmetrical relations of power", is that power is assigned unevenly to actors within institutions, whether this is manifested in terms of access, decision-making privileges, or voice, and that this relational power is cast as a win-lose scenario (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 940-1). This relates to the discussion on substantive versus descriptive representation: if women are not able to exercise agency, the use of quotas would be reduced to "window dressing" appointments aimed at upholding the status quo. However, men are also expected to toe the party line: the difficulty comes in differentiating between demands that are aimed at creating a more equitable society, and those that reflect a difference of opinion. Lukes (2005: 12) addresses this with the statement that:

> "Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never need to be, exercised); and you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others' interests ... power as domination is only one species of power".

This suggests a number of scenarios. Firstly, that by choosing *not* to exercise its power in maintaining the status quo, the institutional/party elite *allow* women to lobby for change, a view which alludes to indulgent condescension. The change is thus not as a result of women's power, but the lack of opposition from the elite. Secondly, changing the status quo occurs in those areas where it is in the elites' interests to do so: the advancement of women's goals in the process is a peripheral concern. This is especially prevalent within the security arena, where women's interests (and their relative power) have been historically marginal, as will be discussed in the analysis of the South African case study.

It also raises the issue of whether the *manner* in which women acquire their power, and the way in which they gain access to an institutional decision-making space, affects their ability to wield power and affect change. Using the South African case, do former MK commandos have more legitimacy in the view of the institutional security elites, and does this endow them with greater agency? If institutional norms are not sufficiently transformed through this process, it would imply that each subsequent generation of women would face the same "legitimacy" test, with the result that women's power in the security arena would be steadily eroded as frontline positions remain the domain of men

in the new dispensation. This underlines the importance of a genuine transformation of institutional norms in order to entrench structural change. This aspect is explored within subsequent chapters.

Wider institutional and social arrangements cannot be disregarded when considering power, particularly in terms of dominating the agenda, although ascertaining causation between structural procedures and the "exercise of power" can be problematic. This difficulty is partly due to the assertion by Lukes (2005: 26, 30, 54) that power is value-dependent in that any definition attached to it is "inextricably tied to a given set of (probably unacknowledged) value-assumptions which predetermine the range of its empirical application". Given that institutions are value-laden, and that the actors wielding the power subscribe to various values as well, it can be surmised that power itself is not a neutral concept, and neither is the wielding of it.

Steans (1998) offers an analysis of Michel Foucault's theory of power in connection to gender inequality, which speaks to the significance of institutional values to power relations, stating that:

> "Foucault's work on discourse suggested that the production of knowledge was bound up historically with specific regimes of power ... every society produced its own 'truths' which had normalising and regulatory functions" (Steans, 1998: 13-14).

The manner in which power is wielded is also largely contingent on the ranking of actors. The two-dimensional view of power typology incorporates coercion (where compliance is secured through the "threat of deprivation"), influence (where the behaviour of one actor is changed without threats, implicit or explicit), authority (compliance due to a recognition of "legitimate" and "reasonable" claims), force (removing alternatives) and manipulation (as a "sub-concept of force" where compliance occurs without full knowledge of the compromise being made) (Lukes, 2005: 21-22; Pierson, 2000a: 259). Each of these requires different "types" of power by the actor or group of actors employing it. In most scenarios, influence, authority and manipulation are the primary options for women, as few women have advanced sufficiently up the ranks to amass the requisite political capital that would allow deprivation of a resource (coercion) or force (removal of alternatives). Indeed, it could be argued that the inclusion of *more* alternatives is the purpose of the gendering process.

Further, it brings in the dichotomy of "power to" versus "power over". Steans (1998: 170-171) suggests that this is due to the "different life experiences of men and women [which] give rise to different conceptions of power", explaining that "women are positioned in particular kinds of power relationships, but nevertheless have a different understanding of power".

One conceptualisation of this is put forward by Kabeer (1999: 437), who posits power as being contingent on resources (pre-conditions), agency (process), and achievements (outcomes), where the power to *choose* "refers to the expansion in people's ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied them" (Kabeer, 1999: 437). Further, the focus is on "possible *inequalities* in people's capacity to make choices, rather than in *differences* in the choices they make", which necessitates a distinction between preferences and a "denial of choice" (Kabeer, 1999: 439). Thus, concepts of empowerment require a nuanced understanding of local contexts, resulting in policies or approaches that "are sensitive to the domain of possibilities in which women are located" (Kabeer, 1999: 462).

Kabeer's conceptualisation of resources ties in with Luke's typology of influence in relation to power, arguing that resources "are acquired through a multiplicity of social relationships conducted in the various institutional domains which make up a society" (Kabeer, 1999: 437). Thus, the networks and relationships within the institution are the means through which influence is exerted in order to bring about change – the exercising of power through the introduction of new ideas. Krook and Mackay (2011: 10) recount the work of Freidenvall (2009) which surpasses notions of power-distributional models by suggesting that "discourse itself is a medium of power ... In this view, power is not simply defined in terms of positional power within a particular institutional context: rather, ideas and discourses construct and shape the very 'exercise of power'". Franceschet (2011: 66-67) has a similar view, noting that FI "takes this insight even further, showing how ideas and norms about gender are reflected in myriad ways in institutions", and "can also serve as powerful mobilising forces".

The influence of informal institutions in relation to power is raised by authors such as Lukes (2005), Franceschet (2011) and Pierson (2000a: 259), who note that "power

asymmetries are often hidden from view; where power is most unequal, it often does not need to be employed openly". Pierson further argues that while power can be utilised to initiate institutional change, even "relatively small disparities in political resources among contending groups may widen dramatically over time as positive feedback sets in" (Pierson, 2000a: 259). Thus, relational power is a key consideration for any analysis focused on explaining gendered institutional change.

### 2.4.1 A Profile of Power

A multi-faceted definition is required in order to consider the various permutations of power that come into play during the examination of gendered political change, particularly in post-conflict transitional states. This is drawn from the many viewpoints expressed above, bearing in mind the distinct demands of the case study.

Above all, power is considered in terms of *capacity* (Kabeer, 1999; Allen, 2005; Lukes, 2005; Annesley & Gains, 2010): capacity to act upon opportunities that arise within institutions or the wider societal context, capacity to influence the norms and values of institutions, and capacity to bring about change. Power is *relational* in multiple senses: in terms of asymmetrical power relations, as well as relational to the context in which it operates. In other words, power is *value dependent (*Lukes, 2005: 26, 30, 54; Kabeer, 1999; Annesley & Gains, 2010; Schmidt, 2010). Power is central to the model because the opportunities that arise within institutions, whether internally or externally generated, require actors to exercise their relative power in order to initiate, sustain or avoid institutional change. This power is utilised to generate new ideas, and to entrench these ideas within the institutional norms and values.

### 2.4.2 The Power of Ideas

The relationship between diverse interests, knowledge creation and power has been discussed within feminist critical theory (Lovenduski, 1998, 2005; Cornwall, 2003; Puwar, 2004; Daly, 2005; Chappell, 2006, amongst others), particularly in terms of unravelling how the "construction of gender has served to legitimise the subordination of women and of how hegemonic structures are imbued with patriarchal ideology ...

[highlighting] the ways in which ideologies of gender play a role in producing and reproducing power relations and how these relations are structured and transformed" (Steans, 1998: 173-4). FI researchers such as Kenney (1996), Inhetveen (1999), Pierson (2004: 36-37), Connell (2006), Driscoll and Krook (2009), Waylen (2009), Annesley and Gains (2010), and Mackay and Meier (2003: 14) draw attention to "the way institutions shape, reflect and reinforce unequal power relations ... and on the way in which social and political institutions are themselves shaped by social divisions". Schmidt (2010: 1) discusses ideas within the institutional context as an explanatory factor for change, and in an earlier work notes that the "subordination of agency (action) to structure (rules) is the key problem for HI, SI, and RI, and it is why all manner of new institutionalists have turned to ideas and discourse in recent years"(Schmidt, 2008: 314).

Schmidt (2010: 1) approaches the concept of ideas from a discursive perspective, noting the "potential for providing insights into the dynamics of institutional change by explaining the actual preferences, strategies, and normative orientations of actors". This stems from the assertion that the three strands of new institutionalism (Rational Choice, Historical and Sociological) are "better at explaining continuity than change" (Schmidt, 2010: 1-2; Lieberman, 2002; Mackay & Meier, 2003; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Kenny, 2007, amongst others). Exogenous shocks are viewed as the primary cause of change, with endogenous sources of change, such as historical legacies and cultural considerations, only entering the framework recently (Schmidt, 2010: 1-2). This view is not shared by Hall and Taylor (1996: 942) who point out that historical institutionalists "have been especially attentive to the relationship between institutions and ideas or beliefs", although there is agreement that the rational choice school tends to oversimplify the complex web of values and ideas that constitute institutions.

The conceptualisation of ideas within discursive institutionalism is broad, incorporating "interest-based logics" (which corresponds with the Rational Choice view), as well as normative concepts such as values and appropriateness (Schmidt, 2010: 3). The explanations offered about the placement of ideas within institutions draw in many elements of the preceding discussion on power: balancing "appropriateness" based on differing value systems, and managing the diversity of actors engaged in the "construction of policy ideas ... who bring the ideas developed in the context of the

coordinative discourse to the public for deliberation and legitimation" (Schmidt, 2010: 3). Women's agency, in terms of "strategic, creative and intuitive action as well as calculating self-interest" (Mackay & Meier, 2003: 14), operates within the constraints of the institutional context "in which and through which ideas are communicated" (Schmidt, 2010: 4). Thus, ideas are conceptualised as purposive strategic agency, albeit with unintended consequences at times. The norms and values which ideas can shape (given power, context and opportunity) arise as a result of contextual evolution, created due to historical legacies and societal influences.

Thus, ideas reflect the preferences, strategies, and normative orientations of actors, which can in turn instigate institutional change by influencing the norms and values of the formal and informal structures of the State. An understanding of the relationship between actors and institutions therefore constitutes the next layer in the model for explaining institutional change (and continuity) within the post-conflict South African state.

### 2.4.3 Actors and Institutions

The importance of actors is considered within the contextual constraints and opportunities of the institutions in which they operate, the manner in which these institutions affect political outcomes and processes, and the behaviour of the role players (Mackay & Meier, 2003: 8-9; Waylen, 2009: 247; Annesley & Gains, 2010: 4). As Hall and Taylor (1996: 939) argue, "it is through the actions of individuals that institutions have an effect on political outcomes", while Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 10) proclaim that "institutional analysis ... allows us to examine the relationship between political actors as objects and as agents of history" (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 10). Further, the importance of the institutional context is paramount to such investigations as the "opportunities for and constraints on women's descriptive and substantive representation relate strongly to the configuration of political institutions ... it is important to be clear about where the power lies in any institutional context (Chappell, 2004) as well as processes of policy change" (Annesley & Gains, 2010: 4). Thus, examining the way in which institutions, actors and the environment interact is one of the variables explaining institutional change.

Incorporating female actors into institutions that were historically steeped in masculine traditions necessarily draws attention to the newcomers, and the manner in which their presence (and their goals, norms and values) alters – or fails to alter – the institutional status quo. Waylen (2009: 247) asserts that actors "are strategic, seeking to realise certain complex, contingent, and constantly changing goals". However, the gendering of institutions constrains female actors through the accepted rules and norms of what constitutes the "ideal" institutional player. For example, Chappell (2006: 227) recounts the work of Stivers (1993) who spoke of the value attached to "masculine traits", such as objectivity and dispassion, while "emotional" values ascribed as "feminine traits" were viewed as "excessive and laden with bias".

This is one example of the gendering of institutional norms, which permeate the decision-making process and serve to perpetuate the unequal power relations between male and female actors, as described by Chappell (2006: 228):

> "The assumptions underpinning both concepts are highly gendered. While women are considered less deserving of promotion because of their purported irrational nature, their historic absence at senior levels of the bureaucracy has had a further gendering effect: Without women's input, policy decisions that are made at the highest level have tended to disregard (and thereby reinforce) the unequal political, economic, and social position of the two sexes, as well as make stereotypical assumptions about male and female behaviour".

The strategies promoted by gender mainstreaming represent a combination of preceding feminist approaches aimed at altering the institutional status quo, with one dimension being the critical mass arguments. This proposes that women would alter "the very *nature of power* and the *practice of politics* through values of cooperation and collaboration, holding power in trusteeship (power on behalf of, not over) and acting with greater transparency, honesty and public accountability; in other words, there was a belief that women would *play politics* differently and *exercise power* accountably … once women had access to political power, they would act for gender justice and equity" (Batliwala & Dhanraj, 2007: 27-28; Chappell, 2002; Beckwith, 2007; Annesley & Gains, 2010, amongst many others).

Setting aside the controversial assumptions about women's inherent values and nature (Annesley & Gains, 2010: 3), this statement alludes to the transformational power of parity, particularly in relation to structural processes, although it disregards the influence

of the entrenched system which may still be promoted by male members who view the situation as a 'zero sum game'. This view is expanded upon by Cornwall (2003: 1330) who cautions against the reflexive assumption that women will engage as "women" (in the sense of placing their gender identity at the forefront), particularly as cultural norms may result in woman submitting to the views of male members, regardless of parity, thereby serving as little more than legitimating 'rubber stamps'. Thus, the continuing institutional constraints must be factored in any gendered analysis as it impacts upon the agency of women, particularly in understanding how actors acquire and wield power.

A central concern is that equal rights and opportunities do not necessarily imply equal outcomes and benefits, particularly as prevailing structural dynamics may interfere. The Commonwealth Secretariat suggests that one strategy for addressing this concern is the undertaking of positive or affirmative action measures, as the achievement of equality represents a "fundamental component in the democracy-building process" (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005: 9). This concern is echoed by Kabeer (2003: 3) who suggests that, in order to overcome structural inequality, substantive equality and equality of agency must be considered. The former refers to the diverse qualities and contexts of men and women that need to be balanced in the formulation of policy to avoid the perpetuation of imbalanced outcomes. The latter requires access to the structures that will enable women to "make strategic life choices for themselves (and help determine the conditions under which these choices are made)" (Kabeer, 2003: 2). Vincent (2001) suggests that the inclusion of women in decision-making forums (particularly post-war reconstruction debates) does necessarily go beyond concepts of fairness, in that "women have a set of interests different to those of men which can only be defended by other women". While this raises concerns about homogenising women as a single entity with undifferentiated needs, it also points to the idea that women have an alternative perspective to offer, based on their position and roles within society.

However, Puwar (2004: 77) argues that the insertion of a previously marginalised group does not automatically rectify an inherently flawed institutional culture, noting that "the substantive contours of the hidden racially specific masculine norm underlying claims to neutrality and impartiality have to be made visible ... given that these groups occupy a tenuous position as 'space invaders' the expectation that their mere presence will be

enough to transform political styles is unrealistic ... the question for our times is how the 'other' can exist without making the 'other' the same". In addition, women are not generally assigned ministerial portfolios in areas which command high power or generous resources, leading Annesley and Gains (2010: 9) to argue that the "allocation of political and organisational resources in the core executive is gendered". Thus, actors, and their roles within institutions, are an important factor when considering how change is brought about. It will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters detailing the South African experiences that actor's roles, and the manner in which they are viewed by other actors (for example, as outsiders, "others", or as affirmative action appointees), impact upon their realm of influence and the power they have to effect change.

Actors are considered to be "deeply embedded in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation ... not only do institutions provide strategically useful information, they also affect the very identities, self-images and preferences of the actors" (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 939). Reiterating the reciprocal relationship between actors and institutions, Thelen and Steinmo (1992, 16-17) discuss a few of the many ways in which actors impact upon institutions, including the initiation of new players, introducing 'old' actors into 'new' institutions, and amending existing institutions. The concept of "layering" discussed earlier can incorporate a permutation of these, with the possibilities for change varying depending on the context.

The stance of the analytical model is that change is brought about through actors utilising their power to capitalise on the openings created by fluctuating contextual circumstances, by altering the agenda and institutional processes and thereby affecting institutional change. The various concepts and forces discussed in the preceding sections are brought together below in the holistic analytical model, which clarifies how these variables interlink to form a toolkit for the systematic investigation of the opportunities for gendered change within the South African security sector.

## 2.5 Model for Gendered Analysis of Post-Conflict States

The model for analysis presented here represents a framework for the systematic exploration of opportunities for gender transformation in post-conflict South Africa, and how women capitalised on these openings to bring about gendered institutional change.

As has been established in this chapter, NI lends itself to the proposed methodological framework as "institutionalists have constructed important analytical bridges between State-centred and society-centred analyses by looking at the institutional arrangements that structure relations between the two" (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 10). The complementary and contradicting elements of the various strands of NI necessitated the eclectic approach to this model. As Hall and Taylor (1996: 936) have commented: "some of the ambiguities surrounding the new institutionalism can be dispelled if we recognise that it does not constitute a unified body of thought". Consequently, the model utilised in this study draws from the rational choice, historical, sociological and discursive traditions, as well as from FI, in an effort to account for the key influences that explain gendered institutional change within the South African security structures.

This model, diagrammatically represented in Figure 2.1, draws on the wider literature discussed in this chapter in compiling a theoretical framework for examining institutional change within South Africa. It systematically takes into consideration the various influences and factors which accounted for substantive change within the State (and the security structures specifically) by utilising the tools provided by the FI/NI view of continuity and change within institutions.

**Figure 2.1 Analytical Model for Gendered Institutional Change**




The various elements of FI, many of which have multi-directional impacts, are considered within three domains for the purposes of this study: actors, institutions, and the environment. The elements that prompt change, or into which causes of change can be classified, are considered within "key moments", "historical legacies" and "exogenous influences". Power is positioned as the central element, that is, as the key determinant in both affecting and sustaining change. Power is conceptualised in terms of ideas, the capacity to bring about change in the norms and values of institutions, actors and society, influencing the dominant ideology within institutions.

The HI frame of reference is the most utilised, primarily as a result of the emphasis on "asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions", the centrality of path dependence in explaining continuity and change, and the prominence of factors such as ideas in the institutional analysis (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938). In addition, credence is given to the notion that new norms (whether emanating from the local or international environment) can "challenge and replace existing ones within institutions" (Chappell, 2006: 232). Lastly, the ability of institutions "to privilege

some interests while demobilising others" (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 937) is crucial to understanding the gendering of institutions and of institutional change. This institutional focus is an acknowledgement of the

> "interdependence of individual and structural change in processes of empowerment. Structures shape individual resources, agency and achievements. They also define the parameters within which different categories of actors are able to pursue their interests, promoting the voice and agency of some and inhibiting that of others. And finally, they help to shape individual interests so that how people define their goals and what they value will reflect their social positioning as well as their individual histories" Kabeer (1999: 461).

A keen awareness of the manner in which structures and institutional cultures inhibit (or facilitate) change or growth is critical in transitional states, such as South Africa. As Waylen (2007a: 529) points out "... the new government would inherit a largely unchanged state structure that had been created to support and uphold Apartheid", a system that was aimed at entrenching White minority male rule. The transformation of the institution to conform to the ideals of the black majority presented the ideal opportunity to affect change within the realm of gender relations as well. However, given that patriarchal traditions run as deeply within the various South African cultures, this transformation is not automatic, as will be discussed in-depth in subsequent chapters. From a new institutionalist perspective, the transformation is slowed due to the "logic of appropriateness", which enables institutional players who hold power to perpetuate the status quo by referring to accepted institutional norms (Chappell, 2006: 225). By understanding the processes through which change is effected (or continuity is maintained), feminist actors can maximise opportunities for transformation (Chappell, 2006: 224).

It is therefore understandable that the redefinition and reconceptualisation of women's relationships to the State and their societies is a priority for women embroiled in nationalist movements (West, 1997: xiii; Vincent, 2001), as it will have a direct impact on their roles within the new dispensation. This reformulation is made possible because gender inequality is a societal construct that transcends formal laws, and is maintained through the interactions of individuals and structures within society (Kabeer, 2003: 2; Svensson, 2007: 13), as well as through the informal institutions discussed previously.

Within the model, institutions limit opportunities through structural norms developed over time, as well as through rules aimed at maintaining the status quo. However, change is possible, given the normative nature of institutions as reflections of the actors operating the system and the society in which the system operates. Opportunities are presented to create new norms and rules through external forces, through the actions of actors, and through the institution itself adapting to meet evolving demands. In the context of post-conflict states, such as South Africa, many of the previously accepted stereotypes and inequalities have been challenged or even completely obliterated by the roles assumed by women during times of conflict. Thus, the post-conflict period, which generally entails transforming institutions in line with the new dispensation's worldview, represents a unique opportunity to fundamentally overhaul the manner in which the State approaches gender relations. The deciding element is where the power lies at a given juncture; whether a specific group of actors holds sufficient sway to alter the rules, whether an entrenched set of actors has retained sufficient power to maintain the status quo, or whether external forces, such as broad societal transformations, wield enough power to force change.

The following chapters operationalise this framework with respect to the South African case study, and the manner in which the State security structures have been gendered, starting with the armed movement that brought about democratic change and the role women played within it. It illustrates the convergence of historical legacies, path dependent events, the sudden shocks of a series of key moments, and the impact of exogenous influences on women's relational power to the State and society, and also the manner in which this dramatically increased their relational power during the critical transition phase to democracy.

## 2.6 Methodology

The normative focus of FI underlying the study, together with the contextually-driven model for analysis described above, prescribe the methodological approach utilised for data collection. Cognisance was taken of the broader range of variables being considered due to the use of a single case study (South Africa) focused on a particular sector (security). The range and depth of the variables, in contrast to a comparative study,

further necessitated the normative and contextual approach employed for data collection. The methodological approach was therefore oriented towards qualitative process tracing (Checkel, 2005: 6; Ruback, 2006: 2; Tansey, 2007: 765).

As process tracing infers causality to sequences of events (George & Bennett, 2005: 212; Checkel, 2006: 363; Falleti, 2007: 2; Tansey, 2007: 765), in keeping with the FI focus on timing and incorporating elements of path dependency (discussed earlier in this chapter), it was a good fit for the types of questions being asked. The importance of recognising "key decision points or branching points" is an essential component of this approach (George & Bennett, 2005: 212) – and these are incorporated into the model in the form of "key moments" – providing another point of synergy with the FI approach.

Checkel (2005: 6) cautions that "process tracing is strong on questions of how and interactions; it is much weaker at establishing structural context", while Falleti and Lynch (2009: 3) argue that "valid causal inference requires contextualizing causal mechanisms". In this regard, FI strengthens the use of this research methodology with the emphasis on context and normativity, enriching the understanding of "how" interactions occur within a specific time and place. In particular, the centrality of historical narratives to the process tracing methodology aid in the contextualising of processes of gendered change, especially while "highly abstract theories and explanations" are factored into the analysis as well (Falleti, 2007: 4, 1), as "mechanisms alone cannot cause outcomes ... causation resides in the interaction between the mechanism and the context within which it operates" (Falleti & Lynch, 2009: 3). Further, multiple causal mechanisms may be utilised as part of the process tracing evidence set, and some may be specious (George & Bennett, 2005: 222), reiterating the importance of context in the analysis.

While it is argued that process tracing is not especially useful for generating generalisable theories, it does have the advantage of placing "theory and data in close proximity" (Checkel, 2005: 22). In other words, the depth of the data collected can more accurately depict the processes underlying the issue being explored – in this case the gendering of the South African security structures. It is also beneficial for illustrating theoretical constructs in a real world setting – the manifestation of FI principles in the case study.

The use of multiple data collection methods is also advocated within the process tracing approach as a means of corroborating causality and conclusions drawn (Berry, 2002: 680; Checkel, 2005: 6; 2006: 363; Tansey, 2007: 766). These include historical memoirs, surveys, interviews, press accounts, and documents, all of which have been incorporated in the data collection methodology for this study, as discussed later in this section. Interviews, and elite interviews in particular, are cited as useful tools for establishing the perceptions of a knowledgeable group of people, reconstructing events and making inferences from this data as part of the causal process-tracing methodology (Berry, 2002: 679-681; Tansey, 2007: 766). The flexibility of interviews also enables going beyond "party line accounts" (Berry, 2002: 680; Tansey, 2007: 767), and asking "theoretically guided questions about issues that are highly specific to the research objectives" (Tansey, 2007: 767).

Process tracing is described by George and Bennett (2005: 215) as an "opportunity to differentiate and enrich the general theory" for "deviant" cases (such as South Africa) as it can generate explanations "not predicted or explained adequately by existing theories" (George & Bennett, 2005: 215). The benefits of comparative studies towards the comprehension of different gender outcomes in transitions are well documented by authors such as Waylen (2007a, 2007b), who argues that carefully chosen cases and variables can establish trends which produce useful explanations about the circumstances in which positive gender outcomes might emerge as a result of democratic transitions. Waylen utilises examples from Latin America and Eastern Europe, and includes South Africa as an outlier for reasons similar to those outlined by George and Bennett (2005: 215).

As noted previously, the normative slant of New Institutionalism/FI enables an emphasis on context which is critical in explaining the nuances of gendered institutional change and continuity (Lovenduski, 1998; Mackay, 2004; Mottier, 2004; Siim, 2004; Childs and Krook, 2006), and which therefore encourages the pursuit of detailed single case studies that can delve more deeply into the various elements impacting on the consolidation of gender gains. Thus, the use of a single in-depth study has the potential to yield rich information in terms of explaining the processes of institutional change, including the gendered nature of continuity and change within the institutional context

(Kenney, 1996; Lovenduski, 1998; Mahoney, 2000b; Chappell, 2002, 2006; Mackay, 2004; Siim, 2004). Further, the importance of timing can be explored in greater detail within a single case study (Thelen, 1999; Pierson. 2000c: 72; Childs and Krook, 2006). This enables the consideration of a longer time frame, providing a larger pool of data on which to base conclusions, and facilitating the inclusion of the context-specific nuances present in the complex processes of gendered institutional change and continuity.

Criticisms of selection bias can be problematic, as pointed out by Achen and Snidal (1989), Geddes (1990), Mahoney (1999) and Waylen (2007a, 2007b), particularly in terms of generating representative findings that are applicable across various cases. Nevertheless, a preoccupation with the application of findings across various institutions or countries can be "inappropriate and sometimes counterproductive" (George and Bennett, 2005: 31; Hyden, 2006: 2). Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that atypical case studies can achieve more useful results by considering a greater range of factors, and thereby providing a deeper analysis of the root causes and effects of the various factors affecting institutional continuity and change. Similar arguments are put forth by Gerring (2004), Mackay and Kenny (2007), and Mahoney (2000b). For example, Mackay and Kenny (2007) concentrate on the post-devolution gendering of female candidate selection in Scotland, highlighting the factors that have contributed to the decline of female candidates. These findings can then be considered within other contexts, whereupon patterns may emerge with regard to the manner in which women enter and participate in gendered State structures. The use of a single case study therefore provides "opportunities for inductively identifying complex interaction effects" (George & Bennett, 2005: 212).

The emphasis on context and temporality brought to the fore by NI/FI is enhanced by the ability to consider multiple variables, in that the convergence and interaction of various factors and process can be considered in greater detail (George & Bennett, 2005: 212). The researcher's familiarity with the social and political under-currents of the country, borne from working within the security arena (in civil society and academia), further informs the analysis of the contextual factors at play. This knowledge is expanded and enriched by the wide array of literature from multiple perspectives available on the history and transition of the South African state.

Finally, the use of South Africa as a single case study is based on the temporal focus of NI/FI as the confluence of events which occurred towards the start of 1990s had a significant impact on the transitional and democratisation processes of the State and, therefore, on the gendering of State institutions. These events include the end of the Cold War, the emergence of the Human Security Paradigm, the greater prominence of regional organisations (and the impact this would have on national policies in various sectors, specifically in the security sector), the broader gender debates emerging from the third wave of feminism, and the continental ambitions of the new regime. The manner in which these events came together in a specific time and place constitutes a critical consideration in forming a coherent picture of how women self-consciously organised around security and human rights issues, and strove for the formal consolidation of gender gains within the new democratic state.

Thus, there are a number of compelling reasons for undertaking a single case-study using process tracing methodology that focuses on South Africa. Firstly, the ability to conduct an in-depth analysis of a single context within a broader time frame, which takes cognisance of a wider range of variables and considers a number of historical legacies. This can produce a more nuanced understanding of how gendered institutional change takes place, and the process by which gender gains can be consolidated or lost. These results may then have utility in explaining why and how these processes are (or are not) replicated elsewhere – whether in other institutions in the same State, or in other developing states. Secondly, the exploration of an anomalous case such as that of South Africa may produce insights into other contexts, which would not be possible through a comparative study.

Two strands of data were required in order to address the research question. The first strand focused on the events which transpired (classified in the model according to historical legacies, key moments, and exogenous influences) and on the developing philosophies within the State, particularly towards issues of equality, security and good governance. The second strand dealt with the *perceptions* of these events. Given the normative focus of the study, the provision of enabling mechanisms such as gender equality policies and gender machineries (strand one) is not necessarily effective if the

goals of these instruments (equal gender participation) are not accepted as legitimate and necessary by the actors within the institutions (strand two).

Data for the first strand was drawn from scholarly and historical texts (original documents and analysis by a range of experts), political party archives, the media[13], and civil society reports. The second strand was informed by primary data derived from interviews and surveys, and corroborated and enriched by secondary sources such as autobiographical and biographical accounts.

The first general set of accounts deals with the events shaping the liberation struggle and the process of democratic transition in South Africa, while imbuing the narrative with a revealing perspective on the underlying norms of the time. For example, works about the Struggle leaders such as Nelson Mandela (Mandela, 1995), Oliver Tambo (Jordan, 2007), Walter Sisulu (Sisulu, 2002), Desmond Tutu (Allen, 2006), Jacob Zuma (Gordin, 2010) and Thabo Mbeki (Gevisser, 2007; Roberts, 2007; Pottinger, 2008) chart the development of the present-government's equality-centred philosophy of governance. This had an immense impact on the gender and security aspects of the research question, as do more general accounts about the liberation movement (see, for example, Slovo, 1997; Govender, 2007; Feinstein, 2007; Suttner, 2008) and the changing societal dynamics of the transitional state (Malan, 1990; Van Zyl Slabbert, 2006; Calland, 2006; Harris, 2010; Bloom, 2010).

Some of these accounts also speak indirectly about the role of women within the liberation struggle, revealing the often hidden contributions of women. The contributions of high-profile female leaders such as Winnie Madikizela-Mandela (Du Preez Bezdrob, 2004), Albertina Sisulu (Sisulu, 2002), and Helen Suzman (Suzman, 1993) provide insights into the motivations behind women's participation in dangerous activities, and disclose some of the difficulties faced by women challenging accepted gender roles (Ginwala, 2001; Suttner, 2007; Govender, 2007; Gasa, 2007). This theme is also dealt with in the security-specific chronicles of women's participation in the

[13] Given the bias of the State-controlled media prior to the transition, media accounts were primarily drawn from the "liberal" press and independent newspapers. Some information was also derived from the autobiographical accounts of journalists, such as Marinovich & Silva (2000), mainly for the corroboration of other sources.

underground struggle, whether as combatants or activists (Cock, 1991; Modise & Curnow, 2000; Du Preez Bezdrob, 2004; Hutmacher Maclean, 2004; Cherry, 2007; Gasa, 2007; Govender, 2007; Samuelson, 2007; Suttner, 2007; Trewhela, 2009).

These accounts show the practical and strategic measures taken by women to overcome the discriminatory norms permeating the security structures of the underground armed movement, which informed the manner in which gender equality was approached within the security arena of the new democratic state. In addition to the scholarly and governmental[14] works detailing the security sector reform process in the transitional period (discussed in Chapter Four), accounts of personal experiences before, during, and after this period are provided by Thompson (2006), Feinstein (2007), Govender (2007), and Memela-Motumi (2009), amongst others. These stories enrich the understanding of the specific challenges faced in terms of the prevailing values governing gender roles within both the general governance structures of the State as well as within the security arena.

Extensive use has also been made of secondary interview material published by authors such as Cock (1991), Suttner (2007) and Thompson (2006), particularly of interviews with former combatants in the armed forces, both formal (primarily in the South African Defence Force) and informal (primarily in MK). As with the biographical and autobiographical works described above, these accounts offer the insights of individuals directly engaged with the liberation struggle, the armed struggle, the transitional process, or the democratic dispensation. Gaining direct access to these individuals, and the likelihood of obtaining such frank observations as those contained in these materials, would be unlikely. This is due in part to the nature of the subject matter, and the societal and cultural norms that vary across race, age and gender.

The subjective nature of these observations and perceptions, particularly those of invested participants as opposed to impartial observers, is a concern in a study of this nature. However, the potential pitfall of this approach in terms of bias colouring the data was viewed as an advantage of sorts, as statements of perceptions can be revealing

[14] These include White and Green Papers, policy papers, parliamentary proceedings, statements and speeches.

about the values of the participant. A biased response can therefore provide further insights into the investigation.

Areas of commonality and divergence can be identified by examining the perceptions of a variety of actors from different areas of the gender/security arena: politicians and parliamentarians with varying ideological stances, and civil society practitioners with differing experiences of the State security architecture. Issues on which consensus emerges serve as corroboration of the prevalence of that perception, while those statements in which little agreement is evident reveal the spheres of continuing contention[15]. The application of some quantitative methods on qualitative perceptions of issues, such as the factors affecting the advancement of women, aids in establishing trends within these subjective valuations, as is described in the exposition of the primary data collection methodology below.

### 2.6.1 Primary Research

Given the normative focus of the study, primary data collection was focused on gaining an understanding of the *perceptions* of participants towards the integration of gender in the security structures of the State. Is gender equality a concern within the security structures of the State? Do women make an important contribution to the development of security policy? What factors are perceived to play a role in the advancement of women in the security sector? These observations were then considered in conjunction with the secondary materials described above, and analysed in accordance with the analytical framework.

Primary data was collected through surveys, semi-structured interviews and informal briefings by anonymous informants. A number of surveys were developed, with varying purposes. Firstly, the survey aimed to elicit the perceptions of participants towards gender equality issues within general governance structures and the security structures of the State, in order to contrast the responses received about the two spheres. Similar questions were asked about both arenas, such as the factors affecting women's

[15] In both the primary and secondary data, actors with varying ideological stances and experiences within the State security structures were considered to broaden the perspective of the data pool.

advancement and the appropriateness of measures such as quotas. The second goal was to gather opinions on how gender equality is viewed within the two arenas, particularly by senior leadership and policymakers. The same base issues were present in all surveys, with the wording adapted slightly to suit the three categories of respondents: government, civil society, and members of the armed forces[16]. The survey was a mix of open-ended and Likert-scale statements. An opportunity to comment was provided after each scaled question and, on certain questions, further comment was explicitly prompted. All questions offered the respondent the option to remain anonymous, in order to elicit more complete responses[17].

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of policy actors at various levels, both in civil society and Parliament, who had some experience with parliamentary processes or security. The semi-structured format yielded helpful data as respondents were able to move naturally through topics that they deemed to be important, while allowing the key issues of the research to be addressed. The approach utilised is similar to that advocated by Berry (2002: 681) who remarks on the utility of open-ended questions to highlight important or valuable issues that may be unknown to the interviewer, as discussed in the previous section.

Prior to interviews, most respondents received a copy of the relevant survey[18] as an introduction to the issues that would be discussed. This served as an icebreaker, as respondents knew what to expect and could formulate considered responses. Given the security focus of the study, and the political context during the fieldwork period (discussed below), many informants were not willing to be formally interviewed or complete the survey. The informal discussions held with these anonymous informants yielded primarily background information and corroboration of insights drawn from the perceptions of other participants. While members of most political parties were agreeable to discussing the issues raised within the research, only three were willing to do so "on the record" (Democratic Alliance (DA), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and Freedom Front Plus (FF+)). All other governmental participants spoke only on

[16] An abbreviated version of the survey, omitting some of the broader open-ended questions, was also used in certain cases.

[17] The survey circulated was explicitly identified as an opinion-based questionnaire, and included a brief introduction to the research and how the information gathered would be used.

[18] A copy of the survey distributed to government participants is included in Appendix 3 as an example.

condition of anonymity, including the ruling African National Congress (ANC). The same pattern held true for the completion of questionnaires, although the ANC did complete a questionnaire, marking all responses "anonymous". Civil society practitioners (including those with experience within the security sector) were more open and completed the surveys in more detail, with no requests for anonymity.

The four parties included in the survey results (ANC, DA, FF+, IFP) represent a wide spectrum of political ideologies, from liberal (ANC, DA) to conservative (FF+, IFP), and inclusive (ANC, DA) to exclusive (IFP, FF+). While such a small sample cannot be viewed as conclusively indicative of the wider perceptions within government with respect to gender, and gender within the security sector, they serve a useful purpose in terms of highlighting trends and attitudes. For example, patterns emerged in the responses in accordance with gender (two male and two female respondents), political ideology (conservative versus liberal), and experiences during the liberation struggle, some of which were unexpected, as will be discussed in later chapters. The data yielded by the surveys, as with the information gained from interviews and informal discussions, was not used as the basis for findings but as contributory or supporting knowledge corroborating the insights gained from the application of the analytical model.

### 2.6.2 Methodological Challenges

In keeping with the contextual focus of the study, a number of methodological challenges were considered in the course of investigating the processes of gendered institutional transformation within the security structures of the State. Some of these have been addressed above, such as the clarification of what is considered evidence and the importance of perceptions in lending weight to the evidence of gendered institutional change. Four further methodological challenges are discussed here, each with theoretical and practical implications.

The first challenge refers to the limitations created by the political climate during the fieldwork period and the subject matter of the study, and the impact these had on the data collection process. Secondly, the opportunities and challenges of conducting research in a developing world setting, which relates directly to the third challenge:

access. Lastly, the importance of approaching the research question from a development perspective that takes cognisance of the post-colonial divisions of knowledge production. In other words, prioritising local knowledge within the framework of a northern scholarly discourse in keeping with the contextually-focused research design. While these particular issues do not represent a comprehensive list of the methodological challenges faced, they wield significant influence on the manner in which this research project was approached.

### *i. Trying Times: Political Tension During Fieldwork*

In June 2005, President Thabo Mbeki had relieved Jacob Zuma of his duties as Deputy President of South Africa. This was attributed to his upcoming rape trial (he was found not guilty in 2006), as well as to the corruption charges brought against him relating to the Arms Deal[19]. In the run up to the ANC Conference in Polokwane (December 2007), divisions within the ruling ANC began to be publicly played out. At the Polokwane Conference, Zuma defeated Mbeki's bid for the Presidency of the ANC, securing his place as the presidential nominee of the ANC for the 2009 general elections.

Tensions simmered until September 2008, when the corruption charges against Zuma were dropped, based on the finding by Judge Chris Nicholson of the High Court that the charges were based on unlawful procedural grounds. In his ruling, the Judge commented that "political meddling cannot be excluded and ... existed to a sufficiently egregious degree that it justified inclusion in the papers" [referring to the application to drop the charges] (Nicholson, 2008: para. 238). A number of people were cited within the ruling, and the inference was that Mbeki had been improperly involved in this decision.

Following the Court's decision, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC elected to "recall" President Mbeki, and he tendered his resignation of the Presidency in September 2008. ANC Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe was sworn in as interim President of South Africa until the general election in April 2009. Following Mbeki's

[19] The Arms Deal forms a major part of the thesis, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight.

ousting, 14 members of the 31-member Cabinet resigned, including Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka, Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel, Deputy Minister of Finance Jabu Moleketi, Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils, Minister in the Presidency Essop Pahad, Minister of Local Government Sydney Mfumadi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad, Minister of Public Service and Administration Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, Minister of Public Enterprises Alec Erwin, Minister of Public Works Thoko Didiza, Minister of Correctional Services Ngconde Balfour, and Deputy Minister of Correctional Services Loretta Jacobus.

Tensions escalated further following the formation of the Congress of the People (COPE) in 2008, a breakaway party from the ruling ANC created by the defection of some prominent ANC members. These included Mbhazima Sam Shilowa (Premier of Gauteng 1999-2008), Mosiuoa "Terror" Lekota (Minister of Defence 1999-2008), and Mluleki Editor George (Deputy Minister of Defence 2004-2008). The cumulative effect of these events led to a general climate of mistrust, with the continued sidelining of ANC members perceived to be ideologically aligned with former President Mbeki, and the rising of tensions within the ANC's tripartite alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

Fieldwork was undertaken from January to November 2009, and most interviews and informal briefings were conducted in Cape Town (Parliament), Pretoria (seat of government), and Johannesburg. The tense political atmosphere played an influential role in the data collection process, as did the unavailability of respondents due to, amongst others, the general elections. This brief overview situates the fieldwork in a particular context. The events described above contributed to the reticence of participants about speaking on the record, particularly about sensitive topics regarding security. This is partially due to the continued scrutiny of both the Arms Deal and the general state of the defence force, which are elaborated on in forthcoming chapters.

Discussions around gender issues were also perceived as sensitive as a result of events surrounding President Zuma's rape trial, and his pending nuptials to his sixth wife[20].

Following the general elections, participants were more readily available for informal discussions, but remained unwilling to be quoted, even as anonymous sources. The impression was that the internal political manoeuvring had not yet settled, and few were willing to be perceived as speaking against the party or the government, which in many instances were accepted as the same thing. Despite the general unwillingness of participants to speak "on the record", most were agreeable to discussing the research questions informally. These discussions, while not quoted or paraphrased within the text as per agreement with the informants, served to clarify various themes and issues within the study, revealing concerns not previously considered, and reinforcing certain insights.

### *ii. The Challenge (and Opportunity) of Context*

While being a developing state is usually characterised as an obstacle, it can also present a valuable opportunity for gendered institutional change, in terms of reforming 'old' institutions or in shaping 'new' institutions from the ground up. The relative youth of post-independence governance structures may provide openings for changes that would be difficult in the more mature bureaucratic structures of the developed states, which have entrenched systems. Within the context of the Apartheid struggle in South Africa, a number of occurrences enhanced the potential for substantive changes to the gender equality of women in South Africa, particularly in terms of access to decision-making positions. These "windows of opportunity" as they relate to South Africa are discussed in subsequent chapters, but it is useful to note here that the presence of these factors all combined to create the ideal environment for an overhaul of gender stereotypes and gender relations in South Africa. These factors include the timing of the liberation struggle within broader trends of global developments, the centrality of equality in the ANC Charter and the subsequent inclusion of women at high levels of decision-making, the presence of women at the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum, and their involvement in the redrafting of the Constitution.

[20] Jacob Zuma has been married six times (divorced once, and widowed once). He currently has four wives, twenty children (13 with his past and present wives, and seven illegitimate children). He has paid *lobola* (bride price) for another fiancé.

These distinctive prospects provided by transitional states imply that women can, to some extent, mould the inherited patriarchal institutions of the State as it is being transformed in the larger political sense, as discussed in part by Jansen (2005: 17). As the South African democracy matures, the State machinery is naturally subjected to changes in structure and modes of functioning are altered. By constructing spaces within which women can operate, gains made are consolidated, and further achievements are facilitated. This situation is not as replicable in long established democracies where procedures and organizational models are more firmly entrenched. These circumstances provide a number of research opportunities as it is a rare occurrence for an African state to be democratically progressive in terms of gender rights, have a reasonably strong capacity to implement change (comparable to other developing states), and be in a position to lead other states in the region (and internationally) on the issue. The research thus attempted to maintain an awareness of this unique South African context, as well as integrate the challenges that arose from working in a developing state.

### *iii. Access: Practical Considerations*

The South African democratic process places a strong emphasis on participatory governance, involving widespread consultations with a variety of stakeholders at most levels (Baden, Hassim & Meintjies, 1998: 23). Access to parliamentarians and other office bearers is therefore less problematic than in other post-conflict developing states, such as Angola. However, as with most bureaucracies, the gatekeepers can be difficult to bypass and can impose unnecessary constraints on interactions with parliamentarians. Having worked with parliamentarians in Southern Africa in recent years provided an understanding of the bureaucratic process and established a number of direct contacts. This allowed some circumvention of lower level gatekeepers. Further networking opportunities existed through both these contacts and civil society interactions. This may have improved the quality of information gathered, as there were fewer limitations on the conditions of the interviews, and some trust was already established that potentially sensitive data would be handled in a responsible manner. This also resulted in a "snowball" effect of referrals, leading to further informal briefings.

Considerable difficulty was encountered at times in gaining access to certain documents and statistics, particularly those related to security issues. While many official documents are easily accessible, it was somewhat more complex to obtain internal working documents that would be invaluable in revealing the in-house policy process, the key players, and their roles. The convoluted bureaucratic processes involved in gaining access to such information are described by Jansen (2005:18) as being particularly prevalent in developing states and newly formed democracies due to "an unusual level of political sensitivity" – a description that had a direct bearing on the volatile political situation at the time in South Africa.

The nature of the research constitutes a further challenge, as one of the key principles of gender mainstreaming is that "everyone at all levels" is supposed to share responsibility for implementing reforms within their departments, yet there is uncertainty about targets and what the strategy actually entails. These individuals may be wary of sharing information about their gender related activities (or lack thereof) for fear of appearing uninformed about the process or confirming that no substantive progress has been made. For example, some departments claimed not to have gender point persons at all despite what was said in their official communications, while some junior level respondents claimed the existence of a range of gender-related activities that could not be substantiated with either documentation or the knowledge of more senior level respondents. In this case, familiarity with the institutional context in which the data was being collected had the further advantage of identifying anomalous responses.

At the same time, there are instances where this type of familiarity can raise a few issues. Prime among these is the danger of bias in conducting research within your indigenous environment – referring to the bias of the researcher towards the subject matter, and the bias of respondents towards the researcher. This concern has a strong link to the normative nature of bias, and the assumptions made on the basis of gender and race. In a discussion of "indigenous" researchers working in their own communities, Smith (1999: 5) raised similar concerns about working across divisions of gender, age and race – a common occurrence in a country as diverse as South Africa. The centrality of race in particular as a shaping force in South African history cannot be discounted, while gender forms a second barrier especially in the context of the security dimension of the

research. The age consideration aided to an extent as participants were more willing to "explain how it really was" to a younger researcher, overcoming gender and racial bias to some degree.

In analysing the responses received, the perceptions of the respondents towards the researcher are important filters for bias in terms of the perceived expectations of the researcher (What does the researcher want to hear? What will be done with the collected data? What does the researcher (and their audience) think of the respondent and their actions?). As Nanda (1998: 287) asserts, concepts of rationality and truth are reliant on cultural constructs, which are further mediated by gender, class, and race. Thus, the social category into which the researcher is classified will influence both expectations and answers, as it will be used by respondents as a basis for justifying the inclusion or exclusion of information (Agar, 1996: 91).

This can be partly overcome by applying lessons learnt by King (2000: 270) who argues that what is *not* said can reveal as much as what is shared. This strategy was useful in the identification of problematic issues that warranted further exploration and in deciding which areas to exclude. As the primary format for data collection consisted of semi-structured interviews and informal conversations, respondents in general revealed as much (or as little) as they were comfortable doing. Very few probing questions were asked of respondents with whom no prior relationship existed. With the data collected from surveys, there was no face-to-face interaction with respondents, eliminating some of the biases listed above but losing the non verbal data gathered during personal interactions (such as body language and tone of voice).

Despite appealing to both male and female respondents, the majority of civil society respondents were women; either as they heeded requests for participation, or as they were assigned as spokespeople by the organisations contacted. Amongst government respondents, the gender divide was more evenly split, although the higher number of male respondents in this group could be attributed to acquaintances formed while conducting previous research in Parliament. It should be noted that among government respondents, males were more likely to allow statements to be attributed to them;

women made more frequent use of the "Anonymous" tab on questions related to both gender and security.

A noteworthy trend emerged during the course of the informal interviews with male informers who had participated in the Struggle, as opposed to male informers employed in State structures at the time or who had little or no direct involvement in the liberation struggle. The "Struggle" men all had definitive views on gender, gender equality, and the value of women's contributions to the Struggle. This could be attributed to the rhetoric at the time, which emphasised equality across all sectors (race, class, sex, ethnicity), as well as to the prevalent discourse during the first decade of democracy in particular, which focused on building a participative governance system. White male respondents who had been employed in various capacities within the previous system of governance seemed most uncomfortable with the topic, and would often suggest speaking to a female colleague instead. On general security matters, this group was more willing to share general experiences, but very rarely specifics. This is partially due to the nature of the activities undertaken, but is also attributable to cultural norms governing what is acceptable to disclose. This is dealt with at length in the work of Thompson (2006), in which the author interviews men who served in the South African Defence Force (SADF) (either fulfilling their obligatory national service or as volunteers) – the reticence in sharing their experiences was clearly shown to be a combination of the nature of the experience (and how it is viewed now by society at large) and the customs imposed by their social and cultural contexts. The highlighting of noteworthy trends in the responses of both civil society versus government respondents, and of men and women, will occur throughout the thesis as relevant data is analysed within each chapter.

*iv. The North-South Divide*

As has been established in Chapters One and Two, the view of gender and gender relations as socially constructed has a direct bearing on the understanding of gendered institutional change. As this is the central theme of the research, an awareness of how these normative constructs are understood is of paramount importance. In particular, the manner in which these context-specific norms and values are analysed will impact on the conclusions drawn. This raises a philosophical quandary when the environment

under observation is fundamentally different to the environment in which the analytical tools were developed. In other words, the methodological framework by which the processes of gendered institutional change can be understood is a construct of the developed "North" but is being applied in the developing "South".

Post-colonial debates regarding the oppressive nature of Western knowledge and the South's struggle to generate a new identity are themes that bear exploring, particularly in terms of framing the experiences of Northern and Southern feminists and finding points of commonality (Steans, 2006: 18). This is discussed in Chapter Three, but it is flagged here as the challenges presented by the persistence of the "Northern ivory tower" continue to dominate the literature and research tools for social research regardless of the context, as discussed by Pearson (2004), Jansen (2005), Hyden (2006), Seekings (2010), and a variety of researchers in Hammett & Wedgwood's (2005) exploration of methodological challenges in Africa. For example, Pearson (2004) offers a feminist perspective that highlights the benefits of differentiated analysis. One criticism put forward is that imperialist methods of grading indigenous knowledge and analysing it through Western filters before "importing" it back to the South presents a particular set of challenges for contemporary researchers (Smith, 1999: 1). This common problem is expanded upon by Jansen (2005: 20) who notes the continued reliance on theoretical models emanating from the developed world, due to the comparative underdevelopment of Southern alternatives.

Overcoming the challenge of the North-South divide lies in ensuring that the positive contributions made by knowledge from the North are recognised and retained. Stephens (2005: 28) contends that it is plausible to be critical of Western theories (in terms of their base assumptions) while still utilising the practical aspects of the theory, provided that context (particularly cultural factors) is taken into consideration. This is clearly a case of not reinventing the wheel; the theoretical developments and the wealth of experience amassed by Western feminists represents an immense pool of knowledge from which developing world feminists can draw. This is predicated on the contextualisation of the knowledge, applying it as specifically as possible to the situation at hand, and being mindful of the limitations not only of cultural and social norms but also of the fragility inherent to most post-conflict states. This is not to say that harmful

or problematic practices must be accommodated or integrated into the strategies, but rather that incremental changes, which are aware of the limits of a society's ability to rapidly adapt to a range of changes in many sectors, have a better chance of being accepted as the new status quo. In other words, a wholesale importation of a Western model (and its attendant norms and values) is unlikely to result in lasting substantive change. A model tempered by the realities of a developing post-conflict state, together with an understanding of the underlying contextual challenges, is a more appropriate approach. Familiarity with and an understanding of the local cultural and social dynamics is advantageous when analysing the prevailing norms, available resources, and capacity of participants to instigate change within the institutional environment. As emphasised throughout the study, gender policies cannot succeed without addressing underlying customs, given that concepts of gender are socially constructed (Daly, 2005: 439). Thus, relevance and context are the key contributors to understanding the complexity of the local environment (Jasanoff, 2002: 265). This view reinforces the validity of the normative and contextual approach of FI in understanding the processes of gendered institutional change, regardless of the setting.

## 2.7 Conclusion

This chapter established the utility of a feminist institutionalist approach in answering the questions: *How* does gendered institutional change occur? What variables account for the fluctuating power relationships within institutions? How does the institutional layering of old and new structures affect the consolidation of gender gains?

By adopting a normative approach sensitive to a range of contextual factors, a clearer understanding can be gained of the gendered processes of institutional change and continuity, enabling a critical examination of the gendering of the South African security sector, and contributing to the broader knowledge of gendered processes of institutional change.

The application of this analytical model to the unique South African context does more than generate insights into the process of gendered institutional change following a transition. The model reveals the methods through which women attained the requisite

power and capacity to enter the system, and the development of the strategies through which institutional change was enacted. The contextual and normative focus of the FI approach facilitates an examination of how "past legacies [inform] institutional design – and consequently, the lack of fit between intention and outcomes [which] is central to understanding institutional origins" (Chappell, 2011: 164). This is especially apt for the South African case, as will be shown in the forthcoming discussion, as the interweaving of historical legacies with emerging norms and values, new rules and institutions, and ambitious transformation goals, affect the processes of gendered institutional change.

The use of process tracing methodology aids in this investigation of how gendered change occurred in the South African security sector. The data derived from multiple sources including interviews, biographies, surveys, and documentary evidence provide a contextual depth that facilitates the understanding of how the historical legacies influencing women's autonomy and power developed, the exogenous influences that shaped society, and the multitude of other factors that impacted on the course of the women's movement in South Africa.

The following chapter lays the historical foundation and contextual backdrop against which these changes occurred, and establishes the historical legacies of women's growing autonomy and militancy. These were affected by exogenous influences such as the end of the Cold War and the evolution of the international feminist movement, as well as by various key moments within the liberation movement's history. By placing the women's movement within the broader context of the South African history, Chapter Three presents the first step in unravelling the puzzle of *how* women affected gendered institutional change within the security structures of the State.

# 3

# LEARNING FROM LEGACIES: WOMEN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

## 3.1 Introduction

The role played by women in the South African armed struggle as combatants, organisers and leaders, has a clear link with the militarised past of South Africa and the socialisation of women into militarised roles (Cock, 1991; Modise & Curnow, 2000; Gasa, 2007; Suttner, 2007, 2008; Clarke, 2008;). As Cock (1991: 104) asserts:

> "One of the defining features of South Africa as a militarised society engaged in a 'war' (as viewed by the black majority), or in defending itself against the 'total onslaught' (the view of the state and many whites) is that the battlefield is the entire society. A clear demarcation of the battlefield is the fulcrum of the connection between militarisation and gender" (Cock, 1991: 104).

The juxtaposition of "atypical" gender roles with traditional gender roles associated with patriarchal societies had an immense impact on women's demands of the State, and their envisioned roles as political actors within State structures, with no delineation between stereotypical "woman's" roles and those situated within the masculine realm. What events prompted this change? Which historical legacies were capitalised upon in order to transform the gendered norms constraining women's roles within society, particularly the relationship between women and security?

The aim of this chapter is to provide the background against which women began organising politically. Demonstrating the contextual influences which prompted increasingly militant action against the oppression of the State, and highlighting the events which drew more women to explicitly take up the banner of the national liberation struggle in a variety of roles, will reveal the historical legacies that fundamentally impacted upon gendered notions of identity and citizenship. These legacies are central to uncovering *how* institutional change occurred in the South African post-conflict State, and furthering the understanding of how women as political actors influenced the norms and rules of the ANC structures. The chapter concludes with an

examination of exogenous influences to the women's movement in South Africa, noting the role that global feminism debates played in shaping the demands and tactics of women in South Africa, particularly during the transitional stages of the new democracy.

## 3.2 Colonial Conflicts

The legacy of militancy within and between South Africa's many competing cultural groups[21] was firmly established early in South Africa's history, with the legacy of equality becoming intricately interwoven with the path of militancy after the arrival of colonial settlers in the Cape in 1652 (Thompson, 2000: 33; Welsh, 2000: 21).[22] Altercations amongst indigenous peoples rapidly escalated with the arrival of settlers, who pushed the borders of their seized territories outwards, encroaching on indigenous grazing and farming lands (Thompson, 2000: 54-55). As the Europeans migrated north and east, bloodier conflicts began to arise between these settlers and the indigenous nations, including the KhoiKhoi Dutch Wars (1659-1677), and the Cape Frontier/Xhosa Wars (1779-1879). These battles were never evenly matched as the technological superiority of Western weaponry, combined with the systematic destruction of indigenous homes, crops, livestock and reserves, ensured that the Europeans emerged victorious (Thompson, 2000: 72).

Later, there was also bloodshed between the competing colonial powers, such as at the Battle of Muizenberg in 1795 that resulted in Britain gaining control of the Cape from the Dutch (Welsh, 2000: 89). By 1806 Britain had completely annexed the Cape, claiming it as a British Colony, and necessitating the imposition of a governance system

[21] The racial classification system dating back to the period of colonial rule and entrenched by the National Party government remains in use today, although with different intent. Therefore, the same terminology is employed in this thesis: African refers to the indigenous Black population, White to citizens of European descent, Coloured to citizens of mixed heritage, and Indian to those of Asiatic descent, predominantly drawn from India, Madagascar, Ceylon and Indonesia. Within these broad categorisations, further distinctions will be drawn where appropriate, such as between Xhosa and Zulu (two dominant ethnic populations within the political context), and English-speaking Whites and Afrikaners who are predominantly of Dutch descent.

[22] Despite South Africa's lack of natural harbours and the existence of treacherous ocean currents, its advantageous position on the oceanic trade route prompted the Portuguese to land in Mossel Bay in 1487, the first Europeans to do so. However, it was not until 1652 that a permanent settlement was established in the Cape by Jan van Riebeeck as a refreshment station for the Dutch East India Company (Thompson, 2000: 33; Welsh, 2000: 21).

to protect their interests from the groups of indigenous peoples bordering their eastern territories, and also from various settler groups who were largely a law unto themselves (Thompson, 2000: 52-53). Prompted by the social unrest in the United Kingdom (UK) derived from high unemployment, the British Parliament began transferring settlers to South Africa to begin farming communities (Thompson, 2000: 55). In 1820, over five thousand settlers started occupying former tribal lands. These settlers did not integrate with the primarily Dutch Europeans (Afrikaners/*Boers*) already residing in South Africa, although they mimicked their forceful seizing of land and resources from the indigenous people (Meintjes, 1996: 51; Thompson, 2000: 56-57), perpetuating the legacy of militancy.

The British regime increasingly alienated the Afrikaner population through the imposition of a cultural and legislative system that reduced their farmlands through annexation, the forced abolition of slavery (which drastically reduced the cheap workforce upon which they were dependent), and the use of English throughout the Government and schooling systems. Dissatisfied with their loss of autonomy, and unable to maintain self-sufficiency, approximately 12 000 *Voortrekkers* (pioneers) of primarily Flemish, Dutch and German descent migrated to establish the Boer Republics in the former Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal regions in 1830 (Leatt, Kneifel & Nurnberger, 1986: 71; Thompson, 2000: 67-69, 87-91; Welsh, 2000: 166). Moving inland, where they could self-govern, these *Voortrekkers* engaged in numerous altercations with the indigenous groups living in the hinterland.

An integral part of these skirmishes stemmed from the expansion of the Zulu empire by the warrior King Shaka, whose strategic prowess saw the formation of a "militaristic kingdom" stretching between the Pongola and Tugela Rivers (Thompson, 2000: 83; Welsh, 2000: 139). This prompted the dispersal of other ethnic groups, causing upheaval throughout the south-east as the *Voortrekkers* moved through. The more militant among these indigenous refugees began creating new settlements, including the Ndebele (of Nguni descent), who subsumed some Sotho and Tswana chiefdoms into a state nestled between the Vaal and Limpopo Rivers (Thompson, 2000: 86).

The distribution of the indigenous groups at this time is represented in Map 3.1[23]. As the map shows, the British engaged in altercations with indigenous inhabitants along the eastern coast of the country as the colony expanded. Following the path of the *Voortrekker* migration northwards, battles erupted between the Afrikaners and the tribal armies whose lands they were traversing. The overall view of Map 3.1 clearly illustrates the militant mindset of all the parties involved: the *Afrikaners,* the British and the indigenous population[24]. It also assists in demonstrating the development of the closely linked legacies of militancy and equality: militant actions were repeatedly utilised in order to assert equality and acquire autonomy, whether it was the Afrikaners asserting their independence from the British, or the Ndebele claiming autonomy from the expanding Zulu kingdom.

A decisive turning point occurred in 1838 following the Battle of Blood River[25], where the defeat fractured the Zulu kingdom and paved the way for the Afrikaner settlement in the high rainfall area of the east coast (Welsh, 2000: 173; Thompson, 2000: 91). It also served as one of the first significant moments around which an Afrikaner identity and common history began to emerge, as it symbolised the triumph of the Afrikaner after decades of suppression by the British, vindicating the decision to strike out in search of a state of their own. The Afrikaners, while by no means a cohesive group ideologically, had achieved their goal of independence by 1854[26].

The discovery of gold in 1864 and diamonds in 1867[27] led to further territorial conflicts[28] (Meintjes, 1996: 51; Thompson, 2000: 110), most notably the First Anglo

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[23] Map 3.1 is adapted from Mayhew (1980: 10, 11, 153, 345), Welsh (2000: xiv-xv, 98-99, 141, 142-144, 154-155, 204-205, 211), Thompson (2000: 3, 34, 74, 82, 89, 149), SA-Venues (2011) and South African History Online (2011). The battles indicated on Map 3.1 are listed in Appendix 4 – Major South African Battles 1779-1902.

[24] It should also be noted that the majority of conflicts between indigenous groups involved the Zulu and the Xhosa. These two ethnic groupings are the dominant forces within the current democratic regime.

[25] An army of ten thousand Zulus attacked a commando of five hundred Afrikaner settlers. However, the settlers, armed with guns and cannons, killed three thousand Zulu warriors without losing a single settler (Welsh, 2000: 173).

[26] The Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions formalised their withdrawal from British sovereignty, establishing the Boer Republics in the Orange Free State and Transvaal, and enabled the "Afrikaners to [begin] self-consciously fashioning a national historical tradition" (Thompson, 2000: 96; Leatt *et al*, 1986: 71).

[27] These discoveries are of significant import to later developments as the immense labour needs of the mining industry spawned a range of strategies forcing African workers into urban areas, since farming land had been appropriated by settlers in the formalisation of the racial segregation laws that would be expanded under the Apartheid regime (Thompson, 2000: 111).

Boer War in 1880, in which the Boer Republics defeated the British through the use of guerrilla warfare tactics[29]. The Second Anglo Boer War in 1899 resulted in a victorious Britain, who had adapted their strategy by employing a scorched earth policy and building concentration camps[30] to house captured commandos and civilians (Leatt *et al*, 1986: 17-18; Thompson, 2000: 132-143). However, the defeat served to strengthen Afrikaner unity by fostering a sense of nationalism among the settlers, which had previously been lacking, centred around anti-imperialist sentiments and the need for self-governance. In 1910, the Union of South Africa was created as a dominion of the British Empire (Thompson, 2000: 154).

By 1934, the Status of the Union Act consolidated the gains from the Statute of Westminster and effectively provided for South African independence from Britain by allowing legislative independence (Thompson, 2000: 161; Welsh, 2000: 407)[31].

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[28] The major battles of the two Anglo-Boer Wars are indicated on Map 3.1, and in Appendix 4.

[29] The motivation for war was not the securing of the mineral wealth *per se*, but rather an attempt by the Afrikaners to preserve their independence and fledgling culture from the "menace" of incoming English immigrants (Welsh, 2000: 325).

[30] Approximately 28 000 Afrikaner civilians died in these camps as a result of disease and malnutrition (Thompson, 2000: 143).

[31] South Africa became a Republic in 1961, leaving the Commonwealth.

**Map 3.1 Battle for Autonomy in Colonial South Africa**



## 3.3 Birth of the Opposition Movement: The Formation of the South African Native National Congress (1912)

The establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 by the British saw the demise of Afrikaner independence, and also highlighted the urgent need for African nationalists to organise at a national level. The need to oppose the flood of inequitable laws and policies emanating from Parliament[32] led to the creation of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC)[33] in 1912 (Leatt *et al*, 1986: 58; Meintjes, 1996: 51).

The ANC, together with the South African Indian Congress and the South African Coloured People's Organisation, adopted a liberal agenda for affecting change based on cooperation between various African bodies and other multi-racial organisations pursuing similar goals of equality in terms of defending the "freedom, rights and privileges" of the majority (SANNC, 1919: Clause 6; Leatt *et al*, 1986: 59; Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 59). The attainment of political equality was seen as the necessary first step towards achieving this goal. The 1919 Constitution of the South African Native National Congress called for collective action in the form of protests, "constitutional and peaceful" propaganda, and enquiries and "passive" action (SANNC, 1919: Clause 13) as a means of achieving its manifesto. Violent tactics were implicitly prohibited. This conservative approach would only alter with the formation of the Youth League decades later. In all its proclamations and statements, the attainment of equality remained the cornerstone of the ANC's manifesto: a vital source of access with respect to gender claims and participation, as it was framed broadly in terms that encompassed race, ethnicity and gender (Waylen, 2007a: 524).

While the manner in which this goal was pursued necessarily evolved over time in response to the political, economic and legal constraints imposed by the State, the inclusive framing of equality did not waver, creating a much wider base for participation than in other mass movements in South Africa. This represented a crucial discursive

[32] While these laws would intensify after 1948 when the National Party seized power, the entrenchment of racial inequality had already begun with the 1913 Native Land Act (a precursor of the Group Areas Act) and the pass law system imposed by the British (Welsh, 2000: 375-376).

[33] SANNC was renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1925. For purposes of clarity, the organisation will be referred to as the ANC throughout the text.

legacy in terms of the women's movement in South Africa, and established an entry point for women into the formal structures of the ANC.

The way in which the struggle for liberation was conceptualised within the ANC was not necessarily without internal contestation. For example, many senior members of the party had overlapping membership with the Communist Party and thus viewed class disparities as an important element of the liberation movement (Nugent, 2004: 299). There was also a contingent of Africanists who were suspicious of multi-racial politics, communists and especially of Whites (Thompson, 2000: 210; Nugent, 2004: 300). This eventually led to the formation of a breakaway group under Robert Sobukwe in 1952: the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The PAC was exclusively and militantly African, stating "Whites could not be trusted because their material interests lay in a perpetuation of the structures of racial domination, whatever their intellectual conversion" (Nugent, 2004: 300).

The ANC Constitution established a democratic governance culture, making provisions for tribal leadership structures as well, and enabling an expansion of the organisations base (SANNC, 1919). The organisational structure was explicitly detailed in the 1958 Constitution, with national, provincial and branch structures and responsibilities clearly outlined[34]. Membership was not restricted in terms of race or gender[35], with the only explicit proviso being that the applicant be older than 18 years of age. While women were not formally included in the early leadership structures of the ANC, they nevertheless participated in the "deliberations, decision making and campaigns of the organisation" (Ginwala, 2001; Cock, 1991: 47). This was partly due to the amenability of the ANC to gender issues, and represented a crucial opportunity for the expansion of women's political power (Waylen, 2007a: 524). This early inclusion and participation in the decision-making structures of the ANC is therefore of critical importance in terms

[34] The two signatories of the Constitution, Albert Luthuli (then President General) and Oliver Tambo (then Secretary General), were both influential in subsequent decades in advancing women's equality, as will be shown in this chapter and in the forthcoming discussion on the transitional phase.

[35] By 1958, women's equal status within the organisation was enshrined in the ANC Constitution, including the right to participate in elections and to stand for any position within the ANC (ANC, 1958: Clause 7). The 1991 Constitution of the ANC also explicitly called for women's equality (ANC, 1991: Clause B7) and carried this through subsequent Constitutions (ANC, 1994; 1998; 2002). The use of quotas to increase the representation of women was clarified in the 1994 Constitution (ANC, 1994: Clause 14), and by 1998 this was quantified at a minimum of one third in all structures, and maintained in subsequent Constitutions (ANC, 1998; Clause 14; ANC, 2002: Rule 6).

of creating openings for women to organise politically, and served as a base from which to begin consolidating political gender gains. The emphasis on inclusivity and equality as core values early in the history of the ANC aided in the establishment of a legacy of equality within the organisation, which in turn played a role in the development of the twinned legacy of increasing women's autonomy through the course of South African history, as this chapter shows.

## 3.4 Women Get Organised: The Bantu Women's League (1918)

The formation of the Bantu Women's League[36] in 1918 was a pivotal experience as it served as an "acknowledgement [by the ANC] that women were entitled to organise politically" (Ginwala, 2001). Although the creation of this body was supported by the ANC leadership, the Bantu Women's League was not formally affiliated and could thus pursue its own agenda. As with many of the contributory occurrences explaining women's active participation in the struggle for liberation, the combination of an enabling organisational environment (dependent on male co-operation), the ability of women to organise themselves effectively in pursuit of their own goals, and the presence of remarkable leaders (both male and female) all coalesced to produce results. Charlotte Maxeke, the leader of the Bantu Women's League at the time, had national esteem within the party and the capacity to deal effectively with leaders from the movement and State officials. This endowed the Bantu Women's League with greater credibility and empowered women to "articulate their demands and make their own representations", having been freed of the need for male interpreters or spokesmen (Ginwala, 2001). Gasa (2007: 215) notes that "from their very first entry into the political space, women resisted male domination, acting on their own, representing themselves directly to the Union government and even in their appeals to the empire".

Given the independence of the Bantu Women's League from the central ANC structures, there was a need for the ANC Women's Section to be revived as a forum for women's formal representation within the organisation, although there was a significant overlap of membership (Ginwala, 2001). An annual subscription fee enabled self-

[36] The Bantu Women's League, although created separately from the ANC's Women Section (later Women's League) had the same leadership and overlapping membership.

sufficiency (to an extent) and the Provincial Presidents of the Women's Section were included in the ANC's executive body (Ginwala, 2001). This clearly demonstrates the growing autonomy of the ANC women's movement.

By 1943, the status of women within the organisation was further elevated with the formal establishment of the ANC's Women League (ANCWL), which replaced the Women's Section.[37] The ANC Executive confirmed their autonomy in a resolution, although their independence was qualified with the statement that it should "not mean parallelism, but co-operation and mutual assistance in the building up of membership" (Ginwala, 2001). While women were full members of the ANC by this time, the 1945 Draft Constitution clarified the reasoning behind the establishment of the Women's League as follows:

> "In the Congress women members shall enjoy the same status as men, and shall be entitled to elect and be elected to any position including the highest office. Notwithstanding this fact, however, and without in any way diminishing the rights of women members, the Congress may, recognising the special disabilities and differences to which African women are subjected and because of the peculiar problems facing them, and in order to arouse their interest and facilitate their organisation, create a Women's Section within its machinery" (Ginwala, 2001).

While national liberation remained the overarching goal, women railed against the National Executive Committee (NEC) exercising complete control over their activities (Hassim, 2004: 434), and called for the ANCWL to be endowed with greater authority. This was seen as a crucial step in consolidating women's power and in building the required political capital to affect substantive change, remaining central to their activities in the coming decades.

## 3.5 Radical Views: Establishment of the ANC Youth League (1944)

The Youth League arose due to dissatisfaction within the party with the reticent manner in which the ANC leadership continued to engage with the State despite its increasingly draconian suppression of African civil rights. Nelson Mandela described this period of ANC history as the "era of delegations, deputations, letters and telegrams. Everything was done in the English manner, the idea being that despite our disagreements we were

[37] The organised women's division within the ANC went through numerous name changes throughout the course of the liberation struggle. For clarity, it can be assumed that ANCWL and Women's Section refer to the same entity.

all gentleman" (Mandela, 1995: 113). A more militant approach was desired, one which would place greater emphasis on African nationalism, while maintaining the central goals of the ANC in terms of achieving non-racial democratic governance (Mandela, 1995: 112-114; Ginwala, 2001; Welsh, 2000: 458; Thompson, 2000: 211; Nugent, 2004: 298).

Formed on Easter Sunday in 1944, the Youth League was made up of a notable group of emerging leaders who would transform the political landscape in the coming years. These included Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo and Anton Lembede[38] – the first president of the Youth League (Mandela, 1995: 113; Nugent, 2004: 298). By 1947 Peter Mda, who had succeeded Lembede as President of the Youth League, "believed the [Youth League] should function as an internal pressure group, a militant nationalistic wing within the ANC as a whole that would propel the organisation into a new era" amid concerns that the ANC was "generally poorly organised, operating in a haphazard way" (Mandela, 1995: 123; Nugent, 2004: 298). The 1949 Conference saw the Youth League backing Dr James Moroko for ANC president after Dr Alfred Xuma refused to support the more militant Programme of Action calling for civil disobedience (Mandela, 1995: 131-132; Welsh, 2000: 431; Nugent, 2004: 298). Walter Sisulu became Secretary-General and Oliver Tambo was appointed to the National Executive Committee (NEC), thus placing the Youth League within the senior echelons of the organisation.

The Programme of Action was a radical departure for the ANC, who had previously been at pains to stay within the letter of the law. The calls for "boycotts, strikes, stay-at-homes, passive resistance, protest demonstrations and other forms of mass actions" thus moved the ANC into a "more activist stage"[39] (Mandela, 1995: 130; Nugent, 2004: 298). The fundamental shift in the political landscape, brought about by the electoral

[38] It should be noted that the issue of racial exclusivity was not as clear-cut within the Youth League as within the broader ANC. Some, like Lembede, maintained that only by standing alone could Africans achieve true liberation, while others called for the inclusion of Indians and Coloureds. Some argued that only true non-racialism would ensure liberation, but many remained distrustful of Whites (Mandela, 1995: 115).

[39] For example, less than a year later, the 'Defend Free Speech Convention' drew 10 000 protesters (Mandela, 1995: 132). However, the use of mass action was not without its problems, as participants faced incarceration, loss of employment, and the retraction of passes to reside in urban areas (and thus the ability to seek or gain employment) (Mandela, 1995: 135).

victory of the National Party (NP), prompted the immediate implementation of this new approach.

## 3.6 The National Party and Apartheid (1948)

The rise of Afrikaner nationalism, which was to irrevocably shape the political landscape of South Africa in coming decades, was due in part to the alienation that the Afrikaners felt from the other European settlers. It fostered the need to create a common identity using the basis of shared language, faith and recent history with others who felt oppressed by the imposition of "foreign" rule in the form of the British (Leatt *et al*, 1986: 70; Mandela, 1995: 128). The Anglo-Boer Wars, in particular, strengthened the resolve to create a haven in which the Afrikaners could be in control of their own destiny. The success of the National Party in 1948 gave hope that this dream could be a reality, as described by Mandela (1995: 128):

> "In the distorted cosmology of the Afrikaner, the Nationalist victory was like the Israelites' journey to the Promised Land. This was the fulfilment of God's promise, and the justification for their view that South Africa should be a white man's country forever".

The National Party was established in 1914 in response to the 1910 Union of South Africa, and morphed into the Purified National Party (PNP) under the leadership of the ultra-conservative DF Malan in 1934[40] (Welsh, 2000: 407). The PNP was focused on closing the gap between Afrikaners and English-speaking Whites: in 1946 the income level of Afrikaners was less than half that of English-speaking Whites (Thompson, 2000: 188). Once the NP was in power, State contracts, government positions, investment houses and banks, and even publishing houses were directed towards Afrikaners, rapidly expanding the middle class and closing the economic gap between the English and the Afrikaners (Thompson, 2000: 188; Welsh, 2000: 411).

The policy of Apartheid, or "separate development" for which the renamed National Party became notorious, did not ascribe to the idea of "separate but equal", irrespective

[40] The formation of the PNP was a reaction to the merging of one faction of the National Party with Jan Smuts' South African Party to form the United Party, which had an English and Afrikaans-speaking support base, and some Coloured supporters as well. The PNP is referred to as the National Party (NP) throughout the text, as the party returned to being known as the NP following the 1948 electoral victory.

of the rhetoric utilised by the State. Initially, Afrikaner nationalists might not have viewed ethnically divided group areas as unjust as it was "their own desire for separation and ethnic identity" that prompted the development of the system of Apartheid (Leatt *et al*, 1986: 72-73). It was driven as much by a need to preserve the fledgling Afrikaner group identity as it was by the aspiration of a State modelled around their guaranteed prosperity and way of life.

However, racial segregation was not an original Afrikaner initiative; the Dutch and British colonial rulers (and every administration thereafter) had implemented prejudicial policies on the basis of race (Leatt *et al*, 1986: 72). Nevertheless, Apartheid

> "represented the codification in one oppressive system of all the laws and regulations that had kept Africans in an inferior position to Whites for centuries. What had been more or less *de facto* was become relentlessly *de jure*. The often haphazard segregation of the past three hundred years was to be consolidated into a monolithic system that was diabolical in its detail, inescapable in its reach and overwhelming in its power" (Mandela, 1995: 127).

Every aspect of life would come to be affected by the immense network of laws and regulations implemented under Apartheid, with devastating repercussions for the social and cultural structures of society. Inter-racial relationships were prohibited through the Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act (1950), prohibiting miscegenation. Even the use of public premises and transportation was divided by race (Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 1953) (Leatt *et al*, 1986: 72; Mandela, 1995: 130). The Bantu Education Bill (1953) limited the educational opportunities for Black (and to a lesser extent, Coloured and Indian) students, aiming to provide a semi-skilled workforce that would never be able to compete with Whites (Welsh, 2000: 447).

One particularly notorious piece of legislation was the Group Areas Act (1950)[41], allocating urban areas according to race and forcibly removing people from designated "White" areas (Meintjes, 1996: 53; Thompson, 2000: 194; Welsh, 2000: 340). Nelson Mandela (1995: 130) commented that "in the past, Whites took land by force; now they secured it by legislation". The Group Areas Act, in combination with the Population

[41] These laws were extensions of pre-existing legislation, some dating back to the colonial era, such as the Native Land Act (1913) prohibiting Black ownership of land, and the Natives in Urban Areas Bill (1918) that regulated urban settlements according to race.

Registration Act (1950) and the system of pass laws,[42] further eroded family and community structures as men were forced to reside in the urban centres where they worked, while women and children remained in the homelands[43]. This effectively created a matriarchal structure within a patriarchal system whereby women assumed responsibility for the upholding of familial and societal structures while having to conform to traditional expectations. Every tool at the disposal of the State was called into service to implement and maintain this vast system of social engineering.

During the Apartheid era, South Africa engaged in a sustained military and economic destabilisation campaign in the region (Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004, 14) in an effort to create a buffer between South Africa and "hostile" (Black-led quasi-socialist) African states (Nugent, 2004: 295)[44]. The activities undertaken by the South African Defence Force (SADF) included:

> "... invasions and "hot pursuit" operations into Angola, pre-emptive strikes against the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia and Angola, actions against the [ANC] in exile in countries such as Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho, and military support for rebel anti-Marxist groups such as RENAMO [Mozambican National Resistance] and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. From 1975, the SADF invaded southern Angola regularly ... In response to ANC refugees in Lesotho, the SADF attacked "targets" in the capital, Maseru, in 1982 and 1985, killing 36 ANC members and 15 Lesotho citizens. … In Mozambique, South Africa's support for RENAMO and its direct military actions against ANC bases in Maputo, led the ruling party [FRELIMO – the Liberation Front of Mozambique], to curb the ANC's presence in its territory officially, as part of the infamous 1984 Inkomati Accord" (Stott, 2002).

This aggressive interventionist stance led to the formation of the Frontline States (FLS) in 1975 – an organisation of Southern African states[45] that both aimed "to formulate and coordinate policies in support of national liberation movements, initially those in Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and later in South Africa, and also to counteract their dependence on and therefore the regional hegemony of South Africa" (Swart and Du Plessis, 2004: 26-27).

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[42] Pass laws required all people of colour to carry passbooks in order to regulate their movements and restrict access to designated "White" areas.

[43] Also known as "Bantustans", the homelands were designated areas set aside for Black and Coloured settlements, as a precursor to establishing "autonomous" states (ANC, 1980).

[44] States such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were economically dependent on South Africa, and Namibia (formerly South West Africa), as a South African mandate territory, also posed little threat to the NP-regime (Nugent, 2004: 295).

[45] Members included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

As internal opposition to its policies increased, the SADF would be sent into the townships to quell protests, often using excessive force (Cock, 1991: 8; Thompson, 2000: 249; Marinovich & Silva, 2000). The use of the national defence force within South Africa's borders against its own people further contributed to the militarisation of society (Clarke, 2008; Cock, 2009), leading to the formation of the armed opposition movement, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

Despite the heavy-handed use of the defence force both at home and in the region, the Western international community viewed South Africa as a "bulwark against communism and an island of stability in a rapidly disintegrating Africa" (Welsh, 2000: 455). As Cold War rivalries played out across the Continent, South Africa found that it could garner support while pursuing its own objectives through the aforementioned destabilisation campaign in the region. Indeed, Western states, including the US, would often provide material support for these actions, as was the case during the Angolan liberation struggle (Nugent, 2004: 289).

South Africa used the antipathy towards communism to further domestic objectives as well. The 1950 Suppression of Communism Act "was drafted in such a broad way that it outlawed all but the mildest protest against the state, deeming it a crime to advocate any doctrine that promoted 'political, industrial, social or economic change within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or disorder'. Essentially, the bill permitted the government to outlaw any organisation and to restrict any individual opposed to its policies" (Mandela, 1995: 134; Welsh, 2000: 431). Even as international opinion started turning and investors began withdrawing, the economy continued to grow at a rate of around 7%, with exports continuing to increase[46], allowing the NP to maintain its course. It was not until the sharp recession in the 1970s that the economy began to stagnate, forcing the NP to begin considering concessions to its policies (Thompson, 2000: 221).

[46] Exports to Asia exploded by more than 300%, while American and European exports rose by 65% and 50%, respectively (Welsh, 2000: 456).

## 3.7 Organised Opposition: The 1952 Defiance Campaign and the Freedom Charter (1955)

The 1952 launch of the Defiance Campaign marked an upsurge in civil disobedience, aimed primarily at the pass laws, with the most common form of protest being the destruction of the passbooks followed by the protestors presenting themselves for arrest, or the blatant use of "White's only" entrances and facilities in order to prompt arrest and clog the Apartheid system (Mandela, 1995: 149; Meintjes, 1996: 50, 54; Anderlini, 2004: 5; Nugent, 2004: 299). The tone of protests was to remain non-violent, as the State had already demonstrated its willingness to use brutal force against demonstrators (Mandela, 1995: 147). As the protests gathered momentum, a cross-racial alliance slowly emerged, forming the basis of the "Congress Alliance" of a wide swathe of political opposition movements. The wave of mass actions served to enhance the credibility of the ANC. The increased co-operation amongst the various movements solidified into a cross-party alliance at the Congress of the People in Kliptown in 1955, where 3000 delegates adopted the landmark Freedom Charter that would serve as a "set of principles for the foundation of a new South Africa" (Mandela, 1995: 199; Leatt *et al*, 1986: 59; Nugent, 2004: 299; Hassim, 2009: 456).

Based on multiracial equality and ideas from people across the country (submitted through their representatives), the Freedom Charter would be the guiding statement which carried the ANC (and its alliance partners) through the struggle against Apartheid (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 59; Mandela, 1995: 199; Nugent, 2004: 299; Anderlini, 2004: 5; Suttner, 2008: 153). As the ANC anticipated that it would soon be forced to operate illegally underground, the event also provided an opportunity to publicly demonstrate its policies, gather support and present a "public display of strength" (Mandela, 1995: 199).

The Freedom Charter was envisaged as "a convention uniting all the oppressed and progressive forces of South Africa to create a clarion call for change" (Mandela, 1995: 199):

> "like other enduring political documents, such as the American Declaration of Independence, the Drench Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Communist Manifesto, the Freedom Charter is a mixture of practical goals and poetic language. It extols the abolition of racial discrimination and the achievement of equal rights for all. It welcomes all who embrace freedom to participate in the making of a democratic, non-racial South Africa, It captured the hopes and dreams of the people and acted as a blueprint for the liberation struggle and the future of the nation" (Mandela, 1995: 203).

The preamble of the Freedom Charter encapsulated the spirit of the struggle, declaring "only a democratic state, based on the will of the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief" (ANC, 1955), once again reiterating the commitment to equality in all spheres. Thus, the Freedom Charter served to further entrench women's claims on full and equal participation, enshrining their calls for equality as central to the liberation struggle.

There appeared to be a delicate balancing act between the autonomy of the women's movement (in terms of making representations on their own behalf) and working through the broader ANC structures. For example, while the Women's Section was a fairly autonomous organ within the ANC, women also participated within the central party structures. This participation is described by Bernstein (1985) as a recognition of "women's clear understanding that the reforms they need are dependent upon a restructuring of the state itself", and that this would only achieved within a broader liberation movement, particularly given the power of the NP-regime.

This did not imply that they assumed national liberation would automatically result in women's liberation, but that transforming the governance structures of the ANC would strengthen their position once national liberation was attained. As such, women continuously strived to "reorganise and strengthen the ANC" through their participation on committees such as Resolutions and Finance (Ginwala. 2001). This involvement stemmed from the openings created by documents such as the Freedom Charter, which enshrined their right to representation.

However, the prevailing gender norms continued to inform some of women's activities within the ANC, casting them in the roles of "wives and daughters of the ANC leadership" (Ginwala, 2001; Suttner, 2007: 237). Nevertheless, these roles also served as the basis for their political participation, as they mobilised around matters that had "immediate and direct relevance to their daily lives"[47] (Ginwala, 2001; Meintjes, 1996: 50; Govender, 2007: 67). This enabled a wide support base to be drawn from "below". Thus, the form of women's early participation within the ANC should thus not be dismissed as being "supportive of the role of men or performing conventional female roles". Rather, by broadening the definition of "feminist roles", the possibility should be considered that fulfilling these traditional roles within the political arena could in fact transform the way women are viewed as political agents (Suttner, 2007: 237; Govender, 2007: 80). The dichotomy of this view was not entirely shared within the ANCWL, and the dual objectives of organising around grassroots "women's" issues as well as mobilising around broader political concerns began to cause tensions amongst women within the group, as well as in affiliated bodies such as the National Council of African Women (NCAW).

This cleft could also be seen as the playing out of Molyneux's distinction between strategic and practical women's interests. While both interests arise out of the subordinate positioning of women in society, strategic needs are focused on creating "alternative, more satisfactory set of arrangements to those which exist", while practical needs are centered on the "concrete conditions of women's positioning within the gender division of labour" (Molyneux, 1985: 232-233; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 134). In other words, practical gender concerns are "usually a response to an immediate perceived need, and they do not generally entail a strategic goal such as women's emancipation or gender equality" (Molyneux, 1985: 233).[48] This conflict would continue through the liberation struggle, gaining intensity as women in exile began integrating feminist ideas into their goals, while women who remained in the country maintained a focus on grassroots issues[49].

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[47] For example, the undue economic burden placed on women by the law stipulating the purchase of permits for municipal wash houses led to the Orange Free State Anti-Pass campaign (Ginwala, 2001).

[48] Moser (1993) and Hassim & Gouws (2000) are among the many authors who expand on these concepts, outlining the practical and theoretical implications of this view of gendered interests.

[49] This is discussed in greater length at a later stage in this chapter.

Nevertheless, the history of women's effective organising within the mass liberation movement had been established (Ginwala, 2001; Waylen, 2007a: 524; Gasa, 2007; Govender, 2007). The unifying element for the ANC Women's League and the organisations to which it was affiliated was that national liberation was perceived as a necessary first step towards achieving gender equality (Cock, 1991: 48; Govender, 2007: 80).

These organisational legacies being established were consolidated as women in South Africa from all racial and ethnic backgrounds organised on multiple levels and within various (sometimes overlapping) structures in their campaign for equality in all spheres. For example, white-based women's organisations such as the Black Sash gained international recognition for their silent protests (wearing the ubiquitous black sash) and offered assistance to those communities affected by Apartheid laws (Meintjes, 1996: 55; Thompson, 2000: 205; Welsh, 2000: 452; Anderlini, 2004; Black Sash, 2011). Founded in 1955, Black Sash had an overt agenda to protect human rights, while not attempting to push a specific political ideology (Rauch, 1994; Meintjes, 1996: 55; Thompson, 2000: 205; Welsh, 2000: 452; Anderlini, 2004; Black Sash, 2011).

A notable example of the cooperation and consolidation amongst women's groups was the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW)[50], which consisted of women's organisations drawn from across the racial spectrum. The Women's Charter, drawn up at the 1954 inaugural conference, explicitly outlined the terms for women's emancipation. Arguing that the "status of women is a test of civilisation", the Women's Charter called for equal rights in all spheres, specifically noting suffrage[51], property ownership, pay and education (FEDSAW, 1954). As Govender (2007: 82) relates "women had been working hard at all levels of the struggle against Apartheid and in many instances in the struggle against patriarchy too, and had achieved a great deal throughout the country". For example, the 1957 demonstration against the continued imposition of pass laws on African Women was an experience that inspired and mobilised generations of women. Thousands of women were arrested across the

[50] FEDSAW was the precursor to the Women's National Coalition that was formed in 1992, and would prove integral to the participation of women in the transition to democracy, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

[51] White women received the right to vote in 1930.

country, including Winnie Mandela. Nelson Mandela (1995: 257) acknowledged the extraordinary power of the women's civil disobedience campaign as "courageous, persistent, enthusiastic, indefatigable ... [setting] a standard for anti-government protest that was never equalled" (Mandela, 1995: 257). Mandela went on to quote Chief Luthuli who stated that "when the women begin to take an active part in the struggle, no power on earth can stop us from achieving freedom in our lifetime" (quoted by Mandela, 1995: 257).

## 3.8 Treason Trial (1956)

On the evening of 5 December 1956, the majority of the ANC's executive leadership[52] around the country was arrested by the security police on charges of high treason and "a countrywide conspiracy to use violence to overthrow the present government and replace it with a communist state" (Mandela, 1995: 231-233). The indictment included the 1952 Defiance Campaign and the 1955 Congress of the People (where the Freedom Charter was drawn up). High treason was defined as a "hostile intention to disturb, impair or endanger the independence or safety of the state" and carried the death penalty (Mandela, 1995: 236). The Congress Alliance defence team responded that they would "strenuously repudiate that the terms of the Freedom Charter are treasonable or criminal. On the contrary ... the ideas and beliefs which are expressed in this charter, although repugnant to the policy of the present government, are such as are shared by the overwhelming majority of the citizens of this country" (Mandela, 1995: 244). While much of the State's evidence was proved to be fabricated, and various witnesses discredited, it was nevertheless decided after a year of preparatory statements that there was "sufficient reason" for the trial to proceed to the Transvaal Supreme Court (Mandela, 1995: 244-248).

The trial concluded more than four years later, in March 1961, with all parties being found not guilty. The eloquence with which the accused presented the principles and goals of their respective organisations, combined with the avid interest of both

[52] 156 people were arrested: 105 Africans, 21 Indians, 23 Whites and 7 Coloureds representing a range of organisations that had come together under the Congress Alliance (Mandela, 1995: 232), including respected activist Helen Joseph.

spectators and the press, meant that the trial was a publicity windfall for opposition groups of all races.

However, the occurrence of the Sharpeville Massacre during the trial fundamentally altered the manner in which the liberation struggle would continue, and represented a *key moment* in the way in which women participated in the political emancipation of the state, particularly following the formation of the armed resistance movement.

## 3.9 State of Emergency: Sharpeville and the Banning of the ANC (1960)

The transition to more militant resistance was predominantly precipitated by the increasingly draconian laws issued by the Apartheid State, as well as by the escalating violence with which the armed forces were reacting to protests. The Sharpeville Massacre, an anti-pass demonstration organised by the PAC on 21 March 1960,[53] constituted a *key moment* in the liberation movement (Welsh, 2000: 454).[54] During a "positive action" protest, participants would give themselves up for arrest at police stations in order to "clog up the machinery of justice" (Thompson, 2000: 210; Frankel, 2001: 68; Nugent, 2004: 301). Instead of the peaceful mass protest envisaged by organisers, police in the township of Sharpeville outside Veereniging (near Johannesburg) opened fire on demonstrators, killing sixty-nine people as they fled and wounding 168 others (Welsh, 2000: 454; Thompson, 2000: 210; Frankel, 2001: 150-151; Nugent, 2004: 301; Anderlini, 2004, 6). In the wake of the massacre, the country was swept with strikes and civil disobedience acts, including a march of 15,000 to 30,000 protesters to Cape Town's Parliament (Thompson, 2000: 210).

The government responded by declaring a State of Emergency on 30 March, allowing the mobilisation of army reserves. Scores of people were arrested[55], amongst them the

[53] The PAC protest was scheduled to pre-empt a planned action by the ANC (which was due to take place ten days later) in an attempt by the PAC to win supporters from the ANC (Welsh, 2000: 454; Nugent, 2004: 301).

[54] For an in-depth analysis of the Sharpeville Massacre, see Frankel (2001).

[55] The tally for those arrested in the wake of Sharpeville includes 98 whites, 90 Indians, 36 Coloureds and 11, 279 Africans. A further 6,800 were jailed following the protests in March (Thompson, 2000: 210; Welsh, 2000: 456).

organisers of these events, including the leader of the PAC Sobukwe, severely incapacitating the party. The Unlawful Organisations Bill was put into action, which banned the ANC and PAC together with all other political movements in opposition to the Apartheid State (Meintjes, 1996: 50; Thompson, 2000: 210; Welsh, 2000: 456; Nugent, 2004: 301; Anderlini, 2004, 6). The result was that all demonstrations (peaceful or otherwise) were declared illegal and opposition movement leaders were driven underground, signalling a new era in the liberation struggle.

The banning of the ANC in 1960 effectively banned the ANCWL as well[56] (Mandela, 1995: 301; Hassim, 2004: 434-5). However, the women of the ANC continued with their mandate of recruiting more active female members and campaigning for international support, both economic and political (Hassim 2004: 435). The ANCWL has been described as the ANC's "social worker ... performing the caring tasks that arose when people were far from their conventional support networks. Frene Ginwala comments that its role was 'supportive, a social network rather than political' ... [and] functioned as a network of solidarity rather than a mobilising agency" (Hassim, 2004: 435).

While the continued focus on social and supportive activities was critically commented upon by militant women activists, it raises important questions about what constitutes important work within a national liberation movement. As will be explored more fully within the discussion on security, the tasks performed by the ANCWL at that time may not have been glamorous or high profile but it does not detract from their necessity. Further, the fact that they conform to traditional gender stereotypes in terms of being "caring" and "nurturing" tasks does not render them unimportant. As Hassim (2004) comments:

> "... the necessity of the Women's Section's practical activities shaped its conventional role as a women's auxiliary of the national liberation movement. In this capacity, its role was both validated and valuable for the movement; however, this work pushed some women activists to question the extent to which the movement was, in practice, committed to women's equality and whether in fact women stood to gain equality automatically from national liberation. ... such moves to question the theoretical hierarchy of nationalist struggle and the male structures of authority within the ANC were less than easily accepted" (Hassim, 2004: 436).

[56] The Women's Section, under the leadership of the Women's Secretariat, was created at the 1969 Morogoro Conference to replace the suspended ANCWL (Hassim, 2004: 435), and benefitted from the leadership of a number of influential women, including Ruth Mompati, Gertrude Shope, and Zanele Mbeki.

It must also be remembered that the penalties for engaging in political activities were as harsh for the women as for men. These included bannings, imprisonment, and loss of employment that was often the only source of income in many households. Such measures would be increasingly applied against women as the Struggle intensified.

## 3.10 Spear of the Nation: The Formation of *Umkhonto we Siswe* (1961)

The violent overreaction of police to the student protests in Sharpeville, followed by the declaration of the State of Emergency that banned political organisations, significantly hampered efforts at organised civil disobedience. This necessitated a new approach by the mass liberation movement. The ANC resolved to form an armed wing to undertake acts of sabotage against the State, since the armed movement would not be able to directly confront the immense State machinery (Mandela, 1995: 336; Nugent, 2004: 302; Anderlini, 2004, 6).

*Umkhonto we Siswe* (Spear of the Nation, or MK) was established in 1961[57]. While membership of the ANC Executive was not open to Whites, MK favoured a more inclusive approach as it would allow the participation of a number of strategic partners, including the South African Communist Party (SACP), which had already began undertaking acts of sabotage (Mandela, 1995: 323). Nelson Mandela was given the task of setting the plan into motion, reasoning that sabotage would be the best course of action:

> "since it did not involve loss of life, it offered the best hope for reconciliation among the races afterwards ... animosity between Afrikaner and Englishman was still sharp fifty years after the Anglo-Boer War; what would race relations be like between white and black if we provoked a civil war? Sabotage had the added virtue of requiring the least manpower" (Mandela, 1995: 337).

The structure of MK initially mimicked that of the ANC, with a tactically-oriented High Command, Regional Commands in each province, and Local Commands overseeing the cells (Mandela, 1995: 336-337). Cadres were trained in exile (including in Angola,

[57] Other active armed movements at the time included the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), and *Poqo* (the armed wing of the PAC, meaning "pure"/"alone") which was largely defunct by 1963 after numerous arrests (Thompson, 2000: 211; Welsh, 2000: 514, Anderlini, 2004, 6). These movements did not necessarily share the ANC's views on avoiding civilian casualties.

Mozambique, China and Russia), and by necessity aligned with other communist powers, including Cuba (Mandela, 1995; Nugent, 2004: 302). MK cadres would also be integral to the formation of "self defence units" within the South African townships, formed to protect residents from attacks by other armed units and "third force" agents (Marinovich & Silva, 2000)[58].

The first offensive was launched on the day MK announced its formation, 16 December 1961, a public holiday commemorating the Battle of Blood River. Bombs were set off at government offices and power stations in Durban, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. The only casualty was an MK soldier (Mandela, 1995: 338).[59]

MK also participated in the liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia[60], in keeping with their stated objectives of the broader manifesto enshrined in the 1958 ANC Constitution where the organisation explicitly stated its support for the "national liberation and the right to independence of nations in Africa" (ANC, 1958: Clause 2). This statement of action would later define the foreign defence policy of the democratic regime.

## 3.11 Women, the Armed Struggle and MK: Transforming Roles

The roles that women fulfilled in MK were a curious amalgamation of traditional "feminine" and militantly masculine roles, blending stereotypical expectations with the requirements of the changing South African context. This dichotomy is raised by Cock (1991: 183), who comments "women have often participated in wars of resistance throughout Africa in their traditional roles. Women who carried firewood in traditional society carried arms in the liberation struggle. But war alters social maps". Moreover,

[58] These activities intensified in the pre-transition period, largely due to State instigators, and will be explored more fully in the next chapter.

[59] Examples of MK sabotage activities included an attack on the SASOL (South African Coal and Oil) complex in the Orange Free State in 1980, the firing of rockets at the military base in Voortrekkerhoogte in Pretoria in 1981, explosions set off at the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station in the Cape in 1982, and a car bomb detonated at the South African Air Force Headquarters in Pretoria in 1983 (Mandela, 1995: 338-9; Welsh, 2000: 285; Williams, 2006: 26).

[60] Wars in which the Apartheid government was also involved, although without fail they would be fighting for the other side, ostensibly to stem the tide of communism.

women in MK pushed the bounds of "acceptable" gender roles, striving for formal recognition of their status as equals to the male combatants.

Women formed an integral part of the broader underground movement and MK[61], undergoing the same training as the men, and serving in leadership positions with men under their command[62] (Cock, 1991: 163; Modise & Curnow, 2000: 37; Geisler, 2000; Anderlini, 2004, 8; Suttner, 2007: 240). Women engaged in direct combat as well, although these battles occurred predominantly outside South Africa, primarily in Angola. Suttner (2007: 245) recounts one example from an interview with Wally Serote, where a female combatant provided artillery fire during a UNITA ambush, sacrificing herself to cover her retreating comrades (Suttner, 2007: 245).

While the overturning of long-held stereotypes about women's abilities was not always a smooth process, the intolerance of discrimination by certain respected male leaders, such as Chris Hani and Joe Modise, did much to ensure that women received the same opportunities as men (Suttner, 2007: 240; Suttner, 2008: 126). In addition, the influx into MK of women who had been local level leaders and "couldn't be pushed around, they stood their ground" further aided the process of recasting gender roles (Hassim, 2004: 440; Modise & Curnow, 2000: 37; Anderlini, 2004, 8). These women often viewed the liberation struggle as an opportunity to challenge gender roles, and became increasingly militant and proactive (Cherry, 2007: 292).

As more women moved into exile (and into MK), they no longer confined themselves to separate women's organisations, expecting to be treated as equal participants within the broader structures of the ANC, including MK.[63] This expectation derived in part from the ANC's stated commitment to equality in all spheres, as reiterated in the Freedom Charter. Further, the militarised legacies of South African history reinforced

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[61] Women represented 20% of MK cadres by 1991 (Cock, 1991: 162; Hassim, 2004: 440).

[62] Jackie Molefe, Lindiwe Sisulu, Thandi Modise, Marion Sparg and Thenjiwe Mtintso are just a few of the women who led squads within MK (Suttner, 2007: 239). Some of them would later hold senior positions within the newly created South African National Defence Force (SANDF), as is discussed later in the thesis.

[63] The growing involvement of women was not confined to the opposition movement: women were engaging in activities on behalf of the State's Security Branch as well. For example, Olivia Forsyth and Joy Harnden were both intelligence operatives who infiltrated the ANC (Cock, 1991: 139-142), fulfilling what Cock describes as the "traditional female role of spy ... 'the Mata Hari phenomenon'".

the view that armed insurrection was the accepted means by which political change was affected. This is supported by Cock (1991: 198) who argues that the "widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of the armed struggle and the notion of a 'just war' means that the Western connection between feminism and pacifism is loosened in the South African context. In fact, the female soldier, the MK guerrilla, is a popular mass image of the strong, liberated women". Therefore, the right to militantly oppose oppression (whether in the guise of the Apartheid state or the patriarchal attitudes of society) was considered an inherent right by these women.

While there were obvious differences between the conventional armed forces of the SADF focused on conservatism and the guerrilla forces of MK aimed at change, there were also numerous similarities between MK and the SADF with respect to women, as Cock (1991: 162-163) points out:

> "In both the SADF and MK, women constituted a small minority in the 1970s ... In both the SADF and MK there were dramatic increases in the numbers of women soldiers between 1976 and 1989. Women now constitute almost 14 per cent of the Permanent Force of the SADF and approximately 20 per cent of cadres in MK. The two processes were connected in that MK's expansion after 1976 fuelled the SADF perception of 'threat levels' and a 'manpower' crisis, to which the increasing incorporation of white women was part of the solution. Despite this process of increasing incorporation, in both armies women are under-represented in positions of leaderships and authority".

Women in the SADF served almost exclusively in support roles such as administration and in the medical corps (Unterhalter, 1987: 108-115; Cock, 1992; Anderlini, 2004, 7; Moller, 2006). Unterhalter (1987: 111) describes the "patronising attitude towards women in the SADF", arguing that "white women are no more equal in the SADF than Blacks are" (Unterhalter, 1987: 115). The opportunities to attain positions of influence were also limited, not least by the fact that women did not receive comparable training to the men (Unterhalter, 1987: 115; Cock, 1992; Anderlini, 2004, 7).

Both Unterhalter (1987: 117) and Cock (1992) comment on the "elaborate cultivation of femininity" within the SADF that sought to preserve rigidly defined conceptions of women's roles within security. This was achieved not only through the curtailment of the roles and positions open to women, but also in the training provided for female recruits. Courses included instruction on proper dress and use of cosmetics, diet, and household management (Unterhalter, 1987: 117-118; Cock, 1992). Unterhalter (1987:

118) suggests that this "maintenance of 'femininity' is an appeal to perceived traditional values of gender difference which need to be preserved in times of stress and change", while Cock (1992) considers it as evidence that the "incorporation of women does not eliminate the subordination of women or even erode patriarchal authority relations".

This can also be seen in the manner in which motherhood was linked to militarism by both the Apartheid regime and the ANC, as explored by Gaitskell and Unterhalter (1989: 59), who sought to uncover points of similarity and contention in the strategies of these oppositional forces. In the NP propaganda at the time, women's roles as mothers was often cast as an alternative form of soldiering, as seen in literature which called women "indispensable soldiers within our country's borders ... their spiritual power is South Africa's secret weapon" (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 66). Another example of this linkage by the State of motherhood and militancy cited by Gaitskell and Unterhalter (1989: 66) is: "women were also 'doing service' every day, ' without call up instructions, without military pay, but in the service of the things which are dear to us- our families, our countries, our nation' ". The cross-racial unifying power of the ANC was viewed with concern by the Apartheid State, leading to attempts to emulate the ANC strategy by using the common experience of motherhood to draw in women from across the racial divide (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 66-67; Tickner, 2001: 58). However, "when the situations of mothers in different race groups is in fact so manifestly different, and in a context where radical transformation of South African society is not on the agenda, 'bridge-building' on the basis that the home is what mothers have in common becomes farcical" (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 67). The ANC also acknowledged the role of "motherhood" in drawing women into the liberation struggle, and retained its cross-racial emphasis in the statement made by the NEC in 1987:

> "The mothers of the nation, the womenfolk as a whole, are the titans of our struggle. The oppressors and the exploiters see in black womanhood nothing but the calloused hands of the washerwoman, the cleaner, the agricultural and factory worker: their white sisters are themselves domesticated possessions kept as objects for reproduction. Our revolutionary movement has long recognised the fact that an oppressive social order such as ours could not but enslave women in a particularly brutal way. One of the greatest prizes of the democratic revolution must therefore be the unshackling of the women ... These black and white mothers must reach across the divide created by the common enemy of our people and form a human chain to stop, now and forever, the murderous rampage of the apartheid system" (ANC, 1987; Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 71).

Later, women's organisations affiliated to the UDF (discussed in Chapter Four), such as the Federation of South African Women (FSAW) and the United Women's Congress (UWCO), utilised the mobilising power of "women's identities as mothers" (Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 136) to further expand their support bases.

The primary difference between the strategies of the ANC and the NP is that the ANC's approach seems "to go a considerable way to explaining the new vision of motherhood in the ANC as something dynamic and activist, rather than passively in need of protection" (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 73). However, Hassim and Gouws (2000: 141) caution that there is an inherent tension between the "conservatising aspects of motherism and the project to transform gender relations", arguing that "a political strategy based on motherhood is not inherently progressive, no matter how strongly rooted it may be in women's experience". That being said, it is useful to note the following statement made by Hassim and Gouws (2000: 142), as it intersects with the forthcoming argument about the manner in which feminism has been conceptualised in South Africa:

> "motherism is an authentic alternative to South African feminist consciousness. It has played a central role in making space for the discussion of the relationship between nationalism and women's rights in a context in which the more conventional western forms of feminism had little to offer South African women".

This argument is raised again in the following chapter, as the unifying power of motherhood was also utilised by the End Conscription Campaign, an organisation of predominantly white women using the basis of shared motherhood to protest the militarisation of South African society.

Within the context of this period of history, the diverse (and sometimes oppositional) ways in which the mother-military linkage has been conceptualised by the ANC and the NP had the effect of casting (or keeping) women in the SADF in far more passive roles than the women in MK, despite calling on similar gendered stereotypes. As Anderlini (2004: 7) argues: "whereas MK prompted change, the inherent ideology of the SADF was to maintain the status quo, not only of white supremacy but also of male dominance". Taking this argument a step further, it could be seen that using motherhood as a unifying concept created a starting place for the dialogue on what feminism means in the South African context.

The reconciliation of multiple conflicting roles provided some challenges. For example, while "maternal" roles remained part of the MK women's contribution, bearing children could limit mobility in terms of deployment. A range of approaches emerged from the various camps. Some report that "women deployed to the Angolan camps were inserted with IUDs [intrauterine devices] as a matter of policy", while another cadre comments "I didn't have to choose between motherhood and politics because the Women's Section made it possible for me to do both. I knew I could leave my child in good hands" (quoted by Hassim, 2004: 436). Other camps, such as those in Tanzania, established childcare facilities to accommodate female cadres who had children (Suttner, 2007: 242). There are some accounts of women taking their children with them on certain assignments in an effort to disguise their missions from authorities (Suttner, 2007: 243).

The dismissal of some of women's activities as restricted to logistical and "care-taking" tasks as opposed to frontline combat is misleading (Suttner, 2007: 233-244). The reconnaissance work done by cadres, such as Totsie Memela prior to Operation Vula (including the preparation of hidden guns caches, maps of safe houses and safe routes), and the provision of safe houses by activists such as Dorothy Nyembe (and many others) were activities just as dangerous for the women as for the men they were harbouring (Anderlini, 2004, 8; Suttner, 2007: 244; Suttner, 2008: 35). Drawing on interviews conducted with cadres, Suttner (2008: 63) relates how

> "these women organised safe accommodation for individuals on the run from the police ... managed an elaborate communications system and courier network linking the different units ... ensured that they knew the conditions of various people in need of assistance after experiencing repression and attended to their welfare".

The penalties were as severe if they were caught by the State: imprisonment (which included torture and extended periods of solitary confinement) and banning orders were common, which severely curtailed their ability to meet their familial and social responsibilities (Suttner, 2008: 35).

Thus, while providing safe houses and undertaking logistical tasks could be viewed as stereotypically female roles, the context within which these actions were undertaken (and the penalties if caught) transformed the manner in which these acts were viewed.

As Suttner (2007: 233) argues, women were "not merely perpetuating traditional female roles, but performing an essential element of the success of a military operation".

Cock (1991: 30-31) asserts that "in both the African and Afrikaner traditions there is an image of the tough but submissive female", which suggests that while men expected to be dominant, there was also an assumption that women would participate but in different roles. Cock also describes women undertaking activities such as armaments production and participation in commando units (predominantly in rural areas where women were compelled to take more responsibility for their own safety as men were absent for extended periods, or not at hand to offer assistance in an attack), and notes that "in this process of incorporation, traditional notions of femininity are restructured and expanded" (Cock, 1991: 112). However, this does not imply that established gender roles are disregarded; rather it refers to the addition of further roles.

Both Cock (1991) and Hassim (2004) have produced research about women in the armed struggle, based on many in-depth interviews with male and female MK cadres, which delves into the positive and negative repercussions of the armed struggle on gender roles. As Suttner (2008: 105) points out "liberation struggles are often seen as essentially defined by masculinist discourse, an essentially male and public terrain where women periodically enter" (Suttner, 2008: 105). Some accounts point to the assumption of masculine traits by female cadres, while others allude that liberation from traditional roles did not necessarily entail the abandonment of femininity. Negotiating the divide between masculinity and femininity in this context is therefore complex[64]. By and large, female cadres saw the experience as beneficial, as MK's standing within the ANC was such that it created new opportunities for leadership[65] (Hassim, 2004: 440).

This is echoed by Suttner (2008: 121) who declares that "the political predominance of the ANC means that understanding its gender practices and notions of manhood may be one of the bases on which gender equality will have to be grounded in the future". This is an important observation, as it was on the basis of the strength of the ANC that

[64] Duncanson (2007) provides an in-depth exploration of the construction of militarised masculinity and its implications for gender relations within the military.

[65] For example, Commander Thandi Modise had a distinguished career within MK, as well as serving as Deputy President of the ANC Women's League, and later went on to become the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence (Modise & Curnow, 2000: 36).

women were later able to create openings within the security structures of the new democratic State, emboldened by the emphasis on equality that permeated the ANC.

The willingness of women to engage in combat was outside the realm of the SADF's experience, as women were not viewed as having either the capacity or the inclination for violent conflict. As has been pointed out by Cock (1991: 162-163; 1989; 1992) and Anderlini (2004), women in the SADF rarely served in leadership positions, fulfilling more "traditional" administrative roles. Thus, the discovery by the State that White women activists such as Barbara Hogan and Marion Sparg did not only support the goals of the liberation movement, but were also volunteering for combat positions within the movement, prompted vitriolic attacks aimed at their femininity, labelling them "butch" and "misfits" (Suttner, 2007: 248). The ingrained ultra-conservative and racial dogma of the State could not comprehend that these women could choose to reject and violently oppose the ideology that was being crafted for their "benefit": it went against all accepted notions of White femininity.

Regardless of the assumptions of the State (or men in the liberation movement) about the "appropriate" roles for women in the struggle, women themselves continued to militantly engage in all forms of protest against inequality. These activities would increase as the male leadership of the party became fragmented, either through arrest or exile, necessitating the women of the ANC to step into the breach and maintain the presence of the ANC, continuing to violently oppose the State's oppression of their rights. While women had proved to be effective leaders within the ANCWL, the assumption of more high-profile leadership roles in the general ANC structures went beyond what was perceived as "appropriate" feminine behaviour. The expansion of women's roles was a direct response to the needs of the movement, and served to demonstrate their capabilities and further entrench the growing political power wielded by women.

## 3.12 Leaders Lost: The Rivonia Trials (1963)

The *key moment* that facilitated the expansion of women's leadership roles stemmed from the passage of the Sabotage Act into law in 1962, which allowed for house arrests and bannings not subject to challenge in the court (Mandela, 1995: 402). This law greatly increased the powers of the State to detain individuals under the flimsiest of pretexts, and carried a maximum penalty of death[66] (Mandela, 1995: 402- 403). Nelson Mandela was arrested in August of 1962 on charges of travelling without valid documents and inciting workers to strike. Mandela used his trial as an opportunity to voice his opposition to oppression and inequality in all guises, once again utilising the stage provided by the State to clarify and disseminate the ANC message (Mandela, 1995: 374-395). He was sentenced to five years imprisonment without parole, and began serving his time on Robben Island.

Nine months into the sentence, the State discovered the MK headquarters at Lillisleaf Farm in Rivonia. The entire MK High Command was arrested[67] and would be tried with Nelson Mandela under the Sabotage Act, with the State seeking the death penalty on charges of "complicity in over two hundred acts of sabotage aimed at facilitating violent revolution and an armed invasion of the country" (Mandela, 1995: 419). By not charging the leaders with treason, the State would not need to overcome the hurdle of reasonable doubt through the provision of witnesses and evidence on each charge, as "under the Sabotage Law, the onus was on the defence to prove the accused innocent" (Mandela, 1995: 419). At the same time, the State stepped up its harassment of the leaders' wives, for example refusing Winnie Mandela permission to attend court (she was under a banning order at the time) and detaining Albertina Sisulu and Caroline Motsoaledi under the Ninety-Day Detention Act (Mandela, 1995: 419). Following international media coverage of the trial, and protests from statesmen and citizens in the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Russia, amongst others, a sentence of life imprisonment was

[66] The provisions for house arrest were also expanded and used aggressively against activists such as Helen Joseph and Winnie Mandela. A related Act of Parliament made the printing or dispersal of any statements by banned persons illegal (Mandela, 1995: 402-403).

[67] Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Andrew Mlangeni, Bob Hepple, Raymond Mhlaba, Elias Motsoaledi, Dennis Goldberg, and Rusty Bernstein were all arrested. Only Joe Slovo and Bram Fischer were not present at the time of the raid (Mandela, 1995: 414-415).

handed down in June of 1964 and the men were sent to Robben Island (Mandela, 1995: 443-447; Nugent, 2004: 302).

The imprisonment of the male leadership pushed women to the fore; their organisational capacity maintained the momentum of the movement in a myriad of ways. Rebuilding the ANC's networks was one of the most crucial activities, and required "a balance between apparent low-profile inactivity (for purposes of police attention) and simultaneously undertaking – under the noses of the police – the difficult task of gradually building some semblance of ANC underground machinery" (Suttner, 2008: 63). Albertina Sisulu, Winnie Mandela and Lilian Ngoyi were central figures in this process, although their styles differed considerably, with Winnie Mandela's tactics considered somewhat "risky" (Suttner, 2008: 64). As Nelson Mandela noted, Winnie "behaved as much like a soldier as a wife" (Mandela, 1995: 343).

The upsurge in women's explicit political organising to compensate for the imprisonment and exile of male leaders did not go unnoticed by the State. Winnie Mandela remained a constant thorn in the State's side, but their continual harassment did little to deter her political activities. She was placed under banning orders in 1961 and again in 1962 (Mandela, 1995: 477; Du Preez Bezdrob, 2004: 111). After her arrest in 1966, Winnie Mandela lost her employment as a social worker and the primary source of income for the household (Mandela, 1995: 414, 477, 506). In 1969, when detained under the Terrorism Act, she was "relentlessly and brutally interrogated" for six months before being released without charge seventeen months later – spending almost the entire period of her incarceration in solitary confinement (Mandela, 1995: 530; Du Preez Bezdrob, 2004: 155).

After being imprisoned again in 1974 for violating her banning order, the State banished her to the small, ultra-conservative town of Brandfort in the Free State, placing her in a bleak township where she did not speak the language, had no running water, heat or toilet (Mandela, 1995: 587; Du Preez Bezdrob, 2004: 181-209). Despite ongoing police harassment and intimidation, Winnie was undaunted: she soon established a soup kitchen and a township crèche, and started fundraising for a medical clinic. Albertina Sisulu was also placed under numerous banning orders, restricting her to the township

of Orlando, and prohibiting her from visiting any educational institutions, hospitals or media outlets in an attempt to curb her political organising (Sisulu, 2002: Du Preez Bezdrob, 2004: 181-209).

Undeterred by the imprisonment of key leaders and the exile of remaining principals, the liberation movement continued, reinvigorating its efforts against the State and building momentum towards the end of the 1970s. This serves as another example of women seizing (and creating) opportunities for change, even within situations that appear restrictive and closed to action.

## 3.13 Students Spark a Change: The Soweto Uprisings (1976)

The NP, under the leadership of President P.W Botha, began a series of piecemeal reforms in an effort to revive the now flagging economy. The economy was suffering from the "critical shortage of skilled labour" brought about by the Bantu Education Bill (noted previously), and the lack of foreign investment due to South Africa's increasingly grim international reputation (Nugent, 2004: 311). These reforms included attempts to rebrand Apartheid in different terms while retaining the core of racial segregation that protected White interests. For example, limited representation was offered to Coloureds, Indians and some Africans, pass laws were eased for urban dwellers to enable home ownership, and the establishment of unions was allowed[68] (Nugent, 2004: 311).

While it was hoped that these measures would attract people of colour to the NP, as a result of "sharing in the spoils" to a degree, they were insufficient to produce any tangible results. Instead, the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) began gaining momentum, drawing inspiration from Africanist rhetoric across the continent as well as from the ANC and PAC. It emphasised Black self-reliance and called for "principled non-co-operation with Apartheid structures" (Nugent, 2004: 304-306; Leatt *et al*, 1986:

[68] The sharp increase in labour unrest in the 1970s was exacerbated by the State policy at the time that left employers with no worker's leadership with whom to negotiate (Nugent, 2004: 305-306). Once the disruptive capacity of strikes was demonstrated, the right to form unions became a necessity, and from 1979 urban workers were allowed to unionise. It was hoped that instead of being "political agitators", the unions would focus on "bread-and-butter" issues (Nugent, 2004: 312). The participation of the unions in the struggle will be briefly discussed later in this chapter.

59; Anderlini, 2004, 6). The underlying tenets were adopted by a variety of liberation groups, some of which utilised the rhetoric to justify racial exclusion of all but Africans. For example, the Black Women's Federation was formed as a national umbrella body of the Black Consciousness movement in order to "[mobilise] women against racial discrimination" (Geisler, 2000: 609). Others, such as the South African Students Organisation (SASO)[69], attempted to operationalise the fundamental goals of the movement, maintaining the inclusionary approach of the ANC by extending membership to Coloureds and Indians as well (Seekings, 2000: 30; Nugent, 2004: 306). One of the key goals of BCM and SASO was the promotion of literacy through better educational access, which ultimately sparked the controversy that led to the Soweto Uprisings.

The Soweto Uprisings of 16 June 1976 centered around the use of Afrikaans as the language of instruction within educational institutions, which the students saw as a double insult: an inferior education delivered in the language of the oppressor (Meintjes, 1996: 50; Thompson, 2000: 212). After a series of boycotts in schools in Soweto, the South African Students Movement coordinated the mass demonstration of 15,000 pupils aged between ten and twenty (Nugent, 2004: 307). In an effort to disperse the crowd, police fired live ammunition into the mass of students, killing 96 and leaving more than a thousand wounded (Nugent, 2004: 307). While the instigators of the Soweto Uprisings were students, the events set off a series of mass protests that fundamentally altered the liberation struggle, primarily due to the State's response.

Riots broke out across the country as the news spread, with workers joining in the protests. Collective resistance campaigns continued until 1977 when the government finally suppressed the dissent (Nugent, 2004: 307-310). The involvement of workers in the protests eventually prompted the creation of a "super-federation" of 34 affiliated unions in 1985: the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which included the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), and various independent unions (Nugent, 2004: 314). The

[69] SASO was founded in 1969 on the non-White university campuses of South Africa as a representative body for students and was a co-sponsor of the Black People's Convention in 1972 (Nugent, 2004: 304).

combined membership of 500,000 workers made it a formidable political force[70], especially once its overtly political goals were clarified: "the removal of the SADF from the townships, the unbanning of proscribed organisations and the repeal of racist legislation" (Nugent, 2004: 314). While unions had initially been hesitant to engage directly in political action for fear that it would undermine their negotiating position, it soon became evident that "it was meaningless to distinguish between community and labour struggles" and the number of wildcat strikes increased, leading to record numbers of workdays lost and establishing the unions as potent participants on the political scene (Nugent, 2004: 314; Meintjes, 1996: 50; Anderlini, 2004). While the ANC was not the organiser of the protests, its credibility amongst citizens was further increased and membership swelled – including more than 5,000 student activists who immediately went into exile (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 70; Nugent, 2004: 310).

In the aftermath of the Soweto Uprisings, a number of the concerns regarding the intersection of the women's movement with the broader liberation movement needed to be addressed. Prime amongst these issues was the level of autonomy that women's structures should have within the ANC. This in turn related to the membership profile of the movement, which included a significant number of women who were still largely treated as "second class members" until the 1980s, despite the provisions in the ANC's Constitution. Another factor was determining how international feminist movements (particularly those in Africa and other post-independence states) related to the ANC and its goals. The result was that "these influences intersected to reshape the ANC and lay a basis for new practices and discourses of gender equality and democracy" (Hassim, 2004: 434).

[70] Women were union members, but very few had leadership roles, even in unions such as the Garment Workers Industrial Union (GWIU) where women made up the majority of the workforce (Govender, 2007: 96).

## 3.14 Women Reflect on the Way Forward

There was a clear chasm between the ANC women's movement in exile and the ANC women who remained in South Africa. One way of characterising the split is that women in exile were focused on means of consolidating the gains of women in the post-liberation period, while women in South Africa were concerned with how best to confront the practical constraints imposed by Apartheid. The two sides began to coalesce following the 1976 Soweto Uprisings, which saw a sharp increase in the number of young women joining the ANC in exile (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 70; Hassim, 2004: 440). This required a stronger organisation that could provide strategic leadership to activists, both within the borders of South Africa and those outside. It was decided to reactivate the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW), which had originally been formed in 1954, and retain the focus on national liberation while pushing the gender agenda in a more coordinated fashion. Although the internal and external women's movement never functionally coalesced around the FEDSAW structure (Hassim, 2004: 446; Govender, 2007: 83), women were "beginning to organise more self-consciously around gender issues even if they did not use the term *feminism* overtly" (Waylen, 2007a: 527).

Of particular concern to the exiled women's movement was the lack of substantive representation in the broader ANC decision-making processes, and the lack of autonomy of the Women's Section, despite various guarantees in documents such as the ANC Constitution and the Freedom Charter (Hassim, 2004: 434). It is important to point out that "substantive" representation was the goal; it was becoming increasingly clear that the political will of various leaders was the deciding factor, which would thus result in a loss of gains when that political leader moved on. For example, Oliver Tambo is cited by various women as a key ally: "it was Tambo who was able to shift the tone ... from haranguing women to emphasising the importance of finding out what gave rise to women's unhappiness. Without the space he created, the antagonistic response of the [National Executive Committee] might have ended women's attempts to transform the internal culture of the movement" (Hassim, 2004: 447). As Acting ANC President, Tambo used his influence to further the goal of women's substantive contribution to the Struggle by appointing representatives such as Lindiwe Mabuza, Barbara Masekela

and Ruth Mompati. While not necessarily ascribing to feminist theories, this action allowed the women to "demonstrate their skills and also exposed women in the ANC to the rising tide of feminism internationally" (Hassim, 2004: 443).

By the 1985 ANC National Consultative Conference in Kabwe, women had clearly articulated their stance that the "traditional, conservative and primitive constraints imposed on women by man-dominated structures within our movement" was a primary concern (Hassim, 2004: 447). In essence, the women concluded that gender equality must first be attained and consolidated within the movement if it was to be translated into the post-liberation democracy. The NEC, under the leadership of Acting President Oliver Tambo[71], acknowledged the validity of this argument for the first time "formally recognising that women's equality would deepen and enhance the quality of democracy itself" (Hassim, 2004: 447). However, the awareness of women that their participation and autonomy was largely reliant on the political will of the leadership led to an increased commitment to providing political education to women activists; it was the only means by which opportunities would be identified and seized.

## 3.15 Women and Feminism: The Third World View

Within South Africa, feminism was not a rallying point for women activists. In an in-depth study with a range of informants, Cock (1991: 147) described the opinions of the women interviewed as revealing "widespread suspicion and rejection of feminism as anti-men or as bourgeois and divisive, as essentially reformist and concerned with entrenching and extending privilege". This was, in part, due to the way in which feminism was "marketed" at the time; the issues that were deemed to be important, such as sexual preference and lesbian rights, were, within the South African context, "viewed as irrelevant" and oriented towards the "promotion of middle-class women's interests" (Cock, 1991: 47, 1992; Gouws, 2008b). This was glaringly obvious under Apartheid, where Black women in particular suffered under far more restrictions than White (and to an extent Coloured and Indian) women. In addition to the cultural and social burdens faced by most women, the harsh laws restricting movement and livelihoods further curtailed their ability to exercise control over their lives (Waylen,

[71] Nelson Mandela, then President of the ANC, was incarcerated at Robben Island at the time.

2007a: 526). While some of the same hardships were shared by Black men, the domestic problems created by the draconian Apartheid laws fell disproportionately to women to solve, whether due to the men being employed far away in urban centres, in jail or in exile, or as a result of prevailing cultural norms that allocated the responsibility for the household to women. The interaction between Western feminist ideals and the goals of the women in the developing South is thus outlined in this section, which seeks to contextualise the experience of South African women.

The manner in which feminism debates interacted with the goals of national and gender equality was a point of contention, and was closely related to the split between the exiled and internal women activists (Govender, 2007: 124). Gasa (2007: xvii) argues that as women across the developing world sought "ways in which their own cultural and historical realities can be taken as a point of departure in feminist scholarship and worldview", women in South Africa continued to view Western liberal feminism as "suspect" or even "irrelevant", as discussed above.

This situation arose, in part, from the consistent depiction of women from Third World countries as passive, weak victims, whose life experiences get "reduced and universalised" (Kabeer, 1999: 459), more so than women from other contexts. This is particularly the case in matters related to women in conflict situations, where the essentialist descriptions of women deny the existence of female instigators and perpetrators of violence (Vincent, 2001). This is an important element in understanding the evolution of women's roles in relation to security, and is discussed at length in Chapter Six.

Suttner (2008: 124) concisely captures the essential differences between how Western feminists and women in the developing world view the role of women in conflict:

> "The fact that women have often entered liberation struggles initially as mothers has been seen by some as immediately disqualifying any feminist significance in their action, and as automatically and comprehensively reproducing patriarchal relations. Another argument is that participating in a liberation struggle tends to subordinate and ultimately displace feminist demands in favour of larger nationalist ones. It is also claimed that the military efforts of women tend to have no effect on their status after the war, and this idea seems to have proved true in many such struggles" (Suttner, 2008: 124).

While it is certainly true that gains made during conflict are often lost in the post-liberation period (Waylen, 2003; 2007a, 2007b), reducing the value of the contributions made by women performing "stereotypical" or "traditional" roles further reinforced the sense that two different concepts of feminism were developing as a result of vastly different experiences being played out in disparate contexts.

The concern therefore centers around the conversion of theory to practice, and the need to "develop contextually-based strategies and create workable alliances in constrained environments" (Standing, 2007: 109; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 131-132). This is echoed by Jasanoff (2002: 265) who warns that Northern concepts of gender relations critically underestimate the complex environments in which they must operate. Without a clear contextual grounding, the socially constructed notions of gender cannot be challenged effectively, as each society has entrenched processes of constructing and deconstructing social relations (Daly, 2005: 439). In other words, women in developing states did not see the utility, practicality or desirability of the ideas being sold by Western feminism – it did not have resonance with their daily realities[72].

The Cold War had a significant impact on the feminist debate in Africa as the wave of Marxist and Socialist ideology swept the continent (Waylen, 1996: 70-71; Heinecken, 2002: 717). The resulting exposure to liberal ideas from the diaspora created a melting pot of ideas that combined Western, Eastern and Developing World experiences and ideals. Even within South Africa, the overlapping memberships between the SACP and the ANC led to a diffusion of ideas about the ideal society and where women would find themselves after liberation.

A single unifying definition of feminism acceptable to developing world women which could overcome the "racist and ethnocentric assumptions of mainstream (Western and white) feminisms" (Sardenberg, 2007: 51) was thus difficult to come by. This was (and

[72] This is most often seen in the growing use of the term "empowerment", which aims to comprehend the underlying social and economic practices that impact upon gender relations (including colonialism and development policy) and thereby "[transform] women's position in national and international contexts" (Datte & Kornberg, 2002: 2). However, some analysts contend that empowerment is "rooted in the Western culture of individualism and personal achievement" (Datte & Kornberg, 2002: 3), which is often at odds with the communal credo common to African states and the concept of *ubuntu,* which places the community at the centre as opposed to individuals.

still is) partly because of the varying experiences of women arising from class, race, age, and ethnic differences, as well as differing views on new national identities. It made the formulation of a singular definition of feminism, which did not homogenise women and their understandings of their place within society, impossible (Waylen, 1996: 22; Mangaliso, 1997: 134; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 131-132; Sardenberg, 2007: 51).

The need to define feminist objectives within the development framework (such as welfare, poverty and education), instead of through abstract notions of power and social injustice, was a key concern, particularly as those who stood to benefit from the changes to the status quo "carry very little clout with those who set the agendas in major policy-making institutions" (Kabeer, 1999: 435). It was also a more definitive rallying call for women's movements themselves, as the clamour for resources was necessarily focused on issues of greatest national need, as well as matters of local concern, such as reconciling newly assumed gender roles in the post-conflict states with the continued cultural and social subordination (Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 131-132; Heinecken, 2002: 726). What women did take from the feminist debate (both in the West and from the experiences of other developing nations) was that while gender equality would not be achieved without national liberation, they would need to operate strategically within the Struggle to ensure that their issues remained on the agenda (Bernstein, 1985; Cock, 1991: 48). Representation on central decision-making bodies was thus crucial.

## 3.16 Conclusion

Stretching back to pre-colonial times, military conquest has laid at the heart of nation-building and identity formation within a variety of sub-national factions in South Africa. This trend accelerated with the arrival of the colonial powers and the newly formed ethnic societies, such as the Afrikaners, who assimilated the militaristic traditions into their developing cultures, further entrenching the centrality of organised militancy within South African society.

The rise of the NP regime in 1948 represented a *key moment* in the history of the country given the lengths to which it was prepared to go to realise its vision of an ideal society. Consequently, the 1950s represented a distinctive shift in the manner in which the

ANC, as the dominant opposing force to the NP, articulated and pursued its goals of political equality, which in turn affected the way in which women were viewed and participated within the organisation and the broader liberation struggle. During the same period, a number of catalysts for change occurred, including the influx of influential new members, the formation of the Youth League and the Women's League, as well as the influence of regional and international events, such as the rise of communism. The wave of independence movements sweeping the continent were also influential, as they impacted on the modus operandi of the ANC, and lessons were drawn by the women in South Africa that would prove significant in the battle for equality. The impact of the NP regime and its policies on the opposition movement further necessitated the shift from passive resistance towards a more militant approach, and this fundamentally altered the manner in which women participated in the struggle for democracy.

The other "shift" or *key moment* occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when the imprisonment and exile of the majority of the Struggle leaders necessitated the transformation of women's political, social and economic roles. Women were active political participants since the inception of the opposition movement in 1912, albeit with varying degrees of autonomy in relation to the liberation organisations such as the ANC. While their formal equality would be codified in various documents, including the Freedom Charter, their substantive equality would somewhat wax and wane in response to the historical events that impacted the broader movement, as well as the political support they could garner from the male leadership. When the struggle for national equality turned more militant, women grasped the new opportunities for more active involvement. This started the process of consolidating their power as political players in their own right, making their status within the liberation movement less contingent on the vagaries of the leadership, and enabling them to maintain the broader organisation's momentum when the State's policies began throwing the male leadership into disarray. This chapter also illustrated how women utilised their relative power as actors within the liberation movement to alter some of the norms and rules within the liberation movement by pushing for the recognition of the evolution of women's political roles, thereby impacting on the institutional environment in which they were operating.

The events described in this chapter establish the historical legacies of militancy, equality and increasing women's autonomy, which built the momentum of the women's movement towards a decisive *key moment*: the transitional phase culminating in the first democratic elections. These events also demonstrate the importance of timing, and particularly the sequences discussed by Pierson (2004: 68), in that the occurrence of certain events in the sequence in which they happened had a definite impact on the evolution of the women's movement in South Africa. In particular, the sequence of events had consequences for women's relative power, and their rising autonomy within the movement, which affected women's capacity to instigate change.

Building on this base, women began consciously planning for the post-liberation era, determined to heed the experiences of women in other liberation struggles in the developing world. First and foremost on the agenda would be securing a place at the negotiating table during the transitional phase. This would require careful manoeuvring, utilising all the hard-won gains such as the explicit inclusion of gender in various proclamations, both local and international, and the broad support base provided by their networks and alliances. The expansion of women's roles, and the political savvy gained from keeping the ANC afloat during the tumultuous preceding decades, made it a realistic proposition.

The next chapter details the transitional phase to democracy, showing how women approached the gendering of inherited state institutions under the new democratic regime. The complex layering of inherited state structures with newly established institutions presented a new challenge for the women's movement, and multiple strategies would be required in order to infuse the institutional arena with the principles (ideas) of equality and diversity espoused by the liberation movement. Understanding how this task was undertaken within the general governance structures of the State serves as a basis for comparison in the later investigation of the gendering of the security structures.

# 4

# TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: WOMEN ORGANISING TO CONSOLIDATE GENDER GAINS

## 4.1 Introduction

Throughout the tumultuous history of South Africa, women's roles in all spheres were expanding as a result of the intersecting legacies of equality, increasing women's autonomy and militancy. The broader historical legacy of developing an equality-based society facilitated the creation of an active women's movement, as shown in Chapter Three. At each successive *key moment* in the liberation movement, women acted strategically to entrench gender equality gains in the formal structures and instruments of the opposition movement. The inclusion of gender within the ANC Constitution and the Freedom Charter, the gradual rise of women within the leadership structures of the ANC following the Treason Trials, and the influx of women into the underground movement following the Soweto Uprisings had the cumulative effect of consolidating the gains made by women in the pursuit of equality, and increasing their autonomy. In other words, the legacies of equality and autonomy served to increase their relative power as political actors within the structures of the ANC liberation movement. As the momentum for regime change accelerated, women remained mindful of the experiences in other developing states: it was not guaranteed that women's liberation would follow from national liberation.

The transitional period that followed would thus be critical for the women's movement. Chapter Four resumes the timeline of the previous chapter, charting the continuation and expansion of the historical legacies of equality, autonomy and militancy that contribute to the understanding of *how* gendered institutional change was effected. What means were employed to keep gender on the agenda? How did women seize the opportunities created by the negotiation process? What mechanisms for inclusion did they utilise or create? An understanding of the bridging period between the ANC as an opposition movement and the birth of a political party reveals the means by which

women inserted gender claims into the foundation of the new State, creating spaces for participation and ensuring their input in the crafting of an equality-based democratic society responsive to gender claims on the State.

## 4.2 The Collapse of Apartheid

The demise of the Soviet Union in 1989 diminished international support for the Apartheid regime as Western states began to capitulate to the demands of their local constituencies to end their policies of "constructive engagement" that had been pursued during the fight against communism (Ramphele, 2008: 32; Hassim, 2009: 453-454). The ANC was also forced to re-evaluate its position as it could no longer count on material support from its Soviet allies (Stott, 2002; Solomon, 2004: 6; Ramphele, 2008: 31).

As sanctions began being introduced by the international community, the NP regime was initially able to stave off some of the impact. For example, large-scale operations had been developed to produce petrol from coal and South Africa generated half of the electricity used by the continent (Welsh, 2000: 489). The imposition of a mandatory arms embargo by the UN in 1977 (Thompson, 2000: 222; Solomon, 2004: 7) prompted the expansion of the South African arms industry (including significant exports), and the development of at least six nuclear weapons (Welsh, 2000: 489)[73]. However, these efforts were not enough to sustain the flagging economy.

Afrikaner unity was also dissolving with the emergence of a wealthy middle class (Thompson, 2000: 223) which started feeling the effect of a rapidly shrinking market and increasing isolation from the rest of the world. The economy started to freefall, due in part to the lack of a skilled workforce, disruptions in production due to strikes, and diminishing markets regionally and internationally as pressure for meaningful reforms mounted (Thompson, 2000: 221-228; Anderlini, 2004, 9). The effects of the oil crisis in the 1970s were also being felt, as loans were called in and investors withdrew (Welsh, 2000: 491; Saunders, 2004: 160).

[73] This would have a significant impact on the South African security sector, as will be discussed in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.

Some reforms aimed at projecting an image of a more moderate regime to both international and domestic critics were attempted, although they were not regarded as the start of the dismantling of Apartheid. For example, some of the pass laws were repealed, as were segregationist policies such as those concerning miscegenation, job reservation and wide wage disparities (Thompson, 2000: 226-227; Welsh, 2000: 491; Anderlini, 2004, 8). However, these reforms were not considered sufficient[74]; as Nelson Mandela commented "this is a pinprick ... it is not my ambition to marry a White women or swim in a White pool. It is political equality we want" (Mandela, 1995: 620).

At Oliver Tambo's urging, the campaign to "render the country ungovernable" was stepped up, prompting the State to impose another State of Emergency in 1986[75] (Mandela, 1995: 630-631). This unrest was initially limited to non-White areas; however, building on the momentum of the Soweto Uprisings and the rolling strikes by the trade unions[76], resistance towards the Apartheid regime intensified[77], drawing participants from across the racial and economic spectrum (Thompson, 2000: 228). *Exogenous influences* such as the end of the Cold War and the imposition of sanctions were thus impacting on the strategies of both the Apartheid state and the liberation movement.

## 4.3 United Democratic Front – Cooperation and Coordination

The upsurge of defiance campaigns necessitated coordination and, as a result, the importance of the ANC in exile increased dramatically following the Rivonia Treason Trials and the banning of the party in South Africa, as described in Chapter Three. Diversifying from fund-raising and organising military training for cadres, the administration of the entire organisation was now under the purview of the exile

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74 For example, while Black education funding increased, the State was "still spending more than seven times as much to educate a White child as to educate an African child" (Thompson, 2000: 227).

75 The State of Emergency would extend throughout 1987 and 1988 as the violence continued unabated from both sides of the ideological divide (Mandela, 1995: 644).

76 By 1986 the two national union federations, COSATU and the Council of Unions of South Africa-Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (CUSA-AZACTU), had a membership exceeding a million workers. Both union federations were politically militant and represented a "central force in the struggle for power in South Africa" (Thompson, 2000: 225).

77 In 1985 alone, there were school and bus boycotts, 146 insurgency attacks, 390 strikes (by more than 240 000 workers), and a recorded political violence death toll of 879 (Thompson, 2000: 229). A nationwide hunger strike by political detainees resulted in the release of more than 900 political prisoners (Mandela, 1995: 655).

movement. Mandela (1995: 521) notes that the "external Mission not only had to create an organisation in exile, but had the even more formidable task of trying to revitalise the underground ANC inside South Africa". There was continued tension between the movement in exile and the party members remaining in South Africa regarding the direction that the Struggle should take. This division arose primarily due to conflicting ideas about the continuance of the armed movement and the prudency of engaging in talks with the State.

The acts of sabotage carried out by MK were thought to be striking a blow to the State, and making it more likely that they would engage in talks for a democratic dispensation. MK remained focused on strategic targets, such as the 1982 explosions at the Koeberg nuclear power plant and the detonation of a car bomb at the Pretoria based air force and military intelligence office in 1983 (Mandela, 1995: 617). The State retaliated with a strike against ANC members in Lesotho where 42 people were killed, including women and children (Mandela, 1995: 617).

Mandela (1995: 702) argued that while MK was no longer particularly active during the late 1980s, "the aura of the armed struggle had great meaning for many people. Even when cited merely as a rhetorical device, the armed struggle was a sign that we were actively fighting the enemy. As a result, it had a popularity out of proportion to what it had achieved on the ground".[78] The continuation of the armed movement, even if it was in name only, was thus vital in terms of morale. However, the campaign to render the country ungovernable was reaping better results and drawing more participants as its effectiveness became apparent.

There were three main schools of thought within the ANC at this time: one which supported the escalation of the armed conflict to bring about a revolution (which represented a minority), one which saw the armed movement as a means to force talks and a negotiated settlement (which had the majority support), and the third which advocated initiating peace talks with the State.

[78] The activities of the armed movement in general, and MK in particular, were a sticking point once "talks about talks" began, as the State wanted the ANC to renounce the armed struggle before negotiations could start, while the ANC maintained that it was a defensive strategy against State violence, particularly the 'third force' activities described later in this chapter.

Irrespective of the differences in opinion regarding the course of the Struggle, both factions of the ANC, internal and external, recognised the need to increase the coordination and cooperation between the various liberation parties and movements in order to be effective.

This resulted in the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983. The UDF united over 600 organisations ranging from trade unions to community groups, women's organisations to sporting bodies, with the aim of providing co-ordination for the mass protests aimed at overthrowing the Apartheid regime (Seekings, 1991: 93-94; 2000: 29; Mandela, 1995: 618; Geisler, 2000; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 135-136; Thompson, 2000: 228; Welsh, 2000: 487; Hassim, 2003a: 48; Anderlini, 2004, 8; Govender, 2007: 79). The overarching purpose was to "create a united and democratic South Africa", based on the principles of the Freedom Charter which emphasised equality in all spheres (Thompson, 2000: 228-229; Seekings, 1991: 94; Hassim, 2003a: 48). The formation of an alliance with COSATU in 1989 under the banner of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) ensured that the subsequent boycotts and defiance campaigns mobilised a significant swathe of the population (Mandela, 1995: 655; Seekings, 2000: 228).

The UDF's primary function was to bring about democratic change, although some of the organisations affiliated with the movement also saw their involvement as an opportunity to further related goals, by virtue of their participation. Pregs Govender, an activist who would later serve in the first democratic Parliament, noted that women were able to demonstrate their strategic organising power on equal footing with many other parties and organisations, and further raised the profile of debates around women's equality (Baden *et al*, 1998: 8; Geisler, 2000; Hassim, 2003a: 48; Govender, 2007: 80). The UDF provided another space for action: women's activist groups saw the coalition as a means to both fight for national liberation and further broader gender transformation goals, an assessment shared by Geisler (2002: 610).

The formidable leadership of the various women's organisations became more prominent. This was partly due to the emphasis on grassroots power structures (Hassim, 2003a: 48), which had the effect of highlighting the existing power of women built over

the preceding years of gradually increasing autonomy, and which "catapulted women into public view as political actors" (Hassim, 2003a: 50; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 135-136). Hassim & Gouws, (2000: 135-136) comment that the women's organisation affiliated with the UDF "articulated linkages between women's issues and national issues", further pushing gender onto the national liberation agenda.

While the advances made would not overturn assumptions overnight or recast stereotypes altogether, it strengthened the campaign for equality as the women's capacity for mass mobilisation was demonstrated time and time again, particularly in the formation of the Women's National Coalition (WNC) in 1992.

Both the UDF and the WNC were important structures in terms of forging new alliances between women's groups, and between women's groups and other organisations – relationships that would prove useful in the new democratic era. Another influential alliance structure active at this time was the End Conscription Campaign (ECC). Formed in 1984, the ECC was a national coalition of 52 member organisations comprised predominantly of white women (Nathan, 1989: 308; Rauch, 1994; Anderlini, 2004, 8). The aim of the ECC was to protest the "increasing militarisation of South African society, and the role the South African military was playing in the front-line states and in the townships" by raising awareness and agitating for the withdrawal of compulsory conscription (Rauch, 1994; Nathan, 1989). The ECC argued that "conscription intensifies violent conflict in society and, in effect, denied South Africans their basic human rights" (Anderlini, 2004, 8), showing some points of commonality with another influential white-based women's organisation: Black Sash.

The campaign identified strongly with imagery of motherhood in order to garner support, particularly amongst white middle class women (Anderlini, 2004, 8), in a similar manner to the ANC, as described in Chapter Three. Nathan (1989) and Anderlini (2004: 9) argue that the ECC "was the first step towards political and gender consciousness for many white women; for the first time, many were becoming aware of the depth of patriarchy in their society ... especially in the political and security domains. In challenging conscription, they were questioning the militaristic values of the government as well as the idea of white male supremacy at the roots of the Apartheid state. This

increased consciousness and direct engagement with military matters proved essential to women's ability to engage in the subsequent debate on national security". The ECC also served a similar political educational purpose for white women that MK political training did for black women: it stimulated debate and prompted action against a gargantuan system that had an impact on every aspect of women's lives. Most importantly, it furthered the experiences of women in building effective coalitions that expanded the support base for the liberation movement, raising the profile of women leaders, and consolidating gains made in terms of women working as political actors in the public arena.

Hassim and Gouws (2000), Geisler (2000), Seidman (2001), and Britton (2002) expand on the crucial role played by these and other coalitions forged by women, not only for the impact they had during the liberation struggle but also for the critical role which these alliances played in the transitional period to democracy. These experiences in coalition-building would continue to be utilised to great effect during the transition and in the new democratic dispensation, as will be demonstrated in forthcoming chapters.

One of the key factors strengthening the mass alliance of the UDF was inclusivity based on broad equality, which cut across gender, race, ethnicity and religion. The emphasis on the application of the principles outlined within the Freedom Charter was indicative of the underlying resolve of a variety of political and civic organisations to create a new South Africa in which all South Africans would be equal participants. This determination would emerge repeatedly during the transition process, with the result that a diversity of citizens would be empowered to participate in the (re)construction of the State. As Seekings (1991, 2000) and Hassim and Gouws (2000: 135-136) argue, the significance of the UDF did not revolve primarily around the campaigns launched by the organisation and its affiliates, but rather in its role as a unifying umbrella structure bringing together various groups and movements that were striving for similar goals. It served to highlight the potential power of such co-ordinated action, proving that broad-based participation in the construction of a new political reality was both possible and effective.

Tying in with this emphasis on diversity and participation was the incorporation of gender as a key value of the broader vision for a democratic South Africa by a national network of powerful organisations (Geisler, 2000; Seidman, 2001; Hassim, 2003a: 64-64). While the UDF as a structure would not increase the number of women in leadership positions within the national liberation movement, it "hinted at the political possibilities that might exist when women's political roles were central to the survival of broader national politics" (Hassim, 2003a: 64). Thus the active involvement of women in the actions undertaken by the UDF served to not only advance the goals of the liberation movement and the women's movement in South Africa, but also aided the slow process of transforming political norms regarding the roles of women as political actors.

The commitment to unify citizens across racial and ethnic grounds promoted by the UDF was, however, not universal. The State continued instigating and exacerbating existing animosities between rivals in order to fragment the growing unity of purpose amongst the liberation movements, and to strengthen its own position within the negotiations that would inevitably be taking place.

## 4.4 Township Violence and the 'Third Force'

The 1980s and 1990s were characterised by the united efforts of political movements to bring about change through coordinated mass action. This spirit of camaraderie was not evident in the townships of South Africa, where savage violence was becoming the norm. In part, this was explained by the actions of rival criminal gangs, with very loose associations with the political struggle, taking advantage of the lack of law and order to wage turf wars (Thompson, 2000; Marinovich & Silva, 2000). At the same time, it was becoming apparent that not only were the State forces not quelling the violence, they were instigating and fomenting it.

The opportunity for State security agents to agitate an already volatile situation was presented in the form of existing animosities within the townships. The deepest divisions ran between Xhosa residents and Zulu migrants in the townships of Johannesburg, and the particularly intense hostility between IFP- and ANC-supporting

Zulus (Welsh, 2000: 508-509; Marinovich & Silva, 2000: 15; Harris, 2010: 11). While the ANC was multi-ethnic in membership, there was a perception that the leadership was dominated by Xhosas. The IFP had explicitly branded itself as the Zulu Party. Secret State security agents, dubbed the 'Third Force', would clandestinely support IFP armed gangs, providing arms and assistance during raids and attacks (Mandela, 1995: 703; Thompson, 2000: 229; Welsh, 2000: 509; Harris, 2010: 11).

From the State's point of view, the ongoing violence provoked by the 'Third Force' would disrupt the negotiations, extending the tenure of the NP, and could be covered up as "black on black violence" (Baden *et al*, 1998: 7; Marinovich and Silva, 2000: 14; Welsh, 2000: 509; Thompson, 2000: 249). The IFP feared that a negotiated settlement would result in the loss of the partial autonomy of the KwaZulu homeland, which would then become part of the unified South Africa led by the ANC (Marinovich & Silva, 2000: 15). The IFP thus accepted the military training and arms offered by the State. Marinovich and Silva (2000: 14) recount the "sustained campaign of brutal killings and terror, covertly planned, funded and executed by government security units and the police", citing examples where "policemen and soldiers assassinated political figures, community leaders and also hired gangs to spread terror in the townships".

A clear illustration of the complicity between the State and the IFP in the township violence occurred in July 1990, when the ANC was tipped off about a planned IFP attack on ANC members living in the Sebokeng township near Johannesburg. The Minister of Law and Order, the Police Commissioner and various other officials were informed and asked to intervene. Instead, police escorted the busloads of armed IFP supporters into the township and more than thirty people were massacred (Mandela, 1995: 704). Nelson Mandela reported that "the police and defence force were destabilising the area. I was told of the police confiscating weapons one day in one area, and then Inkatha [IFP] forces attacking our people with those stolen weapons the next day. We heard stories of the police escorting Inkatha members to ... their attacks" (Mandela, 1995: 703)[79]. In the Natal stronghold of the IFP, there were unrelenting

[79] By July of 1991, sufficient evidence had come to light confirming the financial and material support of the government to the IFP in the township massacres, becoming known as '*Inkathagate*' (Welsh, 2000: 509). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998) would amass further evidence detailing the participation of the State in these 'Third Force' activities (TRC, 2003).

violent altercations between ANC and Inkatha supporters where villages were razed to the ground and hundreds injured: 230 people died in March of 1990 alone, and the countrywide political death toll would exceed 1,500 in that year (Mandela, 1995: 689-701).

While women were routinely victims of the township violence, some were also active participants in the atrocities (Baden *et al*, 1998: 7), particularly in the vigilante justice that was meted out to suspected informers. Given the brutality with which police raids were carried out, being a traitor was the most serious charge that could be levelled at a township resident. The preferred punishment was "necklacing", where a tyre filled with petrol would be placed around the informer's neck and set alight (Welsh, 2000: 487; Marinovich & Silva, 2000: 48-49). One the most respected figures within the ANC, Winnie Mandela, dubbed the "Mother of the Nation", endorsed the use of this penalty. At a speech in Munsieville in 1986 she proclaimed that "we shall liberate this country [with] our boxes of matches and our necklaces" (Beresford, 1989). Winnie Mandela later received a six-year prison sentence[80] for the infamous kidnapping and assault of four youths, one of whom died of multiple stab wounds at the hands of her "bodyguards": a gang known as the Mandela United Football Club (Beresford, 1989; Wren, 1989; Mandela, 1995: 710-711; Thompson, 2000: 251).

While Winnie Mandela's actions were not the norm, township women reacted with increasing violence to the brutality they faced in their communities each day. The expansion of these women's roles within the informal security arena of the liberation struggle could be cast as an instinctive response for survival in what increasingly resembled a civil war in pockets of South Africa. It is also one of the many motivations through which women's combative participation in the formal armed movement can be understood.

[80] On appeal, this was reduced to a fine and a two-year suspended sentence.

## 4.5 Run Up to the Negotiations: Talks about Talks

The rapidly deteriorating situation within South Africa led to the realisation by both the State and the senior leadership of the ANC that a negotiated settlement would be the only way to quell the violence and begin repairing the economy. Overtures began between Nelson Mandela (who was still incarcerated) and a few key figures within the State in a slow process of mostly informal meetings that stretched from 1987 to 1989 (Mandela, 1995: 636-660; Welsh, 2000: 495).

The ANC stipulated a number of demands before negotiations could take place, including unbanning restricted organisations and persons, releasing political prisoners, lifting the State of Emergency and withdrawing SADF troops from the townships (Mandela, 1995: 660-663). Mandela (1995: 663) "stressed that a mutually agreed-upon ceasefire to end hostilities ought to be the first order of business, for without that, no business could be conducted". Mandela (1995: 663) further argued that the demands "put the onus on the government to eliminate the obstacles to negotiations that the State itself had created".

By the 1990 opening of Parliament, the newly elected President F.W. de Klerk demonstrated that a new era had begun. Sweeping changes were announced, and the dismantling of the Apartheid system appeared to have started. Bans were lifted on all "illegal" organisations (including the ANC, PAC, and Communist Party), political prisoners would be released, the death penalty was suspended, and a number of restrictions put in place under the State of Emergency were removed[81] (Mandela, 1995: 666; Welsh, 2000: 499; Waylen, 2007b: 77).

Once the "talks about talks" were formally underway in 1990, there were high hopes that the parties could reach consensus on the form the negotiation process would take. The first scheduled meeting was to take place in April, but at the end of March police fired live ammunition at a fleeing crowd of unarmed demonstrators in the Sebokeng

[81] The State of Emergency continued and troops were not withdrawn from the townships (Mandela, 1995: 666).

township outside Johannesburg, killing twelve and leaving hundreds injured (Mandela, 1995: 691; Thompson, 2000: 248).

Talks were resumed in May 1990, resulting in the *Groote Schuur Minute*. The ANC delegation, headed by Nelson Mandela, consisted of Walter Sisulu, Joe Slovo, Alfred Nzo, Thabo Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Joe Modise, Ruth Mompati, Archie Gumede, Reverend Beyers Naude, and Cheryl Carolus. The female delegates were powerful players both within the ANC and within the wider liberation movement. In the *Groote Schuur Minute*, both sides undertook to ensure a peaceful negotiation process once the State of Emergency was lifted (Mandela, 1995: 694; Welsh, 2000: 508). It was also proposed that an interim government drawn from multiple parties be instated as the "government could not be both player and referee" (Mandela, 1995: 694).

The subsequent *Pretoria Minute* acknowledged the cessation of armed action, set dates for the release of political prisoners and called on the government to overhaul the Internal Security Act (Mandela, 1995: 702). However, violence in the townships increased during this time amid reports of "third force" activities and, after calls for the State to dismantle the secret "counter-insurgency" units, talks were suspended again in May 1991.[82]

In July 1991, Nelson Mandela was elected as ANC President at the annual Conference, with popular unionist Cyril Ramaphosa serving as secretary-general (Mandela, 1995: 709). Key among the concerns voiced at this time was the transformation of the ANC from an "illegal" resistance movement to a legitimate political party, and the merging of returning exiles with members and affiliated organisations that had remained active within South Africa (Mandela, 1995: 709-710).

[82] The Institute for Race Relations estimates that in 1990 there were 3,699 political killings; similar figures are reported for 1992 through to 1994 (Thompson, 2000: 248). The majority of these occurred in the townships. From the Soweto Uprisings in 1976 until the elections in 1994, an estimated 30,000 people died in political violence, which Ramphele (2008: 39) describes as a "struggle that had all the hallmarks of a civil war".

## 4.6 Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA)

Formal negotiations finally commenced in December 1991. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) brought together eighteen delegations representing a wide spectrum of political, ethnic, racial, religious and ideological groups, and was observed by representatives from the United Nations (UN), Commonwealth, European Union (EU) and Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Mandela, 1995: 712; Thompson, 2000: 252; Harris, 2010: 13). Both the PAC and the IFP elected to boycott CODESA[83].

An exceptional characteristic of the CODESA negotiations was that

> "unlike the negotiations preceding new dispensations in African states like Zimbabwe and Angola, which required outside mediators, we in South Africa were settling our differences among ourselves" (Mandela, 1995: 713).

The government finally committed to a "power-sharing" transitional governance structure (Mandela, 1995: 713). A Declaration of Intent, signed by all political parties, outlined the vision for the new South Africa. This vision included enshrining multi-party democracy predicated on universal suffrage, an independent judiciary upholding constitutionally protected equal rights, and a new bill of rights (Mandela, 1995: 713-714; Thompson, 2000: 252). Five working groups would convene in preparation for the second round of CODESA in 1992, with the purpose of reaching agreement on issues such as the constitutional principles upon which the new State would be based, the form of the interim government, and the restructuring of various State entities (Mandela, 1995: 714). A referendum of the White population in April of 1992 revealed that 69% of Whites supported the negotiations for a new Constitution based on non-racialism (Mandela, 1995: 717; Welsh, 2000: 511; Thompson, 2000: 254), further driving the process forward.

A few days prior to the start of CODESA 2 in May 1992, two revelations of government misconduct became public. The first was the uncovering of widespread corruption within the Department of Development Aid, which administered the funds

[83] The PAC had negligible national support at this stage, while the IFP was still committed to the idea of a federal system that would preserve Zulu autonomy in Natal (Mandela, 1995: 713; Welsh, 2000: 505; Harris, 2010: 13).

for the homelands (Mandela, 1995: 721). The second was further corroboration of "*Inkathagate*" activities (discussed previously), in which evidence was revealed of State involvement in the death of four UDF members, including activist Matthew Goniwe (Mandela, 1995: 721; Welsh, 2000: 511). Mandela (1995: 721) commented that these events "undermined the credibility of the government and strengthened our hand", placing the ANC in a better position to direct the negotiations towards a more equitable solution.

The CODESA 2 mandate was for the multi-party transitional council to create the interim Constitution, in preparation for the general elections which would elect the constituent assembly and the legislature, drawn from both national and regional lists (Mandela, 1995: 721-722). However, the talks were deadlocked over the minority veto powers that the government was trying to build into the system in a variety of ways (Mandela, 1995: 723). Before a way out of the impasse could be found, the IFP launched an armed raid on the township of Boipatong on the evening of 17 June 1992, killing 46 people, mostly women and children. It was the fourth attack on ANC supporters in one week, and reports of government complicity gained further credence when no arrests were made and no investigation initiated (Mandela, 1995: 724; Welsh, 2000: 512; Thompson, 2000: 254).

Withdrawing from the negotiations, the ANC embarked on another mass action campaign to demonstrate its support within the country, including a march of 100,000 protestors to the Union Buildings in Pretoria[84]. A march on Bisho, in the Ciskei homeland, ended in bloodshed when the police fired on the crowd, killing 29 and injuring more than 200 (Mandela, 1995: 725-726; Welsh, 2000: 512). It was clear that only by re-opening negotiations would the violence ever cease, and in September of 1992 a Record of Understanding was reached wherein the terms of CODESA 2, described above, were finally agreed upon (Mandela, 1995: 726; Thompson, 2000: 255).

Further, following an initiative by Joe Slovo, a Government of National Unity would be formed for a period of five years. This would amount to a form of power sharing in order to keep the bureaucracy functioning during and immediately after the transition.

[84] The seat of Government.

In effect, civil servants would remain in place, the National Party would participate in the governance of the State (provided it attained enough votes in the general election), and security officers would be given amnesty (Mandela, 1995: 727; Welsh, 2000: 514; Thompson, 2000: 257). The Record of Understanding further established the basis of the proportional representation system that would enable any party gaining at least 5% of the vote in the general election to have a voice in the new multi-party cabinet (Mandela, 1995: 727).

This was a significant breakthrough and set the scene for the first general elections to be held. The fragile peace was soon broken by the assassination of the enormously popular communist leader Chris Hani[85] by a member of the ultra-militant Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)[86] in April 1993 (Mandela, 1995: 729; Thompson, 2000: 255). Impassioned pleas by the ANC leadership managed to divert the violence threatened by the youths of the ANC and SACP, who viewed Hani as a martyr to be avenged. A key moment during this period of upheaval was the announcement of the first democratic elections, to be held one year later on 27 April 1994, easing tensions considerably.

## 4.7 The First Democratic Elections

In the intervening period, the Multi-party Negotiation Forum (MPNF) was convened as the successor to CODESA 2. An interim Constitution was drafted, which established a bicameral Parliament consisting of a national assembly of 400 members, following a system of proportional representation drawn from national and regional party lists. Regional legislatures would indirectly elect the senate (Mandela, 1995: 733; Thompson, 2000: 257-258).

As voter education drives and electioneering began, potential electoral spoilers emerged. The IFP refused to register for the elections, and thousands of its supporters marched on the ANC headquarters, Shell House in Johannesburg, causing the deaths of 53

[85] Hani was a widely respected leader within the Communist Party, as well as the ANC, who had played a key role within MK, serving as its Chief of Staff at one stage (Mandela, 1995: 729).

[86] The AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) later tried to disrupt the talks again by driving an armoured vehicle into the negotiation venue (Thompson, 2000: 256).

people. The White right-wing continued demands for a homeland of their own, and also refused to register (Mandela, 1995: 738-739; Welsh, 2000: 513; Thompson, 2000: 259; Harris, 2010: 153-155). Eventually both parties were brought on board in time to participate, alleviating some of the tension.[87]

Given the turmoil in the run-up to the election, the four days allocated to voting (26-29 April 1994) were surprisingly free of serious violence. An estimated 86% of the electorate, nearly twenty million people, participated in the landmark elections (Thompson, 2000: 263). The ANC won the majority of votes in seven of the nine provinces, with the IFP sweeping KwaZulu Natal and the NP winning the Western Cape (largely due to the Coloured vote which was based on shared language and religion) (Mandela, 1995: 743; Thompson, 2000: 264). Nationally, the ANC stood at 62.6% of the popular vote (252 seats), followed by the NP at 20.39% (82 seats) and the IFP at 10.54% (43 seats). As part of the sunset clauses negotiated by Joe Slovo, former President F.W. de Klerk became Second Deputy President, while Thabo Mbeki served as First Deputy to President Nelson Mandela (Mandela, 1995: 743; Thompson, 2000: 264; Anderlini, 2004, 13). The NP would have 5 seats in Mandela's new Cabinet, and the IFP would have 3.

Mandela (1995: 173) noted that he was "relieved" that the ANC did not get a two thirds majority because if they "had been able to write a Constitution unfettered by input from others, people would argue that we had created an ANC Constitution, not a South African Constitution. I wanted a true government of national unity". This comment once again reflected the determination of the ANC to forge an inclusive regime of governance in which all the diverse sectors of South African society would have a voice; a commitment that would be echoed in the Constitution drawn up through widespread consultation. The Constitution of South Africa would entrench the principles of equality and inclusivity, which not only formed the basis of the new democratic regime but created unprecedented opportunities for the expansion and consolidation of women's descriptive and substantive representation.

[87] Another spoiler who attempted to disrupt the process was the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), who killed 12 worshippers and injured 56 during an attack on St James' Church in Cape Town in July 1993 (Welsh, 2000: 514). The AWB also planted numerous bombs in the run up to the election (Harris, 2010). The PAC did participate in the 1994 elections.

## 4.8 Women and the Transition: The WNC

> "the nature of the transition from non-democratic rule – it's timing, whether it is a slow or quick, pacted or unpacted one and its openness to gender claims – is another important factor. Do different paths offer women actors different opportunities?" (Waylen, 2007b: 40).

The transition to democracy represented an opening, with a specific time frame, in which to instigate meaningful gender change. The capacity to seize this opportunity for the entrenchment of gender equality within the new democratic state was built over the course of the armed liberation movement (as described in Chapter Three) and strengthened during the transitional period as will be discussed in the next section. In particular, the power vested in women by their broad support base at the grassroots level and their solidarity with the party leadership, would play an integral part in securing their place at the negotiating table and enable them to influence the (re)construction of the institutional structures of South Africa. The formation of the Women's National Coalition (WNC) was central to this process, which demonstrated the influence of women's strategic organising facilitated by the legacies of equality and increasing autonomy throughout the liberation struggle.

Although there were sharp divisions between the various women's movements, and within the ANCWL itself (as examined previously), the need for united action was apparent. The Malibongwe Conference (held in Amsterdam in 1992) allowed, for the first time, for robust debate between activists, academics, and exiled women (Meintjes, 1996: 47-48; Baden *et al*, 1998: 8-9; Geisler, 2000: 611; Anderlini, 2004, 9; Waylen, 2007a: 529). The two key conclusions drawn during the conference were that women's liberation and national liberation were inseparable, and that it was imperative for women to have meaningful representation at the forthcoming negotiation forums.

In 1992, the women of the ANC initiated the broadest alliance of women's organisations in the history of the country. Gathering under the banner of the Women's National Coalition (WNC) were women from political parties including the PAC, NP and the Communist Party, as well as a range of liberal and conservative organisations, representing both rural and urban women from every racial, religious and ethnic group (Meintjes, 1996: 47, 49, 59; 2005: 231; Baden *et al*, 1998: 8; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 137;

Geisler, 2000: 613; Britton, 2002; Hassim, 2003b: 505; Govender, 2007: 125; Waylen, 2007b: 77). The 90 organisations and 13 regional coalitions that constituted the WNC operated independently as a movement with two goals: to establish a unified national women's movement, and to participate in the political process of engineering the new State (Meintjes, 1996: 47, 59; Geisler, 2000: 610; Albertyn, 2003: 101; Anderlini, 2004, 9; Waylen, 2007b: 77).

Gender equality had been placed on the agenda as part and parcel of the opposition demands for the new democratic regime (Seidman, 2001; Anderlini, 2004; Waylen, 2007b: 77), although the convener of the WNC, Frene Ginwala, who would later become the first Speaker of Parliament, pronounced

> "Our experience has been that the more powerful the committee, the fewer the women ... They will talk of non-sexism, they will not practice it. The air around us is thick with talk of change, of the end of racism and Apartheid, of a new era of democracy. Is the change we are all talking about going to mean simply adding some black where white men sat before?" (quoted by Govender, 2007: 126).

It was therefore imperative that women remained focused on not only keeping gender equality on the agenda, but also pushing for its operationalisation. In this way, gender rights could be entrenched from the inception of the negotiation process, consolidating the gains made over the decades of the Struggle, and ensuring that women would be equal participants in the new regime emerging from the MPNF.

Given that negotiations with the State for a new democratic society had already begun, women were galvanised into action to ensure their voices were heard and that the process of Constitution-building included their point of view (Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 138; Britton, 2002; Albertyn, 2003; Hassim, 2003b: 505, 508; Anderlini, 2004, 10; Meintjes, 2005: 232; Waylen, 2007b: 77). To this end, the coalition launched the Women's Charter, under the leadership of Pregs Govender, to articulate their goals and generate publicity for their issues (WNC, 1994; Meintjes, 1996: 60-61; 2005: 231-232; Geisler, 2000: 613; Govender, 2007: 126-130).

The Women's Charter recognised the political, economic and social ramifications of excluding women from the development of South Africa, noting women's "invaluable contributions to society despite widespread gender discrimination" (WNC, 1994).

Asserting the need for "shared responsibilities and decision-making in all areas of public and private life", the Women's Charter explicitly laid out its mandate:

> "Democracy and human rights, if they are to be meaningful to women, must address out historic subordination and oppression. For women to be able to participate in, and shape the nature and form of our democracy, the concepts of both human rights and democracy must be redefined and interpreted in ways which encompass women's diverse experiences. We require society to be reorganised, and its institutions to be restructured to take cognisance of all women. In particular, women should have full opportunity and access to leadership positions and decision-making at all levels and in all sectors of society" (WNC, 1994).

The reasoning behind this unifying Charter was that "unless women at the negotiating table were backed by a strong women's movement, they would not be taken seriously. They would be powerless to make the changes women needed in South Africa's new Constitution" (Govender, 2007: 126; Albertyn, 2003: 99-101; Hassim, 2003b: 508; Anderlini, 2004, 10; Waylen, 2007b: 77-78). The results were heartening: at the next round of negotiations, the Multi-Party Negotiation Forum (MPNF), women represented 50% of the official delegates, with all participating organisations undertaking to include at least one female delegate on technical committees (Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 124; Britton, 2002; Albertyn, 2003: 101; Anderlini, 2004, 11).

Gender equality was reaffirmed as a core constitutional principle. Most notably, the constitutional gender clause would supersede the authority of customary law, which was also part of the new Constitution, in order to foster unity with traditional leaders (Geisler, 2000: 614; Albertyn, 2003: 101; Meintjes, 2005: 232; Waylen, 2007b: 78). This constituted a significant achievement because in many African liberation movements women had been excluded from formal and informal negotiations, particularly high-profile events (Sorenson, 1998: iv; Walsh, 2006: 85). This exclusion would invariably result "in a lack of direct influence on the identification of reconstruction priorities that are usually part of a peace agreement" (Sorenson, 1998: iv).

The cumulative effect of the increasing autonomy and relative power of the South African women's movement therefore enabled women to participate in the transitional process to a greater degree, or, as Hassim and Gouws (2000: 139) put it: "the broader context of transition provided a framework within which an articulate women's movement could make certain gains".

However, the WNC did not expect vague "notions of sisterhood ... to sustain us" (Govender, 2007: 127; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 139-141): the women affiliated within the WNC were all working towards the twin goals of national liberation and gender equality, and had established their own networks, target issues and activities. These were not subsumed by their membership of the WNC. Instead, Pregs Govender pitched the coalition as a catalyst for change:

> "Women had to start from this reality, recognise their own power and raise the debate in the country by putting women's issues on the agenda in all political parties, in trade unions, in sport, media, the law and education. It was up to each one of us individually and collectively to do this, and to make each other aware of what we could achieve when we came together. As women took action in different parts of the country, these experiences would build the campaign nationally. And so my mantra became: 'Use the coalition campaign as a catalyst to build women's power. Don't expect power to come from up above, like manna from heaven'" (Govender, 2007: 127).

The combined effort of women politicians, activists, feminists and academics provided a strategic advantage which was effectively wielded at a critical moment in South African history (Meintjes, 1996; Anderlini, 2004; Waylen, 2007b: 78). The power of the WNC during the transitional period was largely due to its ability to draw participants and partners from most active political parties and movements, widening its constituency and empowering women to push their organisational leadership for change (Baden *et al*, 1998: 24; Britton, 2002; Albertyn, 2003: 101; Anderlini, 2004).

The manner in which women organised as women, and used their political power to affect institutional change (in terms of shaping the new institutional environment), was critical as it created spaces for future participation. Meintjes (1996: 59) and Britton (2002: 39) comment on the extraordinary unity of purpose demonstrated by the WNC, given the diversity of the alliance's membership: a testament to the expanding experiences of women actors in the art of coalition building. Hassim and Gouws (2000: 143-144) assert that the "successes of the [WNC] have also opened up the discursive space for feminism to be debated in new ways. The demands for participation, representation and for changing gender power relations have become an acceptable part of the discourse of women's organisations".

The manner in which the WNC navigated the diversity of member's interests was also central to its success, according to Meintjes (1996: 59) who opines that the broad spectrum of ideological and political views encompassed by the WNC membership was testament to the ability of the WNC to move "away from the essentialism which had dogged feminist initiatives elsewhere in the world". Most importantly, "the arguments adopted by the [WNC] during the negotiations process emphasised the need to *recognise* and *include* women in the public sphere; the substance of the debate was *how* they should be included" (Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 146; Anderlini, 2004).

While acknowledging the impact of increasing the representation of women in the negotiation talks (and thereby having an input into the formation of the new State), further steps had to be taken to ensure that rhetoric could be transformed into action after the transition period. Key to this goal would be the formalisation of gender equality into the founding documents of the new South Africa, particularly in the Constitution. The participation of women in the transitional negotiations therefore represented a *key moment* in the paths of women's autonomy and equality: a moment in time during which organised women had the means to utilise the power amassed to create openings for future action, and thereby set the groundwork for the sustainable participation of women within the incoming democratic regime.

## 4.9 A New Constitution: Formalising Gender Claims

The importance of a robust legal framework within which gender claims can be substantiated has been demonstrated through the gains achieved as a result of documents such as the Beijing Declaration and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Rai, 2004: 590; Subrahmanian, 2007: 112; Woodford-Berger, 2007: 124; Batliwala & Dhanraj, 2007: 27). As Sorenson points out:

> "For women, constitution-making is of uttermost importance, as the lack of recognition of their rights in a new constitution will have long-term impacts on their recovery and options for development" (Sorenson, 1998: 12).

Further, the Constitution serves as the guide for new legislation as it "reflect[s] the new political reality, changes in power relationships, and ideological objectives" (Sorenson, 1998: 12), and the resulting "gender-specific laws ... create new bases to overcome

discrimination" (Suneja, 2002: 31). Thus, the Constitution does more than define economic, political and social rights: it serves as a critical element in the empowerment of the marginalised (Sorenson, 1998: 13).

The concerted power of women in the transitional period, thanks in part to the might of the WNC at the time, aided in the inclusion of women's rights into a landmark Constitution that was internationally hailed as a monument to human rights (Meintjes, 1996: 47; Albertyn, 2003: 99-101; Calland, 2006: 7-8; Govender, 2007: 137).

This was a significant victory for women (and women's activism), as the integration of gender rights into the Constitution "created a favourable context for women to make rights claims on this and future governments" (Baden *et al*, 1998: 10; Britton, 2002; Hassim, 2003c; Anderlini, 2004). This gender gain was further strengthened by the emphasis on human rights championed by the ANC and entrenched within the Bill of Rights, and which formed the cornerstone of the transformation agenda (Baden *et al*, 1998: 10; Albertyn, 2003: 102-105; Anderlini, 2004; Ramphele, 2008: 14, 108). Together, these two documents legally and unequivocally entrenched gender equality into the institutional fabric of the new South Africa; enacting it would be a matter of political will. This is reiterated by Kabeer (1999: 462) who cautions that "creating constitutional provision for political participation ... [is] unlikely to be automatically empowering [but does] ... create the vantage point of alternatives which allows a more transformatory consciousness to come into play".

The importance of the political will (of both male and female politicians) cannot be underestimated, and is one of the key issues explored in the analysis of the first democratic regime (Chapter Five). The proportional representation system, which does not bind office-holders to a specific constituency, places loyalty with the party above all else, as the party leadership determines whether position (and prestige) will be retained. Thus, lasting change is only possible through collaboration and cooperation between both sexes. Related to the link between political will and the proportional representation system, is the tempering of political action due to the marginalisation, manipulation and compromises required to remain within party lines. While women were certainly present in sufficient numbers to instigate change, their power to play a transformational role was

necessarily constrained by their reliance on the (male) party leadership to keep them on the electoral party lists, as is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Nevertheless, this political reality does not diminish the magnitude of the inclusion in unequivocal terms of gender equality within the Constitution. As Mackay, Myers and Brown (2003: 90) point out, female policy makers do push alternative priorities, particularly in situations where the bureaucratic system has been restructured to empower women to challenge the agenda, which is essentially what the Constitution and Bill of Rights aimed to do.

While the transitional government was charged with instituting a bureaucratic system that was open to claims from all sectors of society, particularly those that have been historically marginalised, the Constitution would ensure that the right to make such claims would be protected in the strongest terms available to the State. This represented a convergence of the paths of equality and autonomy, a *key moment* at which gender gains were consolidated through the entrenchment of rights within the foundational documents of the State, reaffirming equality as a core value of the emerging democratic State.

## 4.10 Conclusion: Women at the End of the Transition

In any analysis of gender and transitions, the manner in which women participated in the liberation movement, and the consolidation of gains in the period thereafter, constitutes a critical consideration (Waylen, 2003: 158). From the increased militancy of women in the face of escalating violence within their communities to the formation of strategic alliances in order to push for women's liberation concurrently with national liberation, the assertion by Waylen (2003: 158) that "women's movements often use a wide and adaptable strategic repertoire of different alliances and actions over multiple political venues" has clearly been shown to have been the case in South Africa.

From the creation of new alliances and coalitions, such as the formation of the WNC and the UDF, or the continuation of previously effective strategies within the ANC, the women's movement relentlessly pursued the twin goals of women's and national

liberation. This process was aided by the continuing rise in women's autonomy within the liberation movement, despite increasingly severe measures by the State to curtail political opposition. Further, the entrenchment of equality rhetoric in not only the ANC but also in other organisations and coalitions involved in the liberation movement provided new opportunities for strategic action by women and enabled a growth in their collective and individual power as gender roles evolved and expanded. A correlation between the increasing "stickiness" of ideas about equality within the liberation movement, and the expansion of women's power and autonomy can clearly be seen.

By the end of the transition, women had ensured that their concerns were placed on the agenda and that respected women leaders were participating in furthering their claims on the State. Their right to substantive representation at all levels (both within the party and the State) was acknowledged. The momentum and might created by the broad-based WNC were being wielded to great effect.

A significant achievement in the long battle for formal gender rights was the campaign by the WNC to place women at the negotiating table of the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum. The provision of a forum at which women could articulate their expectations of the new democratic State enabled women to actively influence the establishment of new institutional norms and values. This participation led directly to the second notable success for women's rights during the transition period: the entrenchment of gender equality within the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The inclusion of explicit gender provisions within these foundational documents would serve as a basis for further action in terms of the creation of mechanisms aimed at gendering State institutions, the consideration of gender differentiated needs during policy formulation, and various other methods of entrenching gender equality and transforming institutional norms and values.

While these achievements were laudable, the next challenge would be the utilisation of all their political and social power to carry these gains over to the new State structures, and cement their newfound influence. The steps taken by women in response to the *key moments* outlined this chapter ensured that they were strategically positioned to exercise the power gained over the course of the liberation struggle within the new democratic

structures of the State. In other words, women were poised to engage as equal actors within the institutions of post-conflict South Africa, with the aim of infusing the fledgling democratic structures with the equality-based norms of the ANC. Thus, the next chapter considers the consolidation of these gender gains, and the means by which sustainable institutional change could be achieved. How did women fare in the first democratic regime in terms of descriptive and substantive representation? Were the strategies set forth by the gender mainstreaming approach being integrated into the institutions of the new State? What were some of the key challenges and opportunities of the new democracy? This will provide the institutional context for the forthcoming discussion on women and the reform of South Africa's security sector in Part III, and enable a contextualised investigation of the processes of gendered institutional change in the security structures of the State, and uncovering *how* gendered institutional change occurred.

# 5

# WOMEN AND THE FIRST DEMOCRATIC REGIME

## 5.1 Introduction

By the dawn of the new democratic era, the South African women's movement was strategically positioned to shape the institutional structures of the first democratic regime. As the two preceding chapters have shown, the increasing autonomy of women within the ANC arose due to a combination of three primary factors. Firstly, the seizing of opportunities following *key moments* in the history of the liberation struggle, which expanded women's roles within the leadership structures of the movement, including in the security arena. The growth and recognition of these roles was especially notable following events such as the Treason Trials and the Soweto Uprisings, as detailed in Chapter Three, and was facilitated by the centrality of the ANC's equality-based philosophy.

The second factor was the entrenchment of these gains through the inclusion of gender rights within foundational documents such as the ANC Constitution and the Freedom Charter, and the formal representation of women in the governing structures of the ANC – an indicator of women's increasing autonomy and the recognition of their status as political actors within the liberation movement. The impact of these gains was made evident in the role that women played during the transition process, as described in Chapter Four. By securing a place at the negotiating table during the Multi-Party Negotiation Forum (MPNF), women were later able to embed gender rights within the new Constitution and the Bill of Rights, providing a foundation from which measures for attaining gender equality within institutional structures could be built.

The third factor was the changing normative environment brought about by the cumulative effect of the increased strength of the women's movement, the entrenchment of gender gains within the founding documents of the State, and the ANC's vision of a society predicated on equality and human rights. The oft-stated

commitment of the ANC to women's representation in all structures (ANC, 1955, 1958, 1991, 1998, 2002) would be put into practice with a 30% quota on party lists, which would guarantee women a voice within the new democratic State (Baden *et al*, 1998: 19; Geisler, 2000: 606; Albertyn, 2003: 102; Hassim, 2003c; Anderlini, 2004, 11; Waylen, 2007a: 534; Gouws, 2008a). Britton (2002) expands on the importance of the consolidation of these changes within the constitutional context, noting that it enabled women to move "from the 'silent backbone' of the nation to a force of considerable political power and public influence" (Britton, 2002: 36). Geisler (2002: 606) also discusses the significance of the influx of women and the diversity of the backgrounds of these women, arguing that their positions of prominence, together with the proportion of women in Parliament, enabled women to "substantially influence both political cultures and policy outcomes". These collective gains and advancements in the substantive and descriptive representation of women heralded the forging of a new path; the establishment of a fresh legacy as the historical path of women within the liberation movement drew to a close, and the path of women within government began.

The active participation of women in the liberation process in a variety of capacities, from stridently militant to logistical planners to grassroots activists, heightened their consciousness of their increased power and influence, and their subsequent capacity to affect change (Meintjes, 1996; Datte & Kornberg, 2002: 5; Anderlini, 2004). With women actively partaking in the construction of a new institutional culture as equal political actors within State institutions, some values and norms began to change, although patriarchal norms were proving hard to shift, particularly the entrenched prejudices and structural inequalities of the inherited institutions of the State. How did women go about reconciling these conflicting value systems? In what practical way did the declared gender values of the ANC assist the infusion of gender equality into the maze of layered institutions?

This chapter focuses on *how* women utilised this unprecedented opportunity to gender the institutional structures of the fledgling democracy. How successfully were women integrated into the general governance structures of the new State? What gender equality mechanisms were implemented, and how effective are these measures perceived to be?

The first section of this chapter presents an overview of the women in Parliament: the gains made in descriptive terms, and the positions that women occupied (and occupy) within the new democratic regime in the transitional period and medium term. The next part looks at the institutional environment at the time of the transition. In particular, the promises and limits of change as a result of the negotiated settlement that produced layered institutions of old and new structures which had varying impacts on the institutional gendering process. The repositioning of structures as a result of the democratic shift further altered the bureaucratic system, with some institutions gaining prominence and influence and others experiencing an ebb in power. The creation of new mechanisms, such as the gender machineries, also played a role in the gendering of South African governance structures, and is discussed within this section.

The ramifications of the institutional layering process, combined with the relative strength of the women's movement during the formative years of the new State, are illustrated through the example of the Women's Budget. This also reveals the continued use of strategic alliances by powerful players to influence the values of the new and old institutions, thereby entrenching gender gains within the governance process. The next section considers the perceptions of the research participants towards the effectiveness of the State gendering process by exploring the perceived factors affecting women's advancement within State governance structures. This analysis also discloses the extent to which women are seen to be in control of their own destiny: is the advancement of women contingent on the vagaries of the male leadership, or have women impacted sufficiently on the institutional norms of the State to advance through merit alone? The chapter concludes with an assessment of the position of women within the State governance structures, utilising the variables outlined in Chapter Two.

Throughout the text, data derived from the interviews and surveys conducted with parliamentarians, party members and civil society practitioners in 2009 is utilised. This enables a picture to emerge of how the institutional gendering process is being perceived by institutional players, and the opportunities and constraints that are felt to be important to the process. What were the perceived successes and failures? What factors account for the advancement of women within the general governance structures of the State?

Understanding the institutional gendering process within these general structures enables a clearer insight into the forthcoming examination of the security structures of the State by identifying the factors that created the new status quo. The elements drawn out in this chapter also provide a point of comparison for the evaluation of women's progress in the masculine enclaves of the security sector, explored in Part III of this thesis.

## 5.2 Numbers and Prominence: An Overview of Women in Parliament

The first democratic regime could be characterised as markedly positive in terms of gender representation. The inclusion of statistical measures of women's representation in government does not imply the assumption that their mere presence will alter the status quo, or that all women within government will push an overtly feminist agenda (Cranny-Francis *et al*, 2003: 49; Kabeer, 2003: 2; Subrahmanian, 2007: 112; Svensson, 2007: 13; Annesley & Gains, 2010: 4). It is, however, considered a necessary first step in altering the institutional culture (Britton, 2002; Annesley & Gains, 2010: 4). South Africa did remarkably well when using the yardstick for descriptive gender representation put forward by Waylen (2007b: 38) that 25% or above can be considered a positive outcome.[88]

This can partly be attributed to the adoption of a 30% quota on the party list by the ANC (RSA NGF, 2000: 18; Britton, 2002; Lowe Morna, 2003: 4; Hassim, 2003b: 506; Anderlini, 2004, 13; Meintjes, 2005: 230; Waylen, 2007a: 534; Gouws, 2008b) which, in turn, came about through the concerted lobbying by the women's groups over preceding decades, as described in Chapters Three and Four. The calls for equitable representation were predicated on the equality rhetoric of the ANC, and served as the foundation for women's demands of the party to fulfil its promises of creating a participative governance structure.

[88] Waylen (2007: 38) classifies representation under 10% as low, 10-25% as moderate.

The margin of the ANC victory placed 90 women in the first post-Apartheid Parliament, representing 36% of the ANC delegation (which would rise to 48% by 2009), as reflected in Table 5.1. The table also shows a steady increase in the overall representation of women in the National Assembly over four elections, from 28% in 1994 to 43% in 2009. It should be noted that while none of the opposition parties have implemented a gender quota, their gender representation has also generally increased (Hendricks, 2005: 82). This could be interpreted as an indication of the "stickiness" of the equality discourse infusing the structures of governance in the post-transition period, and an indication of the evolving institutional and societal norms acknowledging the new public roles of women. This view is also reflected by Britton (2002) and Meintjes (2005), who note that the transformative nature of the transition facilitated these decisive shifts in gendered societal norms and rules, aided by the strength of the women's movement at the time to pressure powerful actors in the process.

**Table 5.1 Representation of Women in National Assembly 1994 to 2009**

| | 1994 | | | 1999 | | | 2004 | | | 2009 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Party** | **Total** | **W** | **%W** | **Total** | **W** | **%W** | **Total** | **W** | **%W** | **Total** | **W** | **%W** |
| ANC | 252 | 90 | 36 | 266 | 95 | 36 | 279 | 104 | 37 | 264 | 126 | 48 |
| DP/DA | 7 | 1 | 14 | 38 | 6 | 16 | 50 | 13 | 26 | 67 | 20 | 30 |
| IFP | 43 | 10 | 23 | 33 | 9 | 27 | 28 | 5 | 18 | 18 | 4 | 22 |
| NP/NNP | 82 | 9 | 11 | 28 | 4 | 14 | 7 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - |
| UDM | | | | 14 | 1 | 7 | 9 | 4 | 44 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| ACDP | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 33 | 6 | 2 | 33 | 3 | 1 | 33 |
| FF | | | | 3 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| UCDP | | | | 3 | 1 | 33 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 100 |
| PAC | 5 | 1 | 20 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - |
| COPE | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 30 | 14 | 47 |
| Other | | | | 5 | 2 | 40 | (7) | (3) | (43) | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 400 | 111 | 28 | 400 | 120 | 30 | 400 | 131 | 33 | 400 | 170 | 43 |

Adapted from Hendricks (2005: 82), Meintjes (2005) and Lowe Morna, Rama and Mtonga (2009).

It is also crucial to consider the *types* of positions that women took up, particularly in the first democratic administration. Although it was a negotiated settlement, the ANC dominated the proceedings and this is reflected in the prominence of the appointments of ANC women. It is also indicative of the power exercised by these women and the esteem in which they were held by the leadership of the party. Women were appointed to a range of key ministerial positions, including Health (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma), Welfare and Population Development (Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi), and Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (Winnie Mandela). Traditionally male-dominated "hard" portfolios were also headed by women, including: Agriculture (Thoko Didiza), Justice

(Sheila Camerer), Minerals and Energy (Susan Shabangu), Public Enterprises (Stella Sigcau), and Trade and Industry (Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka). The 1999 Cabinet saw a female Foreign Affairs Minister (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) – a post she would hold until 2009. The post of Deputy President was held by a women from 2004 (Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka) until 2009 (Baleka Mbete).[89] In particular, the election of Frene Ginwala as the first Speaker of the new Parliament was noteworthy. Fellow MP Pregs Govender commented: "in the most powerful seat in the National Assembly, she was a powerful symbol – a woman in a sari, not a suit. A significant change was being signalled" (Govender, 2007: 145; Meintjes, 1996: 57; Anderlini, 2004; Calland, 2006: 35). The choice of Frene Ginwala as Speaker represented an important gender gain, given the prestige and symbolism of the position, and was indicative of the progress being made in terms of altering societal norms with respect to the acceptability of women in leadership roles.

The dramatic increase in the descriptive, and potentially substantive, representation of women in the first democratic dispensation provided an enabling environment for addressing the entrenched institutional norms and values of the inherited Apartheid structures. It also presented these women with the opportunity to participate in the construction of the new institutions that would be creating and operationalising the new norms and values by which society would be governed.

The next section considers the institutional environment in which these women would be operating. Three aspects are examined. Firstly, the institutional layering that arose as a result of the negotiated transition to democracy, consequently interweaving old and new structures (and their attendant norms and values), and impacting on the relational power between the old and new structures of the State. Secondly, the formal mechanisms and structures aimed at mainstreaming gender throughout the system of governance, in terms of their placement and mandate, and their resulting power and influence in changing the gendered norms of the State. The third aspect considers the "real world" consequences of the institutional environment by presenting an example of how women institutionalised the consideration of gendered interests in the budgeting process, amongst other examples.

[89] For a complete list of female Ministers from 1994-2009, see Appendix 5.

## 5.3 The Institutional Environment

The transitional period, during which democratic gains would be consolidated, called for a broad-based overhaul of the country's values and practices. The overturning of ingrained prejudices based on race, sex and ethnicity would be an enduring challenge for decades. Articulating a vision for the nation based on human rights and equality was necessitated by "the scale and scope of the transformation South Africa embarked on after Apartheid [which was] without precedence" (Ramphele, 2008: 13). Putting the rhetoric into practice would be a challenge that depended heavily on sufficient political will, not only in terms of fully integrating gender into the new structures, but also in putting mechanisms in place to consolidate (and protect) these gains in forthcoming administrations.

The political and historical events discussed in the preceding chapters fundamentally impacted on the belief and value systems of the population at large, although not all deep-seated prejudices could be dislodged. The commitment of the ruling ANC to operationalising gender equality proved to be a significant step towards reformulating assumptions about women and their capacity to lead and govern. This commitment resulted partly from the manner in which women participated in the historical and political events that shaped the transition to democracy, discussed previously. As Waylen (2003: 163) points out, it is essential to consider not only the causes of the downfall of "non-democratic regimes", but also the *forms* of transitions, as both will have an impact on the consolidation of gender gains in new democracies (Waylen, 2003: 163). As noted above, the institutional layering which occurred as a result of the negotiated transition played a significant role in the gendering of State institutions, as the entrenched norms and values of old institutions would need to be reconciled with the emerging norms of new institutions. What was the effect of the institutional layering process in gender terms, and how did it affect relational power between structures?

### 5.3.1 Institutional Layering

The nature of the negotiated settlement meant that the new democratic State would not be starting with a blank slate. In effect, the ANC-regime would be inheriting some of the old Apartheid structures intact, including the civil service and the labyrinth of bureaucracy that accompanied it. New structures would be created to work in conjunction with the old[90], with some eventually replacing their predecessors. This complex institutional layering of old and new structures served both as an opportunity and a constraint for the gendering of State institutions as the prospect for meaningful change was tempered by the ingrained practices of old institutions that would need to be consciously shifted.

One advantage of the layering of new institutions with old structures was that some of the new structures, such as the Constitution and parliamentary committees dealing specifically with gender, were endowed with prominence – and, therefore, had the necessary influence to instigate change, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Further, the infusion of the principles of racial and gender equality across all government structures, old and new, saw the re-organisation of parliamentary structures, such as the National Assembly (NA) and the provincial government structures, which further aided the task of gendering these structures in line with the new democratic vision of the State.

The interweaving of old and new institutions transformed the power relations between structures. The new institutional directives, such as the emphasis on equality and broad-based participatory mechanisms, also impacted on the relative importance and influence of new structures as responsibilities and spheres of influence were adjusted. The influx of influential men and women had a marked impact on the initial power relationships between these structures, not least because of the existing relationships between these individuals forged over the decades of the liberation struggle.

[90] A range of new institutions were created by different structures and committees, with various purposes. For example, some institutions were created to fulfil constitutional mandates (such as the Standing Committee on Public Accounts). Thompson (2000), Venter (2001) and Calland (2006) are among the many authors who delve into the process of State formation following the 1994 elections, detailing the specific institutions created and their purpose within the larger bureaucratic structure.

The power matrix depicted in Figure 5.1, oriented according to influence and prominence, serves as a graphical representation of the relative power of the various institutions of the new democratic dispensation[91]. As can be seen, Parliament as a whole has both prominence and influence, with the institutions within Parliament having varying degrees of influence. For example, while the National Assembly (NA) has more prominence, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) has more influence as a result of its constitutional mandate to provide oversight and accountability. The matrix also reveals the ANC to have greater influence than the opposition parties (as would be expected from the ruling party), and a similar degree of prominence. However, the blurring of the divide between the party and the State increases the informal influence and prominence of the ANC to a significant extent – with serious repercussions, which are discussed in Part III of the thesis.

**Figure 5.1 Institutional Power Matrix**




Adapted from Calland (2006: 330).

[91] The Institutional Power Matrix was adapted from the work of Calland (2006) who undertook a detailed study of power within the democratic structures of South Africa, including an in-depth analysis of the key figures involved in the governance process. The positioning of the various entities in the matrix is supported by the perceptions of the research participants, and by first-hand experience with the South African governance structures. Similar assessments on the relative power and influence of these institutional structures are also drawn by Venter (2001), Albertyn (2003) and Lowe Morna *et al* (2009).

The power matrix reveals the relative institutional prominence and power of the structures discussed in the earlier overview of women's descriptive gains. It illustrates how the positions held by women within institutional structures that have both prominence and influence will imbue those office-holders with a certain degree of power by virtue of their position alone, without taking into account the power wielded due to personal alliance and party coalitions. The location of gender machineries (discussed later in this section) within the Office of the Presidency similarly bestows those office-bearers with greater legitimacy and, therefore, greater influence.

Given the portfolios held by women, particularly in the first democratic regime (described earlier), the potential power to enact meaningful change is thus apparent from Figure 5.1. The relative positioning of these various structures has a direct correlation with the discussion on power in Chapter Two, where power is viewed in terms of capacity (Kabeer, 1999; Allen, 2005; Lukes, 2005; Annesley & Gains, 2010). Therefore, the prominence and influence accorded to these structures, by virtue of their relative positions within the system of State governance structures, endows the office-bearers with the *capacity* to act. The potential range of women's influence expands further when considered in conjunction with the power of the particular ANC women within these positions (power accrued from the historical legacies described in previous chapters).

The effective exercise of this power is, however, contingent on the capacity of the gender machineries to entrench the changes and facilitate the continued gendering of institutional processes. One of the foremost challenges would therefore be the creation of robust gender machineries that would aid in the consolidation of these changes once these particular women had moved on. It must be noted that the influx of Struggle veterans into the governance structures of the new democratic regime was an unique phenomenon. Consequently, these women, who had amassed significant power and influence during the liberation era, would need to entrench the hard-won gender gains in a manner that would be sustainable for future generations[92]. In other words, an institutional environment would need to be created that was conducive to gender

[92] The consequences of the lack of an environment open to women's needs and interests in the post-transition period is discussed in detail by authors such as Ray and Korteweg (1999) and Waylen (2007b), amongst many others.

claims, supported by mechanisms that would sustain the momentum of increasing gender gains without being reliant on the alliances and personal histories of these particular women[93]. One of the primary means by which this could be achieved was through the creation of formal gender machineries. The motivation behind the pursuit of this course of action was bolstered by the international diffusion of participatory gender machineries located within formal State structures, and the mechanisms described in international and regional instruments from the UN, SADC, and AU (UN, 1979, 1995a; Albertyn, 2003: 102; Anderlini, 2004; Meintjes, 2005; Gouws, 2008b, amongst others described in Chapter Two). The establishment and strategic placement of gender machineries were therefore one means by which the "first generation" effect could be mitigated: effective machineries provide the mechanisms through which gender mainstreaming strategies can be more efficiently implemented, aiding in the gendering of institutional norms, and creating momentum for further change.

### 5.3.2 Challenge of Gender Machineries

The lobbying by women's organisations during the transition period (most notably through the WNC) placed an emphasis on ensuring the meaningful representation of women within the new structures (especially Parliament), as well as on creating "an enabling environment for women to give 'voice' to their various interests" (Baden *et al*, 1998: 4; Meintjes, 1996: 61; RSA NGF, 2000; Geisler, 2000; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 146; Albertyn, 2003: 100-102; Anderlini, 2004; Waylen, 2007a: 524; Waylen, 2007b: 150).

The combination of institutional measures entrenching gender equality (such as those contained within the Bill of Rights and the Constitution, and the National Gender Framework), together with the commitment of the ANC towards gender equality,[94] empowered women to push for transformational strategies that would be "more responsive to women's demands and more representative of women" (Baden *et al*, 1998: 10; Geisler, 2000; Heinecken, 2002: 718; Hassim, 2003b: 508; Albertyn, 2003: 100-102;

[93] The potential of this aspect as a barrier to the consolidation of gender gains is discussed later in the thesis. Geisler (2000) demonstrates the impact of this factor on the WNC and ANCWL, illustrating the devastating repercussions for gender structures and their relative power when insufficient mechanisms for maintaining a strong leadership are not in place.

[94] The ANC was the only political party to adopt a gender quota of 30% on its party lists (Baden *et al*, 1998: 19; Albertyn, 2003: 102; Waylen, 2007a: 534).

Anderlini, 2004; Waylen, 2007a: 524). The creation of "an integrated set of structures on different levels of the State with an encompassing monitoring and oversight function" was explicitly included in the transitional agreement in order to ensure that the "institutional design would ensure the participation of activists in the State and accountability of the State to constituencies of women (Gouws, 2008b: 548).

Numerous State mechanisms were established with the express purpose of gender mainstreaming in the sense of serving as hubs through which policy interventions could be launched. However, "the acceptance of the principle of gender equality as both a formal constitutional value as well as a substantive policy imperative has introduced a new set of complexities that have to be considered in resource allocation" (Baden *et al*, 1998: 5; Gouws, 2008b: 547). Thus, these machineries would need to be positioned strategically and be allocated sufficient resources in order to be effective.

The central structures, which were established with a view to creating an integrated and coordinated network of mechanisms to impact on the gendering of policy processes, included the multiparty Parliamentary Women's Group, based in the legislature, the Women's Empowerment Unit (focused on capacity building and training for female parliamentarians), and the Committee on Improving the Quality of Life and Status of Women, which is responsible for "disaggregating and analysing the budget along gender lines" (Baden *et al*, 1998: 12; Meintjes, 1996: 61; RSA NGF, 2000: 27; 2005: 234; Anderlini, 2004, 13). Additionally, the Office for the Status of Women, located within the Presidency (in the offices of the Deputy President), provides national coordination, while the Commission on Gender Equality provides oversight as an independent statutory body (Albertyn, 1996; Meintjes, 1996: 61; 2005: 232, 234; Baden *et al*, 1998: 12; RSA NGF, 2000: 27; Geisler, 2000; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 123; Seidman, 2001; Hassim, 2003b: 508-510; Anderlini, 2004, 13; Calland, 2006: 12-13; Waylen, 2007a: 535; Waylen, 2007b: 151; Gouws, 2008a, 2008b).

**Figure 5.2 National Gender Machineries**




(Adapted from Gouws, 2008b: 55).

As with many such gender machineries, there is a lack of resources, both human and financial, which severely constrains the effectiveness of these mechanisms, while the sectoral approach further weakens the efficiency of the gender machineries (Albertyn, 1996; Baden *et al*, 1998: 15; Sorenson, 1998: iv; Seidman, 2001; Meintjes, 2005: 234-235; Govender, 2007: 171; Waylen, 2007a: 535). For example, there is minimal coordination, insufficient operating budgets, and a distinct lack of political will in certain areas (Albertyn, 1996; Baden *et al*, 1998: 15; Gouws, 2008b)[95]. The "overlapping mandates" between the various mechanisms is an additional strain on the limited resources of the gender machineries (Gouws, 2008b: 550; Meintjes, 2005: 234-235), as is the slow progress being made in establishing fully functioning machineries at all levels (Seidman, 2001; Anderlini, 2004).

[95] This is a common problem with gender machineries, as described in detail by Byrne, Laier, Baden and Marcus (1996) and Anderlini (2004), amongst others. A comprehensive assessment of the gender machineries at the provincial level was conducted by Albertyn (1996) and reflects some of the setbacks also experienced at the national level, particularly with respect to scarce resources and ambiguous mandates. Seidman (2001) details the successes and challenges of the Gender Commission, noting the history and development of the explicitly feminist structure against a nuanced contextual analysis of the transition to democracy.

Further, the creation of these machineries does not imply an acceptance of the ideas and policies being championed. The push to incorporate gender into all government structures and policies was a mixed success (Albertyn, 1996; Anderlini, 2004; Waylen, 2007a: 525, 534-36; Lowe Morna *et al*, 2009). One part of the problem lies in educating policy makers about the philosophy underlying gender mainstreaming, the importance of gender equality to the State-building exercise, and the practical advantages of following this approach. The second challenge involves putting the policy into action, and finding the means to effectively monitor the application of the gender mainstreaming toolkit.

While acknowledging the limitations of the gender machineries, it is worthwhile noting not only the establishment of these structures, but also the prominent placement of some of the gender machineries. It is a positive development in the broader sense of the gendering process of State institutions, and speaks to the commitment of various actors that these institutions continue to receive resources and attention. However, in order to be effective, a high degree of political will remains critical, particularly in terms of securing more appropriate funding to maximise the impact of these structures in the process of gender mainstreaming in the State. This is addressed to some extent by Seidman (2001), who discusses the importance of the calibre of Commissioners who established and served in the Gender Commission, and the impact this had on the development of a robust feminist institution. The esteem in which these political actors were held due to their experiences had a significant effect on the respect afforded to the Gender Commission.

While this reiterates the influence of specific actors and their relative power to facilitate and enact change, it also points to the crucial process of consolidating gains made in order to ensure that gendered institutional change is entrenched, and is not dependent on particular actors. In other words, while the power of these actors is being used to affect change, these modifications of institutional rules and norms must be entrenched in order for meaningful institutional change to have occurred, preventing a reversion to the status quo once these actors have left.

The ambiguity of policy makers towards these aspects is reflected in the responses of both parliamentarians and civil society respondents interviewed for this research in 2009. For example, when considering the responses of all government respondents, there was agreement that senior staff understood what gender and gender mainstreaming issues were about. However, female government respondents reported a high degree of uncertainty about whether these issues were considered to be important or received special attention, as shown in Graph 5.1.

One government respondent commented that he felt "South African society does not pay special attention to gender issues"[96] and that this is reflected in the attitudes of senior staff within government. Another noted that while there was a commitment to gender issues in theory, this was not often seen in practice[97]. These findings are congruent with those of Seidman (2001) who discusses the limited knowledge of bureaucrats to the practical implications of gender inequality, and the manner in which policies have gender differentiated impacts.

In general, civil society respondents agreed that gender mainstreaming was understood by senior staff (see Graph 5.2 showing civil society responses), but there was uncertainty about how important senior staff considered gender issues to be. Those members of civil society with experience in government (CS1) were slightly more critical of the extent to which gender issues are understood and considered important by senior staff, as opposed to those respondents without experience in government (CS2).

[96] Survey GM-2 (Government Respondent – Male).
[97] Survey GF-3 (Government Respondent – Female).

**Graph 5.1 Gender Issues – Government Respondents**




**Graph 5.2 Gender Issues – Civil Society Respondents**



There was a generally ambivalent response regarding the consideration of gender issues during policy formulation: slightly more positive amongst some civil society respondents, and slightly less positive amongst female government respondents. A civil society respondent argued that while senior staff understood gender issues, and some considered it important, "this is a far cry from being able to articulate this into concrete actions"[98]. This implies that there is a lack of understanding on how to tackle gender equality in a practical sense, an assessment shared by some civil society respondents with government experience, one of whom noted that a lack of resources, investment and training has contributed to this uncertainty[99]. It also corresponds with the judgments of authors such as Albertyn (2003), Lowe Morna (2009) and Govender (2007). It is equally worth noting the ambiguity of the respondents towards the consideration of gender issues during policy formulation (particularly the flatlining response of government participants in Graph 5.1, and the perceptions of CS1 respondents in Graph 5.2), as this is a central element of the gender mainstreaming process.

The overall results of questions related to gender and government were therefore somewhat varied, indicating that while there is an awareness of unequal gender relations and the need to address it, both within government structures and through the policies produced, gender/gender mainstreaming is not integrated as part of the "normal" policy formulation process. It is still considered a special interest issue, demonstrating that changes to institutional norms and values are not yet entrenched. This is also reflected in Graph 5.3, which shows the differences in perceptions about male and female leaders' attentiveness to gender issues during policy formulation. This variable explored whether respondents felt that leaders understood the purpose of gender mainstreaming, and then encouraged the discussion of gender issues during the policy formulation process. The question was divided in this manner because understanding an issue does not necessarily imply that it is considered to be important. Consequently, if value is attributed to the gender mainstreaming process, discussion will be encouraged.

[98] Survey CS2-4 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience).
[99] Survey CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).

**Graph 5.3 Gender Issues: Male versus Female Leaders**




This graph shows that while there is some agreement between civil society and government respondents that female leaders pay more attention to gender issues than their male counterparts, civil society generally shows a more negative perception of whether issues are understood and integrated during policy formulation. The findings related to the preceding series of graphs suggest that the overall perception amongst respondents is that gender mainstreaming is not viewed as a priority during policy formulation, and this would, in turn, result in policies and programmes that do not adequately consider gender-differentiated needs and priorities.

Further, the results of the survey reiterate the importance of focusing on both genders during gender mainstreaming exercises. It is not only men who are sidelining gender issues. One respondent had conducted an analysis of speeches made in Parliament over a period of time, and found very few references to gender, noting that "there are currently very few female feminists in Parliament"[100]. Another civil society respondent

[100] Survey CS1-3 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).

noted that male leaders tend to "tolerate" discussions of gender issues[101]. A particularly telling comment was made that often it is "female MPs who sacrifice gender on the altar of their careers. On the whole ... gender issues tended to take a back seat if there were concessions to be made"[102]. In other words, while women are generally more likely to push the gender agenda, it is also women who water down gender concessions when it is politically expedient to do so. This could be interpreted as being more a case of facing the political reality of the current context than a statement on the state of feminism in Parliament. Legislation with a few gender provisions may be the best that can be expected in certain situations[103].

Despite widely varying perceptions amongst sub-sets of government and civil society respondents about the understanding of gender issues within government structures, many parliamentarians have utilised the resources available to them (including the formation of strategic alliances) in order to push the issue of gender equality forward. One of these successful initiatives was the adoption of a Women's Budget. The process involved the utilisation of power and influence derived from both the positions these women held and from their accomplishments during the liberation struggle, and serves as a demonstration of the power of women in strategically organising in order to bring about gendered institutional change.

### 5.3.3 Overcoming Gendered Institutional Constraints: The Women's Budget and Other Examples of Gendered Change

The process of initiating and activating the Women's Budget in South Africa illustrated the implementation of gender mainstreaming strategies in real terms, as well as serving as an example of the FI view of gendered institutional change. Following the *key moment* of the democratic transition, and capitalising on the power amassed through the legacies of equality and women's autonomy that had been extended into the new institutional

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101 Survey CS2-4 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience).

102 Survey CS2-5 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience).

103 This is explored in greater detail by Albertyn (2003) and Lowe Morna *et al* (2009), both of whom discuss the gender differentiated approach to the legislative process, and politics in general. Budlender, Hicks and Vetten (2002) expand on the processes of consultation underpinning the approach followed by the Women's Budget in South Africa, and the crucial role played by NGOs in sustaining the momentum of this initiative.

structures of the State, women utilised their new positions of influence and prominence to instigate change, capitalising on their new roles as equal political actors within the decision-making arena. These gendered changes sought to alter the formal rules that impact on policy formulation through the activation of networks and the forging of alliances, both with other women actors but also with men, demonstrating the continuation of strategies that had been used to effect change within the structures of the liberation movement, as detailed in Chapters Three and Four.

The need for a Women's Budget was apparent given that the broader context of women's realities within South Africa would not be transformed by virtue of better representation in Parliament and Cabinet alone, nor by the establishment of gender machineries. Baden *et al* (1998: 11) outline some of the disparities facing women, particularly the inequalities born of class, race, age and location. These include challenges such as the preponderance of women-headed households (over 40% of African households, with the majority having dependents), the high percentage of women in the informal sector (75%), higher poverty rates (particularly in rural areas), and exceedingly high rates of domestic violence and abuse. A legislature more attuned to the specific interests of women, and the differential impact of legislation on the genders, is a necessary first step towards transforming the cultural and social norms perpetuating inequality in South African society.

The necessity of considering the reality of women's lives when drawing up budget priorities was thus clear. Based on the Australian Women's Budget Statement, and championed by Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge and Pregs Govender, the initiative to adopt a Women's Budget aimed to consider the entire budget from a gendered perspective. The idea was to utilise a gender checklist during the compilation of budgets, and to lay down clear goals with "measurable, realistic and ... clear time frames" (Govender, 2007: 161-162; Beveridge, Nott & Stephen, 2000: 390; Geisler, 2000: 620-621; Budlender, Hicks & Vetten, 2002; Albertyn, 2003: 105-106; Meintjes, 2005: 235). As Govender (2007: 162) acknowledges "the timing was crucial. We had come into Parliament on the back of a powerful women's movement, which created the space to push the boundaries in the interests of poor women. But it was a space that would not last too long".

Utilising the power and influence of their positions, Pregs Govender, as chair of a parliamentary committee (and a member of the Joint Standing Committee on Finance), Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, Speaker Frene Ginwala, Gauteng Finance Minister Jabu Moleketi and Maria Ramos[104] (Deputy Director-General of Financial Planning in the Department of Finance), together wielded sufficient clout to initiate the institutionalisation of the Women's Budget (Baden *et al*, 1998: 23; Budlender, Hicks & Vetten, 2002; Albertyn, 2003: 105-106; Meintjes, 2005: 235; Govender, 2007: 162-164; Waylen, 2007a: 535-6). The involvement of Trevor Manuel, a respected figure in the financial sector, and the support of Gauteng Finance Minister Jabu Moleketi were especially critical – Gauteng is the economic hub of South Africa, and bringing these two individuals into the coalition pushing for the adoption of the Women's Budget proved to be a strategically adept move.

The Women's Budget illustrates the effective power of women at a *key moment* of the new democratic regime. Creating alliances with other powerful players in order to enact change within traditionally male-dominated arenas, such as finance, demonstrated the strategic prowess of women in government. This continued utilisation of coalitions to bring about and entrench gendered change also shows the continuation of strategies developed during the liberation struggle, as described in Chapter Four, and underscores the assertion by Britton (2002) that part of the success of the gendering process in South Africa must be attributed to the ability of women to forge effective coalitions with a diversity of actors.

Various other "gender-centric" initiatives were undertaken. The identification of institutional barriers to gender equality was one of the many challenges facing women in the first democratic administration. The capacity of women to alter their circumstances was greatly aided by the power and influence that these women wielded as a result of their prominence within the liberation movement. Women then utilised their new positions (and the accompanying influence) to strategically initiate change. Govender (2007: 147) points out that apart from adjusting to women's political presence in the legislature, physical adjustments also had to be made, from adjusting the hours and operating style of the National Assembly to creating facilities for women, further adding

[104] Maria Ramos became Director-General of the National Treasury in 1996.

to the sense of women invading a previously masculine domain. The assumption of formal political roles did not imply that the division of labour was in any way altered for these women, as many women MPs still retained primary child and home care responsibilities. Parliament's lack of a schedule and the 'old boys club' mentality demonstrated that the institutional culture had not yet started adapting to the new gender realities (Sorenson, 1998: iv; Geisler, 2000: 617-618; Hassim, 2003c; Meintjes, 2005: 232; Govender, 2007: 147-149).[105]

The retention of operational procedures (such as irregular hours and a heckling debating style) and dismissive attitudes in some sectors towards gender issues proved difficult to change (Geisler, 2000: 618). The creation of an institutional environment that recognises the specific needs of women was one of the issues raised by both government and civil society respondents, including a comment by one civil society practitioner who noted that

> "Many of our institutions are inherited from the past and are patriarchal in nature. There is a need to recognise the subtle (and not so subtle) obstacles that limit women. One could easily point to the obvious things (like making sure that parliamentary breaks coincide with school holidays, the provision of child-care, adjusting the parliamentary schedule to make allowances for female parents etc). It is of vital importance that the people involved articulate what their experience is and what they need in order to more fully participate" [106]

These challenges demonstrate how the gender barriers of old and new institutions coincided. For example, within the old structures, women were a negligible presence[107], and physical concessions, such as day-care facilities and restrooms, were never needed. The masculine culture of Parliament (and government in general) was not impeded by the practical considerations of childcare, and could thus be conducted at irregular hours.

While the new institutions aimed to entrench equality measures into operational procedures from their inception, similar chauvinistic attitudes to those found in old institutions were encountered, although new institutions appeared more adaptable. Nevertheless, these challenges were confronted with mixed success through the use of

[105] Some gender realities started being adapted: Feinstein (2007: 83), an ANC MP, remarked that to the best of his knowledge he was the first male MP to take paternity leave in the history of South Africa.
[106] Survey CS2-5 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience).
[107] 2.7% prior to 1994 (GenderLinks, 2009).

institutional safeguards, such as the equity provisions set out in the Bill of Rights, and the influence of powerful female parliamentarians.

However, the primary focus remained on the wider entrenchment of meaningful gender gains for the women of South Africa, as evidenced in the promulgation of important legislation such as the Draft National Women's Empowerment Policy (1995), the Charter for Effective Equality (1994)[108], the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995), the Employment Equity Act (1998), the Skills Development Act (1998), the Housing Act (1997), and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (2000). The enactment of these legislative gains represent the further entrenchment and formalisation of gender rights through the crafting of legislation that takes into account gender differentiated needs. For example, the Housing Act of 1997 specifically notes the "housing needs of marginalised women and other groups disadvantaged by unfair discrimination" (RSA, 1997). As another example, the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995) calls for the maintenance of fair labour irrespective of gender, repeatedly noting the need for a representative public service and stating in its mission that it aims to "facilitate the transformation of the attitudes and behaviour of public servants towards a democratic ethos underlined by the overriding importance of human rights" (RSA, 1995). The document explicitly identifies achieving representativeness as a priority.

These important gains highlighted the manner in which women were ensuring that gender gains (and their collective power) would be maintained in subsequent regimes. It is reminiscent of the strategies utilised during the liberation struggle – consolidating gains within formal documents to serve as a basis for further change.

While progress was demonstrably being made in various areas of the general governance structures, in terms of representation, changing the institutional culture, and producing legislation that took cognisance of gender differentiated needs, broader concerns were arising. Would these changes be sustainable in the future once these particular women left? How could the "first generation" effect be addressed? It is thus critical to understand the means by which women were advancing within the structures of the

[108] Produced with the WNC.

State: How were positions of influence being attained? Was the institutional culture evolving in a manner that would facilitate the influx of new women without the Struggle credentials and the network of alliances of these particular women? The next section incorporates the perceptions of interview and survey respondents from government and civil society to answer the question: What factors are seen as aiding the ascent of women up the leadership ladder?

## 5.4 Factors Affecting the Advancement of Women Within State Governance Structures

It is crucial to examine the means by which women are advancing within the general State structures; the tools used to consolidate their positional gains. In particular, are these factors within their power to affect (such as qualifications, length of service), somewhat dependent on their own will (political party loyalty), or wholly within the power of others to bestow (patronage, nepotism)? The purpose of examining the manner in which women advance within the government structures is to ascertain whether the high descriptive representation of women is dependent on the political will of powerful allies, or whether the gains made in the first democratic regime have started being consolidated into the structures of governance as a matter of course. Are women are able to participate on their own terms as political players on an even field with their male counterparts? In other words, this variable considers the entrenchment of women's power within the institutional process, which is a crucial consideration given the uneven effectiveness of the State gender machineries described above, and the ambivalence towards integrating gender issues into the everyday business of Parliament.

All the survey respondents identified political party loyalty as the most significant factor (rating the highest number of "very significant" responses), followed by merit and patronage, as Figure 5.3 indicates. Political party loyalty was also cited by almost all anonymous informants as the strongest motivator for advancement. The prominence of this factor for advancement reiterates the emphasis placed on informal networks and structures in the institutional environment by Lovenduski (1998), Mackay and Meier (2003), Streeck and Thelen (2005), Chappell (2006), and Kenny (2007) when explaining

the power dynamics that affect change (as discussed in Chapter Two).[109] Given the pressures faced by activists during the liberation era, the emphasis placed on political party loyalty is unsurprising, especially when considering the often severe ramifications when this trust was breached (as described in Chapters Three and Four).

**Figure 5.3 Factors in Women's Advancement**




[109] The influence of political party loyalty in the South African context is also discussed in broader terms by Calland (2006), Feinstein (2007), Gevisser (2007), Roberts (2007), Holden (2008), Pottinger (2008), Gordin (2010).

While the various opposition parties are represented within the new structures at all levels, the number, influence and power of the ANC representatives dominates proceedings within State institutions. This is somewhat tempered by the layering of institutions as well as by the various mechanisms for oversight and accountability built into the new system of governance, preventing South Africa from becoming a one-party State by virtue of the supremacy of the ANC at the time of the transition. Nevertheless, the power of the ANC has led to the infusion of the party's culture into the structures of the State, and one of the central aspects of the ANC's institutional culture revolves around party loyalty. Internal decision-making practices are deeply democratic, but once decisions are made at the upper levels of the NEC and NWC all party members are expected to present a united public face[110] (Mandela, 1995; Calland, 2006: 122; Gevisser, 2007; Roberts, 2007; Feinstein, 2007; Govender, 2007; Pottinger, 2008).

Of course, political parties across the globe expect loyalty from their representatives. The South African example represents perhaps a slightly more extreme version of this assumption of fidelity, particularly in the open acknowledgment from parliamentarians that it is the overriding factor in advancement and that previously stated opinions (and causes vehemently fought for) will be abandoned at the will of the party leadership. The power of party loyalty to curb the behaviour and actions of party members is also partly derived from the proportional representation system, which ensures that positions of influence are contingent on maintaining the goodwill of the party leadership as opposed to being drawn from the approval of constituents (Geisler, 2000: 622-623; Hassim, 2003c; Meintjes, 2005: 236; Calland, 2006: 109; Feinstein, 2007: 260; Waylen, 2007a: 534-5; Gouws, 2008a). In other words, loyalty to the party trumps loyalty to gender equality.[111]

The least significant influence on women's advancement, according to respondents, was length of service. This could be anticipated given the relative youth of the democracy, and could be a time limited variable that gains more credence as the democracy matures. Ethnicity, like all classifications of "otherness", was carefully and consciously included

[110] This will be revisited in Chapter Eight where the Arms Deal is utilised to illustrate the various ramifications of this practice.

[111] Lowe Morna *et al* (2009) discuss this in greater detail, citing specific examples illustrating how this divided loyalty has played out in the South African context. The tension between class, ideology and gender is also explored by Waylen (2007b: 134).

within the umbrella of equality and inclusiveness throughout the liberation struggle and the formation of the new State structures, particularly in light of the animosity between the Zulu and Xhosa factions of the ANC, and between the ANC and the IFP (as discussed in previous chapters). Ethnicity has, to some extent, come to the fore since the ANC national conference in Polokwane in 2007, which led to the ousting of President Mbeki, as discussed in Chapter Two. Nevertheless, the turmoil within the ANC at the time cannot be attributed solely to ethnicity issues. The markedly different leadership styles of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma (Gordin, 2000; Gevisser, 2007; Roberts, 2007; Pottinger, 2008) are one of the many factors raised in any analysis of the rift within the ruling party; a view supported by analysts such as Calland (2006), Landsberg (2010) and Bloom (2010).

The responses of government respondents across gender lines show general consensus on most of the categories, with the only one exception. Female government respondents attributed a slightly higher importance to patronage than did their male counterparts, which most of the women indicated was due to their increased awareness of the role it has played in either their own advancement or that of other parliamentarians, male and female. The anomalous answer from a female ANC MP is flagged here as it was the only time a female respondent did not acknowledge the influence of patronage in women's advancement. All anonymous informants also noted this variable as significant, and most viewed it as positive.

Given the dearth of mentorship programmes, a few respondents noted that patronage was akin to mentoring in some ways, as the patron served as a source of expertise in helping to navigate the political arena. However, one of the dangers of this practice was made evident in the aftermath of President Mbeki's resignation, when some of the women perceived as being ideologically aligned with him were subsequently sidelined. This is not a gender-specific danger – male politicians experienced similar ostracism in the wake of the resignation.

One other prominent anomaly noted in general was that female participants (both in government and in civil society) had a much higher rate of "unsure" answers, with male

respondents indicating an "unsure" response only once[112]: all other answers by male respondents were unequivocal statements. This was surprising given that the survey was centred around issues of gender and gender equality. Further questioning revealed that women only gave unequivocal responses to questions that they had had direct experience with, while men seemed more comfortable using their impressions of situations with which they had no direct experience as a basis for an unequivocal answer. However, some "unsure" answers were also given by women in relation to situations with which they *did* have direct experience. This suggests that women were less likely to record strong opinions, and raises concerns about the value women attribute to their experiences. The forthcoming analysis of the security sector explores this in greater detail.

The results from the civil society respondents regarding advancement factors reveal greater disparities in opinion once responses are broken down into two categories: civil society respondents who have worked within government structures (CS1) and those who have not (CS2). As Graph 5.4 below shows, there is a strong correlation with government respondent's answers about the prominence of political party loyalty with regards to the advancement of women.[113] Opinions were divided amongst CS1 and CS2 respondents on the role of ethnicity, although similar trends emerged with regard to merit, nepotism, patronage and qualifications. Considering the "positive"[114] factors of merit and qualifications reveals that those civil society respondents who had experience working within government see these as having only an average impact on advancement, while the second group (without experience of government employment) places more significance on them.

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112 In response to whether gender issues were considered during policy formulation.

113 Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which the factors of merit, nepotism, patronage, ethnicity, qualifications, political party loyalty and length of service impacted on the advancement of women within government structures. The question was constructed on a Likert-scale from "very significant", "significant", "average", "insignificant" and "very insignificant". The two outlying categories on each side were collapsed together for the graphs.

114 Merit and qualifications are considered "positive" factors as they are motivated by individual capacity rather than being dependent on the will of others, as is the case with nepotism and patronage. While nepotism could be considered "negative", patronage is more neutral as the basis for patronage usually suggests that some reciprocal benefit can be derived.

**Graph 5.4 Factors in Women's Advancement – Civil Society Respondents**




Establishing the primary causes of women's advancement gives some indication of the limits of their ability to exercise their power independently, and the security of their positions within the structures of governance. For example, the perception that merit is a significant factor in women's advancement implies a wider scope of influence than if patronage or nepotism were considered imperative to advancement. It should be noted that men are also beholden to the party for the security of their positions, and that their actions may also be tempered by loyalty to the party line. This factor is therefore a structural constraint as a result of the proportional representation system.

On the whole, it appears that the institutional environment in the post-transition period has evolved to the extent that women's advancement is already somewhat within their own control; while compromises would be necessary to retain political party favour, this is true for male colleagues as well. The high regard for merit as a factor in advancement shows a recognition of women's skills and contributions, which bodes well for the continued prominence of women in powerful portfolios. It is also a positive sign that patronage is seen as more influential than nepotism. As closely related concepts, the

former has a decidedly more optimistic connotation than the latter. The persistent perception amongst both government and civil society respondents is that patronage relates more closely to alliances than to nepotism. This is an encouraging view as it implies that both parties (women and their patrons) are deriving some benefit – it is an implicit acknowledgement of the influence and abilities of women. It should be pointed out that almost all respondents (from both government and civil society) perceived patrons to be male. While it was acknowledged by respondents that female mentors would be beneficial, there are no formal (and few informal) mentorship initiatives in place within government at the present time. This is not to imply that women are not supportive of each other, but rather that there does not appear to be a trend of ongoing one-on-one mentorship style support, but rather the formation of strategic alliances for the attainment of specific goals.

Generally, the factors perceived as influential in the advancement of women within the general governance structures of the State can be seen as a positive indicator of the progress of gender equality in South Africa. The factors perceived by respondents as most influential - political party loyalty, patronage, and merit - fall within a positive subset of the factors considered. The responses regarding the lack of mentorship initiatives in the general governance structures of the State will be contrasted with the experiences of women in the security sector. The three key trends that are carried through to the next part of the thesis are that firstly, political party loyalty overrides all other fidelities. Secondly, patronage continues to play an important role in the advancement of women, continuing the legacy established during the liberation era. Lastly, the perceived value attributed to merit and qualifications as factors in advancement suggest that women are being recognised for their achievements and are thus viewed as legitimate participants in the governance process, although gender issues are not enjoying the same status. In other words, while women are acknowledged as political actors, similar credence is not attached to the importance of gender issues.

## 5.5 Conclusion: Women in General Governance Structures

The overall picture of gender equality within the broad structures of governance in South Africa is generally positive. The dominance of the ANC during the negotiated settlement enabled the application of the party's pro-rights ethos, which impacted positively on descriptive gender representation, especially through the use of the 30% quota on its party lists and the appointment of powerful women to influential positions in government (RSA NGF, 2000: 18; Lowe Morna, 2003: 4; Hendricks, 2005: 82; Waylen, 2007a: 534). Once in place, these women utilised the available institutional and positional resources to initiate changes that altered the institutional environment, entrenching some gains and creating a conducive atmosphere for transformation. These include initiatives such as the Women's Budget, the creation of new parliamentary committees, and the restructuring of some institutions, such as the National Assembly, to be more receptive to women and to gender claims. The formation of gender machineries also has the potential to produce and entrench change at the bureaucratic level, although a lack of resources and capacity currently curtails the effectiveness of these machineries (Baden *et al*, 1998: 4; RSA NGF, 2000; Heinecken, 2002: 718; Albertyn, 2003: 100-102; Waylen, 2007a: 524).

The perceptions surrounding women's advancement in terms of power and influence are also encouraging, as the overall impression is that women are advancing on the basis of merit and political savvy, rather than as affirmative action appointees. While patronage continues to play an influential role, this is not necessarily perceived as a negative issue as the formation of strategic alliances has enabled women to utilise their influence more effectively, instigating changes that advance gender equality and entrenching gains made.

The purpose of exploring the factors affecting the advancement of women in general government structures is to determine whether they shed some light on the gendering processes of the security sector as well. Have the historical legacies that empowered women to participate meaningfully in the transitional process, and have a voice in the construction of new institutional structures also enabled women to retain their positions of influence within the new democratic security forces? The key considerations that are

taken forward into Part III of this thesis, which deals with the security structures of the State, are pointed out in Figure 5.4. The figure utilises the analytical framework outlined in Chapter Two to indicate the influences on the processes of gendered change in the general governance structures.

**Figure 5.4 Framework for Analysis: Women in Government**




The historical legacies delineated in Chapters Three and Four showed how women amassed power and influence over the course of South Africa's liberation struggle, expanding their roles within the liberation movement and enhancing their ability to affect change within the structures of the ANC. These legacies were grouped into three categories: *women's autonomy, militancy* and *equality*.

The first category, *autonomy*, incorporates the institutional developments within the ANC that facilitated the development of women's formal leadership roles, and their increasing autonomy within both the ANC and the broader leadership movement through the setting of their own agenda and the strategic pursuit of their own goals. The creation of the Women's League acknowledged the right and ability of women to organise

politically and independently, while the adoption of the Freedom Charter formally entrenched these rights (ANC, 1955; Ginwala, 2001; Hassim, 2004: 434; Gasa, 2007: 215). It has been seen that women's roles were further expanded with the inception of MK, and that their prominence within the Struggle was enhanced following their stewardship of the organisation when the male leadership was imprisoned or exiled in the wake of the Rivonia Trials (Cock, 1991; Modise & Curnow, 2000; Du Preez Bezdrob, 2004; Hassim, 2004; Suttner, 2007, 2008; Cherry, 2007). This established an important path in the development of women's public leadership within South Africa; the amassing of this power and influence could (and was) effectively wielded during the transition to democracy.

The second category, *equality*, facilitated the rise in women's autonomy through the central placement of equal rights and participative, representative governance in the ANC's institutional culture. This enabled calls for action on these principles by activist women, and the demand for equal representation within governance structures of the party and later within the structures of the democratic government.

The third category, *militancy*, originated prior to the colonial era and refers to the incorporation of militancy into the culture of almost all sub-groups of the country (including that of the Afrikaner settlers). This is imperative in understanding the course of South African history and was influential in the course of the liberation struggle as well, as was demonstrated in Chapter Three. Prompted by the extensive and forceful use of the Defence Force in quelling opposition to the Apartheid State (particularly in the townships, and with specific reference to "Third Force" activities), the formation of MK catapulted women into formal militant roles, especially after the Sharpeville Massacre and the Soweto Uprisings (Cock, 1991; Modise & Curnow, 2000; Hassim, 2004; Cherry, 2007; Suttner, 2007, 2008). While women had certainly been active participants in the internal violence taking place across the country, their ascension within the ranks of an "army" formalised their participation as combatants and would prove to be critical during the process of security sector reform in the new South Africa.

Utilising the insights drawn from FI (discussed in Chapter Two), a series of *key moments* were identified that impacted on the development of these historical legacies. These *key moments* served to advance the progress of women towards attaining autonomy (such as the creation of the Women's League in the 1940s), and the formal recognition of gender equality and gender rights (such as the adoption of the Women's Charter and the Freedom Charter). They arose in part due to the ability of women to organise mass protests as evidenced during the Defiance Campaign in the 1950s. The increased visibility of women's leadership following the tumultuous events of the 1960s and 1970s (including the aforementioned Sharpeville Massacre, the Rivonia Trials and the Soweto Uprisings, and the declaration of the State of Emergency) facilitated the consolidation of the gender gains made in previous eras.

Although the e*xogenous influences* highlighted in Figure 5.3 impacted on the country as a whole, women also reaped the benefits as these events served to further entrench the progress made. The end of the Cold War, which had to a large extent protected the Apartheid government from overt Western censure, facilitated the application of sanctions that, in turn, aided in the decision by the NP-regime to reach a negotiated settlement (Welsh, 2000; Thompson, 2000; Stott, 2002; Ramphele, 2008).

The experiences of African independence movements provided a range of lessons about the perils of poor follow-through for gender goals, and highlighted the fact that national liberation would not automatically result in women's liberation (Bernstein, 1985; Cock, 1991; Heinecken, 2002). This prompted women to devise a number of strategies to ensure that gender remained on the agenda, not only during the transition but in the first regime as well. Capitalising on the increasing emphasis on inclusivity and the development of a strong human rights culture, women entrenched gender rights into the Constitution and organised strategically to secure a place at the MPNF negotiating table (WNC, 1994; Baden *et al*, 1998; Albertyn, 2003; Waylen, 2007a, 2007b; Govender, 2007). These were essential for the participation of women in the creation of the new institutional structures of governance, and the ability to positively influence the normative culture of the new State.

The cumulative effect of these factors was the amassing of power by women within government structures, which enabled them to influence the ideas upon which the new State was built. This meant that the increase in power and influence led to the incorporation of the central tenets of the liberation ideology: inclusivity, equality and an emphasis on human rights in a gender inclusive sense. In other words, these ideological tenets were not narrowly interpreted. These in turn informed the understanding of the gendered context that the ANC women sought to create within the institutional structures of the new democratic regime.

While all three of these ideals would undoubtedly have been present to some degree without the involvement of women, their entrenchment would not likely have been achieved to the same extent. In particular, the saturation of certain structures, such as the Constitution and the National Assembly, with the principles of equality, and the creation of mechanisms to ensure the continued attention to the rights of all citizens, such as the Bill of Rights and the gender machineries, were greatly aided by the persistent activism of the women in the new regime. Their ability to affect the institutional culture as they did was a direct result of their prominence during the liberation struggle, as was their presence within these structures in the first place.

The *layering of old and new institutions* provided further opportunities (and challenges) for altering the institutional norms and values with respect to gender equality. Some structures (both old and new) gained new prominence and influence as a result of the reform process, as illustrated in the institutional power matrix (see Figure 5.1). This imbued women serving within those structures with further authority to revise the normative culture within certain spaces of the government, some with more lasting effects than others.

The layering of institutions also changed the formal and informal distribution of power between structures, and between participants within those structures. Given the youth of the democracy, the power relationships between structures were largely informed by the people within these structures. The dominance of the ANC at the time of the transition resulted in Struggle veterans with established relationships moving into these positions, with the result that power relations were informed by the affiliations and

loyalties of particular individuals, rather than being derived from the power exercised by any particular structure[115]. Some of these established new patterns of power distribution, some of which have become entrenched while others have decreased in influence and prominence once powerful individuals left. Calland (2000) discusses this at length with particular reference to the South African context, and remarks that

> "People matter greatly to institutions. Institutions – any organisation – are nothing without the people in them. It is people who shape the institution's vision, values and practice. Hence, it matters greatly to identify leadership. And, accordingly, the deployment of certain individuals to key posts in the public service is hugely significant" (Calland, 2006: 79).

One consequence of this personality driven model of power and change is the continuing sway held by both patronage and political party loyalty. Although merit and qualifications are credited with the advancement of women within government structures, the formation of strategic alliances remains the key to enacting substantive change within State structures, and is imperative for influencing the normative culture within governance institutions. A negative consequence of the power of patronage was demonstrated in the recent past with the ousting of President Thabo Mbeki, who had over the course of his tenure in government played an essential role in the promotion of women to powerful positions. These women formed part of his network of strategic alliances, and with his departure some of these women suffered a sudden reversal in fortunes (including Deputy President Baleka Mbete). It can be surmised that, since they were immensely qualified and respected, the key strike against them was their close relationship with the former president: personal alliances surpassed party loyalty.

This generalised overview of the gender environment in governance structures serves to highlight the fact that women's substantive participation has been partly derived from the historical legacies of their involvement within the liberation struggle. Some significant changes have been achieved through a delicate interweaving of strategic alliances, timing, and time-limited focused interventions. The entrenchment of these gains within the institutional fabric of the democratic governance structures speaks to the sustainability of gender gains within the institutional arena. Will a different picture emerge when considering the same issues within the context of State security structures?

[115] This is explored in greater detail by Helmke and Levitsky (2004), who dissect the changing power relations which arise due to institutional layering.

Part III of this thesis examines which of the trends noted here are present in those structures as well. How have women within the security realm capitalised on the opportunities presented during the transitional period to transform the predominantly masculine structures of the State security institutions? Were similar challenges encountered, and are the gains made equally encouraging? What means for entrenching gains have been pursued, and can these measures be considered successful? Uncovering the answers to these questions moves the thesis closer to understanding *how* gendered institutional change occurred in security institutions of post-conflict South Africa.

# 6

# EVOLVING NOTIONS OF SECURITY: OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRANSFORMATION

## 6.1 Introduction

The transition to democracy in South Africa heralded a seismic shift in State priorities in all sectors. Ensuring human rights and equality for all citizens represented the normative foundation upon which the new State would be built, as established in Part II (Chapters Three, Four and Five). As a post-conflict state in the developing South, security and development were central and inter-related concerns. The entrenched legacy of militancy in South Africa, which had intensified during the Apartheid era, called for a new security paradigm that took the challenges confronting the State into account.

The transition to democracy in South Africa occurred at a time when the international perspectives on security were shifting. The concept of security had traditionally focused on the preservation of autonomy and the integrity of national borders through the prowess of military capability: an externally focused "might is right" approach (Tshitereke, 2009: 2; Schoeman, 1998; Stott, 2002; Heinecken, Gueli & Neethling, 2005: 120; Jones, 2009: 26).

The end of the Cold War, and the cessation of related third party interference in African conflicts, saw the necessary evolution of the definition of security. Africa's post-liberation experiences amply illustrated the destructive and destabilising power of poverty, inequality and lack of development (Vickers, 1993: 40-41, 68-81; Schoeman, 1998; Venter, 2001: 334, 336; Anderlini, 2004; Gueli, 2008; Hutton, 2009; Makinana, 2009).

Notions of security therefore had to go beyond the traditional militaristic approach of security against external threats and needed to encompass internal threats as well, such

as underdevelopment and inequality[116] (Stott, 2002; Maclean *et al*, 2006; Stewart, 2006; and Spears, 2007; Hendricks, 2007; Svensson, 2007; Tieku, 2007; Makinana, 2009; Jones, 2009).

A new conception of the prominence and purpose of the military in society also had to be formulated, from its previously negative incarnation to a positive force within the new democracy. How could the new democratic ideals and priorities of the State, such as the human rights based credo, be infused through all State structures including the security sector? In what way could the security structures of the State be fundamentally reshaped to absorb the amalgamation of various fighting forces?[117] Could prevailing gender norms be transformed as part of this process as well? Would the values ascribed to both femininity and masculinity within the realm of security be shifted? This transformation would largely be undertaken through processes such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), described in this chapter, which shows how the culture of the military can be fundamentally reorganised, thereby altering the type of influence it exerts as a social institution.

This chapter argues that the emergence of the Human Security Paradigm as a people-centred approach, as opposed to a State-centric approach to security, formed the basis for the post-conflict reconstruction of South Africa. This shift had significant implications for the (re)gendering of State security institutions, and adds a critical dimension to understanding *how* gendered institutional change occurred in the South African context. At the heart of human security lies the need for empowerment[118] as the cornerstone for development, which is in a mutually reliable relationship with security. As empowerment cannot be seen as a pursuit that excludes half of the population of any given State, gender concerns are implicitly included in the quest for lasting security. Yet

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[116] This resonates with the South African experience, as among the many challenges faced by the new government were widespread poverty and underdevelopment, making it imperative to focus on building the capacity of State institutions to provide services such as health care, overhauling the education system and supplying basic infrastructure, particularly water and sanitation. Budget priorities were therefore geared towards social spending, with defence priorities decreasing drastically.

[117] This would, in turn, place an additional strain on State capacity as a significant number of soldiers would require assistance due to varying levels of training, a multitude of affiliations, and few skills appropriate for the needs of the economy (or conventional military service).

[118] Empowerment in this sense refers to the provision of opportunities to participate equitably and meaningfully in the growth of the State, and the capacity to act on these openings. For an in-depth analysis of the varying definitions and usages of the term, see Oxaal & Baden (1997).

the traditionally hierarchical, parochial and masculine security arena has historically both excluded and denigrated women as victims and passive bystanders (as shown in Chapters Three and Four). However, the active participation of women in South Africa's armed liberation struggle, and the positions they occupy in the new democratic structures, speak to the commitment of the State towards achieving gender equality, albeit with mixed results, as shown in Chapter Five.

While the question at the heart of this thesis is *how* gendered institutional change occurred, it is imperative to uncover whether the same commitment towards gender equality is evident within State security structures as in the general governance structures discussed in previous chapters. This strand of questioning enables the emergence of a clearer understanding of the extent to which security institutions promote and foreclose gendered change. In particular, were the same opportunities for transformation present? Were women able to capitalise on the openings within the security structures facilitated by the paths emerging from the historical legacies described in Chapters Four and Five? Was the oft-stated State goal of equality and diversity in all spheres of government being realised? This chapter provides the background for a detailed discussion of these questions in Chapters Seven and Eight. It outlines the Human Security Paradigm (HSP) and the key features of Security Sector Reform (SSR), and presents a synopsis of the South African Defence Review (DR) process, focusing on the elements relating to integration and transformation.

## 6.2 Shifting Security Priorities: The Human Security Paradigm

> "Human security is therefore not a defensive concept-the way territorial or military security is. Instead, human security is an integrative concept" (UNDP, 1994: 24).

The 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Development Report contains an argument by Mahbub Ul Haq for a people-centred approach to human security, and puts forward a broader conceptualisation of security as an integral link between democratisation and development (UNDP, 1994; Schoeman, 1998; CHS, 2003; Stewart, 2006: 44; Maclean *et al*, 2006; Hendricks, 2007: iv; Clarke, 2008: 51; Jones, 2009). The 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen further expanded on this link, calling for an "enabling environment" for the attainment of

security and stability, with an emphasis on "fundamental freedoms" centered around democracy, development, and basic needs (UN, 1995b: para. 5; Jones, 2009: 7). It was argued that suitable conditions for the pursuit of these goals were predicated on ensuring accountability and transparency (as part of the pursuit of good governance ideals), as well as promoting political participation at all levels (UN, 1995b; Jones, 2009: 11). Further, the defence of fundamental human rights through an emphasis on equality, diversity, and social integration required a substantial increase in social spending (Vickers, 1993; UN: 1995b, 74; Jones, 2009: 7-8).

The sweeping definition of human security put forward by the Commission on Human Security serves to illustrate the extensive reach of this new manner of viewing the inter-connectedness of development and security:

> "human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential ... freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of the future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national, security" (CHS, 2003: 4).

The development and security aspects of this new conceptualisation came under renewed scrutiny following the end of the Cold War. Development was broadly characterised as "progress in human wellbeing", although it was cautioned that development cannot be equated solely with economic growth (Stewart, 2006: 43)[119]. Instead, the UNDP advocated addressing the seven inter-related aspects of insecurity that impact upon stability and development: personal, community, economic, food, health, environmental and political instability (UNDP, 1994: 24-33; Jones, 2009: 32-33).

Capturing the multidimensional nature of security recognises that "security cannot be assessed outside its social and political context", thereby necessitating input from a wide range of stakeholders and actors (Svensson, 2007: 3; Anderlini, 2004). This is reiterated by Williams (2001) who notes: "the extent to which a coherent and integrated human security policy exists within a government which proves capable of integrating the

[119] It should be noted that instability impacts negatively on economic growth as a result of falling production, lower export rates and increased imports (which, in turn, increases foreign debt), and the upsurge in military expenditure that further erodes State capital (Stewart, 2006: 46). However, focusing exclusively on growing the economy does not automatically result in either broad-based development or stability.

diverse elements of security (political, economic, social, military, and technological)" has a profound impact on the success of transformational undertakings. This paradigm shift is also explored by Schoeman (1998) who argues that the developing world is "confronted by an 'insecurity' dilemma rather than a security dilemma".

This relates to the forthcoming discussion on the empowerment effect of utilising local knowledge and local actors, allowing a redefinition of what is important in a particular context, including with respect to security priorities. It is argued that this context-driven approach would allow social and cultural norms and values to permeate the national discourse, providing a more practical foundation from which to build lasting change as opposed to imposing foreign concepts through foreign means. Retaining cognisance of the local context (and its influence on social and cultural norms) is also seen as an essential component for any viable participative approach (Svensson, 2007: 7).

In essence, human security calls for socio-economic centred security thinking which aims to mitigate the conditions that give rise to insecurity, and in so doing "complements State security, enhances human rights and strengthens development" (Tshitereke, 2009: 2; Anderlini, 2004; Stewart, 2006; Jones, 2009, amongst others).

In a more abstract sense, the reconceptualisation of security through the human security paradigm reflects back to the earlier discussion on militarised societies (Chapters Three and Four), and the manner in which this permeates all aspects of life in that society. Cock (1991: 25) posits that:

> "A distinction should be made between the military as a social institution (a set of social relationships organised around war and taking the shape of an armed force); militarism as an ideology (the key component of which is an acceptance of organised violence as a legitimate solution to conflict); and militarisation as a social process that involves a mobilisation of resources for war. These phenomena are closely related. Militarisation involves both the spread of militarism as an ideology, and an expansion of the power and influence of the military as a social institution".

Thus, it is argued that in militarised societies such as South Africa, the post-conflict period necessitates a recasting of the role of the military (and militarism) in society, and the negotiation of a new relationship for members within the military as well.[120]

The adoption of the Human Security Paradigm should not be viewed as a new security policy but rather as a new approach to a range of development and security concerns. It constitutes a different way of viewing the problems within the State and requires the participation of citizens to succeed, as it calls for the repositioning of the military within society and demonstrates that the State is being responsive to the needs of the population. The Human Security Paradigm (HSP) could be simplistically summed up as security for all citizens through inclusive sustainable development, with an emphasis on participation as a means of ensuring local ownership and sustainability (Schoeman, 1998; Williams, 2001; Svensson, 2007; Tshitereke, 2009).

## 6.3 Human Security and South Africa's New Regional Mandate

The move to a human-rights based conceptualisation of security represented a significant shift towards a revaluation of local knowledge and expertise when defining security needs and concerns (Anderlini, 2004; Svensson, 2007: 6; Landsberg, 2010: 124). This reflects the growing consensus within Africa that African problems require African solutions, as expressed in the philosophy of the "African Renaissance" movement promoted by former President Thabo Mbeki (Gevisser, 2007: 16, 32; Landsberg, 2010: 126-131), and in the increasing role of regional and continental alliances, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), which was in part a reaction to the effects of neoliberalism and globalisation.

Emphasising the importance of local knowledge and a context-driven approach to African problems, these groupings aim to stimulate economic growth and stability by

[120] The relationship between society and militarism would take on greater significance during the integration of the various militias into the SADF to form the new SANDF. This is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, and in Chapter Seven. A detailed analysis of the practical ramifications of these issues on the integration of the armed forces is provided by Williams (2001), Stott (2002) and Anderlini (2004).

boosting investment and somewhat limiting interference by "outsider" states (Mansfield & Milner, 1997: 3; Acharya, 1999; Ntamack, 2004: 13; Kingebiel, 2005).

Structured on more participatory terms than traditional super-power led alliances, these new regional groupings strove to lead from "within and below" by addressing human rights issues and basic services shortfalls through greater social spending and emphasising institutional transformation to meet good governance ideals (Nyikuli, 1999: 623; Acharya, 1999; Lee, 2003: 11; Anderlini, 2004, amongst others). In other words, there was a distinct shift towards addressing basic needs as part of a holistic security policy that could be characterised as the choice of "guns versus butter" (Tshitereke, 2009: 2). Active participation in these regional groupings is therefore another strategy aiding the attainment of human security, given the complementary (and overlapping) goals.

The conviction that local experiences should influence the solutions to local challenges played a significant part in the reformulation of South Africa's foreign policy within the sub-Continent, which was a significant departure from the Apartheid policy (Landsberg, 2010). South Africa's role in regional destabilisation during the NP-regime was a product of a militarised mindset fuelled not only by Cold War paranoia but also by the country's own violent history, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four. The "total onslaught" policy severely undermined South Africa's credibility within the region as it engaged in a sustained programme of bombing raids, economic blockades and military interference in Angola, Zambia, Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana, amongst others (Hettne, 2001: 94; Stott, 2002; Solomon, 2004: 5; Anderlini, 2004; Heinecken *et al*, 2005: 132; Holden, 2008: 3; Landsberg, 2010: 40-41).

The ANC-regime thus aimed to rehabilitate South Africa's image within Africa by capitalising on the moral authority endowed as a result of the peaceful transition process. The emergence of SADC in 1992 and the need to forge collective common security solutions as part of the focus on social and economic development initiatives, greatly contributed to the evolution of South Africa's security thinking (Hudson, 2000;

Van Nieuwkerk, 2001; Anderlini, 2004; Gumede, 2005: 198; Murithi, 2008; Aboagye, 2009)[121].

South Africa's continued economic and military dominance within the region, and its increasing stature in the international community, positioned the country to assume a new leadership role within the region, thereby increasing stability nationally and regionally. As the South African Defence Review stated in 1998:

> "much of the sub-continent is stricken by underdevelopment and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. There are large numbers of refugees and displaced people; an acute debt crisis; and disease and environmental degradation … These phenomena are not confined to national borders. They impact negatively on neighbouring states in the form of a range of non-military threats: environmental destruction; the spread of disease; the burden of refugees; and cross-border trafficking in drugs, stolen goods and small arms. Following trends in other parts of the world, South Africa is committed to the development of a "common security" approach in Southern Africa" (DoD, 1998; ch 4, para. 6-8).

The transformation of the security sector in South Africa was directly tied in to this new regional focus in three key ways. Firstly, the security forces required integration in order to be representative of the population, by amalgamating the various liberation armies into one force, and discouraging internal military instability. The security forces also required urgent downsizing/right-sizing in accordance with the new peacetime demands of the democratic State. Secondly, the mandate of the defence force would need to be amended in order to align with the new priorities and values of the State. Lastly, the commitment of South Africa to regional alliances such as SADC and the AU further required the drastic overhaul of the defence structures to meet new obligations, such as the participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. This would entail a re-consideration of the armaments retained (and purchased), as well as the numbers of personnel required and the skills needed to meet these obligations.

[121] In 1992 SADC succeeded the 1980 South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), created in order to curb dependence on Apartheid South Africa, and consisted of the "Frontline States" of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (with Namibia joining in 1990 upon its independence from South Africa). The current SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

There was significant pressure on South Africa to navigate the reform process successfully, particularly given its increasing participation and leadership within the regional and continental structures. Internally, it was essential in order to attract investment by ensuring a stable environment, and foster development through re-prioritised spending. Regionally, it could be viewed as leading by example: implementing measures to attain the good governance ideals promoted not only by the new democracy but also by the regional and continental groupings.

As part of South Africa's "rebranding" as a positive influence in the region, there was a push to revive and further expand regional mechanisms aimed at collective development and security. Former Presidents Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria) and Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal) have been credited as being the driving forces behind the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in 2002, and the promotion of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Cilliers, 2002: 64; Nugent, 2004: 433; Kingebiel, 2005; Pottinger, 2008: 300-301).

Three particular aspects must be highlighted as being pertinent to the evolution of the South African regional re-positioning strategy and the transformation of its security sector[122]. Firstly, the establishment of proactive security mechanisms such as the AU's Peace and Security Council and the African Standby Force, drawn from the regional brigades of groupings such as SADC, which would have the imperative to intervene militarily in certain cases (including on humanitarian grounds), as outlined in the Constitutive Act of the AU (AU, 2000: Article 4; Kingebiel, 2005).

While the current lack of resources (human, financial, and materiel) remains a challenge, as seen in the uneven success of the 2003 African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the 2005 African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Pottinger, 2008: 301), the need for developing local capacity (whether as a regional or continental force) is essential to enable a rapid-

[122] It should be noted that while some of the mechanisms, structures and events discussed here occurred after the transformation of the South African security sector had begun, fledgling versions had already been established, or were foreshadowed by this time.

response to emerging crises in order to maintain stability in the region (Landsberg, 2010: 153)[123].

Secondly, the creation of the African Peer Review Mechanism as a consultative process promoting adherence to good governance ideals amongst NEPAD (and later AU) member states served to underscore the continental commitment to the goals outlined within the human security paradigm. As a leading force in both NEPAD and the AU, South Africa was at the forefront of efforts to establish this mechanism (Cilliers, 2002; Pottinger, 2008: 301; Landsberg, 2010: 149), and would therefore need to be seen to lead by example by getting its own house in order.

Lastly, the dominance of South Africa within both the AU and SADC allowed for greater participation in the development of the institutions and values of these groupings by the fledgling democratic state. This capacity to set the agenda was due, in part, to South Africa's increased international profile, economic prowess, and comparative military capabilities (Venter, 2001: 337; Anderlini, 2004; Pottinger, 2008: 313; Landsberg, 2010: 132, 140-141).[124]

Against this regional and continental backdrop, the impetus for change within the security sector was also starkly apparent internally. The first concern was the legitimacy of the new defence force, given the historical legacies that needed to be tackled. Some of these legacies stemmed from the manner in which the armed forces were utilised during the NP-regime, and had far-reaching consequences on the way the defence force was perceived internally. The deployment of troops to quell civil unrest, as well as the notorious "third force" activities (outlined in Chapter Four), undercut the legitimacy of the then-SADF in the eyes of the general population.

[123] The increasing need for peacekeeping missions across the continent requires the establishment of a capable and efficient African force given that, in 2005, 7 of the 16 UN Peacekeeping Missions were in Africa. In 2004, more than 17 000 personnel were deployed to Sierra Leone and 15 000 to Liberia (Kingebiel, 2005). Greater regional and continental capacity is required to enable faster response times, particularly in cases where the UN is unable to intervene or unwilling to engage for protracted periods of time.

[124] All three of these issues would be pertinent to the complicated arms acquisition process discussed in Chapter Eight.

With the move towards entrenching the human rights enshrined within the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the new SANDF would be required to establish a new relationship with the people of South Africa based on a respect for democratic principles and political neutrality in the deployment of the armed forces (DoD, 1998; Stott, 2002; Heinecken *et al*, 2005: 133). Thus, a wide-reaching transformation of the security sector was undertaken through the SSR process described next.

## 6.4 Security Sector Reform: Opportunity for Transformation

The sweeping scope of the HSP calls for an equally comprehensive strategy for effecting change in the State security structures. SSR is a wide-ranging endeavour aimed at the transformation of all security related mechanisms and actors within a society, including political and military actors and institutions such as ministries, departments, and Parliament, and with particular focus on the armed forces (Zwane, 1995; Stott, 2002; Le Roux, 2004; Bendix, 2008; Gueli, 2008; Hutton, 2009; Jacob, Bendix & Stanley, 2008).

While it is generally undertaken in post-conflict and transitional societies, stable developed states periodically perform SSR as well. The objective is to continuously assess and reformulate the security system to ensure that it upholds democratic ideals, entrenches good governance practices, and takes cognisance of the complex relationships between security concerns and other issues such as development (Sorenson, 1998: 3; Williams, 2001; Valasek, 2008: 1).

SSR targets include the establishment of effective oversight mechanisms (predominantly in terms of ensuring civilian control of the armed forces), building capacity, and restructuring where necessary to ensure efficiency. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) is an essential element of a successful SSR process, particularly as post-conflict and transitional states invariably have over-sized armed forces that are both inappropriate and unaffordable during peacetime. In the South African case, there was the additional consideration of the liberation movement armies further swelling the ranks. The overall purpose of SSR and DDR is to "ensure that the military remains strong enough to defend the State (protected *by* the military) and subservient enough not to threaten the State (protected *from* the military)" (Heinecken *et al*, 2005: 119).

The need for SSR can also surpass militaristic or economic considerations by forming an integral part of the post-conflict reconstruction of a society's norms, creating a space within which former enemies can seek reconciliation and forge a new future, as described by Stott (2002):

> "… the legacy of the recent past will not be overcome simply by the laying aside of arms. Neither the old SADF, nor the liberation armies, were created or structured to serve in a democracy and none had an unblemished history of respecting human rights. For these reasons, it is of the utmost importance that potential problems and pitfalls in the drive to consolidate democratic gains, and fundamentally transform the armed services, are adequately addressed".

Thus, it can also be argued that SSR has a role to play in wider societal reconstruction, in that it can "present an opportunity to aim higher than merely recreating the pre-conflict situation" (Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004: 8). The challenges and opportunities of the post-conflict period lie in the reconfiguration of the roles and principles through which a society will be governed, and particularly in the redistribution of responsibilities and privileges amongst society (Koen, 2006: 2). An equitable and inclusive system is essential to allow the restoration of order and security (Zwane, 1995; Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004; Svensson, 2007; Albrecht & Barnes, 2008), and prevent the resurgence of conflict.

These opportunities and challenges of the post-conflict period are thus "compounded when viewed through a gendered lens" (Koen, 2006: 2), particularly as the nature of conflicts has changed to become centered around issues of "power, control, political loyalty and ethno-nationalism. These are all elements in the formation of political identities and these political identities are also gendered" (Koen, 2006: 4; Jackson & Pearson, 1998; Modise & Curnow, 2000; Nzomo, 2002; Pearson, 2004; Puwar, 2004; Genz, 2006; Pillay, 2006; Heinecken, 2009: 27).

It is argued that as the fundamental benchmarks for peace and development, such as participation, inclusivity, and broad-based empowerment (Schoeman, 1998; Gueli, 2008; Hutton, 2009; Makinana, 2009), are the same as those required for achieving gender equality (Pillay, 2006: 1; Svensson, 2007: 9), the opportunities which arise during the period of democratisation following transitions from conflict may be capitalised upon in order to consolidate political and social transformations occurring during the post-

conflict stages (Sorenson, 1998; Vincent, 2001; Heinecken, 2002; Koen, 2006; Pillay, 2006; Koen, 2006: 1; Clarke, 2008). Thus, in the same manner that peace and development are actively linked to the overhaul of the security structures, peace and development are also intertwined with gender equality goals in a conscious process of entanglement that connects gender with security.

The increasing pressure of the international community (through policies, declarations and other instruments[125]) to transform the approach of developing states towards human rights and gender rights through constitutional and legislative reform, allows the voices of marginalised groups to be heard (Sorenson, 1998: ii; Koen, 2006: 2; Hendricks & Hutton, 2008: 4; Valasek, 2008: 8).

The potential for affecting change was aided by the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing where the Declaration and Platform for Action set out twelve issues of concern in the attainment of women's equality (and numerous strategies for addressing them), including "numerous obligations in relation to the security sector" (Bastick & Valasek, 2008: 3; Cohn, 2004).

Apart from ensuring gender-balanced State structures at all levels, it also called for targeted training of security personnel (in the military, police, judiciary, etcetera) with respect to gender- and human-rights (Bastick & Valasek, 2008: 3). It further noted the under-representation of women in decision-making positions related to security, stating that "the equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security" (UN, 1995b: para. 134).

[125] These instruments include calls for greater participation by women in all aspects of security. The SSR process represents an opportunity to formalise the involvement of women during the institutional transformation of the security system. These security-specific gender instruments emerged from decades of incremental gains in the protection of fundamental gender rights as laid out in, amongst others, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the UN GA International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952), and the UN Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict (1974), as discussed by Bastick and Valasek (2008). These conventions and declarations formalised equality before the law, and prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or political affiliations. More explicit protection and targets were laid out in further documents, including the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which called for specific legislation to ensure the abolishment of discrimination, exclusion or restrictions against women, protecting their right to equality in all spheres, particularly with regards to employment, promotions, equal remuneration, and job security (UN, 1979).

Two closely related instruments that significantly aided efforts to formalise women's inclusion in peace and security processes were the Windhoek Declaration/Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (May 2000) and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (October 2000).

The Windhoek Declaration/Namibia Plan recognises the necessity for women to be "equal partners" in all aspects of the peace process; calls for a target of 50% women in managerial and decision-making positions, including in UN peace support operations; and the inclusion of gender in the training programmes and monitoring and evaluation reports of missions (UN, 2000: para. 3, 5, 6, 8).

The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) goes further than any preceding instrument in its recognition of the contribution of women in conflict and post-conflict situations in a variety of capacities, and renews earlier calls for women's full and equal participation in all aspects of post-conflict situations (particularly in peace agreements, SSR and DDR processes), expanding on the obligations by states in terms of ensuring compliance. As Cohn (2004) and Heinecken (2009: 27) point out, the Resolution affirmed that the meaningful participation of women in the security arena was "not only something that is beneficial, but essential".[126]

Other regional instruments calling for the legal elimination of discrimination against women, and setting forth a variety of mechanisms by which states can achieve gender equality, include the SADC Gender and Development Declaration (1997), the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (2008), the African Union Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (2002), the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003), and the African Union Solemn Declaration of Gender Equality in Africa (2004).

[126] A range of authors have analysed various aspects of the impact of these instruments on the advancement of gender rights. These include Byrne *et al* (1996); Baden and Goetz (1998); Jackson and Pearson (1998); Zinsser (2002); Cohn (2004); Batliwala and Dhanraj (2007); Cornwall, Harrison & Whitehead (2007); Mama (2007); Molyneux (2007); Mukhopadhyay (2007); Sardenberg (2007); Subrahmanian (2007); Woodford-Berger (2007), Bastick and Valasek (2008), amongst many others.

Arguably, the most innovative gender-related document to emerge from the AU was the 2006 Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD). It identifies gender as a cross-cutting element across all security concerns and acknowledges current institutionalised inequalities. This requires policy development needs to go beyond gender-sensitive planning and the provision of a legal framework for access, by transforming public institutions and ensuring the participation of men in the achievement of these goals (AU, 2006: 22). Significantly, the policy places gender alongside the six indicative elements of the strategy: security; humanitarian/emergency assistance; political governance and transition; socio-economic reconstruction and development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and women and gender (AU, 2006: 7). In other words, the PCRD can be seen as the strategic coupling of gender equality with wider reform goals, providing a compelling basis from which women can agitate for change within the security sector, particularly given South Africa's central role within the AU and its stated intention of being seen as a model for democratic reform based on a commitment to human rights.

In other words, strategically utilising the shift to HSP and the opportunities presented by SSR, and drawing on the tools provided in the various regional and international instruments, provides a time-constrained opportunity to transform gendered norms within the security sector and create an enabling environment for continuing gendered institutional change.

## 6.5 Security Sector Reform: Mainstreaming Gender

> "War implodes the distinction between the public and private spheres. There is a real sense in which war is a transformative force; it initiates social change; it restructures relations between the sexes; it provides a kind of springboard from which many women have moved beyond circumscribed domestic roles into new arenas" (Cock, 1991: 51).

The SSR process presents "an opportunity for African women to advance their status in the public arena" (Clarke, 2008: 49), leading to "operational effectiveness, local ownership and strengthened oversight" (Valasek, 2008: 1; Pillay, 2006: 7; Heinecken, 2009: 27). By calling for robust terms of reference, targeted focus groups, and gender-responsive policies and practices, gender issues are placed on the security agenda, although Valasek (2008: 5) cautions that:

> "being a woman does not automatically make someone a 'gender expert', and increasing the number of women in the room does not necessarily guarantee gender-responsive policy and programming. However, a balance of women and men at all levels of institutions creates greater possibilities for identifying and addressing the different impacts of policy and programming on women and men. In many cases, having both male and female personnel is an operational necessity".

This point of view is shared by Hendricks and Hutton (2008: 3) who argue that

> "although the presence of women is critical to creating a gender balance, this alone does not guarantee that defence reform or the defence forces will be gender responsive. A gender perspective in defence reform has to go beyond numbers. It must critically pose the questions: security for whom and how?"

SSR creates openings to mainstream the use of "gender aware" policies that consider the differential impact of war and post-conflict activities on men and women, and "gender-blind" approaches that "largely disregards these differences" (Sorenson, 1998: 1). This approach, which counters traditional ideas about security as a masculine realm, was adopted by activist women from across the political spectrum in South Africa. Bolstered by the success of DRW and SRW in the general governance structures of the State (outlined in Chapter Five), and drawing on their experiences during the liberation struggle (as detailed in Chapters Three and Four), female politicians and gender activists pushed for a gendered SSR process in South Africa.

Apart from enhancing the legitimacy of the process, women's organisations served as "crucial bridges between local communities and security policymakers, strengthening local ownership" as they have an in-depth understanding of the security needs of their

communities, and often have experience in the creation and implementation of initiatives within their districts (Valasek, 2008: 6). The active involvement of women through forums such as hearings and community consultations widened the potential human resource pool, offering additional skills to the team (Anderlini, 2004; Valasek, 2008: 8; Heinecken, 2009: 27). This is "an operational imperative" in that "gender perspectives ... recognise that a population is not a homogenous group, but constitutes a broad range of needs and interests" (Albrecht & Barnes, 2008: 4). It also facilitates a deeper understanding of conflict, allowing contextual challenges to be factored into the process (Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004: 5; Hendricks & Hutton, 2008: 4). The goal is thus relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and transparency (Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004: 6; Valasek, 2008: 16; Heinecken, 2009: 27).

With specific reference to humanitarian missions, Heinecken (2009: 27) argues that "there is growing evidence that a better gender/racial mix is more suited ... especially in their interaction with local communities", noting that greater diversity "improves the effectiveness of armed forces". A noteworthy example of the effectiveness of a gender dimension to peacekeeping actions was the UN Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) prior to the 1994 elections, a multi-mandated operation encompassing observation, peacekeeping (in case of civil unrest) and peacemaking (assisting local structures during the negotiation process) (Ndulo, 1995; King, 1997; Pillay, 2006: 5). Led by Angela King, at the time it was only the third operation to be under the command of a woman and was the first to achieve gender parity: between 46-53% female mission staff, and 50% female team leaders "even in the politically most volatile provinces of Kwazulu Natal and Gauteng" (Pillay, 2006: 5; King, 1997). In general, the mission with gender parity was found to have been more consultative and hands-on, facilitating better relationships with the community (which instilled confidence and trust), and creating networking and information-sharing opportunities lacking in other missions (Ndulo, 1995; King, 1997; Pillay, 2006: 5).

The experiences and lessons learnt from the UNOMSA mission underscore the assertion that the involvement of women in the defence arena does more than transform notions of gender equality within security, serving to reframe how women are seen within the current social order (Zwane, 1995; King, 1997). The widely accepted

success of the mission amongst officials and security personnel served to reinforce reform efforts by legitimising the presence of women.

The continual emphasis by the ANC regime on equality in all aspects, as articulated in all policy documents (including the Constitution, and the White Paper on Defence, amongst others), could, if implemented, bring about the desired shift in norms. Realising this shift is another matter, but it can be argued that full and meaningful gender integration can have a much wider impact than "just" opening all military posts to women. Achieving gender equality in the security sector can go beyond gendered institutional transformation, as representation arguments feed into this as well. Overcoming discrimination (in any sense) is part of the process of ensuring the legitimacy of the security sector (Heinecken, 2009: 26).

A successful SSR process can be a means to go beyond politically correct lip service and meaningfully assimilate gender issues to ensure broader participation and optimal efficiency in various spheres (Hendricks & Hutton, 2008: 2; Valasek, 2008: 1). The inclusion of broad-based consultations that facilitate the input of a variety of stakeholders ensures non-discriminatory terms of references for the SSR process and aids the development of equity-oriented policies that address the "underlying tensions that cultural and ideological differences bring" (Heinecken, 2009: 27; Valasek, 2008: 5). In practical terms, SSR addresses the disproportionate effect of war on women, which is compounded by the added responsibilities brought about by both conflict and post-conflict roles (Zuckerman and Greenberg, 2004: 8).

The failure or poor implementation of SSR processes in a variety of contexts are usually attributed to poor participation, lack of capacity, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient time and resources for the undertaking (Valasek, 2008: 19; Williams, 2001: Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004: 6). In South Africa, as elsewhere, inequitable power dynamics are a formidable stumbling block, reiterating the need to address the gender relations that perpetuate discrimination and uphold the institutional norms reinforcing gender inequality (Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004: 7; Albrecht & Barnes, 2008: 5). In other words, a reconfiguration of the military and the security sector in general is needed, not only in terms of structure and forces, but also in relation to its purpose in

society and its relationship with society. This must necessarily be tempered by an understanding of how women were/are advancing within security structures both prior to and post conflict. The rethinking of security and its relationship to citizens would enable not only a re-evaluation of women's contributions in the past, but the opening up of new spaces for the future.

The starting point for this process would necessarily entail an understanding of how roles within the security sector are gendered: the processes through which masculinity is privileged in relation to the military. As Tickner (2001: 7), amongst others, has pointed out, "new democracies are not always friendly towards women". This is echoed by Enloe (1990: 13) who notes that while "women do not benefit automatically every time the international system is reordered", there are instances where "re-defining masculinity [is] integral to re-establishing national sovereignty". In other words, the various shifts occurring simultaneously within the South African security – the adoption of the HSP and the transformation of the SANDF, amongst others discussed in Chapters Six and Seven – facilitate the reworking of these concepts, but are not sufficient on their own. This would not be a spontaneous or natural occurrence: the social hierarchies sustaining inequitable gender relations in the security sector would need to be deconstructed (Vickers, 1993: 106-107; Tickner, 2001: 62), a task that would be difficult given the extensive influence of masculinised concepts of security on gendered security roles (Cock, 1992; Goldstein, 2001: 9; Tickner, 2001: 61).

The historical subjugation of women in formal arenas for political participation has been discussed at length throughout this thesis. The difficulty in negotiating access to decision-making forums has similarly been emphasised, and underscores the importance of re-negotiating the way in which women (and women's roles) are perceived. The mixed success of this endeavour within the general governance structures of the State has been scrutinised in Chapter Five, and unpicking how this process has unfolded within the security arena requires an understanding of the construction of gendered roles in relation to war and security (Enloe, 1989; Cock, 1992; Vickers, 1993: 106-107; Tickner, 2001: 53; Cockburn, 2007: 243).

In the same way that gender and gender relations are constructed through unequal power relations in society, so too is the concept of security mediated in a way that privileges masculinity, as explored by authors such as Enloe (1989), Cock (1992), Vickers (1993), Tickner (2001), Goldstein (2001), and Cockburn (2007). The means by which this occurs are plentiful, and include the denial of women's voices in issues concerning security (Tickner, 2001: 37), portraying women as innately peaceful and nurturing (Enloe, 1989; Cock, 1992; Vickers, 1993: 43, 107; Goldstein, 2001: 322-331; Tickner, 2001: 57-59; Cockburn, 2007: 241), and excluding women from meaningfully participating in the security infrastructure of the State.

The socially mediated construction of gender roles (whether in security or any other arena), extends to the linkage of security and masculinity, and therefore requires the exercise of power by elites in order to sustain the dominance of the masculine over the feminine. This is clearly articulated in the statement by Tickner (2001: 60) that the "traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity that sustain war require an exercise of power: they are not inevitable", and this power "must be adaptively reproduced from generation to generation" (Cockburn, 2007: 240). In other words, the gendering of conceptualisations of war/militarism is socially mediated, privileging the masculine in the realm of security. The "intense socialisation and training" needed to link masculinity and war (Goldstein, 2001: 252; Vickers, 1993: 43; Cockburn, 2007: 227-229, 242, 250) must be sustained, and changing the way masculinity, war and security are interlinked requires a conscious shift of the norms and rules (formal and informal) surrounding these concepts.

The combined influences of the HSP, SANDF restructuring, pursuit of gender mainstreaming policies, and the influx of women from MK, all served to kick start this process of gendered institutional change in the State security sector. Firstly, the more inclusive view of security increased the opportunities for change, as feminist arguments have asserted for some time (Tickner, 2001: 4, 63). The increase in descriptive representation, and the measures aimed at achieving substantive representation, detailed in the next chapter, all influenced the reconstruction of the formal and informal rules and norms governing the roles of women in security, subtly altering how masculinity and femininity are tied to security, and aiding the process of institutional transformation.

Key to this process would be the undertaking of Security Sector Reform, which facilitates the implementation of gender mainstreaming principles as it advocates a participative strategy aimed at fundamentally reconstructing the security sector – creating openings for the substantive participation of women in the security infrastructure of the State.

## 6.6 Security Sector Reform: SADF to SANDF

The transformation of the South African Defence Force (SADF) to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was modelled upon the strategies developed to effect the broader transformation process within South Africa, and had repercussions on the economic, political and social structures of society. The move from an aggressive regional stance towards "a posture of co-operative and confidence-building defence" (DoD, 1998: ch 9, para. 1) was perhaps the most significant shift as it reflected the new vision of the State as a leading regional partner promoting peace, stability and development, as has been highlighted above. This is articulated within the plethora of government policy documents and initiatives that emerged at the time, including the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and various strategic plans such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and later the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR).

Following the parliamentary approval of the 1996 White Paper on National Defence, a Defence Review (DR) was undertaken to elaborate on the policy framework outlined within the White Paper, providing a basis for long-term planning (DoD, 1998). The Defence Review clarified the new doctrine and mandate of the force, required levels of personnel, armaments and funding, and the transformation strategy of the SANDF to ensure that all forces conform to equity and representation targets, creating a "non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture" (DoD, 1998; ch 10, para. 2).

According to the Defence Review, the transformation of the Department of Defence (DoD) was to be undertaken within three areas: civil-military relations, normative and cultural transformation, and organisational restructuring. Addressing civil-military

relations called for the alignment of the DoD with constitutional and other legal frameworks, including the RDP, GEAR, the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, and the Defence White Paper, amongst others (DoD, 1998; ch 9, para. 1).

As part of this alignment process, it was proposed that accountability measures be strengthened, the function and composition of the defence force reconsidered, and stringent oversight mechanisms put in place (DoD, 1998; ch 9, para. 2). This would include parliamentary control of the defence mandate and budget[127] to ensure the harmonisation of defence activities with wider government objectives.

More broadly, the legislative and oversight function of the South African Parliament was intended to place the institution in a unique position to ensure the participation and inclusion of a multitude of marginalised groups, not least that of women. As democratically elected representatives, parliamentarians "exercise a crucial bridging function between government and the citizens in shaping national dialogue on security" (Luciak: 2008, 1; Anderlini, 2004). By building consensus through debates and hearings, at times conflicting views on security needs can be reconciled through the parliamentary process. Parliamentarians can also amend security related policies and laws, call on expert civilian testimony, and exercise their monitoring and evaluation powers over programmes and strategies (Anderlini, 2004; Luciak: 2008, 2).

However, the long-established dominance of the Executive in the security arena constrains Parliament to an extent. The legitimacy of civilian oversight of the military and the commitment to good governance principles require that these traditional notions of control be challenged.[128] This is expanded upon in Chapter Eight's discussion of the Arms Deal, which illustrates the repercussions of this dominance.

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[127] The Joint Standing Committee on Defence, together with the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces defence committees would fulfil this function (DoD, 1998). This provision is of particular import to this study, as is the proviso for the Finance and Public Accounts parliamentary committees to "summon any public account holder concerning their expenditure", including the Auditor General. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight during the analysis of the Arms Deal case.

[128] As demonstrated in Chapter Five, the Executive wields an extraordinary amount of power (see Figure 5.2 Institutional Power Matrix).

The goal of the normative and cultural transformation of the defence sector was to remodel the values and traditions of the DoD in line with the espoused new democratic human-rights based culture of the South African government. This would entail, for example, ensuring equal opportunities to all population groups with respect to participation and advancement within the defence sector, including the use of affirmative action programmes to facilitate the achievement of a broadly representative defence structure that reflected the demographic profile of South Africa (DoD, 1998: ch 9, para. 2.2.2, ch 10, para. 46-7).

The final element of the SSR process, highlighted for the purposes of this study, is organisational restructuring, which refers to the "rationalisation and right-sizing of the DoD", including the demobilisation of surplus personnel (DoD, 1998: ch 9, para. 2.3). The various armed movements[129] involved in the struggle for democracy were integrated into one unified force as part of the transformation of the SADF to the SANDF, creating a number of challenges for the SSR process as the ranks swelled.

It was understood that the assimilation of formerly antagonistic forces would need to be undertaken with sensitivity, particularly as the simultaneous application of affirmative action policies could cause animosity between personnel (Zwane, 1995; Williams, 2001; Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004, 23; Heinecken, 2009: 36). The affirmative action policies were aimed at achieving more than providing opportunities for previously marginalised groups, including women; they sought to produce a force that was more representative of the wider population and ensure that the "military culture will be reflective of the diverse military traditions within South African society" (DoD, 1998: ch 9, para. 2.2.2). These two challenges relate closely to the third challenge: the reduction of the number of surplus personnel while retaining skilled officers, and providing transferable skills to those leaving the force in order to facilitate their reintegration into society. This was particularly salient in the case of former freedom fighters that may have limited education as a result of the Struggle, and therefore required vocational training in order to enter the formal economy following their demobilisation (DoD, 1998: ch 7, para.

[129] These include MK, APLA, and the forces of the nominally independent "homelands" of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC).

23)[130]. A further insight is made by Williams (2001) that "demobilisation is not simply a military challenge – indeed, it is not even primarily a military challenge" as the military has neither the human nor financial capacity to attend to the various challenges which accompany reintegrating former combatants, relying instead on community structures (traditionally dominated by women). The failure of the State to engage adequately with demobilised combatants in post-conflict South Africa has been well documented, with the most visible consequences being a rise in violent crime and domestic violence (Zwane, 1995; ISS, 2001; Williams, 2001; Stott, 2002).

The observation that SSR transcends military considerations (Williams, 2001) reiterates the need to incorporate personnel from a variety of backgrounds in order to create a representative force aimed at transforming wider societal norms and values. The presence of an array of personnel with differing experiences and perspectives creates a pool of human capacity upon which to draw that is as diverse as the challenges facing the nation. Ensuring the retention of personnel with the skills required to contribute to the transformation process was one facet of the SSR strategy, and reiterates the importance of utilising the expertise of women who had participated in the liberation struggle.

This process of organisational restructuring represented a *key moment* for the participation of women in the reform of the security sector. How could gender be entrenched within the new structures of the security? What mechanisms could aid the advancement of women within these transformed structures? What were the tools that women strategically wielded to sustain the gendered institutional changes wrought by the SSR process? This is the focus of Chapter Seven.

[130] In order to achieve this, a Personnel Rationalisation Work Group (PRWG) was established to ensure transparency. A sub-work group provided guidance on "regionalised psychological and social support to members and their families who are to be affected by the rationalisation process", together with a Consultation Forum that would "liaise with employee organisations about civilian members who could be affected by the rationalisation process" (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 48). Concerns were also raised about the provision of pensions to combatants who were not retained, and which could constitute a significant budgetary allocation (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 51).

## 6.7 Conclusion

The shift towards the people-centred and development-oriented human security paradigm fundamentally altered the manner in which South Africa viewed security. The overarching need to transform both its internal and external security policies with a view to negotiate the various post-transition challenges (such as underdevelopment and broad-based institutional restructuring) and meet its regional and continental obligations, created a conducive environment for increased participation from all sectors of society.

Building on past gains and the positive effects of the historical legacies of the armed struggle and the openings for more active involvement created by the SSR process, women had the opportunity to make a marked impact on the restructuring of the security mechanisms of the State. In light of the continued emphasis on equality, the prominence of women within the general structures of the State, and the status previously enjoyed by women within MK in particular, the prospects for meaningful reform appeared promising. Gender-specific provisions within various regional and international instruments provided further impetus for gendered institutional change. The movement towards a truly inclusive security arena was also supported by the State's own regional leadership aspirations.

Within the SANDF, the need to utilise the potential human capacity of incoming personnel as a result of the amalgamation of various forces further enhanced women's prospects for affecting gendered institutional change. A specific focus on skills development and equity provisions mandated by various policies could provide another boost.

Set against this backdrop, the following chapter explores the gender gains made in the security sector in South Africa. The success of the integration process undertaken through SSR is considered in numerical terms, as is the increased overall representation of women, specifically within management positions. A more in-depth analysis of the perceptions of women within the security structures of the State is followed by a short case-study of the reality of women attempting to steer State security policy. The purpose

is to ascertain whether the various instruments highlighted in this chapter have served to increase women's substantive representation within the security structures of the State, or whether an increase in the descriptive representation of women was the extent of the transformation process. In other words, did the ideas promoted by these instruments (equality, participation, collective development and security) become entrenched in the institutional norms and values of the new State?

# 7

# INSTITUTIONAL GENDERING AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY SECTOR

## 7.1 Introduction

The shift to the Human Security Paradigm (HSP), that emphasised a holistic people-centric approach to security, presented opportunities to reconstitute gendered security roles, particularly in the post-conflict context, as noted by feminists from both the developed and developing world. As Clarke (2008: 49) points out, security sector reform may "present an opportunity for engagement with these militarised masculinities in a way which would allow for the emergence of an alternative society". Cock (1991: 105) asserts that "in a civil war or struggle such as that waged in the eighties in South Africa, the landscape of combat is redrawn as the experience of war spreads among the general population. In this process, an important breach in the ideological constructions of gender is threatened". In other words, the legacy of militarisation was the transformation of societal norms with respect to gendered security roles, through a destabilisation of stereotypical gender roles and the reinforcement of new roles that arose as a result of the intersection of women's autonomy and militancy within the armed liberation struggle.

The post-conflict period represented an opportunity to entrench some of these changes within the institutions of the State. The increasing autonomy of women throughout South Africa's history, coupled with the legacy of militancy that expanded women's roles in relation to security, thus provided women in the security sector with the relative power to begin consolidating gender gains during the State transformation process of the transition, in terms of both DRW and SRW. As Chapter Five has shown, women continued acting strategically to infuse new (and old) institutional structures with the norms and values espoused by the ANC: equality and participation in all spheres without discrimination. Perhaps the biggest challenge would be transforming the

masculine realm of the security sector, and entrenching the hard-won gains of the liberation era.

The quest for entrenching gender gains in the evolving security structures of the State was aided by the new mandate of the democratic regime discussed in the previous chapter. The changing international and regional landscape, particularly the end of the Cold War and the shifting power dynamics within the region, precipitated South Africa's adoption of a security policy that took cognisance of the link between security and development. The State needed to reposition the military within both South African society and the wider regional context, and the HSP dove-tailed with the broader foreign policy vision of the ANC-government to rebrand South Africa as a regional player with the moral authority to lead. In an effort to rehabilitate South Africa's poor regional image, the security forces would be re-mandated to focus on peacekeeping activities. This reform of the security sector was intended to solve a number of potential problems: the new SANDF could absorb cadres from former liberation armies to man these missions, the defence force would be seen as more representative of the population (and thus have greater legitimacy), stability would be increased nationally and regionally, and the arms industry would remain operational.

This chapter argues that the intersection of the three legacies established in Part II of the thesis (the legacies of militancy, increasing women's autonomy, and the emphasis on equality) facilitated the process of gendering State security institutions, illustrating *how* gendered institutional change was occurring in post-conflict South Africa. These changes to institutional rules and norms are demonstrated through the creation of structural mechanisms for representation and participation, the reconstitution of the SANDF to reflect population demographics in a more equitable manner, and the rapid increase in women's descriptive representation.

This presents only a partial picture of the SSR process in South Africa, as the focus of this thesis is on the gendered dimension of this process. The second part of this chapter examines the perceptions of members of government and civil society practitioners of the gendering of State security structures, in order to draw a more accurate picture of the SRW. Is gender considered an important dimension in the formulation of security

policy? Are women advancing within these security structures and are their contributions to the SSR process valued? What factors are considered influential in the advancement of women, and what does this reveal about the autonomy and power of women within the security sector in South Africa?

## 7.2 Structural Mechanisms for Representation and Participation

The wide-ranging SSR process in South Africa aimed to reconstitute the place of the military in society through the transformation of the State security institutions. This process was guided by the Defence Review (DR), described in the previous chapter, which also informed the subsequent policy documents pertaining to the security sector.[131] The ANC-regime pursued a participatory and consultative approach during the 1998 Defence Review and the ensuing transformation of the SANDF, which enhanced the opportunities for gendered institutional change during the process. For example, a Working Group, with specialist sub-committees, was appointed by the Minister of Defence. These committees consisted of parliamentarians, SANDF personnel, members of the Defence Secretariat, and representatives from the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor), the defence industry, academia, and civil society. A committee was also established with the sole purpose of considering the role of women within the new SANDF. National consultative conferences and regional workshops were held, which were open to the public, and the findings presented to the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence, the Department of Defence, the Cabinet and Parliament (DoD, 1998: para. 8-13; Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004).

The role of women within the security sector, and the realisation of some of the goals of gender equality are explicitly addressed in the Defence Review, starting with an overturning of the SADF restriction regarding the ineligibility of women to serve in all uniformed posts, and addressing the training backlogs for women wishing to serve in command positions (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 58). In order to speed up the reduction of these backlogs, a "fast tracking" strategy was outlined that would give priority placement

[131] These include the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998), the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (1999), the SANDF Code of Conduct (2000), the New Defence Act 42 of 2002, and the White Paper on the South African Defence Related Industries (1999).

to personnel "who display potential to qualify sooner than would normally be the case" (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 16). This measure was identified by the DoD as a means to fulfil the constitutional equality clause (Section 9) by levelling the playing field through the provision of career development opportunities (SA Soldier, 2004: 40).

In addition, the continuance of the MK tradition of standardised training for male and female personnel is an important feature of the new institutional culture being developed in the SANDF, and represents a marked departure from the experiences of female personnel in the SADF, as discussed in Chapter Three. The standardisation of training contributed to the evolution of institutional norms within the security sector, as it represented the implementation of the equality policy of the new regime. This mirrored the effect that standardised training had in MK, which Cock (1992) discusses:

> "I was frequently told that the outcome of this integrated training was that the presence of competent and confident women was felt in a wide range of departments within MK. I was often told that this helped to overcome feelings of inferiority on the part of women cadres and sexist attitudes on the part of men cadres".

In other words, changing the formal rules regarding the acceptable roles of women in security, and providing the means through which women could attain and maintain these roles, demonstrates the commitment of the State in implementing the gender mainstreaming strategy in order to attain gender equality. This in turn affects the institutional norms governing gender relations, and aids the process of achieving gendered institutional change, not least because of the recognition of women as legitimate political actors in State security institutions.

The primary structure coordinating the gender mainstreaming of the security sector is the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate (EOCD), created as a result of the transformation of the SADF into the SANDF. It forms one of five divisional areas under the purview of the Secretary of Defence, alongside the Policy and Planning Division, Finance Division, Departmental Acquisition and Procurement Division, and the Defence Inspectorate, endowing the structure with both prominence and influence.[132] The EOCD is responsible for creating and monitoring programmes for the

[132] The Defence Secretariat falls directly beneath the Ministry of Defence, and the EOCD therefore has authority over all SANDF structures.

implementation of the Affirmative Action (AA) and Equal Opportunity (EO) policies of the DOD, and facilitating training programmes for all staff (Mdluli-Sedibe, 2003; SA Soldier, 2004: 37, 40; Anderlini, 2004). Its oversight functions extend to dealing with cases of discrimination and ensuring that awareness training is conducted at all levels, with a particular focus on commanding officers (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 65; Anderlini, 2004).[133] Training and gender awareness programmes are conducted through a variety structures, such as the Gender Focal points, the Gender Forum, and the Gender Sensitisation Programme, which operate at various levels within the State security architecture (Anderlini, 2004, 26-27).

The Office of the Ombudsman, created by Act 104 of 1991, also serves as an investigatory body for cases of unfair discrimination, bias and corruption, amongst other offences (SA Soldier, 2004: 21). It is one of the processes open to security personnel who have grievances about the institutional environment. Its mandate was strengthened by the replacement of the statute with Act No 23 of 1994 linking it directly with the Constitution.

As with the gender machineries discussed in Chapter Five, adequate resources remain a challenge, and full roll-out and implementation has been slow in areas (Anderlini, 2004, 27). However, given that these structures were created with the transformation of the SADF into the SANDF, the depth and breadth of the envisioned gender machineries is an encouraging indicator of the commitment of the State towards the implementation of the gender mainstreaming strategy as a means to attain substantive gender equality within the security architecture.

The manner in which South Africa pursued SSR in the transition to democracy is acknowledged as "an example of gender inclusiveness and participation" (Luciak: 2008, 3; Anderlini, 2004), and incorporates a number of gender mainstreaming strategies aimed at facilitating the substantive participation of women. The policy formulation process for the 1994 White Paper on Intelligence, the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Safety and Security White Paper was positively impacted by the inclusion of women from government and civil society, and formalised the mechanisms described

[133] Targets and other specific measures are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

above, in keeping with the central tenets of the gender mainstreaming strategy, as discussed by Anderlini (2004). For example, human security priorities gained prominence as "women with differing views and values and of all races were central to articulating the vision and shaping the process" (Albrecht & Barnes, 2008: 5; SA Soldier, 2004: 40; Anderlini, 2004, 14), bringing previously unheard and unacknowledged perspectives to the design of security strategies, and suggesting that women's substantive representation be enhanced through the process. An illustration of this can be seen in the three national conferences on women in defence held by the DoD (1997, 2006 and 2007) and resulting in the establishment of a Gender Mainstreaming Council (GMC) to oversee and accelerate implementation of gender equality goals, and establish gender focal points across all defence divisions (Juma, 2008: 8). The aims of the conferences included the clarification of defence quotas of 50% at all decision-making levels, measures for the targeted recruitment of female defence personnel, and the creation of budgets for gender initiatives (Juma, 2008: 8).

Practical measures for retaining female personnel were also outlined within the Defence Review. These included the provision of day-care facilities and pre-study materials for parents in order to shorten the duration of long courses that require them to be away from home (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 59). In more general terms, calls were made for the removal of "any unfair discriminatory practice or attitudes, past and present, involving women employed in the DoD" (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 60); the development of training facilities to accommodate women (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 61); and the challenge to SANDF personnel to "adapt their lifestyle, attitudes and behaviour to a specific military culture" (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 63). However, as Stott (2002) points out: "despite these developments there remain a number of institutional obstacles and attitudes that limit developments. They underscore the importance of realising the practical implementation of new policy objectives, including the gradual breakdown of male-dominated structures and trends in the SANDF, by ensuring that women are involved in every structure at all levels of command, including strategic planning and decision-making". The acknowledgement of women's representation at all command levels has extended to the Command Council of the SANDF, which reemphasised the need for the sensitising of personnel to gender issues (Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004).

The next section reviews the progress made towards the integration of women at all levels of the SANDF in terms of descriptive representation. This is considered in conjunction with the representation of women within the security-related divisions of government structures that have a direct influence on the formulation of security policy. In particular, the question is asked: Has the SSR process guided by the Defence Review seen a consolidation of gender gains in terms of numbers? Are women represented within the upper ranks of the security structures? Is an enabling environment being created for the pursuit of substantive gains in terms of gender and security, and does this suggest the emergence of new paths and legacies? In other words, is there evidence of the consolidation of gender gains over time, leading to the establishment of new paths and legacies?

## 7.3 Descriptive Overview of Women in Security Structures

The descriptive representation of women within the State security structures is viewed from the perspective of what the numbers say about the manifestation of the three legacies established in Part II of the thesis, namely militancy, women's autonomy and the commitment to equality. In other words, has the power derived from the increasing autonomy of women within the political and security arenas of the liberation movement, bolstered by the ANC's credo of equality and influenced by the legacy of militancy in South African society, led to demonstrable gains in the newly-formed SANDF?

The emphasis placed on equality by the ruling ANC, which has been demonstrated in the high descriptive representation of women within the general government structures (Chapter Five), is also evident in the security-related parliamentary and ministerial portfolios. The appointment of women in these prominent and influential positions is a visible indicator of women's integration into the security arena, such as the appointment of Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka and Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Further, of the nine provincial premiers, five are women - including Gauteng, the economic hub of the nation. Considering only overtly security related positions, the current Cabinet includes the following portfolios held by women: Minister for Defence and Military Veterans (Lindiwe Sisulu), Correctional Services (Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula), International Relations and Cooperation (Maite Nkoana-Mashabane),

and Deputy Minister of Police (Makhotso Sotya) (RSA, 2010). These women previously occupied positions of prominence and influence as well, demonstrating the embodiment of the legacies being discussed. For example, Dr Sisulu joined MK following her incarceration in 1975, and specialised in military intelligence. Prior to the advent of democracy, she served as Personal Assistant to Jacob Zuma while he was Head of ANC Intelligence, and went on to be the Chief Administrator for the ANC at CODESA. She served as the Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (1995), Minister of Intelligence (2001-2004), and as Head of the Command Centre for Emergency Reconstruction (2000 - 2002) (RSA, 2010). Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula has served on the Joint Standing Committee on Defence since 1994 and as the Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence. During the liberation struggle she underwent military training in Angola and the USSR, and served in the political military structures of the ANC (RSA, 2010).

At committee level, the ANC in particular has shown a tangible commitment to gender equality in terms of descriptive representation:

- Joint Standing Committee on Defence is chaired by Hlengiwe Mgabadeli
- Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans: four of the nine ANC members are women, while the remaining seven places on the committee are filled by men from various opposition parties
- Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation: five of the nine ANC members are women, with men from various opposition parties occupying the remaining eight places
- Portfolio Committee on Police: Chaired by Lydia Sindisiwe Chikunga of the ANC, five of the nine ANC positions are filled by women. Both of the DA's representatives are women, and six men from various opposition parties fill the remainder of the seats.

The numbers suggest that the State's espoused commitment to gender equality, coupled with the continued strategic manoeuvring of women utilising the power amassed during the liberation era, was resulting in the descriptive transformation of the institutional security structures.

This is also reflected in the steady increase in the overall numbers of women in the armed forces from 12.92% in 1998 to 19.29% in 2007, as reflected in Table 7.1. The 1998 figures represent a number higher than expected as women entering the armed forces through MK (and other structures) had already been integrated into the force to some extent at this stage.

Women's representation rose across the board, with Black women making the biggest gains in upper management (an increase of almost 5%) and middle management (an increase of 8.49%). Part of these increases can be attributed to the stature of women who had served within MK[134].

An important point of commonality retained from the SADF- and MK-era is the motivation of some of these women for participating in the security sector, namely patriotism and opportunities for social mobility in terms of career advancement (Cock, 1989, 1992; Unterhalter, 1989; Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989; Tickner, 2001: 58; Anderlini, 2004, 7). While the institutional environment was poles apart in MK and SADF when considering the roles played by women and the dangers women were exposed to, the desire to serve in this manner were not dissimilar. The transformation of the security sector due to the reforms discussed in this chapter did not change these motivations, but rather provided the enabling institutional environment required for women to exercise their rights to participate in all aspects of the decision-making structures of the State.

The influx of MK women in particular facilitated these changes to the institutional norms and rules of the SANDF, given their experiences within the liberation struggle (discussed in Chapters Three and Four) and their assumption that the hard-won gender gains would be honoured. As Geisler (2000: 623) comments "unlike Afrikaner women with a crippling background in Calvinism, black women expected positions in government" (Geisler, 2000: 623). While some women returned to civilian life, Cock

[134] Zwane (1995) notes that SADF women were never part of active combat operations, and the number of women in the TBVC forces was negligible. The particular paths established by the legacies of militancy and autonomy (together with the legacy of equality) discussed in the thesis are therefore distinctive to the ANC. A more detailed discussion of women in the SADF is provided by Cock (1989) and Gaitskell and Unterhalter (1989), noting the roles they played in the militarisation of the Apartheid State.

(2009) notes that for the women of MK, integration into the SANDF represented more than an employment opportunity: "membership of MK involved considerable personal risk and ideological commitment ... MK cadre's status as guerrillas was often a source of intense pride and was linked to their gender identity and hopes for a new generation". Serving in the SANDF was therefore seen as a means to continue their contribution to the nation-building process, challenging ingrained notions of women's "proper" place in society, and ensuring that women remained part of the formal State structures and were not relegated to the sidelines. The increase in descriptive and substantive representation of women within the SANDF is thus rendered more remarkable given the hostile institutional environment experienced by women in the former-SADF, discussed in Chapter Three. In particular, the expansion of women's roles and the formal recognition of women's contributions in these new positions is an important milestone in the gendering of the security sector.

One noteworthy difference that emerges in Table 7.1 is that in comparison to men's representation figures, women within each racial group are better represented in middle management than in either upper management or rank and file positions. Major General Ntsiki Memela-Motumi partly ascribes this to the transfer of MK ranks during the transformation of the SANDF, which enabled MK women to retain their positions of prominence within the new security structure (Hendricks & Magadla, 2010).

Overall, women constitute almost 30% of middle management positions, 12.7% of upper management posts, and 17.7% of rank and file positions. In 2007, within "upper management"[135], Whites constituted 58.25%, followed by Blacks (36.8%), Coloureds (3.79%), and Asians (1.17%). While this is an improvement in comparison to the situation in 1998, when Blacks only occupied 11.24% of upper management in comparison to that of Whites (88.06%), it is a clear indication that overall numbers of Blacks in the armed forces do not necessarily correlate with equality.

[135] Upper management includes the ranks of General, Lieutenant General, Major General, Brigadier General and Colonel.

**Table 7.1 SANDF Composition**

| | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Upper Management** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GEN-COL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1998 [1] | 726 | 34 | 760 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 94 | 3 | 97 | 825 | 38 | 863 |
| 1998% [2] | 84.13% | 3.94% | 88.06% | 0.46% | 0.12% | 0.58% | 0.12% | 0 | 0.12% | 10.89% | 0.35 | 11.24% | 95.6% | 4.40% | 100% |
| 2007 [3] | 528 | 72 | 600 | 35 | 4 | 39 | 9 | 3 | 12 | 327 | 52 | 379 | 899 | 131 | 1030 |
| 2007% [2] | 51.26% | 6.99% | 58.25% | 3.40% | 0.39% | 3.79% | 0.87% | 0.29% | 1.17% | 31.75% | 5.05% | 36.80% | 87.28% | 12.72% | 100% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Middle Management** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LT COL- 2LT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1998 [1] | 4929 | 1822 | 6751 | 413 | 83 | 496 | 34 | 25 | 59 | 1917 | 453 | 2370 | 7293 | 2383 | 9676 |
| 1998% [2] | 50.94% | 18.83% | 69.77% | 4.27% | 0.86% | 5.13% | 0.35% | 0.26 | 0.61% | 19.81% | 4.68% | 24.49% | 75.37% | 24.63% | 100% |
| 2007 [3] | 2360 | 1080 | 3440 | 617 | 266 | 883 | 86 | 68 | 154 | 2872 | 1124 | 3996 | 5935 | 2538 | 8473 |
| 2007% [2] | 27.85% | 12.75% | 40.60% | 7.28% | 3.14% | 10.42% | 1.01% | 0.80% | 1.82% | 33.90% | 13.27% | 47.16% | 70.05% | 29.95% | 100% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Rank and File** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CPLN-AUX | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1998 [1] | 12226 | 3272 | 15498 | 6163 | 540 | 6703 | 756 | 70 | 826 | 36734 | 3189 | 39923 | 55879 | 7071 | 62950 |
| 1998% [2] | 19.42% | 5.20% | 24.62% | 9.79% | 0.86% | 10.65% | 1.20% | 0.11% | 1.31% | 58.35% | 5.07% | 63.42% | 88.77% | 11.23% | 100% |
| 2007 [3] | 5759 | 1629 | 7388 | 5159 | 1152 | 6311 | 507 | 86 | 593 | 32716 | 6645 | 39361 | 44141 | 9512 | 53653 |
| 2007% [2] | 10.73% | 3.04% | 13.77% | 9.62% | 2.15% | 11.76% | 0.94% | 0.16% | 1.11% | 60.98% | 12.39% | 73.36% | 82.27% | 17.73% | 100% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL 1998 [1] | 17881 | 5128 | 23009 | 6580 | 624 | 7204 | 791 | 95 | 886 | 38745 | 3645 | 42390 | 63997 | 9492 | 73489 |
| TOTAL 1998 % [2] | 24.33% | 6.98% | 31.31% | 8.95% | 0.85% | 9.80% | 1.08% | 0.13% | 1.21% | 52.72% | 4.96% | 57.68% | 87.08% | 12.92% | 100% |
| TOTAL 2007 [3] | 8647 | 2781 | 11428 | 5811 | 1422 | 7233 | 602 | 157 | 759 | 35915 | 7821 | 43736 | 50975 | 12181 | 63156 |
| TOTAL 2007% [2] | 13.69% | 4.40% | 18.09% | 9.20% | 2.25% | 11.45% | 0.95% | 0.25% | 1.20% | 56.87% | 12.38% | 69.25% | 80.71% | 19.29% | 100% |

[1] DoD (1998) [2] Calculated across ranks [3] DoD (2007)

This emphasis on numbers as opposed to better engagement at all levels is emphasised by both Zwane (1995) and Heinecken (2009: 29), who note similar disparities between overall representation figures and the racial distribution across ranks. Within "middle management"[136], there is a slightly more even spread in terms of numbers, although the numbers still do not reflect population demographics. Whites make up 40.6% of middle management (down from 69.7% in 1998), while Blacks constitute 47.16% (up from 24.49% in 1998). "Rank and file" members most clearly illustrate the continuing disparity: Whites account for only 13.77% while Blacks make up 73.36%.

The dual emphasis on racial and gender equality within the Defence Review alludes to the acknowledgement of the parallels between racial and gender inequality in South African society. In particular, similar issues around competency and positive action measures arise in both areas. The influence of racism and sexism are obviously not limited to the security arena, but seem to be magnified given the central role that military identity plays across many cultures in South Africa (as outlined in Chapters Three and Four). Sexism seems unusually fraught with competing theories over participation: elementary sexism claims women are physically and emotionally inferior and are thus incapable of fighting, while certain branches of feminism assert that women's "innate nurturing qualities… their creativity and pacifism" essentially makes them ineligible (Cock, 1991: 188-189; Vincent, 2001; Heinecken, 2002: 716; Duncanson, 2007: 6, 14; Clarke, 2008, amongst many others). Thus, even from within the feminist movement the patriarchal military institutions are defended as male domains.

Not all feminists share this view: "equal rights" proponents cite the notion of "equal obligations and responsibilities … tied to the concept of citizenship" (Cock, 1991: 189). A subsection of these liberal feminists maintains that women's right to serve in the military is "linked to their exclusion from economic and political affairs. They deny any linkage of woman with 'peace', asserting that women are no more or less peaceful and compassionate than men" (Cock, 1991: 189, 1992; Enloe, 1989; Vickers, 1993: 43, 107; Goldstein, 2001: 322-331; Tickner, 2001: 57-59; Anderlini, 2004; Pillay, 2006: 7; Cockburn, 2007: 241). This view is supported by the reality of integrating the female

[136] Middle management includes the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel, Major, Captain, Lieutenant, and Second Lieutenant. All other ranks are classified as "rank and file".

commanders and combatants from the armed liberation movements into the SANDF (particularly from MK). In combination with the extensive constitutional reforms, the new defence force was compelled to "acknowledge the right of women to serve in all ranks and positions, including combat roles" (Heinecken, 2002: 715; Anderlini, 2004, 18; Jacob *et al*, 2008; Hutton, 2009). The reconstitution of women's roles in relation to combat during the armed struggle therefore provided an opportunity to transform the manner in which women are viewed within the security structures of the democratic state as well, backed by the force of various legislation, policies and protocols.

This lends some credence to Cock's (1991) view that South Africa has a vastly different experience with militarism, especially in comparison with the Western societies from which most of the feminist theories related to State security structures emerge. As a result, women's relationship to and with militarism is viewed differently, tempered by the historical experiences of women discussed in preceding chapters, which fundamentally impacted on women's notions of citizenship and identity, and the manner in which militarism is intertwined with these two concepts. As one informant remarked, women "can play any role for which they are competent. Perhaps women are more suited to peacekeeping roles, but this does not mean that they cannot be as aggressive as men, if they are trained and socialised to be so"[137].

The intersection between the reconfigured relationship between women and security and the changing context was thus paramount. The new roles assumed by women during the liberation struggle had been borne, in part, from the necessity of the events at the time. The male leadership was imprisoned or in exile, the violence of the State and other involved parties was encroaching into their communities, and the aggressive reaction to sustained oppression was the strategy by which liberation would be achieved. However, with the shift to democracy, many of the reasons on which the acceptance of these expanded roles was based by wider society (dominated by masculine norms) fell away. The necessity of maintaining these roles would remain critical for some women nevertheless, as the security arena would continue to have a tangible impact on their daily lives. Would the maintenance of these new roles continue to be supported by the leadership, or would women need to hurdle this obstacle again? Would the emphasis

[137] CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).

placed on equality and gender mainstreaming by the State, as well as the experiences of male and female parliamentarians with female leaders during the liberation period, influence the attainment of high-profile positions by women within the security arena of the democratic State?

Confronting the norms that privilege the masculine over the feminine in security matters calls for a deeper understanding of the barriers to women's advancement within the security structures, and altering the institutional rules that support and perpetuate these norms, as was discussed in the previous chapter. For example, one of the stumbling blocks to the integration process was the question of professional military standards and the contentious debate over what this implied. SADF personnel assumed that the TBVC and guerrilla armies would "lack the requisite professional standards", while others argued that technical skills should not be the sole criteria for professional ability: political and ethical issues should be considered as well (Zwane, 1995).

This issue intertwines with both race and gender as the base assumption in the debate is that "every white officer is a competent professional who has reached his position on merit alone" (Zwane, 1995). Cock (1991: 44-45) takes this statement further arguing that:

> "There are important similarities between racism and sexism. Both define either blacks or women as inferior, secondary and dependent. The conception of blacks in racism defines them as irresponsible and incompetent. This conception commonly includes qualities such as passivity, stupidity, or at least a poor ability for abstract thought and logical argument. Sexist definitions of femininity commonly include all these qualities. In addition, females are assumed to have a special emotional capacity for sympathy and compassion. Both sexism and racism are inscribed in South Africa society and have generated extremely violent and vicious practices".

In an inherently skewed system, such as Apartheid, patronage played an important role in promotion through ranks, particularly on the basis of political and ideological beliefs. Similarly, in the gender debate, it is assumed that men are legitimately in positions of authority on the basis of merit and skill, whereas women had to rely on powerful patrons and the "helping hand" of affirmative action. Both of these concerns remain issues not only within the SANDF today, but within broader society as well.

At the time, Zwane (1995) commented that

> "The birth of the 'new South Africa' created the assumption that the old South Africa died suddenly on 27 April 1994, and that we were all 'born again'. Change however takes longer to effect and is therefore useless to promote black and women officers to higher positions while the organisational culture within the SANDF remains the same … Black and women officers should be taught that their colour and sex will not afford them special privileges. Officers should know that affirmative action will not mean employing more and more incompetent blacks and the redundancy of more and more competent whites … The past cannot be ignored. Assumptions of racial inferiority and superiority are still present, and these should be openly and constructively debated in forums facilitated by professionals so that a common value system can be developed that is applicable to the military environment".

A similar view was put forward by one research participant, who comments that "culture and gender continue to be an issue. White and black women experience gender equality and gender mainstreaming differently … [and there is] not enough emphasis on this"[138].

The entrenchment of discriminatory norms within the institutional culture thus necessitated the formal targets for integration found in the Defence Review. These demographic targets, reflected in Table 7.2, show that Black personnel increased substantially from 39.2% (1994) to 69.2% (2007), exceeding the target set (64.6%), as did Coloureds (11.4%) and Indians (1.2%). Whites went from being over-represented (46.8% in 1994) to under-represented[139] (18.1% in 2007) in just over a decade. This suggests that the various affirmative action and force integration strategies outlined within the Defence Review are being effectively implemented.

**Table 7.2 Overview of Demographic Targets and Integration in the SANDF**

| | African | Coloured | Indian | White |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Review Target [1] | 64.68 | 10.22 | 0.75 | 24.35 |
| SANDF 1994 [2] | 39.2 | 12.6 | 1.3 | 46.8 |
| SANDF 1998 [3] | 57.6 | 9.8 | 1.2 | 31.3 |
| SANDF 2007 [4] | 69.2 | 11.4 | 1.2 | 18.1 |
| Population 1996 [5] | 76.8 | 8.9 | 2.5 | 10.6 |
| Population 2010 [6] | 79 | 8.8 | 2.5 | 9.7 |

[1] DoD (2006:12) [2] Post Integration Statistics (Adapted from Heinecken, 2009: 29) [3] DoD (1998) [4] DoD (2007) [5] StatsSA (2010) [6] Mid Year Estimate (StatsSA, 2010).
For a detailed breakdown of 1998 figures see Appendix 6; for a detailed breakdown of 2007 figures see Appendix 7.

[138] CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).
[139] Under-represented in terms of the Review target, which aimed to retain some skilled White personnel.

Further, Table 7.3 shows that the combined former liberation forces of MK, APLA, and TBVC accounted for 26% of the 2007 armed forces, in comparison with 32% of former SADF personnel, and 42% SANDF personnel. The top three military ranks (General, Lieutenant General, and Major General) are dominated by Black men, with the former liberation forces accounting for 53% of the upper ranks, in comparison with 47% of the SADF. This indicates that progress is certainly being made, as a decade earlier the figures were 19% and 81% respectively. It is also an indication that the personnel integrated from the former liberation forces fared well in terms of advancement in the SANDF, given their continued dominance of the upper ranks. It could be inferred that the prominence of these cadres aided the promotion of female former freedom fighters as well, given their status within liberation armies such as MK (as was discussed in Chapter Three).

**Table 7.3 Composition by Former Force and Rank (1997 and 2007) (as percentages)**

| | Former Force 1997 | Rank Profile Brig-Gen - Gen | Former Force 2007 | Rank Profile Brig-Gen - Gen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MK | 15 | 14 | 13 | 37 |
| APLA | 5 | 1 | 6 | 9 |
| TBVC | 11 | 4 | 7 | 7 |
| SADF | 58 | 81 | 32 | 47 |
| SANDF* | 11 | 0 | 42 | 0 |

* The SANDF composition reflects those who joined after 1994 and who had no former force affiliation.
Adapted from (Heinecken, 2009: 35).

The decisive increase in the number of women in middle management ranks, in particular, indicate a substantial improvement in the gender (and racial) profile of the SANDF, an assessment shared by Heinecken (2009: 37) who notes that "great strides have been made to improve the gender profile and to remove barriers that restrict the full integration of women".

The descriptive representation of women in the security arena, reflected in the consideration of the quantitative gains, does not represent the whole picture of the gendering of the State security structures. The broader institutional environment must also be considered, particularly the norms and values governing gender relations, in order to draw conclusions about the substantive representation of women. The array of formal rules and informal norms informing these relations are uncovered through the

perceptions of participants within these structures, and individuals interacting with the State security machinery, such as civil society practitioners. The next section presents the findings of the interviews and surveys conducted primarily during the 2009 fieldwork period (described in Chapter Two). The central questions revolve around the advancement of women within the State security structures: which factors are perceived as important? Are gender issues considered during the policy formulation process? Are gender concerns viewed as legitimate within the security arena? By developing a clearer understanding of how gender is viewed within the security realm, a better comprehension of the complete institutional gendering process can be gained.

## 7.4 Perceptions of Gender in State Security Institutions

The processes of gendered institutional change incorporate more than the development of structural mechanisms to facilitate the gendering process. Confronting the discriminatory norms governing gender relations is an integral part of the change process, and the perceptions of players within these structures are indicative of the success of the gendering process in transforming prejudicial norms and values. While the introduction of formal institutional rules aimed at embedding gender-conscious values is a necessary component of the institutional gendering process, the adoption of these new rules by players within the system is also a crucial element for enacting change within the system.

This section therefore examines participants' perceptions on two broad issues: the extent to which gender has been mainstreamed into the security sector, and the factors perceived as influential to women's advancement. This does not entail an assessment of the gendering of policy or the effectiveness of gender equality measures. Rather, the purpose is to uncover how "sticky" the gender rhetoric is within the State security structures: Are prejudicial norms being overturned? Are the gains made during the liberation era being maintained?

### 7.4.1 The Consideration of Gender Issues in the Security Sector

This section of the surveys and interviews was composed of a series of questions aimed at discerning the perceptions of participants towards the consideration of gender issues within the State security institutions at various levels, and the participation of women in the development of security policies.

Overall perceptions were positive, although this was largely attributed to the dedication of particular men and women within both the security sector and broader government structures than on the institutional mechanisms put into place by the SSR process. For example, one respondent commented that the presence of strong women leaders (specifically within key parliamentary portfolios) changed the "way in which defence is conceptualised by DoD [and therefore] shows the participation of women"[140]. However, as the presentation of the survey and interview results below will show, gains in the gendering of State security institutions are tempered by the sense that ingrained prejudicial norms are proving difficult to change within the traditionally male domain of the security sector.

An illustration of this is reflected in Graph 7.1, which shows that while government respondents felt that women made substantive inputs into the new security policies of the State as prominent participants in the SSR process, women were not always treated as credible experts during the formulation of the new security policies. Nevertheless, government respondents felt that women made a useful contribution to the SSR process in South Africa, citing the high number of women in prominent and influential positions within the security sector, including as Ministers and chairs of Portfolio Committees, commenting that "women bring a different perception to issues of security"[141] and have "considerable influence"[142].

[140] CS2-6 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience).
[141] GF-4 (Government Respondent - Female).
[142] GM-2 Government Respondent - Male).

**Graph 7.1 Gender and Security: Government Respondents**




There was also a perception that women "tend to think out of the box and therefore bring fresh ideas. Women are often not easily intimidated and more willing to speak their minds"[143]. One male parliamentarian noted that

> "Women are beginning to assert themselves, they are beginning to claim their rightful place, and overcome the prejudices that have been levelled against them. There are extremely competent and qualified women in South Africa that can hold their own against any male ... But I think more can be done to empower women"[144].

Civil society respondents reported more negative perceptions, as shown in Graph 7.2. Respondents commented that "women attempt to shift the thinking and actions of the security sector but are a minority voice against the military and forceful approaches of [the South African] security sector"[145]. Other participants noted that "the security sector has traditionally been a very male dominated sector in the country. Therefore, when new

[143] GF-4 (Government Respondent - Female).
[144] Interview, 27 September 2009, Male Government Informant.
[145] CS1-1 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).

security policies were formulated, women's input has been very little (if at all)"[146], although "this is slowly changing"[147].

**Graph 7.2 Gender and Security: Civil Society Respondents**




There was a split in opinion between civil society respondents about whether women made a valuable contribution towards the SSR process in South Africa, although most respondents regardless of experience in government security structures reported negative perceptions. As an indicator of whether perceptions towards women in the security sector were shifting, respondents were asked to assess the value men placed on women's contribution towards security issues. Male government respondents appeared unsure whether women's inputs were valued by men, while female government respondents felt that they were not. The majority of civil society respondents agreed with the negative assessment, including all the participants with experience in the government security structures (CS1). When asked how respondents themselves rated women's contribution in the security sector, male government participants answered "average", while most female participants (both from government and civil society)

[146] CS1-3 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).
[147] CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).

responded "highly" and "very highly", commenting that "women are much more likely to think "safety" than simply "security". Women are typically less bellicose and more developmental in their thinking"[148].

This might suggest that the paradigm shift within the security sector towards HSP is permeating institutional values with respect to what security entails, enhancing the potential for women to meaningfully contribute to the continuing development of the "new" mandate of the State. This assessment is shared by Anderlini (2004), who argues that women played a significant role in reformulating a broader definition of security and integrating this new normative framework into the institutional security structures of the State. However, these uneven responses also indicate that some gendered institutional norms are proving more difficult to change, particularly in comparison with the perceptions of participants discussed in Chapter Five's assessment of gender equality in general government structures. Interlinking with the revised security mandate is the sustained emphasis of the ANC-regime on ingraining equality within all sectors of South African society, particularly State institutions. To this end, the next set of questions explored the perceptions of participants towards the consideration of gender issues in policy formulation.

Male government respondents were of the opinion that senior staff within the security structures of the State understood what gender mainstreaming was about and considered it important, while their female colleagues disagreed, as did the majority of civil society respondents. Similar results were obtained when questioning respondents about the consideration of gender during the formulation of security policy, as reflected in Graphs 7.3 and 7.4.

[148] CS1-1 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).

**Graph 7.3 Gender Issues: Government Respondents**




**Graph 7.4 Gender Issues: Civil Society Respondents**



This suggests two scenarios. Firstly, that these male government respondents may be aware of the rhetoric of gender equality, but are not attuned to the underlying transformational purpose of gender mainstreaming to the same extent that these particular female respondents are. The second scenario is that the male respondents *do* understand the structural goals of gender mainstreaming, but are paying lip service to the espoused norms of the State.

Although government respondents considered gender issues to be relevant and appropriate to the work of the security sector, all government respondents indicated that gender issues did not receive special attention within the security sector.
The majority of civil society respondents felt that gender continues to be viewed as irrelevant by policy-makers within the security sector, and therefore did not receive special attention. One practitioner with experience within the State security sector noted that "at the political level [there is] great emphasis and commitment to the importance of gender mainstreaming. [The] problem lies in implementing policies"[149]. This was echoed by a male MP who noted:

> "I think we have come a long way as South Africa in ensuring that we redress the imbalances of the past; the gender equality, the race equality, the religious prejudices and things like that. And whilst I think we have got policies in place, the implementation of those policies still leaves a lot to be desired"[150].

The same respondent commented:

> "There is still a lot of stereotyping in South Africa, particularly amongst the African man. I mean if they see a woman as the head of a security institution, they tend to look again, and not probably give, not show the same kind of respect to a woman as they would to a man, because they feel the women are weaker. Yes, they are physically weaker but mentally they could be much stronger and in terms of ability, much better as well. But there is that prejudice and I think that is going to take a long time for us, for men in South Africa, to get rid of that. And that's why I said we have excellent policies, but implementation of those policies, and allowing people, women especially, to function normally in an environment that is male dominated is something that we have to work at"[151].

This remark is indicative of the perceptions of most respondents: that the conversion of the rhetoric of gender equality into meaningful reforms within the security sector has been slower than in the general government structures of the State. This stems in part

[149] CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).
[150] Interview, 27 September 2009, Male Government Informant.
[151] Interview, 27 September 2009, Male Government Informant.

from a need to clearly articulate the goals of gender mainstreaming, as asserted by one civil society respondent:

> "We need a shift in consciousness and that is not automatic ... there has got to be some planned, conscious effort to shift ... there has to be an understanding on what is gender equality – why should we put this on the agenda? What tells us that this is a problem?" [152]

Another government respondent serving on a parliamentary security portfolio commented: "I do not believe that it even comes up during the discussion of policy formulation. Maybe an inclusion in the Cabinet Memorandum format of a specific question/s to ask whether consideration was given to gender mainstreaming in the policy formulation and how the policy will contribute towards that goal, will focus the need"[153]. This was echoed by a civil society respondent who added "there is no visible policy debate at this level"[154].

Other civil society participants provided more optimistic assessments, arguing that the "new policy for peace missions, for example, now speaks directly to gender mainstreaming"[155], and noting that the women who participate in policy discussions are "vociferous, tenacious and willing to take on the patriarchy that they encounter"[156]. The achievements of specific individuals were also cited: "[gender was not adequately considered during policy formulation] in the past, but under the leadership of General Nsiki Motumi gender has gained greater prominence and there is a dedicated sector that manages equal opportunities. Progress is slow but there is progress"[157]. Another pragmatic response was that "[gender] is considered to the extent that it doesn't clash with other policy imperatives ... economic and strategic advantage being the main over-riding factors"[158]. This can partly be attributed to the masculine and hierarchical nature of the security sector, discussed in previous chapters. It can also be ascribed to the scope of the transformation process undertaken by the SANDF, and the resultant prioritising of other issues such as racial equality.

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[152] Interview, 30 September 2009, Female Civil Society Informant.
[153] GF-4 (Government Respondent – Female).
[154] CS1-1 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).
[155] CS2-6 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience).
[156] CS2-5 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience).
[157] CS1-2 and CS1-3 (Civil Society Respondents with government experience).
[158] CS2-5 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience).

The responses gathered from both government and civil society respondents therefore raise the question: if gender is not being emphasised, what accounts for the (relatively) rapid progression of women within the SANDF? As the preceding overview of the descriptive representation of women in the security sector shows, women are advancing within the defence arena. What are the perceived means by which this is occurring? What do these perceptions reveal about the institutional gendering process of the security sector?

### 7.4.2 Factors in the Advancement of Women within the Security Sector

Despite the establishment of mechanisms for participation (outlined earlier in this chapter), there was an overall perception that these structures were ineffective and did not play a substantial role in the advancement of women, as seen in the indicative comment of one respondent that "women advancing in the security structure [do] so despite the absence of gender mainstreaming programmes"[159]. The majority of participants felt that women were not afforded the same leadership opportunities as men, due to "resistance in some areas", with the same respondent adding that "where women are successful and meet the 'male standard' [these women] often advance quicker than men"[160]. Opinions were more evenly divided about the advancement of women within State security structures, with a slight majority asserting that in their estimation women *were* advancing.

Comparing the factors perceived as influential to women's advancement shows some correlation between general government structures and security structures, as represented in Figure 7.1.

[159] GF-4 (Government Respondent – Female).
[160] CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).

**Figure 7.1 Factors in Advancement – Comparison of General Government Structures and the Security Sector**




Political party loyalty remains the dominant factor in women's progression in State security institutions, according to participants from both government and civil society, followed by merit (government respondents) and ethnicity (civil society respondents). In general, these results reflect the responses given for the general government structures in Chapter Five. One civil society respondent noted that "the distinction between government and the ruling political party is poorly defined, and often seen as one and the same. As a result, those women that are advanced are often those who carry the party colours"[161]. This was echoed by another civil society practitioner in the security arena, who stated that "In South Africa, ethnicity and political party loyalty and

[161] CS2-4 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience).

patronage have been the over-riding factors - not education or length of service (unless one counts length of service in terms of loyalty to the ANC)"[162].

Some incongruent results emerged in the comparison of the two spheres, as shown in Figure 7.1. For example, within the general government structures, there was agreement between respondents that qualifications were the least influential factors in women's advancement. However, within the security sector, this factor rose in perceived importance, particularly amongst government respondents. This was attributed to the prestige inferred to former MK-cadres, and the boost this would give to women's advancement in the ranks of the SANDF. In other words, the experiences of women, and the prominent role that they played both during the Struggle and during the transition, appeared to have made some headway into challenging the norms around women's roles. The importance of qualifications was also rated higher within the security sector, although civil society respondents placed both merit and qualifications as factors of lesser importance for women's advancement.

A significant change was the perceptions around the influence of patronage. Within general government structures, patronage was ranked as the third most influential factor in women's advancement by all respondents. However, this fell to being the least influential factor within the security sector, despite political party loyalty remaining at the top. It would be expected that perceptions of the influence of patronage and political party loyalty would be clustered given the close relation between the two concepts. Patronage tends to originate from within the party, providing an informal means by which loyalty to the party can be enforced.

Further, given the evidence that exists from personal accounts of men and women within the liberation armies, patronage has been shown to be an important factor in women's advancement in the security forces. As was noted in Chapter Four, respected commanders such as Chris Hani and Joe Modise had an acknowledged impact on entrenching the principles of gender equality within military structures such as MK (Modise & Curnow, 2000: 37; Hassim, 2004: 440; Suttner, 2007: 240; Suttner, 2008: 126). While this would not automatically alter the views of all personnel, it helped to

[162] CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).

instil a culture of equality within which women could prove their mettle. It was suggested by one civil society respondent that ensuring the presence of women in decision-making structures related to security allows women to "not only serve as role models to other women, but in the long-term can also influence long-standing perceptions among both males and females on women's positions in society - it can contribute in changing cultural perspectives"[163].

These results would then imply that either the effects of patronage are more subtle within the SANDF than they were in MK, or that there are fewer instances of such relationships within the new defence structures than in the general structures of the State. The second scenario is unlikely, given that political party loyalty remains the most influential factor in the advancement of women, which will be explored in greater depth in the next chapter. As one male MP argued "obviously patronage and nepotism and all these kinds of things are going to play a factor, it plays a factor with males as well, but it's a universal tradition that you put your friend in a job"[164]. The support for women might be less overt in the security structures than in the general government structures, implying that gendered institutional norms are being transformed more slowly within the security sector. As one female MP suggested, there is a need to foster "a better understanding of the unique contribution that women can make in this sector and the willingness to accept it is not a male exclusive domain"[165].

Government respondents rated ethnicity as one of the least influential factors in women's advancement, while civil society respondents considered it highly influential. The civil society view is supported by Heinecken (2009: 38), who cites a 2001 DoD survey in which female personnel regarded race and ethnicity as a significant issue[166]. Some informants felt that they were held back due to their lack of ties to MK, as well as

163 CS1-3 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience).
164 Interview, 27 September 2009, Male Government Informant.
165 GF-4 (Government Respondent – Female).
166 The considerable under-representation of Zulus within the SANDF was also raised. Given the dominance of MK within the new security structures, there was a perception that Xhosas were over-represented. With President Jacob Zuma as the first Zulu President, personnel and analysts are aware that political appointments and leadership re-shuffles may aim to alter this situation (Heinecken, 2009: 30, 45).

their ethnicity[167]. While this view was more common amongst White women most women, regardless of race, felt that other factors such as merit and qualifications were also considered sufficiently by the higher ranked officers during the promotion process in order to ensure advancement, albeit at a slower rate.

The integration process of the security sector (both within State governance structures and within the armed forces) encountered similar issues to those faced in the general governance structures. This was largely as a result of the institutional layering discussed previously, in that existing structures (and their norms and values) were merged and overlapped with new institutions. This required a fundamental shift not only from the leaders of these structures, but also from the staff (whether they be personnel in the armed forces or senior staffers in ministries) in order to affect meaningful institutional change. It is apparent that this process has been somewhat uneven, given the conflicting perceptions amongst both government and civil society respondents about the influence of women within the security structures. This ambivalence towards the full and meaningful integration of gender was made apparent during the contentious arms acquisition process that occurred as the first democratic regime came into power, and is explored in greater detail in the next chapter.

## 7.5 Conclusion: Possibilities and Limits of Gendered Institutional Change in the Security Sector

> "... people are employing women in senior positions, and you look at the Maria Ramos's and the Gill Marcus's, and you look at people like that, you look at the Mamphela Ramphele's. Ten years ago where were they? They were around but they were not given an opportunity to bloom. But if they were, they were suppressed to a very large extent, but now that they have been given this freedom to expose themselves, to express themselves, they are reaching great heights. And that's what we need, we need to create the space for women to actually do whatever they want to do"[168].

The advent of democracy in South Africa presented an opportunity to transform the norms and values of the institutional structures of the State, as the women cited by the respondent above attest. Maria Ramos served as Director General of the National

[167] Only two informants of colour expressed the view that they were held back due to their ethnicity: both were Coloured personnel serving in rank and file positions, and had no affiliation with either the ANC or MK.

[168] Interview, 27 September 2009, Male Government Informant.

Treasury (1996-2003) before going on to prestigious positions as Group Chief Executive at Transnet (2003) and the ABSA Group (2009). Gill Marcus became the first female Governor of the Reserve Bank in 2009, following service as the Deputy Minister of Finance. Mamphela Ramphele, the first black female Vice Chancellor of a South African university (University of Cape Town) has gone on to become one of four Managing Directors at the World Bank – a position never held by a South African.

Within the gendered context of this study, three legacies have emerged which underpin the manner in which this transformation of institutional roles and rules has occurred. Firstly, the determination of the new regime to entrench institutional values based on human rights and equality in all spheres, which was evident in the policies and initiatives pursued, as outlined in Chapters Five and Six. Secondly, the legacy of militancy running through South African history (as described in Chapters Three and Four), the consequences of which would constitute a key challenge for the young democracy. Together, these two legacies required a new approach towards security as a whole, and presented an opportunity for the further development of the third legacy: the increasing autonomy of women within leadership structures of the State.

The process of overhauling the State security structures in order to deliver on the new mandate and realise South Africa's new vision for the nation and the region would be an immense undertaking. Deep-seated animosities would need to be addressed on a number of fronts, including the distrust between the former-SADF personnel and the incoming liberation cadres, racial tensions between various ethnic groups, and political animosities, as well as the ingrained institutional norms that were discordant with the revised mandate of the security sector.

Applying the model for analysis (dissected in Chapter Two), utilised similarly in Chapter Five's analysis of the general governance structures of the State, illustrates the promises and limits of the gendering of the State security institutions.

**Figure 7.2 Framework for Analysis: Women in the Security Institutions of the State**




A central *exogenous influence* that assisted in the creation of an enabling environment for gendered institutional change was the adoption of the HSP, which reflected a wider international trend emphasising the link between security and development and promoting a people-centred approach to security. This shift in security thinking was aligned with the ANC-regime's equality-centric credo that had been utilised to great effect by women in the past. Further, the HSP explicitly identified gender as a crucial element in attaining and maintaining both security and development, as evidenced in the many significant instruments that emerged at the time (and which developed over the next decade), and to which South Africa was party. These included the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (October 2000), the UN Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (May 2000), and the AU Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (2006).

The effect of the paradigm shift in security thinking dovetailed with the new mandate of the State to focus on peace support operations in the region, as part of the rebranding

of South Africa's armed forces. This created new openings for the participation of women at all levels of the security sector, as constitutionally mandated by both the Bill of Rights and the ratification of various regional and international instruments described in Chapter Six. The experience gained by women during the militant struggle for democracy, and the attendant power which had been amassed as a result of the *legacies* of increasing autonomy and entrenching gains in equality, provided further impetus for change as the ANC-regime began the arduous task of transforming the military structures of the State in accordance with the new defence mandate.

The Defence Review set out clear guidelines for the integration of the armed forces, establishing targets to ensure that the revised composition of the SANDF was more favourably aligned with the demographics of the country. The steady increase in the overall numbers of women in the armed forces, the growing number of women in "middle management" positions, and the prominence of the ministerial portfolios under the purview of women were all encouraging indicators of a gender-receptive security environment. However, the transformation of prejudicial institutional norms within the traditionally masculine and hierarchical sector has proved more challenging, as this chapter has shown.

As discussed, the possibilities for gendered change were tempered somewhat by the ingrained institutional culture of the security sector. This presented a different set of challenges to those encountered within the general governance structures of the State, described in Chapter Five. The institutional norms of the governance and security structures are vastly different. For example, masculine ideals influencing the institutional culture are more ingrained within the security structures, as is evidenced by the comments of the research participants and authors such as Cock (1991, 2007), Modise and Curnow (2000), Anderlini (2004), Motumi (2006), Suttner (2007), and Clarke (2008). The acknowledgement of the importance of gender within the security sector is contradicted by the perception that gender issues are not considered important during policy formulation, and that women (despite their wealth of experience) are not treated as credible experts.

Rigidly hierarchical modes of interaction are also a consistent feature within the security sector, rendering change more difficult. However, the sanctity of the chain of command can also have the effect of aiding the gendering process, in that the leadership of a higher ranking officer, regardless of their sex, must be obeyed. In other words, positional authority may counter-balance cultural attitudes towards women. This limits the extent of non-compliance, and can have a positive effect on the transformation of gendered norms over time, particularly as women are advancing into positions of authority, as was shown in this chapter.

As in the general governance structures of the State, the negotiated settlement resulted in the *layering* of institutions, creating an amalgamation of new institutions operating alongside "old" institutions that were re-purposed. The layering of the security sector is however most akin to the concept of *conversion*, described by Streeck and Thelen (2005: 26)[169] as the process whereby institutions are

> "redirected to new goals, functions, or purposes. Some redirection may come about as a result of new environmental challenges, to which policymakers respond by deploying existing institutional resources to new ends, or it can come about through changes in power relations, such that actors who were not involved in the original design of an institution and whose participation in it may not have been reckoned with, take it over and turn it to new ends ... existing institutions are adapted to serve new goals or fit the interests of new actors".

This has been shown to be the case in South Africa, as the environmental challenges (the shift to the HSP, the adoption of a new defence mandate, and the need to rehabilitate South Africa's image) necessitated an extensive overhaul of the security architecture of the State, involving both layering and conversion processes. The assumption of power by the ANC, and the influx of cadres from various previously antagonistic armed forces, further challenged the redesign of existing institutions.

The institutional layering had an impact on the gendering process through the creation of new mechanisms for participation and the use of policy directives such as the setting of demographic targets for equitable representation. These measures created openings for women's participation, and provided a means though which meaningful reforms of the prevailing institutional culture of the "old" security institutions could be instigated.

[169] While layering and conversion are described as two different processes by Streeck and Thelen (2005), elements of both processes can be seen within the South African security sector.

In essence, the institutional layering and conversion process created the possibility for infusing security structures of the State with the values of equality and representativeness and establishing them as the new norm. This is a reflection of the work of Streeck and Thelen (2005:23), who describe this process of institutional change:

> "... new dynamics are set in motion by political actors working on the margins by introducing amendments" and these changes can, over time, fundamentally alter the overall trajectory of development ... [and] assume an ever more prominent role in governing individual behaviour".

In other words, while the rhetoric of gender equality has been slow to infiltrate the institutional norms of the security sector, the equality credo has been more "sticky" due to the conversion and layering process, creating an opening for women's continued participation as equality becomes more entrenched and develops into the new institutional norm.

The comparative importance of qualifications and length of service within the security sector (as opposed to its importance within the general governance structures of the State) suggests a measure of sustainability is being established for the entrenchment of gender gains, as neither factor is contingent on patronage or political party loyalty. This implies a continued valuing of MK cadres' experience, and the transference of this respect to women's service within the SANDF. This is also supported by the perception amongst respondents that qualifications are considered more important within the security sector than in the general governance structures of the State, and that the "stickiness" of women's equality as it relates to roles within the military is increasing.

While political party loyalty and patronage were more closely correlated in the general governance structures of the State, the perceived importance of patronage as a factor for advancement fell dramatically within the security sector. This may be attributed to the dominance of the military's internal power dynamic, whereby promotion is largely based on length of service and merit, therefore diminishing the influence of individuals (however powerful) to significantly affect the rate of women's advancement. The continuing perception of the influence of political party loyalty as the most significant factor in women's advancement is a crucial element. It speaks to *how* women initially entered the security structures, and also relates to the impact of the various types of

coalitions that might arise within the security sector, as is explored in the following chapter's discussion of the Arms Deal case.

The gendering of the institutions within the security sector has been shown to be a mixed success. The relatively high descriptive representation of women, particularly in middle management positions, is a positive development in a traditionally masculine environment perceived as hostile to gender demands. The establishment of various mechanisms for promoting diversity and participation, coupled with gender-specific provisions within key documents, provides a strong foundation from which to continue pushing for and entrenching change. However, the perception amongst respondents remains that institutional norms are not evolving as readily as institutional rules, and that informal rules privileging the masculine over the feminine continue to subvert the substantive transformation of the institutional culture. The following chapter delves into this perception by considering how these institutions operate within a real world scenario. Can the mechanisms established to protect the ideals of equality function effectively under pressure? How do informal coalitions (influenced by political party loyalty) factor into this process? Are women able to effectively gender new policy initiatives?

# 8

# LESSONS FROM THE ARMS DEAL

> "[The Arms Deal] was a catalyst that divided the ANC ... exposed the fragility of the constitutional institutions, and revealed the darkest side of a political movement once rightly lauded as an icon of modern reformism on the African continent" (Pottinger, 2008: 50).

## 8.1 Introduction

The process of gendering the institutional structures of the State has been shown to be influenced by a range of factors both internal and external to the system. In addition to the effect of international instruments and wider political events, the State-building process has also impacted on the opportunities available to women to consolidate the gains made during the liberation struggle, particularly in the security sector. One component of entrenching these gains is the establishment of structural mechanisms for participation that contribute to the sustainability of women's participation in all aspects of decision-making and in all arenas, including the security sector, in accordance with the gender mainstreaming approach described in previous chapters. These mechanisms are not necessarily women-centric, but are aimed at upholding the values of equality and good governance upon which the new regime is predicated. The effectiveness of these mechanisms in altering the norms of institutions is gauged according to the perceptions of participants within the system, and of members of civil society who interact with the security system.

As the previous chapter has shown, the realisation of gender equality in the State security structures has been a mixed success. In descriptive terms, great strides have been made in increasing the number of women serving in positions of influence within the security sector, including at ministerial levels. However, the perception amongst respondents interviewed for this research is that gender is not considered an integral part of the work of the security sector, suggesting that the implementation of gender mainstreaming has not been consistently applied across the security architecture. This implies that the rhetoric of gender equality has not substantially altered the norms of the

security sector, despite the enabling environment created by the State's new defence mandate and the gains made by women within the security realm throughout the liberation struggle.

This chapter uses the "case-study within a case study" of the Arms Deal to explore how women are engaging with State security issues through the mechanisms established to foster and protect their participation. What are the practical implications of the issues raised in previous chapters, such as the emphasis placed on political party loyalty, the ramifications of the party-list system, and the difficulties of realising an idealistic mandate? How do the mechanisms upholding new institutional norms (such as equality, accountability and other indicators of good governance) operate under pressure? Are masculinist security policies being challenged, in accordance with the values espoused by the HSP and the gender mainstreaming strategy? In other words, the purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how the factors raised in Chapter Seven, including the perceptions of participants and the mechanisms for participation created as part of the integration process, have played out in the security sector, using the Arms Deal as a contextual backdrop.

The case study will demonstrate the limits of gendered institutional change within the security sector, particularly the difficulties faced by women actors in contesting the status quo, which continues to be maintained by an elite hierarchy of men. While certain aspects of the case study will allude to the shifting gendered norms and rules of the security sector, the losses in terms of the gender gains initially made through policies such as the Defence Review and the adoption of the HSP are an indicator of the complexity of transforming a rigidly masculine set of institutions.

This chapter begins with a description of the background to the Arms Deal: how do the regional responsibilities arising from the new defence mandate impact on domestic goals such as creating employment and stabilising the security sector? What are the international influences on South Africa's economic and political agenda? An overview of the arms package introduces the controversy in which the acquisition has become mired, including the circumvention of oversight mechanisms and procurement procedures, and considers how pervasive the influence of political party loyalty was in

this process. In particular, what informal rules and alliances can be seen playing out within the case of the Arms Deal, and how do these interact with the formal rules and mechanisms of the State? How does the exercising of power, discussed in relation to the gendering of security in Chapter Six, play out in reality, and what is the impact on women's substantive participation in the security arena?

These questions are addressed by focusing on the actions of various women such as Speaker Frene Ginwala and MP Pregs Govender, as well as opposition MPs including Patricia de Lille, and military veterans such as Thandi Modise. How did these women confront the erosion of gender gains that occurred due to the actions of party elites? What does this case study reveal about the realities of the institutional transformation process, particularly the effect of the masculinity of Realpolitik on gendering the security process? The answers to these questions deliver a practical perspective on the research question: *how* has gendered institutional change occurred in the South African security sector?

## 8.2 Background to the Arms Deal

The underlying philosophy of the Human Security Paradigm (HSP), in conjunction with the Security Sector Reform (SSR) imperatives and demands of the new defence mandate of the ANC-regime, necessitated the right-sizing[170] of the defence force and a decrease in defence spending (DoD, 1998: ch 9, para. 2.3; Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004; Heinecken *et al*, 2005: 119, Dunne, 2006: 40; Gevisser, 2007: 680).

As discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, the integration of the various armed forces involved in the liberation struggle formed part of the SSR obligation to demobilise soldiers and equip them with transferable skills. Military equipment needs would be altered and reduced, with any new acquisitions being subject to the new peace support mandate of the State. Expenditure in general would be focused towards socio-economic spending, in keeping with the development-oriented security ethos adopted by the State, and in accordance with the findings of the Defence Review discussed in Chapter Six.

[170] Right-sizing in this context is used to mean the reduction of personnel in order to reduce costs and maximise efficiency while still meeting domestic and regional security obligations.

This shift in mandate and spending priorities has been recognised by feminists as conducive to creation of opportunities for change within the security sector, as discussed by Enloe (1989), Vickers (1993), and Tickner (2001) amongst others in Chapter Six. The institutional conditions for instigating gendered change was therefore promising, and the Arms Deal would be the first real test of these new rules and mechanisms. However, the political and economic reality of the new State tempered this vision in four key areas (for the purposes of this discussion): South Africa's regional aspirations, the need to create a unified force supporting a stable State, the importance of the arms industry to South Africa's economic growth, and international political and economic considerations.

### 8.2.1 Regional Aspirations: Africa's Peacekeeper

The recasting of South Africa's regional role was a strategy to both rebrand the negative continental image of Apartheid South Africa's use of its defence forces in neighbouring states, and a desire to realise the promise of the human security paradigm. As discussed in Chapter Six, the explicit linkage of security and development tied South Africa's future stability and prosperity with that of its regional neighbours.

The increased stature of the country gained by the transition process was perceived as a boon to the repositioning of South Africa as a regional leader. Gevisser (2007: 682) describes the efforts of Thabo Mbeki in particular as

> "leading South Africa diplomatically ... towards the role of continental peacekeeper ... this was the cornerstone argument of his African Renaissance: that South Africa's own growth and development was not possible on a decaying, conflict ridden continent, and so investment in the neighbourhood must be an essential component of the country's own growth strategy ... One could well understand Mbeki feeling this ... it had been the most conflict-ridden year in Africa since the ANC had come to power – from the alleged assassinations in Nigeria ... to the threat of civil war on South Africa's borders in Lesotho, to the beginnings of a tumultuous Congolese war which would claim three million lives. Through all these conflicts, Mbeki had been building a profile, for South Africa, as the continent's peacemaker".

The pressure to retain its newfound status as a model transitional State was intense, particularly given the scope of the domestic transformation required to retain stability, and the magnitude of the regional commitments being considered by the new regime.

One analyst commented that

> "Since its first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa has moved into a new category: instead of appearing as an outlier, it is now increasingly treated as an exemplar, a case that illustrates the post colonial condition. Led by an unusually articulate and self-conscious group of reformers and blessed by an unusual degree of international legitimacy, South Africa in the 1990s appears to offer new ways to think about the consolidation of democracy and strategies for development at the turn of the century" (Seidman, 1999: 429).

Any arms acquisitions would therefore need to balance South Africa's domestic responsibilities and regional aspirations. As a leading force behind the development and expansion of regional entities such as SADC, NEPAD and the AU, particularly in terms of the effectiveness of their peace and security organs, any new equipment would need to fulfil the needs of the SANDF on multilateral peace missions. The weight of this burden is articulated by Venter (2001: 350):

> "South Africa is expected by many in and outside Africa to take a leading role on the continent; to take up the responsibility of being both an economic motor to drive the rest of the continent forward and a force for reconciliation and peace. The government has responded to these expectations by involving itself in multilateral institutions, building economic links and supporting peace-building efforts ... In Africa [South Africa] contributes towards a broader picture, based on the government's determination to play a full part in the continent's affairs. That fuller role is illustrated by a commitment to conflict resolution and reconciliation. South Africa has made major contributions to political settlements on its own borders, in Mozambique and Lesotho. It has also spread its wings farther afield, including playing an impressive part in the transformation of Zaire into DRC in 1997 ... Yet there are limits to South Africa's leadership role in the continent. Uncertainty exists about whether South Africa has the financial and personnel resources to maintain such a role, especially as a new government with harsh and bitter domestic problems to deal with".

The defence requirements of the SANDF had to be adjusted to address the domestic crises in the broader societal sense, as well as the domestic needs of the transformed and newly mandated SANDF. Both of these considerations had positive implications for gendered claims on altering the institutional norms of the State, as elements of equality and participation were central to the foundational doctrines of the transformed SANDF and the development agenda of the State. The opportunities for strategically gendering institutional norms were therefore promising from a theoretical perspective.

### 8.2.2 Domestic Crises: Creating a Unified and Capable Force

The nature of the negotiated settlement meant that the ANC-regime inherited security structures that would need significant transformation to meet its reformed vision for the

defence sector, while integrating a variety of formerly antagonistic forces, and addressing deep-seated issues centred around equality. Some of these issues have been addressed in Chapters Six and Seven, and serve as examples of how institutional layering affects processes of change. The introduction of new values into "old" institutions within the context of broader societal transformation is a delicate process of competing claims for power, as occurred during the Arms Deal process.

While the ANC's overwhelming victory at the polls gave it immense power, the scope (and cost) of the transformation process was a cause for concern, given the many competing demands arising from the establishment of a new democratic state. The defence force was a particular cause for concern, as described by Gevisser (2007: 680):

> "Suddenly the Mandela government found itself responsible not only for a voracious defence force suffering from serious fatigue – in terms of both morale and hardware – but for integrating the demobilised liberation movement armies into it too: even before 1994, the generals had made it clear to their political masters that their ongoing quiescence was dependent on the upgrading of the force. The new government immediately launched a public review process in which Joe Slovo, the struggle's pre-eminent military hero turned custodian of the nation's homeless, put the 'butter' position most succinctly: 'South Africa's greatest defence will be a satisfied population' ".

The loyalty of both the retained and incoming personnel was also a cause for unease, as Gevisser (2007: 685) expands upon, arguing that "if [Alec] Erwin and [Joe] Modise are to believed ... the security Mbeki was buying South Africa with a R30 billion price tag was not against external aggressors, but against the internal threat of a disaffected military, still sceptical – on both sides – about the negotiated settlement, and still carrying, in its increasingly obsolete arsenal, the serious threat of destabilisation". The deterioration of military capacity in the Air Force and Navy was a further cause for concern, as defence spending had been concentrated in the Army due to the internal focus of SADF during Apartheid (Cilliers, 1998: 1-2; Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004, 14; Holden, 2008: 3; Pottinger, 2008: 51; Gordin, 2010: 77).

The challenges of unifying a fragmented military, while implementing major changes to the institutional structures of the security sector and transforming the culture of the SANDF, were further exacerbated by the need to demobilise a large number of combatants and create employment not only for these personnel, but for citizens as well. This reiterated the linkage between security and development – economic growth

would be a critical factor in providing employment for demobilised soldiers, generating the revenue required to address shortfalls in military capability, and foster investor confidence in the ability of the new regime to ensure a stable and peaceful State. To this end, the role of Armscor and the local defence industry moved to the fore.

### 8.2.3 The Role of the Local Defence Industry

The Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) originated during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) when local companies began manufacturing advanced weaponry for the Boer forces (Dunne, 2006: 40; Armscor, 2010). An Advisory Committee on Union Defence Force Equipment Requirements was appointed in 1948, formally establishing Armscor.

Armscor is the "officially appointed acquisition organisation of the [DoD] and with the approval of the Minister of Defence also renders a professional acquisition service to other government departments and public entities" (Armscor, 2010). The Armscor Board of Directors is chaired by an appointee of the Minister of Defence, and all equity is held by the State (Armscor, 2010).

The Acts[171] establishing Armscor prohibit the manufacture of products that compete with the private sector supply chain, leading to the split of Armscor into two entities in 1992: Armscor and Denel (Dunne, 2006: 41; Armscor, 2010). Denel would fall under the purview of the Minister of Public Enterprises, and is a "major supplier of manufactured products and systems", while Armscor focuses on "programme management and acquisition", and "government to government marketing" (Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 57; Armscor, 2010).

During the Apartheid era, the State expanded the local defence industry to meet its armament needs and counter the impact of arms sanctions (Venter, 2001: 345;

[171] Armscor is governed by the conditions stipulated in Act 57 of 1968 and Act 51 of 2003, and Denel by Act 46 of 1992 (Armscor, 2010).

Anderlini, 2004, 14; Dunne, 2006: 40; Landsberg, 2010: 111)[172]. Given the ANC-regime's desire to govern by example in order to boost its regional and international stature, the manner in which the arms industry operated would need to be carefully monitored. The arms industry contributed the largest share of export earnings in 1994, estimated at R103 billion, and employed more than 50 000 workers (Spence 1998:13 quoted by Venter, 2001: 345; Dunne, 2006: 41). It was an essential component of South Africa's continued economic growth, particularly after the UN arms embargo was lifted and the State's client list could be expanded (Venter, 2001: 345; Landsberg, 2010: 111). The list of customer states was not, however, in keeping with the foreign policy mandate of the new State[173].

The State thus needed to find a means to balance the export and employment potential of the arms industry with the strategic requirements of maintaining an exemplary good governance record to uphold the country's "moral authority" (Venter, 2001: 345). To this end a high level Cabinet Committee was formed in 1995 – the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) – which would "regulate arms sales and transfers, and ... give moral sanction to South Africa's arms deals" (Venter, 2001: 345; Skosana, 2002; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 59; Landsberg, 2010: 111-112). The committee was chaired by Kader Asmal[174], described by Landsberg (2010: 111) as a "staunch critic of the secretive and clandestine nature of arms sales during the Apartheid years, [who] wished to see democratisation of the practice [arguing that] 'our future foreign policy cannot be determined by shadowy merchants of death in foreign countries'"[175]. This tension between political and economic interests is described by Venter (2001: 347) as being primarily between the ideologues and the neomercantilists, the latter viewing the "government's declared commitment to human rights and issues of good governance ... an unnecessary albatross around South Africa's neck".

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[172] Among the armaments manufactured for export were G5 and G6 Howitzers, armoured and mine-resistant vehicles, the Rooivalk helicopter, mine-detecting clearance equipment, and battle tanks (Landsberg, 2010: 111; Armscor, 2010).

[173] The furore over inappropriate customer states began with the Wazan debacle in which arms were sold to Yemen via Lebanon, despite the civil war prohibiting such sales (Skosana, 2002). This raised questions about the sale of arms to other client states such as Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Colombia, and Angola, given the South African regime's desire to rebrand the State's image.

[174] Professor Asmal was also the Chair of the Joint Parliamentary Sub-Committee of Ethics and Members' interests.

[175] The NCACC only became a statutory body in 2000, a year after the Arms Deal was approved. However, the deal was not sent through the NCACC process, although the committee was operational at the time (Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 59).

### 8.2.4 International Pressure

As democratisation efforts got underway, South Africa slowly started emerging from the state of isolation imposed by the international community due to the policies of the Apartheid regime. One of the consequences was the increasing pressure placed on the transitional government as Pretoria become the focus of the arms lobbyists, desperate after the rapid decline in arms sales following the fall of the Berlin Wall (Vickers, 1993: 39; Crawford-Browne, 2004: 329-330; Holden, 2008: 5). The push for arms contracts did not come only from the dealers; foreign dignitaries came armed with proposals and letters pushing the relative merits of the defence contractors from their home states (Cornish & Cameron, 1995; Cilliers, 1998: 3; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 72). As a new government, the ANC was mindful of the need to demonstrate to the international community that it was a major player in the defence sector, and "needed to demonstrate the capacity to govern: to command, to spend" (Gevisser, 2007: 685).

In a similar vein, some analysts have suggested that the intent was to demonstrate to foreign powers that South Africa was able to be a player in international markets, willing to allow free trade and playing by the global market rules after decades of isolation (Gevisser, 2007: 682). This was part and parcel of the GEAR [Growth, Equality and Redistribution] policy that drove economic strategy at the time (Gumede, 2005: 44-45; Landsberg, 2010: 91). In essence, the strategy promoted "expansionary spending by the State" aimed at promoting foreign direct investment and international trade, which would in turn lead to rapid sustainable growth and job creation, thus allowing "targeted social spending on the poorest of the poor" (Feinstein, 2007: 66-67). The Arms Deal was viewed by members of government such as Alec Erwin (Minister of Trade and Industry) as a means to "attract vital industrial development" while developing the technological skills base in the country (Gevisser, 2007: 681). Ronnie Kasrils (Deputy Minister of Defence) lauded the deal as a major advancement for the achievement of the African Renaissance, and argued that the offsets would create jobs and boost the economy (Holden, 2008: 12).

The pursuit of the Arms Deal was thus explained partly as an attempt to allay investor fears of undue communist influence from the ANC's alliance partners on economic

policy, and partly as a means of "gaining the acceptance of the global economic power brokers" (Feinstein, 2007: 66). Further, the Department of Foreign Affairs was heavily lobbying for a South African seat on the UN Security Council (Venter, 2001: 346), and the deal was seen as a form of "economic foreign policy" (Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 57). In other words, in order to realise the State's leadership ambitions "it actually had to amass the firepower to warrant being respected, as the region's giant, by both its neighbours and the global community" (Gevisser, 2007: 682).

It was against this backdrop of conflicting and competing goals that the Arms Deal took place. The new regime was attempting to transform the military culture while integrating personnel from previously antagonistic fighting forces. It aimed to be Africa's peacekeeper while cutting military expenditure. It strove to realise its new mandate of development-led security following an election campaign promoting social spending by diverting funds to the acquisition of hardware that was incompatible with this vision in order to realise broader goals of foreign investment.

Throughout this process, the mechanisms established to uphold the integrity of the new regime and protect the participation and input of policy makers would be eroded and circumvented, illustrating the difficulties of putting new institutional norms and values into practice. The Arms Deal would also show the simultaneous wielding and loss of power experienced by women in the early years of the new democratic regime, as the ideological transformation of the State was tested by the emergence of 'Realpolitik'[176]. In other words, the increasing pressure on the State in terms of regional and international commitments and influences would test the institutional mechanisms created within the security sector to ensure participation and robust oversight. The wielding of power by elite actors within the party and the State resulted in a decision-making process that did not consider gender differentiated needs in the spending of the defence budget (as discussed in Chapter Five and Six), in terms of focusing the budget on socio-economic priorities, and limited the potential for the substantive participation of women in the procurement decision-making process. The next section outlines this process in general terms, after which the gendered dimensions of the Arms Deal are considered.

[176] 'Realpolitik' is used here in reference to a relentless realism focused on power over ideology in the Bismarckian sense that "realpolitik involves the pursuit of political settlements unencumbered by moral and ethical limitations" (Bassiouni, 2003: 191; Holborn, 1960).

## 8.3 Controversy and the Arms Deal

Following the announcement of the opening of the tendering process in 1994 by Minister of Defence Joe Modise, protests were raised by large sectors of civil society, the general public and parliamentarians from all parties, as will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. The objections centred around the cost of the deal given other development priorities, the unsuitability of the equipment for the State's new security mandate[177], and the manner in which the procurement process was being conducted, particularly the inclusion of offsets as the deciding factor in the awarding of contracts.

The reactions to the proposed deal prompted Cabinet to delay a decision on the arms acquisition until a Defence Review was conducted which would chart the country's defence strategy in greater detail (Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004; Gumede, 2005: 111; Holden, 2008: 10; Pottinger, 2008: 50; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 59; Gordin, 2010: 77)[178]. As the previous chapters attest, the 1998 Defence Review identified regional security as one of the primary functions of the defence sector, with particular reference to peacekeeping as a result of various regional and international defence commitments including those with SADC, the AU, and the UN (DoD, 1998: ch 3, para. 8.8; ch 5, para. 1; Stott, 2002: 44; Gevisser, 2007: 681-2; Pottinger, 2008: 50; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 63). In order to meet national obligations, a "core force" recommendation was put forward outlining the current (and future) needs of each arm of the defence force in

[177] An overview of the equipment purchased is included in Appendix 8. The unsuitability of the equipment purchased for the purposes of peacekeeping operations is a serious concern, given South Africa's role as a regional mediator and participant in various multilateral initiatives on the continent. The ongoing conflicts throughout the sub-region have seen an increase of peacekeeping troops from around 12 000 to over 70 000, with UN contributions continuing to decrease and the shortfall being supplied locally (Cilliers, 2008; Neethling, 2009: 2-3). Since the incident in Somalia in 1993 where 18 US troops died, UN peacekeeping personnel contributions have declined from 40 000 to less than 1600, and peacekeeping operations have fallen from 7 in 1993 to only 3 in 1999 (Neethling, 2009: 3). With the establishment of the African Standby Force (and other regional security initiatives), South Africa will increasingly be called upon to provide support for multidimensional peace support operations: massive expenditure on inappropriate equipment is therefore questionable on this basis alone.

[178] The Defence Review was overseen by a Working Group under the coordination of the Minister and Secretary of Defence, with various sub-committees drawn from representatives of Parliament, the Defence Secretariat, the Defence Force, Armscor, academia and civil society, who consulted widely with various stakeholders regionally and nationally (DoD, 1998: ch 1, para. 8-11). The Review also "produced very progressive policies in terms of the rights of women" (Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 59; Valasek, 2008: 6).

terms of personnel and materiel (DoD, 1998: ch 8, para. 6, 14, 40; Cilliers, 1998: 1). The need to ensure that procurement must be "needs-driven and cost-constrained" (DoD, 1998: ch 1, para. 19) was emphasised and must also "be tempered by national priorities and the budgetary realities" (DoD, 1998: ch 1, para. 22).

The emphasis on cost-effectiveness was reiterated with the call for utilising the ample local arms manufacturing capabilities (DoD, 1998: ch 8, para. 3), described in the previous section. Related to this is the assertion that the largest and, at times, the only client of the local defence industry is the SANDF, and given that:

> "The SANDF funds a large portion (approximately 50%) of research and development spending in the industry and therefore owns much of the immaterial rights of the products manufactured in the industry. The SANDF also contracts a large portion of the logistic and operational support of its equipment to the industry. The technology and know-how and capacity for the maintenance of the weapons systems and supply of services such as informatics, command and control, etc, reside within the industry. This makes the industry part of the SANDF's logistic and operational capability and capacity during peace and war" (DoD, 1998: ch 13, para. 21).

Economic considerations in terms of employment and attracting foreign investment were one of the key drivers of the process. However, cost was excluded as a deciding factor in the arms procurement process at an early stage. Instead, a strong emphasis was placed on the controversial component of offsets.

The touting of the offsets as providing a sound economic basis for the deal was misleading. Offsets, or counter-trade measures, are supplementary incentives from arms suppliers, which promise large-scale investments in the purchasing country's economy. Reports on the scale of the offsets in the arms deal range from R3 billion to R7.6 billion, in various forms[179], and investment in the state worth R100 billion (Gevisser, 2007: 680-81; Holden, 2008: 9-20; Pottinger, 2008: 51; Gordin, 2010: 75).

Both the South African defence industry and Armscor focused on the economics of the deal, pushing it as an "industrial participation package" that would contribute towards

[179] The British tender guaranteed employment for 25 000 people and the construction of 10 000 houses, while the Spanish tender included a new hake fishing fleet, which it subsequently turned out would be completely unviable given the fish stocks (Holden, 2008: 8-9). All told, around 65 000 jobs would be created through the offsets, but by 2006 only 13 000 had materialised (Gevisser, 2007: 681; Holden, 2008: 24), falling far short of compensating for the shortfall in socio-economic spending caused by the Arms Deal.

the RDP goals of the State with an estimated R2 billion net inflow into the country (Holden, 2008: 9). This element of the deal – emphasising offsets as a motivation for the purchase – highlights the emergence of competing coalitions of actors within government and the party, and the conflicting preferences that would play a major role in the controversial acquisition, with women in the losing coalition. These coalitions spanned old and new structures (the Apartheid-era military leadership, together with high-ranking MK personnel, were in favour of the acquisition), intra-party alliances (ANC MPs objecting to the deal), and cross-party coalitions (opposition party MPs also objected to the deal). The tension between the rhetoric of the party and the 'Realpolitik' mindset of some high-ranking party members' actions was also becoming more apparent.

The costs of the deal soon began to spiral; by 1998 the R12 billion deal had mushroomed to R30 billion, and in less than a decade the figure would almost double to R53.2 billion, excluding financing costs (Gumede, 2005: 111; Holden, 2008: 17, 25-26). Warnings about the ballooning costs had already been issued through both a commissioned independent study (Pottinger, 2008: 51; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 67) and an Affordability Report issued by the Department of Finance, which cautioned that the cost of deal would "crowd out other pressing social demands" (Holden, 2008: 27).

At the same time that the deal was pressing forward, Health Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma argued that essential antiretrovirals (ARVs) would not be provided to HIV-positive pregnant women as the cost was too prohibitive (Feinstein, 2007: 154). However, the Report of the Joint Health and Treasury Task Team released shortly thereafter stated that

> "providing ARVs to everybody who would need them by 2008 would cost R5.7 billion a year (10 per cent of the estimated cost of the Arms Deal at the time), and would 'defer' the deaths of 1 721 329 people as well as the orphaning of 860 000 children" (Holden, 2008: 28).

One political analyst, using the cost of the arms deal in real 1999 terms, noted that any of the following could have been funded for the same amount:

- 1 993 333 RDP houses at R15 000 each (this was the subsidy amount offered for an RDP house in 1999), roughly 300 000 fewer than would be needed to clear the country's housing backlog as it stood in November 2007;
- The salaries of 474 603 educators for a year at an average annual salary of R63 000 (over double the number of educators employed by government in 1999);
- The salaries of 590 909 members of the police and correctional services for a year at an average annual salary of R50 600 (triple the number of police and correctional services employees employed by the government in 1999);
- The salaries of 590 909 nurses for a year at an average annual salary of R63 000 (nine times the number of nurses employed by the government in 1999);
- The salaries of 381 864 medical doctors at an average annual salary of R78 300 (a staggering 29 times the 13 000 doctors employed in 1999);
- A power-station the size of Lethabo, which produces 3 558 MW, more than the total electricity demands of a city the size of Johannesburg, or roughly 16 per cent over what we would need to avoid our current spate of 'load-shedding' (Holden, 2008: 30).

The alternative purchases outlined above show the range of pressing development issues that could have been positively impacted by adhering to the stated budgetary priorities of the new regime. These would also have a more gendered impact than an arms acquisition, given the realities of life for South African women, as elaborated upon by Schoeman (1998) and Govender (2007), amongst others. It also serves as a clear indication of the reversion to masculinist security norms that preclude the consideration of wider socio-economic concerns, of which the contemplation of gender differentiated needs is an important component, and is in stark opposition to the values prescribed by the HSP, SANDF mandate, and the vision for security espoused by the State.

What was purchased? The Navy would receive four Corvettes with "blue sea" capacity for search and rescue operations, and three submarines equipped with stealth mode to protect coastal trade. The Air Force would get twenty-eight Advanced Light Fighter

Aircraft (known as the Gripens), described as "multi-role supersonic combat aircraft" used during conventional warfare, and twenty-four Lead-In Fighter Aircraft (known as the Hawks), which provide flight training for the Gripens and have limited capabilities for search and rescue, reconnaissance and patrolling missions. It was reported to SCOPA that the Hawks do not adhere to the Air Force's operational requirements, and, according to the Chief of the Air Force, would only be accepted if "they were 'politically obliged' to do so" (Feinstein, 2007: 215). Thirty Light Utility Helicopters (Agusta) were also purchased, and these were the only components of the deal to fully comply with the State's focus on peace support operations as they were designed to be used for medical and humanitarian assistance operations (Cilliers, 1998: 4; Feinstein, 2007: 155, 215; Holden, 2008: 18-20; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 52-53). The unsuitability of the equipment purchased for the revised defence mandate of the State further inflamed tensions over the massive expenditure (Gumede, 2005: 111; Gevisser, 2007: 683, 677; Holden, 2008: 31; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 53; Pottinger, 2008: 50). The technical aspects of the equipment purchased fall beyond the scope of this study, and are briefly outlined in Appendix 8.

The comparative costing of the Arms Deal in terms of real socio-economic spending priorities serves to highlight the divergence of the State from the repeated emphasis on development as a driver for security. In other words, the Arms Deal provided a measure against which social policy could be costed – the provision of antiretrovirals[180] in particular served as a powerful rhetorical device highlighting the extent of the State's (and the party's) deviation from its core philosophy.

Further, the sound reasoning behind the development-security link, discussed in Chapter Six, was an ideological and practical fit with the State's broader vision for South Africa, and the departure from this course of action clearly demonstrated a turn towards 'Realpolitik'. In essence, the vested interests of powerful individuals, both in formal alliances in the upper echelons of the SANDF and Cabinet and in informal coalitions

[180] It has been projected that at current infection rates, ten million South Africans will die of AIDS-related illnesses by 2015 (Arndt & Lewis, 2000: 857), making a pro-active State response to the pandemic essential. Crawford-Browne (2004: 333) states that with an estimated AIDS-related death toll of 600 people per day, the pandemic has a "casualty rate that would be inconceivable even in full-scale war". For a detailed analysis of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa, and the economic implications thereof, see De Klerk (2006).

within the party, were able to engineer the pursuit of contradictory goals to those formally mandated by the State and the party. This speaks to the strength (or lack thereof) of the decision-making processes of the new democratic State. Despite the objections of parliamentarians that the expenditure should be directed towards the socio-economic commitments made by the government, informal networks were activated to circumvent the mechanisms that facilitate meaningful participation and oversight. A relatively small number of players with considerable power and prominence were thus able to exert the necessary influence to subvert the democratic process and purchase equipment that was not considered necessary by either the SANDF (representing narrow defence interests) or policy makers (speaking for broader societal interests).

Within the context of the exploration of processes of institutional change, the circumvention of mechanisms for participation and oversight during the Arms Deal is a critical factor in understanding the gendering of the security sector. It illustrates the manner in which issues such as political party loyalty and patronage interact with (and at times interfere with) the establishment and entrenchment of good governance ideals, which aid in the implementation of gender mainstreaming processes and thereby facilitate the substantive participation of women. It also shows how the shifting power relations between actors in layered institutions can both advance and erode gender gains in institutional structures. The next section provides a brief explanation of the structures mandated to oversee the arms procurement process, before demonstrating some of the means by which these mechanisms were undermined and evaded, thereby limiting the opportunities for gendered institutional change and eroding the gender gains made. This had implications for the entrenchment of the institutional values espoused by the new democratic regime, particularly in terms of the substantive representation and participation of women, as their voices and interests were sacrificed to the alternative agenda being pushed by security sector elites.

## 8.4 Decision-making Structures and Processes

A major arms acquisition involves a multitude of parties within the State, with varying levels of power and influence over the process. In the case of the Arms Deal, Cabinet would take the final decision, given that the acquisition was more economically and politically driven than technically motivated (Cilliers, 1998: 1; Gumede, 2005: 138; Gevisser, 2007: 675; Holden, 2008: 10, 16-17; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 57). Responsibility for the procurement process lies with the Department of Defence (DoD), and occurs at three levels: the Armament Acquisition Council (AAC), chaired by the Minister of Defence, the Armament Acquisition Steering Board (AASB), chaired by the Secretary for Defence, and the Armament Acquisition Control Board (AACB), chaired by the Chief of Acquisition in the Defence Secretariat (Cilliers, 1998: 1; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 54-56). The process was overseen by the Cabinet sub-committee on Acquisitions, chaired by then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, and included the Minister of Trade and Industry (Alec Erwin), the Minister of Public Enterprise (Stella Sigcau), the Minister of Finance (Trevor Manuel), and the Minister of Defence (Joe Modise) (Holden, 2008: 16)[181].

Despite the recommendations of the 1998 Defence Review to reduce expenditure and tailor any acquisitions towards the new peace support mandate of the State, the Arms Deal was approved by these structures in 1998 (Gevisser, 2007: 675; Holden, 2008: 16-17; Pottinger, 2008: 50-51). The decision reflects a major departure from the established decision-making rules of the ANC and from the institutional processes that the ANC was attempting to entrench within the State.

The accepted norm was for vigorous internal debate, ensuring that actions taken were in accordance with the ANC's vision. Thereafter a united front would be presented for the implementation of the agreed course of action (Gumede, 2005: 137; Feinstein, 2007: 204; Hassim, 2009: 459). The decision taken by the Executive, without the established

[181] A series of related sub-committees would evaluate different aspects of the deal, involving representatives from the Departments of Defence, Trade and Industry, and Finance, as well as delegates from Armscor (Holden, 2008: 16).

participative procedures within either the party or Parliament, was described by Sylvester and Seegers (2008: 73) as being indicative of

> "the degree to which power within government has been centralised. This was evident from, among others, the marginalisation of Parliament and the punishment meted out to critics of the [Arms Deal], including critics within the ruling party. So it can be about political commitments, but this would be only those of a handful of people. The executive's dominating role in the [Arms Deal] is strongly reminiscent of the PW Botha era in SA's civil-military relations".

This implied that the institutional culture of the ruling ANC was taking on characteristics of the system that was being transformed: secretive and unilateral action was being undertaken without consultation, checks and balances were no longer being applied. While this is consistent with political Executives elsewhere, and indeed was a characteristic of the previous regime, it represented an early departure from the ideals espoused by the ANC regime – the party leadership was not fighting for a new political order. It is also an example of the ease with which new institutional rules and norms were eroded, and in particular the loss of truly participatory processes, which are integral to substantive gendered participation.

Many ANC MPs spoke out about the decision to go ahead with the acquisition. For example, the chairperson of the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence, Tony Yengeni, is said to have commented that "the levels of poverty in the country are so high that most victims of poverty cannot comprehend that a new democratic Parliament can endorse spending a substantial amount on corvettes" (quoted by Holden, 2008: 6)[182]. Cabinet ministers such as Jay Naidoo (Minister overseeing the RDP) and Finance Minister Trevor Manuel also expressed concerns. Pottinger (2008: 51) recalls the confusion within the ANC that the oft-stated priority of social spending was being sidelined in favour of an acquisition that the security industry had already admitted it did not need, and which would total R43 billion by 2000. This is echoed by Gumede (2005: 138) who comments "what made the Arms Deal especially sensitive was that it was at variance with the moral convictions of many ANC members. The party came to power pledging drastic cuts to the defence spending that characterised the

[182] Yengeni later reversed his position and became embroiled in the allegations of corruption surrounding the deal. In 2003 he accepted a plea bargain following charges of fraud, perjury and forgery laid against him in 2001, while he was serving as ANC Chief Whip. Yengeni was sentenced to four years imprisonment for accepting a discounted luxury vehicle from one of the companies involved with the Arms Deal (Crawford-Browne, 2004: 332; Gumede, 2005: 302; Holden, 2008: 298-301).

Apartheid era, in favour of social services". This assessment again reinforces the central concern of the majority of female actors in the security sector that development-oriented security policy was critical for the stability of South Africa, as reflected in the centrality of this issue during the first democratic elections.

Minister of Housing Joe Slovo (also former head of MK), Minister of Intelligence Joe Nhlanhla, and MP Pregs Govender also opposed the proposed expenditure in favour of socio-economic spending (Gumede, 2005: 138; Govender, 2007: 198; Pottinger, 2008: 51). The misgivings were related not only with the expenditure on arms given the critical socio-economic priorities of the party and the State, but also with the manner in which the tendering process was being administered (Gumede, 2005: 138). Govender (2007: 198) argued that even if the money remained part of the Defence Budget, there were better uses for it such as the reintegration of soldiers and programmes for retraining retrenched combatants in line with the SSR commitments and human security focus of the State, as opposed to "borrowing money from countries like Britain, Germany and Sweden to buy arms that they themselves found redundant" (Crawford-Browne, 2004: 339).

Govender was admonished by President Thabo Mbeki, with her objections being dismissed as she was a "pacifist" and "lacked the knowledge and experience to make a judgment call on the Arms Deal" (Govender, 2007: 194). Following the accusations of undue interference, Govender (2007: 193-194) commented that:

> "the committee on women was expected to stick to 'women's issues', as if prioritising weapons of war above fully implementing ... the Domestic Violence Act did not legitimise the war in bedrooms and borders".

ANC MPs who opposed the deal were warned by Thabo Mbeki that their chairmanships of parliamentary committees were gained and lost through the ANC, since they were elected as ANC members (Gumede, 2002; Govender, 2007: 198). Thus, toeing the party line was more important that challenging policy. ANC MP Andrew Feinstein was fired over his determination to uncover the corruption in the Arms Deal (Feinstein, 2007: 203-207; Govender, 2007: 199; Holden, 2008: 57). This incident serves to highlight that even as the State was pushing to infuse the workings of governance structures with the values of equality and participative governance, pockets of the

institutional culture were not being meaningfully reformed. Expressing conflicting views prompted a reversion to traditional modes of decision-making in certain quarters: security was the purview of men, an area in which "women's issues" had no part. The return of this patriarchal mode of institutional decision-making represented a loss in terms of gendered institutional change, as being denied a legitimate voice in the decision-making process is a significant element of a successful gender mainstreaming strategy.

Two factors must be considered regarding this turn of events. Firstly, the backlash against detractors of the deal was centred more around the issue of political party loyalty than individual concerns (or gender prejudice), as evidenced by the sidelining of both male and female parliamentarians. Secondly, the larger issue was the unilateral decision-making process that led to the decision to purchase the arms: power was being centralised in the Executive[183] (Thompson, 2000: 289; Venter, 2001: 279; Anderlini, 2004; Feinstein, 2007: 150; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 58, 73), bypassing the established decision-making processes of the ANC and the new State. This is clearly demonstrated in the account provided by Govender (2007: 202-204) about her meeting with then Secretary-General of the ANC Kgalema Motlanthe[184] and the Assistant Secretary General Thenjiwe Mtintso[185] who confirmed that the decision to go ahead with the arms deal had not been discussed or agreed upon in the NEC, the highest decision-making body of the ANC. This centralisation of power within the Executive is not an uncommon feature in other transitional states[186], and speaks to the tension between the vision of transformation espoused by the democratic State and the 'Realpolitik' of governance in a post-conflict state.

[183] Sylvester and Seegers (2008: 58) described the Executive as "an active, if not dominating, participant" in the arms acquisition process, citing its direct negotiations with States including Britain and Germany.

[184] Motlanthe, a former MK operative, served as President of South Africa from 2008 to 2009, completing Mbeki's second term after Mbeki was ousted from office. He is currently Deputy President of South Africa, and Deputy President of the ANC.

[185] Mtintso was a former commander in MK who had challenged the chauvinism within the armed movement, serving as chair of the first gender commission in SA, and is described by Govender as a "feminist communist" (Govender, 2007: 202).

[186] Annesley & Gains (2010), for example, discuss the gender implications of the power focused in the Executive.

The importance of demonstrating loyalty to the ANC government at all costs was therefore highlighted early on in the Arms Deal process, even when it appeared to directly contradict the core values of the party. The occurrence of such undemocratic attitudes in the early years of the democracy rang alarm bells. If the party leadership (and the party acting as the government) was willing to sacrifice its good governance ideals so easily on an issue in contravention to its central philosophy, how strongly would it stand up for less tangible ideals such as gender equality? Would the structures and mechanisms established to entrench and protect these ideals function effectively, thereby protecting the gender gains made thus far? The scandal surrounding the Arms Deal proved to be a baptism by fire, and none of the institutional mechanisms protecting the participatory rights of parliamentarians would emerge unscathed.

## 8.5 Scandal Breaks: Oversight Mechanisms Under Strain

The inauspicious start to the Arms Deal revealed weaknesses in the institutional mechanisms established to ensure equitable democratic participation, which is a key element in attaining the substantive representation of women in terms of the gender mainstreaming strategy. The ability of powerful players to circumvent the measures aimed at entrenching core values of good governance was further demonstrated as the scandals around the procurement process (and the subsequent investigation thereof) broke.

Patricia de Lille,[187] an experienced parliamentarian from the opposition PAC, tabled a briefing document in Parliament in September 1999 signed by "concerned ANC MPs" (Holden, 2008: 38; Crawford-Browne, 2004: 332; Anderlini, 2004: 28; Govender, 2007: 200; Pottinger, 2008: 52; Gordin, 2010: 76)[188]. The documents, which became known as the De Lille Dossier, raised a range of allegations of irregularities and corruption associated with the deal, and named a number of high-ranking ANC members as being

[187] De Lille was a MP for the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) at the time, and would go on to form the Independent Democrats (ID) in 2003.

[188] De Lille refused to divulge who released the document to her, or to name the "concerned MPs" or any of the accused identified in the document, calling instead for a judicial enquiry to establish the veracity of the claims (Holden, 2008: 38).

involved[189]. The Auditor-General (AG) was called upon to table a report about the matter, in which it was confirmed that numerous irregularities had occurred (Pottinger, 2008: 52). Concerns raised included issues with the tender approval process, the lack of sufficient guarantees for the counter trade measures, the substantive departure from standard procurement procedures such as ignoring pricing as a factor, awarding contracts to foreign bidders when local vendors could produce the same equipment for less money, and not heeding the recommendations of the military as to the specific equipment required (Feinstein, 2007: 158; Pottinger, 2008: 52; Gordin, 2010: 76).

The investigation was guided by a set of terms of references agreed upon by the relevant ministers, in accordance with the Auditor-General's Act of 1995, and which included the Defence Special Account Act of 1974 (Holden, 2008: 39-40). The decision taken by powerful figures within the new regime to exercise this section of the Act serves as an example of the consequences of layering old and new institutions and institutional processes that have conflicting values. The purpose of the 1974 Act is described by Holden (2008: 40) as enabling the government

> "to censure any report submitted by the Auditor-General that was to the 'detriment of the public interest'. In reality it allowed the Apartheid government to break arms sanctions placed on the government by excising whatever it felt necessary from an Auditor-General's report. In other words, the ANC government would do exactly what the Apartheid government did: use legislation that contracted the Constitution's dictate that 'no person or organ of State may interfere with the functioning of these institutions' to censor the report of an independent government institution"[190].

The democratic government was utilising the relics of "old" institutional rules to undermine the strengthening of "new" institutional mechanisms. These efforts to conceal the circumvention of procedures designed to root out corruption and poor governance practices were subverting the entrenchment of the core values and norms of

[189] These included allegations that then Defence Minister Joe Modise (who headed MK in exile) received payoffs ranging between R10 and R35 million from bidders, and that the ANC itself was the recipient of multimillions of rands, ostensibly to fund the 1999 election campaign (Feinstein, 2007:155; Gevisser, 2007: 677; Pottinger, 2008: 52).

[190] An audit steering committee was therefore formed to "direct the investigation", and included members of the arms acquisition sub-committee and representatives from the auditor-general's offices (Holden, 2008: 40). Two of the representatives serving on the audit steering committee were later found to have themselves been in contravention of arms procurement procedures: Chippy Shaik for breaching conflict of interest rules for his brother, and Vanan Pillay, who was "fired by the Department of Trade and Industry for accepting a R55 000 discount on a Mercedes-Benz sold by one of the Arms Deal contenders" (Holden, 2008: 40; Govender, 2007: 198; Gordin, 2010: 76).

the ANC into the democratic structures of the State. Put differently, formal rules that ran contrary to the values of the new regime were being activated by informal networks of high ranking ANC members to subvert the functioning of new formal rules aimed at entrenching the core values and norms of the ANC.

From a gendered perspective, this demonstrated that the gains made were not guaranteed: elites still had the relative power to diminish the gendered gains made by altering the rules that provided women with an arena for substantive participation. By reintroducing "old" norms that privileged the decision-making power of an elite (masculine) clique, "new norms" aimed at entrenching good governance (such as exercising oversight over arms acquisitions or conducting investigations of irregularities) were weakened. It is these new norms upon which women were building gendered institutional gains, as they also protected women's rights to participate substantively in the decision-making process. The circumvention of these new institutional norms and values therefore reduced the substantive representation of women within certain areas to merely descriptive roles.

However, other agencies with wider powers were entering the fray, some of which were new mechanisms established by the new regime with the express purpose of halting infringements on the integrity of democratic governance institutions. Investigations were launched by the Special Investigating Unit, the Office for Serious Economic Offences (the "Scorpions") and the Public Protector's Office (Holden, 2008: 43; Gumede, 2005: 301). Coordination between these investigations would be provided by the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA).

## 8.6 The Silencing of SCOPA

SCOPA is the "parliamentary watchdog committee that oversaw public expenditure and conduct and undertook remedial action if it found that an arm of the government had misspent public funds" (Holden, 2008: 43; Feinstein, 2007: 71-72). Due to its constitutional mandate, SCOPA had been transformed from a rubber stamp for the Apartheid government's policies to a highly respected, non-partisan oversight committee (Feinstein, 2007: 71).

At the time of the Arms Deal, SCOPA was chaired by the opposition (IFP MP Gavin Woods), and had a number of esteemed ANC members in its ranks, including Barbara Hogan[191], Andrew Feinstein, and ex-Robben Islanders Laloo Chiba and Billy Nair. Respected political commentator Richard Calland described SCOPA as "a vital committee, perhaps the most important sub-institution of Parliament" (Calland, 2006: 104). While many of the issues brought before the committee prior to the Arms Deal were controversial, the committee's professional and independent manner was protected by the Chief Whip Max Sisulu and at times by the President (Feinstein, 2007: 72). It was seen as an exemplary model of democracy at work.

Upon receiving the Auditor-General's report, SCOPA began a series of hearings to ascertain the veracity of the allegations. The 14th SCOPA report submitted to Parliament (and unanimously passed) recommended a multi-agency investigation into the debacle "to prove or disprove once and for all the allegations which cause damage to perceptions of the government" (SCOPA, 2000; Crawford-Browne, 2004: 333; Holden, 2008: 47; Pottinger, 2008: 53)[192]. This "independent and expert forensic investigation" would consist of the Auditor-General, the Heath Special Investigating Unit, the Public Protector, and the Investigating Directorate of Serious Economic Offences "so that the best combination of skills, legal mandates and resources can be found for such an investigation" (SCOPA, 2000)[193]. The SCOPA report further recommended that the scope of the investigation should not be limited given the "complex and cross-cutting nature of the areas to be investigated" (SCOPA, 2000). Upon completion of the

[191] Described by fellow committee member Andrew Feinstein as "a pugnacious, thorough and fearless MP, Barbara had devoted her life to the ANC. She was the country's longest serving white woman political detainee under Apartheid" (Feinstein, 2007: 71).

[192] In the report, the committee found more than 50 instances of non-compliance with the procurement process, including inconsistent and insufficient evaluation procedures, and the lack of a suitable audit trail (Feinstein, 2007: 211).

[193] The Special Investigating Unit's ability to function effectively would be continually eroded through political interference, starting with the removal of Judge Willem Heath who has been described as a "high-profile public figure with an uncompromising approach to corruption" (Holden, 2008: 49; Pottinger, 2008: 53). The Scorpions, a unit within the National Prosecuting Authority that investigated corruption and organised crime, was also disbanded despite their investigative success in a range of cases (Gordin, 2008: 267; Pottinger, 2008: 53).

investigation, coordinated by SCOPA, a report of the findings would be submitted to the National Assembly[194].

The response of the ANC (both as the party[195] and acting as the government) was to defensively malign the committee's findings (Holden, 2008: 49). At a press conference held soon after the submission of SCOPA's report to Parliament, the Ministers of Defence, Finance, Public Enterprises and Trade and Industry made the following statement:

> "[Cabinet] takes serious issue with the ill-informed conclusions drawn from the Auditor General's Review and the SCOPA Report. These fail to understand the most elementary features of the defence acquisition process. It is our view that the Review and the Report were too cursory to do justice to this matter and have called into question the integrity of government without justification.
>
> We also find it strange that so many people in our country have been driven into a virtual frenzy by mere allegations of wrongdoing, without a single shred of evidence of actual wrong doing being produced.
>
> The Government will go ahead to implement the defence acquisition to meet its constitutional obligations to the country and to the National Defence Force.
>
> The Government remains committed to cooperate in any legitimate investigation into any elements of the defence acquisition process, but will not allow itself to be diverted to participate in what amounts to mere fishing expeditions.
>
> For its part Government remains convinced that nothing that was done in the context of the Strategic Procurement suggests in any way that corruption occurred. We await convincing evidence to prove this otherwise.
>
> Whilst Government is ready to cooperate with any investigation, we believe that it is our duty to challenge any insinuations that question the integrity of government's decision making processes in this regard. We will also not respond to campaigns by those who may have lost out in the bidding process or those who are in principle opposed to the decision to undertake the Strategic Procurement" (RSA, 2001).

This statement captures the conflicting institutional processes undermining the entrenchment of the new good governance values articulated by the ANC in the various foundation documents discussed in previous chapters. The commitment to transparency and equality, which was demonstrated in the establishment of institutional mechanisms

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[194] The final report, which was the result of the joint investigations conducted by the Auditor-General, the Public Protector, and the Scorpions (prior to their disbandment), was heavily edited by the Executive prior to submission, and had been subjected to "significant changes" (Feinstein, 2007: 212-213; Anderlini, 2004; Pottinger, 2008: 53).

[195] The dissension within the party about the deal was curtailed as this chapter describes – a publicly united face was to be presented through the wielding of mechanisms such as political party loyalty. This was an effective strategy given the power the proportional representation system gave the party over its members, as discussed previously.

with constitutionally-mandated powers of oversight, was being called into question as these same mechanisms were being derided when their findings were not supportive of the actions of the ruling party elites. The declaration that the acquisition would go ahead despite evidence of irregularities further eroded confidence in the ability of these institutional mechanisms to uphold the core values espoused in the Constitution, as did the implied sidelining of these important oversight structures with the statement that the government would cooperate with "legitimate" investigations, suggesting that these prominent ministers did not consider the work of SCOPA as legitimate[196]. A similar observation is noted by political analyst Xolela Mangcu, whom Holden (2008: 53) quotes as arguing that "Mbeki's decision to exclude the unit and publicly accuse the AG and SCOPA of wrong-doing subverts the separation of powers and undermines the instruments of accountability in so fragile a democracy".

The curtailment of SCOPA's independence continued as the ANC brought its representatives on the committee in line. Minister in the Presidency Essop Pahad reportedly berated the ANC members of SCOPA, asking "who do you think you are, questioning the integrity of the government, the Ministers and the President?" (Feinstein, 2007: 175). A similar statement was reportedly made by then Deputy President Zuma who "told MPs it was folly to go against the party line" (Gumede, 2005: 141). Feinstein (2007: 194) commented that following the announcement that the ANC would "exercise political control over SCOPA ... the role of the Public Accounts Committee as a non-partisan arbiter on matters of financial management was over".

When Feinstein defended the findings of SCOPA, together with SCOPA Chair Gavin Woods, he was recalled from the committee by the ANC leadership (Holden, 2008: 57). Shortly thereafter, the ANC "moved a motion showing support for and appreciation of the Speaker, a motion that was carried by the ANC's majority", and Feinstein's decision to abstain from voting resulted in his forced resignation from Parliament (Holden, 2008:

[196] The controversy around the improper conduct of high-ranking officials continues, spurred by the conviction of Tony Yengeni (former ANC Chief Whip) and Shabir Shaik (brother of senior arms procurer Chippy Shaik) for his "corrupt relationship with then deputy president (Jacob Zuma) relating to bribes from a French defence contractor"; and the trial of President Jacob Zuma on charges related to bribes from one of the principal arms dealers (and the ensuing cover up, and the continued refusal of the ANC-regime to cooperate with UK and German investigations into the irregularities) (Gevisser, 2007: 677; Govender, 2007: 198; Pottinger, 2008: 54-57; Gordin, 2010: 76).

57; Feinstein, 2007: 203-207)[197]. Feinstein noted that the abstention was "the first time in my seven and a half years as an ANC representative, I did not vote with my comrades ... I had voted with my conscience", and expressed "sadness that it had come to this; that the ANC had behaved so despicably over the Arms Deal; that Parliament was being subjugated to the interests of the party" (Feinstein, 2007: 204). The comment reflects back to the circumvention of the ANC's internal democratic processes, wherein rigorous debate had always been encouraged before decisions were taken. This enabled a variety of views to be heard, after which MPs would be expected to "endorse government policy without fundamental change" (Gumede, 2005: 137).

The impact of the new ANC loyalist majority serving on SCOPA was immediate: "only four days after Feinstein had abstained from the Ginwala vote, ANC members on SCOPA claimed that they were 'too busy' to continue investigating the Arms Deal ... SCOPA would no longer pursue the matter" (Holden, 2008: 58). SCOPA Chair Gavin Woods resigned early the following year, releasing a statement that the committee was "losing its focus and with that a dramatic loss of productivity and of work standards. This translated directly into a serious loss of scrutiny and oversight and with it the early signs of government departments losing their respect for SCOPA" (SAPA/News24, 2002; Holden, 2008: 58). Andrew Feinstein commented on Woods' resignation in the *Mail & Guardian* newspaper, calling it "a massive blow to the credibility of the committee and to the cause of vigorous parliamentary oversight and accountability", remarking that "unless the ANC can pull itself back from the brink and revert to the position it introduced with the advent of democracy by insulating SCOPA from party politics and allowing the members of the committee to determine by consensus whether financial regulations have been transgressed, reports of SCOPA's death will not have been premature" (Feinstein, 2002; Holden, 2008: 58).

This is a reflection of the earlier discussion on the layering of "old" and "new" structures and their sometimes conflicting rules and norms. The importance of the independence of SCOPA is critical to its effective functioning as an oversight body, but the norms which govern the behaviour of actors towards this entity were subverted by

[197] Feinstein's decision to abstain from the vote was in large part due to the role played by Frene Ginwala in suppressing the investigation into irregularities, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

the reversion to "old" norms privileging decision-making by elites. Parallels can be drawn to a number of gender entities which similarly rely on "buy-in" by other actors in terms of the norms supporting the purpose and effectiveness of the machineries aimed at integrating a gendered view into policy: if a few elites with sufficient relative power deem an entity troublesome, its efficiency can be severely curtailed.

The concerns SCOPA expressed about the financial dimension of the deal were well founded. The promised offsets (the primary motivator behind the deal) have, perhaps predictably, not been realised. Firstly, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) generally prohibits such measures (with the exception of developing states), given the inherent leeway for corruption that it contains, and categorically states that offsets should never be the sole basis for awarding an arms contract (Gevisser, 2007: 680-81; Holden, 2008: 22). Pottinger describes offsets or counter-trade measures as a "common and much abused system", and argues that a "mountain of evidence from past arms deals around the world shows that these deals rarely survive the arms-sale signing ceremony and invariably fall far short of the promise" (Pottinger, 2008: 51) [198]. Thus, while the inclusion of offsets may be a requirement in a tender, it must not be used as a "deal breaker" given that "if a country signed a deal purely on the basis of an offset agreement and not on the necessity of the goods purchased, it would be tantamount to legal bribery" (Holden, 2008: 23). Secondly, there are no substantive penalties for non-compliance. Holden (2008) cites numerous sources that argue the impacts of offsets are negligible and in many respects unenforceable- an issue which arose within the SCOPA hearings.

Between the Department of Trade and Industry and Armscor, it has been claimed that from R9 billion to R11.4 billion in returned investment has been realised, although some argue that it is an exceedingly poor return on a substantially higher investment on

[198] In the course of the SCOPA enquiry in 2000, Chief of Acquisitions Chippy Shaik and Chief Negotiator Jay Naidoo disclosed that defaulters would pay a penalty of 10% of the purchase price (approximately R3 billion), which represented less than 3% of the total worth of the R100 billion offset package (Holden, 2008: 24). Andrew Feinstein, ANC MP on SCOPA, argued that "most arms companies have little intention of fulfilling these obligations and tend to build the penalty costs into the price they charge" (Feinstein, 2007: 163). Despite attempts by the State to conceal the progress of the counter-trade measures under the commercial confidentiality clauses (Section 217) of the Constitution, some details have emerged about the extent to which the offsets have failed to materialise. Three arms contractors (Ferrostaal, BAe/Saab and Thales) had defaulted on their first offset delivery deadlines by more than R5 billion (Holden, 2008: 24).

equipment that was not needed (Holden, 2008: 25; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 63-67). Feinstein (2007) reiterates this view, stating that even as the promised impact of the offsets was downgraded from being "pure butter" to the more sedate "economically neutral", expectations continue to be lowered. The promises of job creation also failed to materialise, and the math involved in calculating the benefit to the economy was also shaky at best, as Holden (2008: 31) demonstrates:

> "Working from the estimate of R29.9 billion for the total cost of the package, which would produce 65 000 jobs, it would have cost the South African taxpayer R460 000 per job created – almost six times the average annual salary of a medical doctor in 1999"[199].

Putting aside the specific problems with the deal, and focusing on the broader view of the situation, the manner in which independent oversight mechanisms such as SCOPA were circumvented and undermined raises a number of questions about the processes of institutional change. In particular, the apparent ease with which mechanisms for participation and oversight were bypassed. What is the impact of informal rules such as political party loyalty overriding formal rules established within institutions? What are the implications for entrenching gendered change if core ideals related to good governance are eroded?

## 8.7 Women and the Arms Deal

The interaction of formal rules (such as the functioning of mechanisms for participation and oversight) with informal rules (such as political party loyalty) in the Arms Deal highlighted some of the limits of enacting institutional change. The level of political will required to sustain the permeation of new norms and values into these layered institutions was not consistently applied, with the effect that confidence in some institutions was eroded. While women were present in influential and prominent positions, their capacity to impact the process was therefore curtailed by the persistence of informal rules and norms, particularly political party loyalty.

[199] In 2006 Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota confirmed that of the promised 65 000 jobs that the offsets would generate, only 13 000 had materialised (Holden, 2008: 309). By the end of 2007, the Department of Trade and Industry reported the creation of 15 689 direct jobs, and a further 34 620 indirect jobs created by the offset scheme (DTI, 2007: 12).

A prominent example is the role played by Frene Ginwala, the Speaker of Parliament[200]. Her reputation as a strong force for gendered change had already been well established within the ANC, and her efforts continued within the new democratic structures of the State: as Speaker, she established the *ad hoc* Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life and Status of Women (Govender, 2007: 157). This would later become a standing committee chaired by another ANC veteran, Pregs Govender, who commented that "Frene Ginwala's strengths are legend. She was able, for example, to get the male leadership of the ANC to listen to women's demands" (Govender, 2007: 130). Despite her feisty reputation and "independent streak", the party pressure around the Arms Deal impacted on her role as Speaker (Pottinger, 2008: 44).

While she initially lent support to the SCOPA investigation (Feinstein, 2007: 161; Pottinger, 2008: 53), Ginwala was soon called upon to bring "deviant" ANC members in-line. For example, following the release of the 14th Report, Ginwala and Naledi Pandor (then head of the National Council of Provinces) berated the ANC SCOPA members for their conduct (Holden, 2008: 56). Pottinger (2008: 44) asserts that "she failed to protect the integrity and independence of Parliament to the required level, particularly in regard to the seminal arms deal inquiry ... increasingly, the legislature was subjected to acts of gratuitous insult from the executive in, for example, failing to answer members' questions or not arriving for committee sessions".

When questioned about maintaining impartiality while being accountable to both the ANC and Parliament given conflicting interests such as in the Arms Deal, she responded "you must remember that I am a politician ... and I became a politician before I became a Speaker" (Streek, 2001). This was evidenced in a 2001 letter to Jacob Zuma in which Frene Ginwala provided "the Executive ample cover" (Holden, 2008: 55) by facilitating the exclusion of Judge Heath and enabling the systematic weakening of the investigation. This suggests that the autonomy and power amassed by women over the course of the liberation struggle are not necessarily sufficient to overcome the negative influence of political party loyalty, even once these women obtain positions of

[200] Ginwala was involved with the creation of the Women's National Coalition upon her return from exile, as well as being an active member of the ANCWL. Currently she serves as a member of the United Nations Advisory Panel of High-Level Personalities on African Development to the UN Secretary-General and is a Commissioner on the Commission on Human Security (CHS, 2011).

influence and power. The example of Frene Ginwala's role in the Arms Deal (particularly the investigation and its aftermath) touches on a number of discussions on women's roles in the institutional gendering process. For example, the contentious assumption that women will "act for" women, as debated by Gouws 2008b), Mackay (2004) and Waylen (2007b: 15), amongst many others noted in Chapter One. The actions of Frene Ginwala add to these arguments that aim to debunk this essentialist assumption. Her actions contributed to the erosion of gendered gains, as women's oversight roles as parliamentarians and committee members were not defended but weakened, and women seeking to hold the State to its development promises, which had a very real impact on women's lives, were not supported by the highest ranking woman in parliament.

Another ANC MP, Pregs Govender, came under similar pressure to cease her protests to the manner in which the deal was conducted. Recounting her intention to vote against the deal and resign, Govender (2007: 203-204) commented:

> "I had begun to feel worn down by the way Cabinet seemed to ignore the needs of the majority of the people who had voted us into power. I had grappled with the question of who ANC MPs, including myself, should be loyal to. There were new values and priorities underlying policy choices such as the Arms Deal, and Parliament's power to influence the course we were now on was severely limited".

While the resignation of MPs such as Pregs Govender could be construed as surrender in the face of overwhelming institutional obstacles blocking women's meaningful participation in decision-making processes, Govender's legitimacy as a political actor (based on her history within the liberation struggle and her achievements within government such as the establishment of the Women's Budget) provided her with a public platform from which to voice her dissent. Although the cost of this dissent was her departure from parliament, it served to draw attention to the erosion of gender gains within institutional structures, particularly the weakening of oversight and participatory mechanisms. She was thus contributing to keeping the gender on the agenda, both by continuously highlighting the impact of the Arms Deal on women's lives, and by calling attention to the sidelining of important institutional norms and rules by party elites. In other words, Govender was among the women challenging the return of the masculinist model of security decision-making that was subverting the development agenda in favour of arms.

The pressure on remaining MPs to demonstrate loyalty to the leadership of the party (or rather, loyalty to a powerful coalition of ANC leaders), rather than loyalty to the espoused values of the party. This is an important distinction, since the stated party objectives were in synergy with the policy directives of the State, and would therefore provoke minimal conflict in values. However, the Arms Deal introduced a new dynamic whereby core values and norms of the party, established over the preceding decades, could be disregarded be an elite few. If the new regime aimed to infuse the institutional structures of the State with its good governance philosophy, a dangerous precedent was being set.

The pervasiveness of informal rules, such as political party loyalty, and the negative influence that such rules can have on the effective functioning of institutions, is a serious issue for the entrenchment of good governance ideals such as gender equality[201]. The consolidation of gender gains in institutional mechanisms cannot be meaningfully utilised if these mechanisms can be circumvented by informal means, and if the weakening of these institutions is sanctioned by the same actors who are supposed to be instilling new norms and values of accountability and equality in the institutions of the democratic State. While there are still many unanswered questions around the Arms Deal, the continued lack of transparency speaks to the persistent interference from powerful figures (Gumede, 2005: 302; Feinstein, 2007, Govender, 2007; Pottinger, 2008; Holden, 2008). This subversion of good governance practices (another tenet emphasised in both SSR and human security) further weakens the stability of the State.

The maintenance of Executive dominance, which was highlighted by the manner in which the Arms Deal played out, speaks to a continuation of Apartheid-era norms[202]. This suggests that institutional changes related to good governance in terms of participation and equality were not being firmly entrenched, or rather, could be suppressed through informal coalitions of powerful actors with alternative agendas. Further, the Arms Deal highlighted the negative repercussions of informal rules such as

[201] Waylen (2007b) discusses the gendered impact of party discipline on policy formulation in South Africa (including on reproductive policy) in a comparative analysis of gender and transitions, as does Hassim (2003c).

[202] The pervasiveness of "old" institutional norms that was demonstrated in this case has parallels with the concept of 'nested newness' discussed by Mackay (2010) and Chappell (2011: 165-166).

political party loyalty, and the manner in which this informal rule was utilised in this particular scenario.

However, political party loyalty as a feature of the institutional gendering process is not necessarily a negative force. The power of political party loyalty to unify actors behind causes that strengthen institutional structures has been demonstrated, such as with the Women's Budget discussed in Chapter Five. Even with the Arms Deal, some women sought to gain some gendered changes despite their objections to the process. For example, Thandi Modise, chair of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and MK veteran, forcefully argued about the importance of parliamentary oversight of the acquisition and investigation, and repeatedly sent legislation related to the National Conventional Arms Control process back to parliament for strengthening (Anderlini, 2004: 30). In the face of strong pressure from the party, Modise demonstrated her confidence in the relative power derived from her position of influence and prominence, gained over decades within the MK structures.

Modise continued pushing the gender agenda and fulfilled her role as an active participant in the decision-making processes of the security sector. By ensuring that the National Conventional Arms Control process was as robust as possible, oversight of future arms acquisitions and trade would be better protected. Although this represented a limited gain within the broader context of the Arms Deal, Modise's stature within the ANC by virtue of her standing within MK enabled her to utilise the new institutional rules for women's formal participation in security decision-making processes. In this case, political party loyalty protected Modise's right to participate substantively in the development of security policy. In other words, ANC women worked within the constraints imposed by the developments following the Arms Deal to continue instigating and entrenching gendered change within the security arena.

Further examples of limited gender gains within the context of the Arms Deal are cited below, primarily within the SANDF structures. Although the women cited are affiliated with the ANC, the constraints imposed on the exercising of their power within the security arena are different. Political party loyalty played a role in women's advancement within MK structures, but, once they took up positions within the SANDF, the military

hierarchy superseded that of the party. In other words, pressure could not be exerted in terms of removing them from their positions of power and influence. This can be viewed as a practical example of the assertion by Chappell (2010: 185) that "different levels of the State are, or may be, gendered in different ways". Thus, the way in which the norms of the security arena operate, which are generally obstructive to the furthering of gender equality, served to aid the gendering process in this scenario. These women utilised the entrenched command structure that provided them with influence and power to initiate and entrench change within the acquisition process in often very practical ways. Their power as political actors within the security structures of the State was not curtailed by the informal norms of party loyalty in the same way as women within parliament, and the formal hierarchy of the SANDF facilitated the exercise of this power.

For example, Major General Ntsiki Memela-Motumi (Chief Director of Transformation Management in the SANDF) had first-hand experience with the difficulties of performing effectively with cumbersome equipment designed for men during her time as an MK Commander. She therefore pursued practical amendments in conjunction with institutional initiatives to assist the advancement (and acceptance) of women in the SANDF. In the case of the Arms Deal, she ensured the roll out of gender-friendly equipment, which included an initiative to retro-fit the ejector seats of fighter planes to accommodate the lighter weight of women and thereby enable them to utilise the new equipment (Hendricks & Magadla, 2010). At an institutional level, Major General Memela-Motumi introduced a monthly committee meeting to keep track of progress and challenges on gender mainstreaming implementation, working according to an action plan that clearly delineated areas of responsibility to specific individuals with definite timeframes (Hendricks & Magadla, 2010).

During the same time period that some institutional mechanisms for participation were being weakened, women within the security sector were striving to further the progress made. Some examples include SANDF women's pension benefits being equalised, and women being promoted to certain positions for the first time, including:

- Director of Base Support and Systems for the Air Force
- Director of Military Judges

- Director Air Force Liaison
- General Officer Commanding of the SANDF College of Educational Technology
- Director Foreign Relations
- Logistics Coordinator for the Air Force
- First female helicopter pilot
- First female combat pilot
- First female sheet metal worker on airframes
- First female to command an Infantry Battalion (Hendricks & Magadla, 2010; Vuthela, 2004; Visser, 2004).

The ability of Major General Memela-Motumi, Major General Jackie Sedibe, and the Honourable Thandi Modise amongst others, to utilise the power and influence of their positions to initiate limited gendered change and sustain this change through the power of informal networks, suggests that the institutional environment is conducive to gendered change if existing mechanisms for participation and oversight are supported. It also shows how even slowly changing institutional rules can be co-opted to serve new purposes.

The responses of women in various institutional structures related to the Arms Deal, from Parliament to the SANDF, also speaks to the assertion by Gouws (2008b: 554) that women continue to devise new strategies in response to shifts in the political arena: while direct activism is no longer utilised to the extent that it was in the past, women are using "institutional channels" to achieve their goals. In other words, the range of actions available to parliamentarians may have been constrained by the political realities of party loyalty, but the women within the SANDF leadership found that the rigidly hierarchical institutional processes of the security sector aided their efforts to gender certain aspects of the Arms Deal.

## 8.8 Conclusion: Lessons from the Arms Deal

> "Transformation is essentially a political function driven by political pressures and agendas" (Venter, 2001: 116).

The arms procurement process demonstrated that the transformation of ideals into formal rules and institutional values is not a simple process, particularly when layering institutions with conflicting purposes and ideals. The South African security sector proved to be an institutional arena with a range of obstacles. The security sector conformed to traditional expectations in terms of deeply ingrained opposition to change, and the proposed transformation was vast: the reduction of military expenditure, a new mandate, the comprehensive overhaul of the forces to be representative, and a range of civilian oversight mechanisms aimed at transferring power to elected officials. Keeping the top brass loyal in the wake of these upheavals was one factor leading to the decision to embark on an epic arms acquisition process. This was coupled with the desire by the new State to be seen as a global player, open for business and investment, and to be seen actively working towards realising its stated objective of being a regional security player.

However, the objections from parliamentarians on both sides of the aisle, civil society and the general public, that the deal was in direct opposition to the stated values of the new democratic State set in motion a chain of events that demonstrated the limits of institutional change. The Arms Deal showed the existing government processes to be weak and susceptible to corruption at the highest levels, allowing the purchase of obsolete equipment that was neither needed nor wanted by the military at a time when social spending was being cut in contradiction to stated policy priorities. The circumscribing of established mechanisms for decision-making and the weakening of oversight and accountability measures were exhibited throughout the Arms Deal process, as evidenced by the experiences of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) tasked with investigating the irregularities surrounding the deal. The lack of support for the mechanisms designed to foster a stronger democracy impacts negatively on the entrenchment of good governance ideals, including gender equality. The message sent is that some institutional values can be discarded, despite their entrenchment in foundational legislation such as the Constitution.

The influence of political party loyalty to stymie opposition was made apparent throughout the course of the deal, with parliamentarians made aware that their positions (and their voice in the decision-making process) would be taken away if they did not toe the party line. This points to both the continued power of informal networks within the layered institutions of the State, and the weakness of the party-led proportional representation system in entrenching good governance values. The ability of coalitions of influential party members to wield sufficient power to subvert the core ideals of the party and the State limits the potential for meaningful change. This is exacerbated in sectors such as security, where deeply ingrained norms and values at odds with the broader transformation goals of the State already exist, particularly in terms of mechanisms for oversight, participation or equality.

There were, however, instances in this case of women defending the core values to which the ANC and the State had committed. The exposure of the irregularities of the deal was presented to Parliament by a woman (Patricia de Lille); initial support for an intensive investigation was issued by a woman in a prominent and powerful position (Frene Ginwala); and a woman repeatedly raised the issue of the deal's incompatibility with the ANC's core vision, and eventually resigned over the party's continued deviation from stated objectives and commitments (Pregs Govender). Equally, there were women (and men) who were brought into line through the power of political party loyalty. As this influential force had played a widely acknowledged role in their attainment of positions of influence and prominence, parliamentarians were discovering that it was a double-edged sword.

During the 1996-1998 Defence Review, women parliamentarians demonstrated strong political will in pushing the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence to ensure widespread public participation (particularly women's organisations) during the national consultation process which aimed to uncover the range of stakeholders' and actors' needs and emerge with a clear idea of the current security context and which areas required prioritisation (Valasek, 2008: 6). This commitment to ensuring a representative and legitimate review process was demonstrated through the use of military vehicles for the transportation of a wide variety of civil, community and religious organisations' representatives to meetings and workshops. The issues

uncovered resulted in the formation of two Defence Secretariat sub-committees, and the emergence of a national consensus on the role and goals of the new security institutions (Valasek, 2008: 6). It is this approach for which the new regime was lauded prior to the Arms Deal scandal: inclusionary and participatory governance strategies that created spaces for a diversity of voices and allowed for the identification of priorities. This vision of the possibilities of the democratic State is captured by Seidman (1999: 432-3):

> "South Africa is not just another developing country, of course; it stands out from the rest, in its visibility and in the legitimacy of its current reform efforts. South Africa offers a remarkably visible and transparent example of restructuring. Since the 1994 elections, the wholesale reconstruction of state institutions has involved open and heated public debate".

However, political party loyalty was also shown to have a positive role to play. Women who had initially attained their current positions of influence and power due to their long-standing involvement in the party, and who were now placed strategically within the SANDF, could wield their power in more effective ways. Given that the military's rigidly hierarchical command structure was somewhat insulated from the same tactics of threatening demotion for non-compliance, these women could realise some of the promises for change.

Although derailing the deal would not be possible, there were limited opportunities for enacting some gendered changes, such as the relatively "small" gains of retrofitting of fighter jets to enable women to participate fully in missions. This did not overcome the larger losses to gendered institutional change incurred as a result of the circumvention of important institutional processes. However, important lessons about the functioning of the security sector at different levels were learnt. For example, the manner in which women in the SANDF leadership structure in particular navigated existing institutional rules and norms (both formal and informal) in order to continue pushing for gendered change reveals how strategies utilised within the liberation movement are adapted and reshaped to suit the new environment in which these women operate. Although some mechanisms were being weakened and bypassed (such as the oversight structures for the acquisition process), other structures (for example the gender machineries and gender focal points) were being utilised for maximum effect.

By maintaining the momentum of the structural and normative changes instigated earlier in the democracy, gendered change continued to be effected, due in no small part to the power of these women as savvy political actors. Lost gains would need to be recovered, but the limited reach of informal rules and norms (such as political party loyalty) within the SANDF leadership structures meant that gender gains were *less* vulnerable within the SANDF, indicating that the gender mechanisms operating within that arena could make a significant impact. The mechanisms for women's participation within the broader security structures of the State were revealed to be *more* vulnerable to manipulation by informal rules and norms, a surprising turn of events given the traditional resistance of the security sector to change.

Both the promises and limits of the new institutional environment were exposed. The Arms Deal revealed the darkest inner workings of the informal networks bending institutional rules to the breaking point. As Sylvester and Seegers (2008: 73) commented: "its impact [the Arms Deal] cannot but weaken the supposed political commitment to modernise ... the most obvious policy lesson of the [Arms Deal] is that future decisions and decision-makers will have to pass through the very small eye of the ethical needle". The dominant ideas of a few elites with greater relational power triumphed over the ideals of the party and the norms of the new State. The timing of the Arms Deal in the early stages of the new democracy presented an opportunity to shift the rhetoric of the transitional State (particularly the vision for good governance) into an institutional reality by following the established mechanisms for oversight and accountability. Instead, the promise of this change was limited by the strategic wielding of power by the informal networks connected to the party.

However, as the Arms Deal occurred relatively early in the new democracy, women such as Major General Memela-Motumi, Thandi Modise, and Pregs Govender still had sufficient relational power derived from their personal histories within the liberation struggle, and positional power gained through their roles in the new institutional structures, to pursue limited gender gains within the context of the Arms Deal. These changes were, however, curtailed by the oppositional power of the afore-mentioned elites. The limits imposed by the informal party norms did not prevent women from speaking out, demonstrating the confidence of these women in the legitimacy of their

roles as political actors within State institutions. It can be seen as indication of the partial success of the gender mainstreaming initiative aimed at attaining substantive gender equality that these women confronted the flawed processes of the acquisition and investigation, and exhibited assurance in their right to question the decisions being made, and continued to push the gender agenda in an arena that was traditionally seen as a male-only realm. Nevertheless, the reversion to masculinist modes of decision-making in the security sector, dominated by a few elites with disproportionate power and little regard for institutional mechanisms aimed at ensuring oversight and participation, remains a critical concern for the gendering of State security institutions and the substantive participation of women.

The challenge for the State, not only in the security sector but more broadly within governance structures, is to reaffirm its commitment to the stated core values of good governance and equality, and to support and strengthen the institutional mechanisms established in the transitional period to oversee and protect the promises of transformation upon which the new democratic South Africa was built. Fortifying the independence and integrity of oversight mechanisms and supporting the development and entrenchment of institutional structures such as gender machineries, would have the effect of furthering the broader goals of infusing the norms of equality and participation into the institutional structures of the State, as mandated by the Constitution and espoused by the ruling party. Further, the effective operation of these institutional devices would also facilitate continued gendered change to the rules and norms governing power relations. The importance of this undertaking is demonstrated by the case study of the Arms Deal, which has demonstrated how gendered institutional change can be limited by the imposition of informal rules and norms that are in opposition to the formal rules and values upon which the State is built.

# 9

# CONCLUSION: GENDERED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY SECTOR

*How* does gendered institutional change occur? What factors influence the entrenchment of gender gains in post-conflict transitional societies? This thesis explored the process of gendered institutional change in post-conflict South African security structures, investigating how South African women negotiated a place within the security structures of the democratic State, and the perceptions of policy makers and civil society practitioners about the entrenchment of the gender gains made.

The confluence of historical events that facilitated openings for women's strategic action was central to this investigation, as the establishment of three key legacies enabled the creation of spaces for women's participation and for the consolidation of gender gains in institutional structures. The interlinked legacies of militancy, autonomy and equality empowered women to confront the prejudicial norms and values within the political and security arenas, expanding their power and capacity to act, and entrenching the core values upon which the new democratic regime would be founded. There is a demonstrable link between the development of these three legacies and the creation of structures for representation and participation in the new democratic South Africa. Similarly, the advances in equality made within the armed liberation movement were carried over into the reformation of the State security sector, formalising the gender gains made in the security realm.

The exploration of the processes by which gendered institutional change occurred in the security structures of the South African State was informed by an analytical model grounded in feminist institutionalist theory. This model was utilised to chart the factors affecting women's relative *power*; including mapping the *historical legacies* that enhanced women's capacity to act in the formal political arena, identifying some of the *key moments* that consolidated women's political gains, outlining the *exogenous influences* that fed into

the process, and describing the strategic organising that enabled women to seize the opportunities arising from the transformation of the state. Some of the promises and limits of change were then considered in the post-Apartheid State through the "case study within a case study" of the Arms Deal.

Developing an understanding of gendered institutional change is necessarily tempered by a variety of contextual factors. These dynamics influence the opportunities and constraints inherent to the system, as well as providing new openings for change as the system evolves and adapts over time and through the manoeuvrings of actors inside and outside the network of structures making up the system. The use of a feminist institutionalist model enabled these dynamics to be analysed in a manner that captured the cause and effect of some of the variables, thereby enabling an understanding of *how* gendered change occurred within the system.

The descriptive representation of women can be determined through a statistical overview, and the various policies and machineries aimed at integrating gender into the security structures of the State can reveal the strategies being pursued. However, these indicators are not sufficient to identify whether gendered institutional norms are changing. For this reason, a range of parliamentarians, security personnel, and civil society practitioners were consulted in order to gauge their perceptions of gender equality within the security sector. This provided a deeper understanding of the manner in which the institutional culture was (or was not) transforming with respect to gender equality.

The overall findings of the research are therefore oriented towards identifying the elements that supported sustainable substantive change of the institutional culture, embedding gender equality as an institutional norm and altering perceptions of women within the security sector, in keeping with the use of the benchmarks provided by the gender mainstreaming strategy as a means of assessing both the DRW and SRW in the South African post-conflict security structures. The findings of this research are not presented as a blueprint for other post-conflict developing states. Instead it is posited that the manner in which women in South Africa went about institutionalising gender

equality may have useful applications in other post-conflict states; in other words, presenting a "best practice" case study.

The contribution of the research to original knowledge is two-fold: adding to the methodology of FI by presenting a specific approach to understanding gendered institutional change; and secondly, contributing to the South African gender literature in the under-researched security sector. The research can be seen as a contribution to the growing theoretical body of work emerging around the concept of Feminist Institutionalism, situated at the intersection between FPS and NI, as it explores the explanatory power of FI within post-conflict transitional institutional structures. In particular, the construction and application of a framework for analysis that takes cognisance of a range of normative values and the interaction of these various elements represents another facet of the contribution to theoretical knowledge.

As the thesis considers gendered institutional change within a specific time and place – the post-conflict security structures of the South African State - the research expands the understanding of women's experiences, strategies and goals during and after the liberation struggle for democracy in South Africa. The interaction between historical legacies, various key moments and exogenous influences, and their collective influence on gendered power relations, provide a deeply contextualised account of the gendering of transitional post-conflict States. The consideration of these variables through an FI-lens also provides a slightly more optimistic view of the progress made in achieving gendered institutional change, in comparison to some of the traditional studies discussed in this thesis.

These contributions are linked through the contemplation of particular configurations and transferable mechanisms that explain gendered institutional change, firstly through the development of the theoretical construct of the model, and then through the application of this model to the South African security context. Further, the consideration of the Arms Deal from this gendered institutionalist standpoint represents an original perspective not yet applied to the particular case study.

## 9.1 Devising a Feminist Institutionalist Framework

Drawing on the foundations set by both contemporary feminist literature and the NI view on institutional change, a new analytical model was created with the complexities of the South African case in mind. The normative view of institutions put forward by FI acknowledges the centrality of the social and political context to shaping the formal and informal rules that explain continuity and change, while the integration of gender further expands the utility of FI in explaining the institutional impact on women's agency, particularly in transitional states. An institutional focus has thus been adopted given the opportunities for gendered change that are created through the reconfiguration of structures that set the agenda and promulgate the laws for their attainment.

The purpose of the model has been to discern the process by which gendered institutional change occurred in the South African security sector, particularly in terms of establishing both descriptive and substantive representation within these bastions of masculinity. The application of the theoretical constructs of FI to the history of South Africa in terms of gender equality has thus contributed to the knowledge of women's advancement within formal governance structures. The exploration of the advancement of women within the security sector (particularly within the context of post-conflict states) further enhances the understanding of the opportunities and constraints for the expansion and formalisation of women's leadership roles in developing states.

The analytical model presented in Chapter Two takes as its starting point the assertion that the formal and informal rules and norms that constitute relations between actors and institutions explain processes of continuity and change (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Mackay *et al*, 2009). Particular emphasis has been placed on the normative notion that the social interactions and relationships that maintain institutional norms are bounded and transformed by the power of ideas – "stickier" ideas can fundamentally alter institutional values. The factors that influence the development of both the rules and norms of institutions must therefore be considered as variables with multi-directional impacts, while retaining cognisance of the importance of timing, which has been shown to have a bearing on the shifting power of actors within institutions. The important of context in relation to these variables underscores the suitability of the FI framework

utilised in this study to answer the question of *how* gendered institutional change occurs, as has been demonstrated throughout the thesis.

**Power/Ideas**

Power was placed at the heart of this explanatory model, based on the view that shifting power relationships (between actors and between actors and institutions) enable new ideas about the role of gender in governance to gain credence and transform the institutional culture. This is a key strength of the FI approach, given the emphasis on actors and how they wield power to promote or foreclose change. A multi-dimensional view of power has been utilised within the model, with an emphasis on the relational nature of power within the institutional context, and the value-dependent nature of power (Kabeer, 1999; Lukes, 2005: 26, 30, 54; Annesley & Gains, 2010; Schmidt, 2010). The over-arching conceptualisation of power lies in its capacity to bring about change through influencing the norms and values of institutions (Kabeer, 1999; Allen, 2005; Lukes, 2005; Annesley & Gains, 2010).

The ideational slant derived from the work of Hall & Taylor (1996:947), Lovenduski (2011: viii), and Waylen (2011, 149), amongst others, emphasises the intertwining of institutional and social contexts, and the impact that these contexts have on both structure and agency. This was clearly demonstrated in the centrality of the notion of equality as a social ideal within the institutional philosophy of the ANC, and the impact this had on the increase in women's autonomy.

The feminist institutionalist emphasis on ideas as shaping the transformation process of institutions, and influencing the integration of new concepts of gender equality into these structures (Kabeer, 2003:47; Schmidt, 2008; Krook & Mackay, 2011: 10), further informed the central placement of ideas within the new model for analysis. Thus, "ideas" are conceived as the expression of the normative orientations of actors, or groups of actors. These ideas can prompt either change or the retention of the status quo, depending on the manner in which the power of the actors involved is exercised.

The factors that impacted on these fluctuating power dynamics were categorised into historical legacies (and path dependencies), key moments and exogenous influences, in an effort to capture the many dynamics of the institutional gendering process and enable the systematic charting of the interaction between actors, institutions, and the broader context within which they relate. In particular, how did ideas about gender, gender equality, and evolving gender roles infiltrate the institutional culture of the security sector, were these ideas entrenched, and how did this process occur?

The commensurate emphasis placed on formal and informal institutions in accounting for institutional continuity and change is a further strength of the NI/FI approach, particularly when considering the gendered nature of institutions and the manner in which altering gender norms occurs (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Leach & Lowndes, 2007; Franceschet, 2011: 61-62). This has been especially salient in the analysis of South Africa's security structures in which overlapping informal networks vied for power and resources: the old boy's network of the former SADF, the respective networks of the former liberation armies integrated into the new SANDF, and the alliances forged during the transition, all of which boosted the profile of gender with respect to security.

In the democratic era, informal networks have continued to impact on the power relations within institutions in both positive and negative ways, as seen with the Women's Budget and the Arms Deal. As a feature of the institutional environment, informal networks in the South African case are closely aligned with issues of political party loyalty and patronage, as was shown in Chapters Five, Seven and Eight.

The integration of formal and informal institutions into the FI approach enhanced the analysis of post-conflict South Africa as it enabled the consideration of the institutional "layering" that occurs as a result of pacted transitions, as described by Waylen (2009) and Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 16), amongst others. The displacement and overlapping of 'old' and 'new' institutions within democratic South Africa opened new spaces within which prevailing norms could be contested, and relative power and influence shifted as accepted gender roles were challenged. This process was aided by the insertion of mechanisms for mainstreaming gender within "old" institutions, and the integration of gendered norms from the inception within "new" institutions. These

changes to the institutional gendered norms of both the general State governance structures and the security sector are a testament to the impact of the decades of incremental gender gains, aided by the rise in women's autonomy in the liberation movement, the emphasis on equality as a core value of the now-ruling party, and the resituating of gender roles within the security sector.

The cumulative effect of these multiple sources of change and continuity reflected an inter-dependent relationship between institutions, actors and society. The provisions within FI for appreciating the nuances affecting the gendered nature of these factors further bolters the statement by Waylen (2009: 247) that institutions serve both as strategic resources and constraints for actors. In other words, the interaction of the various factors integrated into the model affected the opportunities that opened up, and the manner in which women strategically utilised these openings to further the goal of gender equality.

## 9.2 Historical Legacies: Militancy, Autonomy and Equality

The application of the theoretical foundation provided by the model presented in Chapter Two revealed three dominant strands that created opportunities for women's empowerment in terms of openings for action and the amassing of political power. These three historical legacies were: the centrality of equality as a core value in the ANC, the increase in women's autonomy and, related to this, the entrenched militancy of the South African society. The paths that led to the transitional tipping point (when the new State was being structured) were punctuated by a number of key moments that served as moments of significant import for the country as a whole, as well as representing consolidation points for the increasing power of women within the political landscape. The progression of the respective legacies and the events that marked their development and consolidation were the focus of Chapters Three and Four, while the impact of these legacies on the creation of the new democratic State was explored in Chapters Five and Seven.

### 9.2.1 Autonomy and Equality: Paths to Participation

The historical legacies of equality and autonomy were intricately interlinked, as advances along the path of broad-based equality were reflected in the rise of women's autonomy, particularly within the ANC. Chapters Three, Four and Five demonstrated how women organised strategically in order to systematically increase the formal recognition of their contributions and thereby begin "activating" or claiming the rights acquired within political parties (and later formal rights within the State). For example, the formation of the Bantu Women's League in 1918 (and the reformation of the ANC Women's League in 1943) provided a space within which women's demands could be articulated, resulting in the formal inclusion of gender equality within foundational documents such as the 1955 Freedom Charter and ANC Constitutions (ANC, 1955, 1958, 1991, 1998, 2002).

As women continued to organise politically not only for gender rights but also more broadly for political equality for all citizens, their collective power grew as they arranged mass protests and expanded their networks and alliances, forming coalitions that would be utilised in the gendering of the democratic institutions of the State in the post-liberation transition period.

The 1960s dramatically advanced the prominence of women in the political and security arenas. The combination of the State of Emergency (which simultaneously banned political parties and their leaders), the Rivonia Trials (which imprisoned male leaders not in exile), and the influx of new women members following the Sharpeville Massacre, all represented *key moments* in the progression of the legacies of *autonomy, militancy* and *equality*. Women stepped up to keep the liberation movement alive, through the maintenance of communication networks (both internally and abroad), the provision of safe houses, the smuggling of cadres into and out of the country for military training, and by performing other logistical tasks, including the "traditional" roles of social services. Women also took on "masculine" roles such as undergoing military training alongside male cadres, smuggling in arms and commanding divisions within MK. The continuously expanding and evolving roles of women, particularly in relation to security, were amply illustrated during the period of the liberation struggle, as the divide between "traditional" masculine and feminine duties blurred further.

A significant part of this change was due to the context. The absence of much of the male leadership due to exile and imprisonment necessitated the more prominent involvement of women. The inclusion of women in the formal leadership and military structures of the ANC served to further enhance their perceived legitimacy as leaders within the movement. The burdens created by the turmoil in the country were disproportionately shouldered by women, in the political, social and economic sense. While women had been fulfilling variations of these roles for years, it was during this time that the prominence of these roles was highlighted, and the legitimacy of women discharging these duties became more widespread. This would prove significant later during the transition to democracy.

At the same time that women were agitating for greater political representation and acknowledgment of their contributions to the liberation struggle, the international feminist movement was making great strides, representing an *exogenous influence* on the evolution of ideas about gender and the State. The successive UN Women's Conferences (and other regional and international instruments) were calling for the formalisation of women's representation within decision-making structures, and the consideration of differentiated gender needs in policy formulation. The experiences of women in liberation struggles across the developing world were also informing the strategies of women in South Africa, who noted that national liberation did not necessarily result in women's liberation. The continuous entrenchment of gender gains made, through the inclusion of gender rights in foundational documents and the active participation of women in all aspects of the liberation struggle, was one of the ongoing strategies pursued by organised women in South Africa.

The infusion of equality into the core of the ANC's philosophy was an immense boon to the women's movement in South Africa. It was on the basis of gender, racial and religious equality that a culture of diversity infused the ANC, and validated calls for inclusion by women. The form of this participation would become increasingly formalised, thereby enhancing the status of women within the organisation and broader society. The rise of women within the leadership of MK was a particularly noteworthy trend as the success of women in this most "masculine" of spheres enhanced their credibility as leaders within the movement. Continuously raising the "glass ceiling" on

the basis of the stated policies of the ANC led to demonstrable gains in terms of leadership positions. A similar strategy was shown to be repeatedly employed over the course of the Struggle, through the transitional period, and into the democratic era.

In order to perpetuate the success of this strategy within the new democratic State, women would need a place at the negotiating table. During CODESA/MPNF, which constituted a *key moment* of significant import, the political and social power incrementally amassed throughout the Struggle served to ensure women's formal participation in the negotiations that would establish popular democracy in South Africa. Women's involvement in this important State-building forum was bolstered by the broad support base of the WNC, as well as by previous gains such as the formal inclusion of gender equality in the Freedom Charter, which legitimated calls for participation. Significantly, the coalition of women from all sectors of South African society gave women a voice in the writing of the landmark Constitution, and the entrenchment of gender rights therein. This foundational document would serve as the philosophical cornerstone of the new State, and the explicit inclusion of gender rights was therefore a significant achievement. These events are also a clear example of Pierson's (2004) concept of *causal chains*, as each event demonstrably influenced the next, building towards an envisioned outcome – the entrenchment of gender equality in the new democratic State.

The ramifications of these explicit provisions for women's equality in the founding documents of the State were widespread. Women would be represented at all levels of State institutions, providing a strong base for the substantive involvement of women in the creation of a new democratic state and thereby the gendering of State institutions. It also served to strengthen the process of transforming institutional norms and values as equality was re-affirmed as a core value of the new democratic State. The *key moment* of the transition to democracy illustrated once again the close correlations between the entrenchment of equality as a core value of the State and the rise and consolidation of women's autonomy and power. In particular, the transitional period demonstrated the exercise of the amassed power of the women's movement to affect demonstrable change in the institutional mechanisms of the State, in terms of descriptive gains and the

establishment of structures for sustaining the momentum of the gendering process (such as the gender machineries and Women's Budget, amongst others).

The entrenchment of these gender gains was a reflection of the evolution of the norms and values of the ANC, which, due to its overwhelming electoral victory, facilitated the infusion of gendered norms into the new institutional structures of the State.

The meteoric increase in the descriptive representation of women within institutional structures bears testament to this change in the institutional culture, rising from 2.7% prior to democracy to 28% under the first ANC regime, with women currently constituting 43% of the National Assembly.

The prominence and influence of the positions women attained under the democratic dispensation further underscored the commitment of the ANC leadership to realising the core values of equality and participative representation that characterize the good governance ideals towards which the government was striving.

In order to sustain these gains, a number of institutional mechanisms were established. These included dedicated parliamentary committees such as the multiparty Parliamentary Women's Group and the Committee on Improving the Quality of Life and Status of Women, the Office for the Status of Women located within the Presidency, and the independent Commission on Gender Equality.

Although these structures faced similar challenges to those confronting women's machinery elsewhere in the world (lack of sufficient resources, unclear mandates due to the sectoral approach, and coordination issues), some notable successes were achieved. Prime among these was the establishment of a Women's Budget, which considered the gendered impacts of policies during the formulation process, brought to fruition through a coalition of powerful male and female parliamentarians, including the Speaker of Parliament Frene Ginwala, Minister of Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, Gauteng Finance Minister Jabu Moleketi, Deputy Director-General of Financial Planning Maria Ramos and MP Pregs Govender.

### 9.2.2 Militancy and the Gendering of State Security Structures

The legacy of militancy established in the early history of South Africa played a significant role in the recasting of gendered security rules. The violent opposition to colonialism in the form of skirmishes and wars between indigenous people, the colonial forces, and Afrikaners, embedded militancy in the norms of the various South African cultures, and had a marked impact on identity and accepted masculine and feminine roles. This entrenchment of militancy would be continuously demonstrated throughout the course of South African history, and would reach a zenith with the widespread deployment of the defence force in suppressing opposition to Apartheid rule internally and externally.

The militant response of the State prompted liberation movements to take up arms, partially in self-defence and partially as a means to bring about more urgent regime change, given that the State was utilising the army against its own people. The massacre of protesting civilians at Sharpeville by State security forces in 1960 directly contributed to the formation of MK in 1961. Later clashes between students and armed forces in the 1976 Soweto Uprisings created another influx of cadres into MK – including many women.

The ongoing emphasis of prominent ANC leaders on the importance of equality as a core value of the ANC created the opening for women's participation on an equal footing with men in MK. The exercising of their right to equality enabled women to begin transforming gendered notions of "acceptable" security roles, as they undertook perilous missions both within and outside South Africa's borders. The willingness of these women to take these risks raised the esteem in which they were held within MK. The acceptance of women in combat positions was slow, with many of the duties carried out by women (even those with an overt security element) continuing to be dismissed as "women's work" given the comparatively high number of women involved in logistical tasks. However, the penalties applied by the State for these logistical activities were harsh, including imprisonment in solitary confinement and banning orders, and would have significant consequences on the lives of these women, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four. The stature enjoyed by MK cadres within the

liberation movement was a significant development in the rising autonomy of women in the political and security arena, and contributed to the changing gender norms within pockets of the security sector.

This legacy of militancy also expanded women's roles and responsibilities within their specific cultures and, as these evolving roles confronted the ingrained notions of acceptable gendered duties, prevailing norms began to shift. The insidious nature of the armed conflict that was increasingly being waged within communities (through the use of "third force" operatives) impacted on all aspects of day-to-day life, drawing more women in as the roles needed for survival expanded. Women were fulfilling new and varied functions within their communities and liberation structures, slowly amassing prominence and influence, although formal positions of power at the highest levels initially remained the dominion of men.

At the time of the transition to democracy, a significant shift in the conceptualisation of security was occurring throughout the developing world. The Human Security Paradigm (HSP) explicitly linked development and security, moving from previously State-centric security models towards a holistic people-centred approach that considered the protection of human rights and good governance ideals as critical components in the creation of sustainable development and the provision of a stable and secure environment (Schoeman, 1998; Hendricks, 2007; Clarke, 2008, amongst others).

HSP had synergy with the ANC's philosophy as it reflected the core values that laid at the heart of the new State-building process. Both the HSP and the ANC's vision for the security policy of the democratic South Africa were informed by key developments in the international and regional environments, chiefly the end of the Cold War and the impact that this had on regional power dynamics. In essence, the prominence of regional groupings in addressing conflicts increased, and South Africa was positioning itself to be a key player in the development of regional collective security organs in SADC and the AU. This was viewed as a means to ensure South Africa's own security and stability, as well as rebranding South Africa's role in Sub-Saharan Africa following the Apartheid era policies of regional destabilisation that had isolated the State from its neighbours.

This inclusive approach towards regional security and development aimed to capitalise on the moral authority derived from the relatively peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa, and would be employed towards entrenching good governance ideals in the region as a means of ensuring regional stability and, therefore, sustainable growth.

South Africa became a strong player in regional political and economic affairs in order to advance its interests, presenting itself as a model of good democratic governance. This necessarily called for a radical repositioning of the military within society, not only in terms of the military's mandate but also with regard to the manner in which it was perceived internally and externally. The military would be primarily oriented towards humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, which would in turn assist with the national strategy of security sector transformation.

As part of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in which the defence force was resized and re-oriented in accordance with its new mandate, the former liberation forces were merged into the SADF, forming the new SANDF, which was to be broadly representative of the population in demographic terms. This process of integration was a vital step towards repositioning the military within society, and rehabilitating the manner in which the defence force was viewed by the broader population, given the destructive role played by the SADF during the liberation struggle.

In gender terms, the new security mandate and the SSR process provided a means to consolidate the gains made by women during the liberation era and created additional openings for the influx of women on the grounds of creating a demographically representative force. The foundation of equality upon which the new State was based carried through to the policies of the SANDF, with the aim of entrenching non-discrimination within the armed forces as well. This meant that new female recruits would receive the same training and the same opportunities for advancement as their male colleagues. Although this did not imply that ingrained attitudes about women and combat were automatically transformed, efforts were being made to create a conducive environment for the abolishment of discriminatory practices and the eventual reconstruction of the norms surrounding women in the armed forces. The process of formal institutional gendering began with the entrenchment of women's formal rights to

fulfil any role in the defence sector within the Constitution and the regulatory policies of the SANDF. Oversight mechanisms for addressing discrimination were established, and monthly committee meetings dedicated to the monitoring of the implementation of gender mainstreaming policies were instituted by experienced female MK veterans such as Major-General Memela-Motumi and Major-General Jackie Sedibe. These efforts were supported and furthered by prominent and influential women within the Defence Ministry, including Thandi Modise and Lindiwe Sisulu.

The disproportionate number of MK veterans (male and female) in the SANDF played a significant role in the transformation process of the SANDF, as the politics of presence came into play. Female commanders strove to retain the respect they had earned during the Struggle, while male cadres were already accustomed to serving alongside women, aiding the process of gender integration with SADF and other forces that had previously been all-male (in terms of combat positions). The patronage of influential male commanders continued within the SANDF, further aiding the infusion of gender equality as a base value of the SANDF. The transference of MK ranks also resulted in a proportionately large number of women entering the SANDF in "middle management" ranks, as explored in Chapter Seven.

Together these factors contributed to the formal transformation of the security structures, and aided in the modification of the traditional informal norms and formal rules of the security sector. The "first-generation" effect was exaggerated by the high influx of MK cadres and by the network of informal alliances that increased their relative power out of proportion with the influence of their ranks. Subsequent generations of women would possibly not be able to replicate the manner in which women attained these positions. However, the institutionalisation of equality measures, together with the emphasis placed on proportionate gender recruitment, indicates that the advancement of women to positions of influence is a sustainable phenomenon within the security sector.

The impact of both the practical and strategic changes to the institutional rules and norms in the security sector has been positive in descriptive terms, both within the corps of the SANDF and the ministerial and parliamentary positions that wield

influence over the formulation and execution of security policies. The shift in South Africa's security policy towards peace support operations also provided new opportunities for women to consolidate acceptance of expanded gender security roles. Following similar strategies to those that had so effectively increased women's autonomy and equality in the liberation struggle, women in the armed forces drew on the various regional and international instruments to which the State was party (particularly the UN SCR 1325, the Windhoek Declaration, and the AU's PCRD discussed in Chapter Six) to call for representation at all levels of missions. The gendered approach to SSR and to peace operations emphasises the repositioning of women (and acceptable gender roles) within the social and political context.

The paths set in motion by the three interlinked legacies of equality, autonomy and militancy have certainly created openings for strategic action by women. These opportunities were seized and built upon in order to entrench gender gains within the institutional fabric of the new democratic State, aided by key moments and exogenous influences from regional and international developments. Clear descriptive gains were made, and substantive changes to the formal institutional rules were enacted. How effective were these strategies in changing prejudicial gendered institutional norms? What did the perceptions of policy-makers and civil society practitioners reveal about the gender values of State security institutions in democratic South Africa?

## 9.3 Changing Gendered Institutional Norms: Perceptions of Participants

Policy makers from across the political spectrum were interviewed about their perceptions of gender equality gains in the structures of government, including in the security sector. Civil society practitioners with varying levels of experience within government security structures were also consulted about their views on the progress made in the institutional gendering of the democratic State. The data yielded from the surveys and interviews conducted was corroborated and expanded upon by anonymous informants from different areas of the security structures of the State and various sectors of civil society.

Overall perceptions amongst parliamentarians and civil society respondents were that gender as a relational concept, and gender mainstreaming as a policy initiative, were understood by senior staff and leadership within both the general governance and security structures of the State. Gender issues were perceived to be considered more important within general governance structures: an indication that participants viewed the security sector as adapting more slowly to the new institutional norms and values of the democratic State. Female leaders within government were seen as more open to the consideration of gender issues during policy formulation, with the security sector again being viewed as less open to the gendering of policies.

These survey results, together with the comments recorded by participants (discussed in Chapters Five and Seven), indicate that the framework for the gendering of State institutions has been established and that changes to institutional norms are occurring, albeit at a slow pace. Respondents also indicated that the high descriptive representation of women would continue to have a positive impact on altering prejudicial norms and values, particularly in light of the supporting legislation and institutional mechanisms for participation put into place. In other words, the awareness of gender issues by a range of actors at various levels of these structures points to the success of keeping gender on the agenda. However, the discordant perceptions of these actors with regard to the importance placed on these issues suggest that some of these gender gains may be superficial in terms of institutional transformation.

Participants also considered the factors perceived as important to the advancement of women within both the general structures and the security institutions of the State. In both realms, political party loyalty was cited as the most influential variable, which has both positive and negative repercussions for the entrenchment of gender equality in State institutions, as explored in Chapter Eight's discussion of the Arms Deal. In the positive sense, political party loyalty provided opportunities for participation and expanding openings for the creation of alliances and coalitions to realise gendered institutional change. Negative repercussions included the curtailment of women's capacity to act, given the limitations of the proportional representation system that endowed the party with significant power over the retention of positions within Parliament.

Throughout the research process, women were more likely than men to acknowledge the importance of patronage, perhaps due to a keener awareness of its role. Women at various levels within both the governance and security structures of the State spoke of the influence of patronage in consolidating the gains made by women, as did civil society practitioners. Patronage was continuously cited as one of the most critical factors in women's advancement. The centrality of equality to the ANC's credo prompted some male leaders to actively support the implementation of gender equality measures, including in the security wing of MK and later in the SANDF. In general, patronage was not perceived as a nepotistic action as women were given the opportunity to operate on the same playing field as men, rather than receiving promotions over more qualified men. In other words, it was the signal from the leadership that discrimination based on gender was unacceptable that removed some of the barriers preventing women from being recognised for their skills and contributions.

However, mentorship was not as highly rated, which suggests that patronage is not seen as a capacity-building exercise but rather as a political support. In other words, patronage was perceived as a quasi-alliance, rather than an experienced individual guiding a less experienced colleague through their political careers. Most respondents noted the lack of effective mentoring programmes (both in government and security structures), and considered this an important aspect for development. It is also worth noting that very few female leaders were named as mentors. This does not imply that women are not assisting other women in moving up the ranks; anecdotal evidence suggests that women in the higher ranks are supportive of their colleagues, but this support is not often as overt as in the case of male patrons. For example, Major General Memela-Motumi (Chief Director of Transformation Management for the SANDF) was cited by respondents and analysts as supportive of female personnel on a range of issues, as well as furthering gender equality at the institutional level in a practical manner. An indicative example is the consideration of gender-appropriate materiel and gear, which stems from her experience in MK grappling with equipment manufactured for men (Johwa, 2009; Hendricks & Magadla, 2010). Major General Memela-Motumi has also called for the expansion of recruitment targets for women to 40% (from 30%) in order to create a larger "feeder pool" from which to draw female personnel for

advancement to senior ranks (Memela-Motumi, 2009), particularly as the female leaders of the MK-era begin moving out of the SANDF system.

Women whose prominence stemmed from the historical legacies of the Struggle, who were shaped by their liberation struggle experiences, and who formed personal working relationships with other powerful players, are wielding this influence to entrench gender in the inherited security structures of the State and transform the culture of these structures to consider women as equal and qualified participants in the security sector. Thus, the paths established by these Struggle women have served to enable subsequent entrants to progress faster, as the institutional culture accepts and adapts to new norms with respect to gender roles. A further example is the standardised provision of training for male and female personnel, which means that a wider base of women have the same skill sets as men and are being given the opportunities to advance – as seen by the large number of middle management positions still occupied by women in the SANDF.

However, some anecdotal evidence based on the perceptions of participants in the study suggests that the consolidation of gender gains has seen uneven results. One area of concern is the weakness of gender machineries in terms of influence and resources, which renders them insufficient to significantly further the goal of gender equality, particularly within the security sector. It remains a task pursued predominantly by individual women within the security (and broader governance) structures to affect change. Therefore, the substantial gains made in terms of descriptive representation in the security structures have proved to be critical, particularly within middle management posts and the significant proportion of women holding cabinet level posts related to security. Women occupying substantive positions exert the greater influence in affecting institutional change, both by virtue of their actions within these posts and through their presence - demonstrating the ability of women to be effective political actors in security structures. This is a clear demonstration of the gender mainstreaming emphasis on the importance of achieving both descriptive and substantive representation of women in order to attain and entrench gendered institutional change.

The power of women within security-related posts enabled a two-fold assault on gender inequality in the security sector. Firstly, their presence in positions of prominence

signified the willingness of the State to abide by its commitments stated in party, national, regional and international instruments. From these positions of State-sanctioned authority, women were able to agitate for change during the formulation and revision of policies and programmes related to security in order to ensure that the gender dimension was considered. Secondly, these women had the ability to strengthen institutional arrangements for the sustainability of these gains in terms of clarifying recruitment targets, playing a mentorship role, and implementing strategies aimed at transforming the institutional culture.

## 9.4 Lessons from the Arms Deal Case Study

The mini-case study of the Arms Deal revealed some of the promises and limits of changing institutional norms, and the impact that this could have on the entrenchment of gender equality within institutional structures. The setbacks experienced in terms of the entrenchment of good governance ideals raises concerns about the reliability and sustainability of the gender gains made, particularly given the prominent role played by political party loyalty in both cases. In other words, while the mini-case study speaks to the difficulty of enacting change within institutional structures in a more general sense, the implications for gendered institutional change is made clear as well. For example, the apparent ease with which oversight mechanisms aimed at upholding new ideas about good governance were circumvented through the exercising of political party loyalty calls into question the safety of gender equality gains.

The manner in which the procurement process and the subsequent investigation of procedural irregularities were carried out highlighted some of the challenges that can arise due to the nature of a negotiated or pacted transition. The layering of old and new institutions, with a mixture of competing norms, values, formal rules and informal networks, created an environment of continuously contested change as ideas competed for dominance. The ideals that are entrenched are those whose supporting rule structures are continually reinforced and sustained, while those values not integrated into the institutional core lose traction. In the case of equality and participation, the Arms Deal revealed a lack of commitment to the effective functioning of institutional mechanisms for oversight and accountability – the same institutions that were mandated

to ensure the implementation of good governance principles, such as gender equality. This subversion of equality and other good governance ideals demonstrated the impact of the proportional list system, coupled with the dominance of political party loyalty (recognised as the most influential factor in the advancement of women), and the vast scope of the broader State transformation process, particularly in the security sector.

The proportional list system proved a boon to women's descriptive representation due to the quota provisions of the ANC, which greatly increased the numbers of women entering Parliament for the first time. However, the lack of designated constituencies places MPs at a remove from the general population, and has the effect of placing party interests foremost in MPs allegiances since they are not reliant on a single constituency for re-election. This has the effect of foregrounding the importance of political party loyalty on the retention of positions of power and influence and, therefore, on the ability to participate in the political process. During the arms procurement process, MPs objected to the deal on the grounds that the expenditure ran contrary to the core values and stated philosophy of the State to concentrate on socio-economic development as a means to ensure security. Nevertheless, the Executive persisted with the deal, warning objectors within the party that positions of influence and prominence were contingent on loyalty to the party (although not necessarily to party ideals). The "mobilisation of bias" (Lukes, 2005: 26; Franceschet, 2011: 65) demonstrated during the Arms Deal was a setback to the entrenchment of not only gender equality ideals, but more broadly to the consolidation of good governance ideals such as oversight and accountability, which assist with the sustainability of gender gains, particularly in terms of implementing an effective gender mainstreaming strategy.

The circumvention of oversight mechanisms designed to ensure that the ideals of good governance were upheld (including core values such as equality, participation, and transparency) pointed to the interlinking of two processes that served to limit gendered change: the influence of political party loyalty and the centralisation of power in the Executive. The disproportionate power wielded by a small number of highly placed individuals therefore had the capacity to weaken the institutional mechanisms through which change was being enacted, calling into question the ability of MPs (men and women) to effectively defend the stated objectives of the State.

The case study also showed the continued pervasiveness of hegemonic ideas of masculinity grounded in 'Realpolitik', and the tension this created with the liberal philosophy of the State. In effect, the development-centric priorities that initially created opportunities for security policy to be more effectively gendered (in terms of considering the gender-differentiated needs of the population) were soon abandoned in favour of the previous regimes' traditional approach to security. This signalled a return of a masculinist decision-making process that curtailed oversight and participation, resulting in the loss of gendered institutional gains in terms of substantive input into the development of security policy. This regression in institutional norms and rules also weakened the mechanisms through which women participated in the decision-making process, and the arena for gendered intervention was further reduced as a result of the informal rules of political party loyalty.

The inherited labyrinth of institutional structures that was layered together with the new institutions created to realise the ambitious new vision of the democratic South Africa was put to the test and was found wanting. However, the experience did yield some insights into the processes by which gendered institutional change occurs, in both the positive and negative sense.

In a positive sense, women demonstrated confidence in the power inferred by their positions of prominence and influence: a female opposition MP, Patricia de Lille, formally tabled the allegations of corruption in Parliament, and a female ANC MP put her objections to the deal on the record despite the political costs to her career. Various other female actors raised objections to the deviation from State policy with respect to the Arms Deal and the subsequent investigation, particularly in terms of the gendered impact of the deal. Female commanders within the SANDF used the opportunity to expand women's roles by ensuring that the new equipment was "gender-friendly", although this was a limited gain given the erosion of more substantive gendered institutional changes made prior to the deal. In other words, despite the curtailment of women's ability to effectively wield the power endowed by their positions of prominence and influence without undue interference from informal rules like political party loyalty, women continued to push for change where they could.

However, the serious undermining of institutional processes aimed at ensuring the substantive participation of women in decision-making in the security arena (particularly with regards to oversight) shows the limits of gendered institutional change when confronted with a few powerful elites, and the current weakness of formal institutional rules protecting women's substantive participation in the security sector.

The element that reconciles the two apparently contradictory narratives of limited positive gendered change against the "Realpolitik" that emerged from the Arms Deal case study is the nature of the power wielded by women in the security sector. By formalising gains in foundational documents of the State and the ruling party, and continuing to wield relational power by virtue of their positions of prominence and influence, women in the security sector maintain a delineated sphere of authority within which change can be affected. At times, such as with the Arms Deal, this sphere of influence contracts. In other instances, such as with the Women's Budget, the range of issues over which women can exert influence expands.

The point of commonality is that while women's relational power may be tempered in certain instances by the opposing forces of "Realpolitik", this power is derived from the positional placement of women, and is therefore not a temporary phenomenon. In some ways, the power of women is *more* constant within the security sector as a result of its rigidly hierarchical institutional structure, as opposed to the situation in the general governance structures of the State where women are dependent on the goodwill of the party leadership to remain in office.

This is a critical lesson in understanding how gendered institutional change occurs: the power of these women as political actors within the security arena was not solely contingent on alliances or informal rules. Their power to enact change was conferred through their relative positions of influence and prominence within the security institutions, and strengthened by the legitimacy with which these positions are viewed by other actors, which are all formally determined and bound by institutional rules. This demonstrates how substantive representation (in terms of attaining positions of relative power and influence), together with increased descriptive representation, assist with the

creation of an enabling environment for change, as theorised by the gender mainstreaming approach.

Viewed from the perspective of the analytical model, a logical thread can be drawn illustrating *how* this institutional change occurred. The legacies of equality and militancy increased the relative power of women as legitimate actors within the security arena. The consolidation of these gains within the security structures of the democratic State further solidified these gains by formalising the influence and prominence of women in these roles. The establishment of mechanisms for participation and oversight extended the arena in which women operated, as the layered structures of the security sector provided some reprieve from the potentially limiting influence of political party loyalty as an additional source of informal rules. The Arms Deal thus illustrated that the constantly shifting informal rules of institutions may foreclose change, but can also be utilised to continue pushing the gender agenda, albeit in new ways, given the existence of formal mechanisms for participation and actors in positions of prominence and power.

## 9.5 Gendered Institutional Change in the South African Security Sector: An Ongoing Process

The thesis examined the process of *how* institutional gendering occurred in the South African security sector from a feminist institutionalist perspective. The application of the theoretical constructs put forward by FI contributed to the understanding of institutional gendering processes in post-conflict states by highlighting the strategies that have been effectively applied in the South African context and by illustrating the gains made as a result of the intersection of various processes.

The paths established by the historical legacies of *equality, autonomy,* and *militancy* expanded women's roles and power within the security arena and altered gendered norms and values. Demanding formal substantive participation at all decision-making junctures and bodies by holding the party leadership to the commitments made in landmark documents such as the Freedom Charter, women further entrenched their power by ensuring they had a voice within a forum where it would be heard. The

pattern of strategic manoeuvring followed by formalised entrenchment of gains would be continuously repeated, from the effective lobbying of the WNC in securing female representatives within the CODESA/MPNF negotiating delegations to the drafting of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, which embedded gender equality in the foundations of the new democratic state. These gender gains were further entrenched through the establishment of institutional mechanisms for participation that aided in mainstreaming the rhetoric of gender equality into the institutional structures of the State.

A similar cycle could be seen within the security sector, where the commitments made by the State with various regional and international organisations (*exogenous influences*) enabled women to move gender to the fore, particularly with respect to peace support operations. In the same vein, the shift towards the development-oriented Human Security Paradigm and the State's new security mandate and the subsequent transformation of the SANDF, created openings for the further entrenchment of gender within the security structures as South Africa sought to transform its image on the regional, continental and international stages.

As the importance of historical legacies demonstrated, the amassing of power and influence empowered women to play active roles within the political liberation of South Africa, utilising their collective strength and wide-ranging alliances to operate strategically within the institutional environment of the new democracy. This facilitated the dissemination of gender narratives throughout the various government structures, raising the profile of gender equality issues, and institutionalising gender equality to an extent. In other words, the path established in the early history of the party with respect to the recognition of gender rights was being continued with the advent of democracy. In many ways, the increasingly formal recognition of gender rights in all spheres, in the form of legislation and policies, embedded these rights more firmly within the institutional structure, although this does not imply that the institutional culture was automatically altered as result.

Tying in with the process of formalised consolidation of gains is the second "best practice" derived from the findings: the continued use of strategic alliances to integrate

gender within the institutional culture. Women effectively utilised the central credo of equality that continues to underlie the ANC's philosophy to push for change by forming alliances within governance and security structures. This practice was facilitated by the maintenance of a large number of women in these structures (descriptive representation) as well as through the assistance of women in high-ranking (substantive representation) positions. Women have also continued garnering support from influential figures (patronage), particularly when the initiatives align with ANC policy (political party loyalty) and are championed by prominent women who have amassed political power through their struggle credentials (historical legacies, merit).

The continued strategic wielding of power, gained through the increasing positions of prominence and influence held by women, is demonstrably contributing to the gradual transformation and gendering of State security institutions. Progress is somewhat tempered by the dominance of the ANC Executive, which exerts pressure on members through the use of political party loyalty as a means of advancement within State institutions. While this has benefitted the status of women through the patronage of powerful individuals, it can also weaken the effective functioning of the oversight mechanisms of the democratic State.

The thesis has shown the strategies utilised by women in post-conflict South Africa towards establishing gender within the fabric of the new institutions of the State, particularly within the security sector, with admittedly uneven results in terms of sustainability. This "battle plan" saw women *advance* (gains made through capitalising on the opportunities arising due to the historical legacies of militancy, autonomy and equality); *entrench* (formalising gender gains in foundational documents); *form alliances* (with various influential party figures and other organisations); and *win* (the war slowly) (by increasing the numbers of women in government, particularly in positions of power, prominence and influence).

Time will tell if the institutional mechanisms established are sufficient to maintain the emphasis on equality, representation and participation as central ideals of the democratic State, especially in the security sector. With new women entering the security arena, will the rhetoric of gender equality "stick" and become the institutional norm?

The progress made has been remarkable, given the relative youth of the democracy and the social, political and economic context within which these gender gains were made. Confronting the challenges of widespread poverty and under-development in a continent with fluctuating stability, while participating in the democratic overhaul of a patriarchal and racist State structure, women have succeeded in keeping gender on the agenda, and continue to agitate for change through demonstrating the immense value that women bring to the security arena.

Understanding *how* gendered institutional change occurs in the security sector, unravelling the variables that strengthen and weaken the mechanisms for entrenching these changes, and appreciating the strategies employed by women and men to create an equal participative society can foster a deeper appreciation for the immense changes occurring in the post-conflict developing South. What can be learnt from the triumphs and failures of the women who participated in the transformation of South Africa? Incremental changes can build up to substantive gains. Opportunities for gendered gains can be found even within seemingly disastrous situations. A deeply divided and conflicted society can be transformed into a flawed yet hopeful society striving to meet its ambitious goals of equality, peace and stability for all citizens.

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# Appendix 1 Timeline of Gender Instruments

| | **Women in Development (WID)**<br>Focus: Suffrage/ Legal equality/ Positive Action | **Gender and Development (GAD)**<br>Focus: Gender Mainstreaming/ Substantive Transformation |
|---|---|---|
| | **Pre-1995** | **Post- 1995** |
| United Nations | 1948: United Nations General Assembly Universal Declaration of Human Rights<br><br>1966: United Nations General Assembly International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights<br><br>1975: 1st World Conference on Women (Mexico)<br><br>1979: Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)<br><br>1980: 2nd World Conference on Women (Copenhagen)<br><br>1985: 3rd World Conference on Women (Nairobi) | 1995: 4th World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action<br><br>2000: 23rd United Nations General Assembly Special Session Beijing +5 Political Declaration<br><br>2000: Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations<br><br>2000: UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security |
| Continental | 1981: Organisation of African Union Banjul Charter on Human & People's Rights | 1996: Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Resolution on the African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights<br><br>2002: African Union (AU) Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance<br><br>2003: African Union (AU) Protocol to the African Charter on Human & People's Rights on the Rights of Women<br><br>2004: African Union (AU) Solemn Declaration of Gender Equality in Africa<br><br>2006: African Union (AU) Post Conflict Reconstruction & Development Policy |
| Regional | | 1997: Southern African Development Community (SADC) Declaration on Gender & Development<br><br>1999: Pan African Parliament (PAP) Women's Declaration & Agenda for a Culture of Peace in Africa<br><br>2005: Commonwealth Secretariat Commonwealth Plan of Action on Gender Equality 2005-2015 |
| National | | 1994: First Democratic Elections<br><br>1996: Bill of Rights & Constitution<br><br>2000: National Framework for Empowerment & Equality |

# Appendix 2 Conflicts in Africa (1948- 2008)

| Date | Description | State/States Involved |
|---|---|---|
| **1940s** | | |
| 1946-1952 | Civil War | Ethiopia/Eritrea[2] |
| 1947-1948 | Colonial Rebellion | Madagascar[2] |
| 1948-1994 | Anti-Apartheid Struggle/Violence | South Africa[1] |
| **1950s** | | |
| 1952-1956 | War of independence | Tunisia[3] |
| 1952-1960 | Mau Mau Uprising | Kenya[1] |
| 1953-1955 | Civil & Interstate War | Sudan, United Kingdom[2] |
| 1954-1962 | War of independence | Algeria[1] |
| 1955-1960 | War of independence | Cameroon[2] |
| 1955-1972 | Civil War | Sudan[1] |
| 1957-1958 | Border dispute | Mauritania, Morocco[2] |
| 1958 | Military Coup | Sudan[2] |
| 1958 | Political Instability | Guinea[2] |
| 1959-2004 | Series of military coups | Sudan[2] |
| 1959 | Overthrow of monarchy | Rwanda[2] |
| **1960s** | | |
| 1960-1963 | Conflict | Rwanda[1] |
| 1960-1965 | Congo Crisis | DRC[2] |
| 1960-1965 | Civil War | Zaire (DRC) [2] |
| 1961-1991 | War of independence | Eritrea[1] |
| 1961-1974 | War of independence | Angola[1] |
| 1962-1964 | Conflict | Rwanda, Burundi[2] |
| 1962 | Conflict | Ethiopia, Eritrea[2] |
| 1962 | Failed coup | Senegal[2] |
| 1963-2005 | Series of military coups | Togo[2] |
| 1963-1974 | War of independence | Guinea-Bissau[1] |
| 1963-1965 | Post Independence War | Congo (Zaire)[1] |
| 1963-1965 | Interstate Conflict | Benin, Niger[2] |
| 1963 | Sand War | Algeria, Morocco[3] |
| 1964-1974 | War of independence | Mozambique[1] |
| 1964-1980 | Bush War | Rhodesia/Zimbabwe[1] |
| 1964 | Civil violence | Zambia[2] |
| 1964 | Civil Violence (Zanzibar) | Tanzania[2] |
| 1964 | Ogaden Clashes | Ethiopia, Somalia [2] |
| 1964-1967 | Civil war | Kenya[2] |
| 1964 | Civil War | Gabon[2] |
| 1964-1965 | Interstate Conflict | Ethiopia, Sudan[2] |
| 1964 | Interstate Conflict | Ethiopia, Somalia[2] |
| 1964 | Civil War | Uganda[2] |
| 1964-2004 | Ethnic violence, military coups | Nigeria[2] |
| 1965-1979 | Civil War | Chad[1] |
| 1966-1988 | War of independence | Namibia[1] |
| 1966 | Civil War (military faction) | Ghana[2] |
| 1966 | Military Coup | Burkina Faso[2] |
| 1966 | Military coup | Burundi[2] |
| 1966 | Series of military coups | Central African Rep. [2] |
| 1967-2004 | Series of military coups | Ghana[2] |
| 1966-2003 | Series of military coups | Guinea[2] |
| 1966-2004 | Series of military coups | Sudan[2] |
| 1967-1970 | Civil War | Nigeria[1] |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1967-1997 | Series of military coups | Sierra Leone[2] |
| 1967-2005 | Series of military coups | Congo-Brazzaville[2] |
| 1968 | Adverse regime change | Zambia[2] |
| 1968-1996 | Series of Military Coups | Mali[3 & 2] |
| 1969 | Coup | Libya[1] |
| 1969 | Coup | Somalia[1] |
| 1969 | Failed coup | Equatorial Guinea[2] |
| **1970s** | | |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Sudan[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of Military coups | Sudan[2] |
| Ongoing | War of independence | Eritrea[1] |
| Ongoing | War of independence | Angola[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Togo[2] |
| Ongoing | War of independence | Guinea-Bissau[1] |
| Ongoing | War of independence | Mozambique[1] |
| Ongoing | Bush War | Rhodesia/Zimbabwe[1] |
| Ongoing | Ethnic violence, military coups | Nigeria[2] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Chad[1] |
| Ongoing | War of independence | Namibia[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Ghana[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Guinea[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Sudan[2] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Nigeria[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Sierra Leone[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Congo-Brazzaville[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of Military Coups | Mali[3 & 2] |
| Ongoing | Anti-Apartheid Struggle | South Africa[1] |
| 1970-1974 | Internal Conflict | Burundi[1] |
| 1970 | Military Coup | Somalia[2] |
| 1971 | Military Coup | Chad[2] |
| 1971 | Dictatorship Instated | Lesotho[2] |
| 1971 | Civil War | Madagascar[2] |
| 1971-1979 | Internal Conflict | Uganda[1] |
| 1971-1997 | Series of Military Coups | Sierra Leone[2] |
| 1972 | Ethnic Violence | Burundi[2] |
| 1972 | Military Coup | Benin[2] |
| 1972 | Military Coup | Ghana[2] |
| 1972-1979 | Ethnic Violence | Zimbabwe[2] |
| 1973 | Dictatorship instated by King | Swaziland[2] |
| 1973 | Interstate | Zambia, Zimbabwe[2] |
| 1973 | Military Coup | Rwanda[2] |
| 1973-1991 | War | Western Sahara[1] |
| 1974 | Series of Military Coups | Ethiopia[2] |
| 1974 | Military Coup | Angola[2] |
| 1974 | Military Coup | Central African Republic [2] |
| 1974 | Military Coup | Madagascar[2] |
| 1974-1975 | Interstate | Burkina Faso, Mali[2] |
| 1974-1999 | Series of Military Coups | Niger[2] |
| 1975 | Series of Military Coups | Nigeria[2] |
| 1975 | Military Coup | Comoros[2] |
| 1975 | War of Independence | Comoros[1] |
| 1975 | Military Coup | Benin[2] |
| 1975 | Military Coup | Chad[2] |
| 1975-2004 | Civil War | Angola[2] |
| 1975-1979 | Interstate Violence | Mozambique, Zimbabwe[2] |
| 1975-1989 | Colonial War | Mauritania, Morocco [2] |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1975-1991 | Civil War | Ethiopia[1] |
| 1976 | Coup | Comoros[2] |
| 1976 | Military Coup | Burundi[2] |
| 1977-1978 | Series of Military Coups | Comoros[2] |
| 1977-2002 | Civil War | Mozambique[1] |
| 1977 | Military Coup | Ghana[2] |
| 1977 | War | Libya, Egypt[3] |
| 1977 | Interstate | Sudan, Ethiopia[2] |
| 1977 | Military Coup | Angola[2] |
| 1977 | Interstate Dispute | Angola, Zaire[2] |
| 1977 | Military Coup | Benin[2] |
| 1977 | Military Coup | Chad[2] |
| 1977-1978 | Ogaden War | Somalia[1] |
| 1977-1979 | Interstate | Zambia, Zimbabwe[2] |
| 1978 | Military Coup | Ghana[2] |
| 1978 | Military Coup | Mali[2] |
| 1978-1979 | War | Uganda, Tanzania[3] |
| 1978-1987 | Conflict | Chad, Libya[3] |
| 1979-1982 | Civil War | Chad[1] |
| 1979 | Series of Military Coups | Ghana[2] |
| 1979 | Military Coup | Central African Republic [2] |
| **1980s** | | |
| Ongoing | War of independence | Eritrea[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Togo[2] |
| Ongoing | Bush War | Rhodesia/Zimbabwe[1] |
| Ongoing | Ethnic violence, military coups | Nigeria[2] |
| Ongoing | War of independence | Namibia[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Ghana[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Guinea[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Sudan[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Sierra Leone[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Congo-Brazzaville[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of Military Coups | Mali[3 & 2] |
| Ongoing | Anti-Apartheid Struggle | South Africa[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of Military Coups | Sierra Leone[2] |
| Ongoing | War | Western Sahara[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of Military Coups | Niger[2] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Angola[2] |
| Ongoing | Colonial War | Mauritania, Morocco[2] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Ethiopia[1] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Mozambique[1] |
| Ongoing | Conflict | Chad, Libya[3] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Chad[1] |
| 1980-1987 | War | Libya, Chad[1] |
| 1980-1985 | Ethnic Violence | Nigeria[2] |
| 1980-1982 | Interstate | Zaire (DRC), Zambia [2] |
| 1980-2003 | Series of Coups and Military Coups | Liberia[1&2] |
| 1980 | Military Coup | Burkina Faso[2] |
| 1980 | Military Coup | Mali[2] |
| 1980 | Military Coup | Guinea-Bissau[2] |
| 1980 | Military Coup | Rwanda[2] |
| 1980 | Military Coup | Zambia[2] |
| 1981-1984 | Series of Military Coups | Ghana[1] |
| 1981 | Military Coup | Central African Republic [2] |
| 1981 | Military Coup | Comoros[2] |
| 1981-1986 | Bush War | Uganda[1] |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1981-1987 | Civil War | Somalia[2] |
| 1981-1987 | Ethnic Violence | Zimbabwe[2] |
| 1981 | Military Coup | Zambia[2] |
| 1982 | Civil War | Kenya[2] |
| 1982 | Border War | Ethiopia, Somalia[1] |
| 1982 | Military Coup | Central African Republic[2] |
| 1982 | Military Coup | Burkina Faso[2] |
| 1982 | Military Coup | Chad[2] |
| 1982 | Military Coup | Madagascar[2] |
| 1983 | Coup | Nigeria[1] |
| 1983 | Interstate | Chad, Nigeria[2] |
| 1983 | Military Coup | Burkina Faso[2] |
| 1983-2005 | Civil War | Sudan[1] |
| 1984-1989 | Internal Conflict & Military Coups | Burundi[2] |
| 1984 | Military Coup | Cameroon[2] |
| 1984 | Military Coup | Guinea[2] |
| 1985-86 | Interstate | Burkina Faso, Mali[2] |
| 1985 | Military Coup | Guinea[2] |
| 1985 | Military Coup | Guinea-Bissau[2] |
| 1985 | Military Coup | Comoros[2] |
| 1985-1988 | Armed Conflict | Angola, SA, Cuba[7] |
| 1986-1991 | Series of Military Coups | Lesotho[2] |
| 1987 | Military Coup | Burkina Faso[2] |
| 1987 | Ethnic tension | Zimbabwe[2] |
| 1987 | Military Coup | Comoros[2] |
| 1988 | Military Coup | Benin[2] |
| 1988 | Military Coup | Somalia[2] |
| 1988 | Military Coup | Zambia[2] |
| 1989 | Military Coup | Chad[2] |
| 1989-1991 | Border War | Mauritania, Senegal[3] |
| 1989-1991 | Civil War | Ethiopia[2] |
| 1989-1997 | Civil War | Liberia[1] |
| **1990s** | | |
| Ongoing | Series of Military Coups | Mali[3 & 2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Congo-Brazzaville[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Sierra Leone[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Sudan[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Guinea[2] |
| Ongoing | Ethnic violence, military coups | Nigeria[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Ghana[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Togo[2] |
| Ongoing | War of independence | Eritrea[1] |
| Ongoing | Anti-Apartheid Struggle | South Africa[1] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Ethiopia[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of Military Coups | Sierra Leone[2] |
| Ongoing | War | Western Sahara[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of Military Coups | Niger[2] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Angola[2] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Ethiopia[1] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Mozambique[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of Coups and Military Coups | Liberia[1&2] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Sudan[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of Military Coups | Lesotho[2] |
| Ongoing | Border War | Mauritania, Senegal[3] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Ethiopia[2] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Liberia[1] |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1990-1994 | Internal Conflict | Burundi[1] |
| 1990-1993 | Series of Military Coups | Chad[2] |
| 1990-1996 | Civil War | Liberia[2] |
| 1990-1998 | First Tuareg Rebellion | Mali, Niger[3] |
| 1990-2002 | Civil War | Sierra Leone[1] |
| 1991-1996 | Civil War & genocide | Rwanda[1] |
| 1991-1999 | Civil War | Somalia[2] |
| 1991-1994 | Civil War | Djibouti[3] |
| 1991-1996 | Series of Military Coups | Mali[2] |
| 1991-2002 | Civil War | Algeria[3] |
| 1991-2002 | Series of Military Coups | Cote d'Ivoire[2] |
| 1991 | Military Coup | Comoros[2] |
| 1992 | Military Coup | Comoros[2] |
| 1992- present | Niger Delta Conflict | Nigeria[3] |
| 1992-1997 | Civil War | Angola[2] |
| 1992 | Interstate | Sudan, Uganda[2] |
| 1992 | Military Coup | Benin[2] |
| 1992 | Military Coup | Burundi[2] |
| 1993-2006 | Civil War | Burundi[1] |
| 1993 | Military Coup | Zambia[2] |
| 1993 | Military Coup | Cameroon[2] |
| 1994 | Military Coup | Cameroon[2] |
| 1994 | Military coup | Gambia[2] |
| 1995 | Military coup | Comoros[2] |
| 1995 | Military Coup | Benin[2] |
| 1995-present | Ogaden insurgency | Ethiopia[4] |
| 1996 | Military coup | Niger[2] |
| 1996 | Interstate | Cameroon, Nigeria[2] |
| 1996 | Coup | Sierra Leone[3] |
| 1996 | Military Coup | Central African Republic [2] |
| 1996-1997 | Civil War | Uganda[2] |
| 1996-1997 | Kabila Uprising | Congo (Zaire)[1] |
| 1997-2002 | Civil War | Sierra Leone[3&2] |
| 1997-1999 | Civil War | Congo (Brazzaville)[1] |
| 1997 | Military Coup | Zambia[2] |
| 1998-2005 | Series of Military Coups | Guinea-Bissau[2] |
| 1999 | Military coup | Comoros[2] |
| 1999-2003 | Second Civil War | Liberia[1] |
| 1999-2004 | Interstate | DRC, Rwanda[2] |
| 1999-2007 | Ituri Conflict | DRC[4] |
| **2000s** | | |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Sudan[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Togo[2] |
| Ongoing | Ethnic violence, military coups | Nigeria[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Ghana[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Guinea[2] |
| Ongoing | Series of military coups | Congo-Brazzaville[2] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Angola[2] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Mozambique[1] |
| Ongoing | Series of Coups and Military Coups | Liberia[1&2] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Sudan[1] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Sierra Leone[1] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Algeria[3] |
| Ongoing | Series of Military Coups | Cote d'Ivoire |
| Ongoing | Niger Delta Conflict | Nigeria[3] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Burundi[1] |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Ongoing | Ogaden insurgency | Ethiopia[4] |
| Ongoing | Civil War | Sierra Leone[3&2] |
| Ongoing | Series of Military Coups | Guinea-Bissau |
| Ongoing | Second Civil War | Liberia[1] |
| Ongoing | Interstate | DRC, Rwanda |
| Ongoing | Ituri Conflict | DRC[4] |
| 2000-2001 | Mano River War | Ghana[1] |
| 2000-2003 | Civil Violence | Liberia[2] |
| 2000 | Military Coup | Comoros[2] |
| 2000 | Armed Conflict | Chad[7] |
| 2000 | Armed Conflict | Senegal[7] |
| 2001 | Military Coup | Central African Republic [2,7] |
| 2002-2007 | Civil War | Cote d'Ivoire[4] |
| 2003 –present | Darfur Conflict | Sudan[4] |
| 2003 | Military coup | Central African Republic[2] |
| 2003 | Military Coup | Burkina Faso[2] |
| 2003 | Military Coup | Guinea-Bissau[2] |
| 2004 | Military Coup | Ghana[2] |
| 2004 | Series if Military Coups | DRC[2] |
| 2004-present | Kivu Conflict | DRC[2] |
| 2004 | Ivorian French Conflict | Cote d'Ivoire, France[4] |
| 2004-present | War | Chad[6] |
| 2006-present | War | Somalia[7] |
| 2007 | Armed Conflict | Mali[7] |
| 2007-2008 | Civil Unrest | Kenya[4] |
| 2008 | Invasion | Comoros[5] |

[1](Global Security, 2008); [2](Marshall, 2005); [3](OnWar, 2008); [4](International Crisis Group, 2008); [5](Kato, 2008); [6](Axe, 2008); [7] (UCDP/PRIO, 2009)

# Appendix 3 Research Survey

| SECTION 1: RESPONDENT DETAILS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | **Full Name** | | |
| **2** | **Job Title** | | |
| **3** | **Department/Ministry etc** | | |
| **4** | **Gender** [ ] Female [ ] Male | | |
| **5** | **Race** [ ] African [ ]Asian [ ] Coloured [ ] Indian [ ] White [ ] Other | | |
| **6** | **Year of Birth** | | |
| **7** | **Political Party** | | |
| **8** | **Are/were you a Member of Parliament?** | | |
| **8.1** | [ ] No (Please proceed to Question 9) | | |
| **8.2** | [ ] Yes, I am currently a Member of Parliament | From | To |
| **8.3** | [ ] Yes, I was a Member of Parliament | From | To |
| **9** | **How long have you worked within Government?** | From | To |
| **10.1** | **Have you been active in the security sector?**<br>[ ] No (Please proceed to Question 11)<br>[ ] Yes (Please continue to Question 10.2) | | |
| **10.2** | **In which structure?** (MK/SANDF/ Ministry etc) | | [ ] Anonymous |
| **10.3** | **For how long?** | From | To |
| **10.4** | **Comments** | | |
| **11.** | **How would you prefer to be identified?**<br>[ ] Name and Title<br>[ ] Title Only<br>[ ] By Department/Ministry Only (e.g. "A senior official in the Department of Defence")<br>[ ]Other. Please specify: | | |

| SECTION 2: GENDER POLICY | |
|---|---|
| **In your opinion, how is gender mainstreaming viewed within <u>your department/ ministry/ parliament</u>?** | |
| Please mark the extent to which you agree with each statement below. | |
| **1.1** | **Senior staff in the department/ministry/parliament understand what gender mainstreaming is about**. |
| | [ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree |
| **1.2** | **Senior staff in the department/ministry/parliament consider gender mainstreaming to be important.** |
| | [ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree |
| **1.3** | **Gender issues are considered during policy formulation and implementation.** |
| | [ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree |
| **1.4** | **Gender issues receive special attention.** |
| | [ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree |
| **1.5 Comments** | [ ] Anonymous |
| **2** | **In general, how would you describe the attitude of male and female leaders <u>in government</u> towards gender mainstreaming?** |
| | Please mark the extent to which you agree with each statement below. |
| **2.1** | **Male leaders in government understand what gender mainstreaming is about**. |
| | [ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree |
| **2.2** | **Female leaders in government understand what gender mainstreaming is about**. |
| | [ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree |
| **2.3** | **Male leaders encourage the discussion of gender issues during policy formulation and implementation.** |
| | [ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree |

**2.4 Female leaders encourage the discussion of gender issues during policy formulation and implementation.**
[ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree

**2.5 Comments** [ ] Anonymous

**3.1 Do you think it is necessary to implement measures to assist women in advancing within government?**

[ ] Definitely Yes [ ] Probably Yes [ ] Probably No [ ] Definitely No

**3.2 In your opinion, what measures would assist women in advancing within government?** [ ] Anonymous

**4.1 In your opinion, are there sufficient mentoring programs within government?**

[ ] Definitely Yes [ ] Probably Yes [ ] Probably No [ ] Definitely No

**4.2 Do the mentoring programs within government assist women in realising their leadership potential?** [ ] Anonymous

**5.1 In your opinion, are women advancing within the government structures?**

[ ] Definitely Yes [ ] Probably Yes [ ] Probably No [ ] Definitely No

**5.2 To what extent do you feel the following factors play a role in the advancement of women within government structures:**

| | Very significant extent | Significant extent | Average | Insignificant extent | Very insignificant extent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Merit** | | | | | |
| **Nepotism** | | | | | |
| **Patronage** | | | | | |
| **Ethnicity** | | | | | |
| **Qualifications** | | | | | |
| **Political party loyalty** | | | | | |
| **Length of service** | | | | | |

**5.3 Comments** [ ] Anonymous

**SECTION 3: WOMEN AND SECURITY**

This section is focused on the role of women within the Security Sector.

**1 How did women participate in the Security Sector Reform process?**
Please mark the extent to which you agree with each statement below.

**1.1 Women made substantive inputs into the new security policies of the state.**

[ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree

**1.2 Women made substantive inputs into the decision to acquire new armaments.**

[ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree

**1.3 Woman were treated as credible experts during the formulation of new security policies.**

[ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree

**1.4 Women were prominent participants in the security sector reform process.**

[ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree

**1.5 Comments** [ ] Anonymous

**2.1 Do you feel women made a valuable contribution towards the Security Sector Reform process in South Africa?**

[ ] Definitely Yes [ ] Probably Yes [ ] Probably No [ ] Definitely No

**2.2 Please elaborate on your answer:** [ ] Anonymous

**3.1 Do men value the contribution of women towards security issues?**

[ ] Definitely Yes [ ] Probably Yes [ ] Probably No [ ] Definitely No

**3.2 How do you rate the value of the contributions of women towards security issues?**

[ ] Very highly [ ] Highly [ ] Average [ ] Low [ ] Very low

**3.3 Comments** [ ] Anonymous

**4** **In your opinion, how is gender mainstreaming viewed within the <u>security structures</u> of the state?**

Please mark the extent to which you agree with each statement below.

**4.1** **Senior staff in the security structures of the state understand what gender mainstreaming is about**.

[ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree

**4.2** **Senior staff in the security structures of the state consider gender mainstreaming to be important.**

[ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree

**4.3** **Gender issues are considered to be irrelevant/inappropriate to the work of the security sector.**

[ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree

**4.4** **Gender issues receive special attention.**

[ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree

**4.5** **Comments** [ ] Anonymous

**5.1** **Are women afforded the same leadership opportunities as men within the <u>security structures</u> of the state?**

[ ] Definitely Yes [ ] Probably Yes [ ] Probably No [ ] Definitely No

**5.2** **Comments** [ ] Anonymous

**6.1** **Some may argue that measures such as gender quotas are inappropriate for the security structures of the state. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?**

[ ]Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Unsure [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree

**6.2** **Please provide comment on your reasons** [ ] Anonymous

**7.1** **In your opinion, are women advancing within the <u>state security structures</u>?**

[ ] Definitely Yes [ ] Probably Yes [ ] Probably No [ ] Definitely No

**7.2** **To what extent do you feel the following factors play a role in the advancement of women within <u>state security structures</u>:**

| | Very significant extent | Significant extent | Average | Insignificant extent | Very insignificant extent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Merit** | | | | | |
| **Nepotism** | | | | | |
| **Patronage** | | | | | |
| **Ethnicity** | | | | | |
| **Qualifications** | | | | | |
| **Political party loyalty** | | | | | |
| **Length of service** | | | | | |

**7.3 Comments** [ ] Anonymous

**8** **In your opinion, what measures could assist women to advance within the security structures of the state?** [ ] Anonymous

**9.1** **In your opinion, is gender adequately considered during the formulation of security policy?**

[ ] Definitely Yes [ ] Probably Yes [ ] Probably No [ ] Definitely No

**9.2 Please explain why you give that response.** [ ] Anonymous

**10 What role do you believe women should play within the security structures of the state?** [ ] Anonymous

| SECTION 4: GENERAL | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | **Are there any specific issues which you feel should be addressed within this study?** | [ ] Anonymous |
| 2 | **Are there any specific people whom you would recommend I contact with regards to this study? If so, please provide their name, email or cell phone number in order that I may forward a survey form to them. Should you not wish to be identified as the referee, please mark the "Anonymous" box on this question** | [ ] Anonymous |
| 3 | **Would you like to receive a copy of the findings of this study?** | [ ] Yes [ ] No |
| 4 | **Would you be willing to be contacted for any follow up questions?** | [ ] Yes [ ] No |

**[End]**

## Appendix 4 Major South African Battles (1779-1902)

The battles listed below are represented on Map 3.1, and correspond to the numerical legend on the right hand side of the table.

| Afrikaner/British Battles | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Year** | **Battle** | **Involved Parties** | ▲ |
| 1838 | Bloukraans | Afrikaners/British | 1 |
| 1848 | Boomplaats | Afrikaners/British | 2 |
| 1881 | Majuba | Afrikaners/British | 3 |
| 1881 | Laingsnek | Afrikaners/British | 4 |
| 1881 | Schuinshoogte/Ingogo | Afrikaners/British | 5 |
| 1899 | Talana Hill | Afrikaners/British | 6 |
| 1899 | Lombaardskop | Afrikaners/British | 7 |
| 1899 | Colenso | Afrikaners/British | 8 |
| 1899 | Ladysmith | Afrikaners/British | 9 |
| 1899 | Belmont | Afrikaners/British | 10 |
| 1899 | Magersfontein | Afrikaners/British | 11 |
| 1900 | Scheepersnek | Afrikaners/British | 12 |
| 1900 | Wagon Hill | Afrikaners/British | 13 |
| 1900 | Pieters | Afrikaners/British | 14 |
| 1900 | Tugela Heights | Afrikaners/British | 15 |
| 1900 | Paardeberg | Afrikaners/British | 16 |
| 1900 | Poplar Grove | Afrikaners/British | 17 |
| 1901 | Blood River Poort | Afrikaners/British | 18 |
| 1901 | Groenkop/Tweefontein | Afrikaners/British | 19 |
| 1901 | Elands River | Afrikaners/British | 20 |
| 1901 | Groenkloof | Afrikaners/British | 21 |
| 1901 | Bakenlaagte | Afrikaners/British | 22 |
| 1902 | Tweebosch | Afrikaners/British | 23 |
| 1902 | Rooiwal | Afrikaners/British | 24 |

| Indigenous/Indigenous Battles | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Year** | **Battle** | **Involved Parties** | ▲ |
| 1819 | Gqokli Hill | Zulu | 1 |
| 1830 | Sand River | Zulu/Ndebele | 2 |
| 1856 | Ndondakusuka | Zulu | 3 |

| Afrikaner/Indigenous Battles | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Year** | **Battle** | **Involved Parties** | △ |
| 1836 | Vegkop | Afrikaners/Ndebele | 1 |
| 1837 | Mosega | Afrikaners /Ndebele | 2 |
| 1837 | Mariqua | Afrikaners /Ndebele | 3 |
| 1838 | Blood River | Afrikaners /Zulu | 4 |

| British/Indigenous Battles | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Year** | **Battle** | **Involved Parties** | △ |
| 1779 | 1st Xhosa War | British/Xhosa | 1 |
| 1789 | 2nd Xhosa War | British/Xhosa | 2 |
| 1799 | 3rd Xhosa War | British/Xhosa | 2 |
| 1811 | 4th Xhosa War | British/Xhosa | 4 |
| 1818 | 5th Xhosa War | British/Xhosa | 5 |
| 1834 | 6th Xhosa War | British/Xhosa | 6 |
| 1838 | Tugela | British/Zulu | 7 |
| 1846 | 7th Xhosa War | British/Xhosa | 8 |
| 1850 | 8th Xhosa War | British/Xhosa | 9 |
| 1877 | 9th Xhosa War | British/Xhosa | 10 |
| 1879 | Nkambula | British/Zulu | 11 |
| 1879 | Rorke's Drift | British/Zulu | 12 |
| 1879 | Isandlwana | British/Zulu | 13 |
| 1879 | Ulundi | British/Zulu | 14 |
| 1879 | Gingindlovu | British/Zulu | 15 |

Adapted from Mayhew (1980: 10, 11, 153, 345), Welsh (2000: xiv-xv, 98-99, 141, 142-144, 154-155, 204-205, 211), Thompson (2000: 3, 34, 74, 82, 89, 149), SA-Venues (2011), and South African History Online (2011).

## Appendix 5 Women in Government 1994-2009

| 1994-1999 |
| --- |
| Agriculture (Thoko Didiza) |
| Arts, Culture, Science & Technology (Winnie Mandela) |
| Health (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) |
| Justice (Sheila Camerer) |
| Minerals & Energy (Susan Shabangu) |
| Public Enterprises (Stella Sigcau) |
| Trade & Industry (Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka) |
| Welfare & Population Development (Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi) |

| 1999-2004 |
| --- |
| Agriculture & Land Affairs (Thoko Didiza) |
| Communications (Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri) |
| Health (Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) |
| Foreign Affairs (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) |
| Minerals & Energy (Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka) |
| Public Works (Stella Sigcau) |
| Public Service & Administration (Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi) |

| 2004-2008 |
| --- |
| Deputy President (Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka) |
| Agriculture & Land Affairs (Thoko Didiza, then Lulama Xingwana) |
| Communications (Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri) |
| Education (Naledi Pandor) |
| Foreign Affairs (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) |
| Health (Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) |
| Home Affairs (Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula) |
| Housing (Lindiwe Sisulu) |
| Justice & Constitutional Development (Brigitte Mabandla) |
| Minerals & Energy (Lindiwe Hendricks, then Buyelwa Patience Sonjica) |
| Public Service & Administration (Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi) |
| Public Works (Stella Sigcau, then Thoko Didza) |
| Water Affairs (Buyelwa Patience Sonjica then Lindiwe Hendricks) |

| 2008-2009 |
| --- |
| Deputy President (Baleka Mbete) |
| Agriculture & Land Affairs (Lulama Xingwana) |
| Communications (Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri, then Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) |
| Education (Naledi Pandor) |
| Foreign Affairs (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) |
| Health (Barbara Hogan) |
| Home Affairs (Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula) |
| Housing (Lindiwe Sisulu) |
| Minerals & Energy (Buyelwa Patience Sonjica) |
| Public Enterprises (Brigitte Mabandla) |
| Minister in the Presidency (Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) |
| Water Affairs & Forestry (Lindiwe Hendricks) |

| 2009-2013 |
| --- |
| Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Tina Joemat-Peterson) |
| Basic education (Angie Motshekga) |
| Correctional Services (Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula) |
| Defence and Military Veterans (Lindiwe Sisulu) |
| Home Affairs (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) |
| International Relations and Co-operation (Maite Nkoana-Mashabane) |
| Labour (Mildred Oliphant) |
| Mineral Resources (Susan Shabangu) |
| Public Works (Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde) |
| Science and Technology (Naledi Pandor) |
| Social Development (Bathabile Dlamini) |
| Water and Environmental Affairs (Edna Molewa) |
| Women, Youth, Children and People with disabilities (Lulu Xingwane) |

# Appendix 6 SANDF Personnel Statistics 1998

**African Personnel (1998)**

| Rank | AFRICAN | | | TOTAL | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL |
| GEN [1] | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| GEN % [2] | 100% | - | 100% | 100% | - | 100% |
| LT GEN [1] | 2 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| LT GEN % [2] | 25% | - | 25% | 100% | - | 100% |
| MAJ GEN [1] | 6 | 0 | 6 | 30 | 1 | 31 |
| MAJ GEN % [2] | 19.35% | - | 19.35% | 96.77% | 3.23% | 100% |
| BRIG GEN [1] | 30 | 1 | 31 | 139 | 4 | 143 |
| BRIG GEN % [2] | 20.98% | 0.70% | 21.68% | 97.20% | 2.80% | 100% |
| COL [1] | 55 | 2 | 57 | 647 | 33 | 680 |
| COL % [2] | 8.09% | 0.29% | 8.38% | 95.15% | 4.85% | 100% |
| LT COL [1] | 166 | 11 | 177 | 1469 | 226 | 1695 |
| LT COL % [2] | 9.79% | 0.65% | 10.44% | 80.67% | 13.33% | 100% |
| MAJ [1] | 364 | 52 | 416 | 1502 | 433 | 1935 |
| MAJ % [2] | 18.81% | 2.69% | 21.50% | 77.62% | 22.38% | 100% |
| CAPT [1] | 510 | 206 | 716 | 1745 | 807 | 2552 |
| CAPT % [2] | 19.98% | 8.07% | 28.06% | 68.38% | 31.62% | 100% |
| LT [1] | 814 | 175 | 989 | 2179 | 737 | 2916 |
| LT % [2] | 27.91% | 6.00% | 33.92% | 74.73% | 25.27% | 100% |
| 2LT [1] | 63 | 9 | 72 | 398 | 180 | 578 |
| 2LT % [2] | 10.90% | 1.56% | 12.46% | 68.86% | 31.14% | 100% |
| CPLN [1] | 36 | 1 | 37 | 127 | 2 | 129 |
| CPLN % [2] | 27.91% | 0.78% | 28.68% | 98.45% | 1.55% | 100% |
| WO1 [1] | 73 | 2 | 75 | 1687 | 199 | 1886 |
| WO1 % [2] | 3.87% | 0.11% | 3.98% | 89.45% | 10.55% | 100% |
| WO2 [1] | 217 | 15 | 232 | 1889 | 421 | 2310 |
| WO2 % [2] | 9.39% | 0.65% | 10.04% | 82.77% | 18.23% | 100% |
| SSGT [1] | 604 | 87 | 691 | 3887 | 797 | 4684 |
| SSGT % [2] | 12.89% | 1.86% | 14.75% | 82.98% | 17.02% | 100% |
| SGT [1] | 1904 | 406 | 2310 | 5960 | 1301 | 7261 |
| SGT % [2] | 26.22% | 5.59% | 31.81% | 82.08% | 17.92% | 100% |
| CPL [1] | 5007 | 688 | 5695 | 8669 | 1558 | 10227 |
| CPL % [2] | 48.96% | 6.73% | 55.69% | 84.77% | 15.23% | 100% |
| L CPL [1] | 5088 | 620 | 5708 | 7060 | 1036 | 8096 |
| L CPL % [2] | 62.85% | 7.66% | 70.51% | 87.20% | 12.80% | 100% |
| PTE [1] | 23643 | 1369 | 25012 | 26367 | 1756 | 28123 |
| PTE % [2] | 84.07% | 4.87% | 88.94% | 93.76% | 6.24% | 100% |
| AUX SERV [1] | 162 | 1 | 163 | 233 | 1 | 234 |
| AUX SERV% [2] | 69.23% | 0.43% | 69..66% | 99.57% | 0.43% | 100% |
| TOTAL [1] | 38745 | 3645 | 42390 | 63997 | 9492 | 73489 |
| TOTAL % [2] | 52.72% | 4.96% | 57.68% | 87.08% | 12.92% | 100% |

[1] Department of Defence 1998 Personnel Statistics [2] Calculated across ranks from Totals

**Asian Personnel (1998)**

| Rank | ASIAN | | | TOTAL | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL |
| GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| GEN % [2] | - | - | - | 100% | - | 100% |
| LT GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| LT GEN % [2] | - | - | - | 100% | - | 100% |
| MAJ GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 1 | 31 |
| MAJ GEN % [2] | - | - | - | 96.77% | 3.23% | 100% |
| BRIG GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 139 | 4 | 143 |
| BRIG GEN % [2] | - | - | - | 97.20% | 2.80% | 100% |
| COL [1] | 1 | 0 | 1 | 647 | 33 | 680 |
| COL % [2] | 0.15% | - | 0.15% | 95.15% | 4.85% | 100% |
| LT COL [1] | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1469 | 226 | 1695 |
| LT COL % [2] | 0.12% | 0.12% | 0.24% | 80.67% | 13.33% | 100% |
| MAJ [1] | 5 | 3 | 8 | 1502 | 433 | 1935 |
| MAJ % [2] | 0.26% | 0.16% | 00.41% | 77.62% | 22.38% | 100% |
| CAPT [1] | 9 | 11 | 20 | 1745 | 807 | 2552 |
| CAPT % [2] | 0.35% | 0.43% | 0.78% | 68.38% | 31.62% | 100% |
| LT [1] | 13 | 8 | 21 | 2179 | 737 | 2916 |
| LT % [2] | 0.45% | 0.27% | 0.72% | 74.73% | 25.27% | 100% |
| 2LT [1] | 5 | 1 | 6 | 398 | 180 | 578 |
| 2LT % [2] | 0.87% | 0.17% | 1.04% | 68.86% | 31.14% | 100% |
| CPLN [1] | 1 | 0 | 1 | 127 | 2 | 129 |
| CPLN % [2] | 0.78% | - | 0.78% | 98.45% | 1.55% | 100% |
| WO1 [1] | 8 | 0 | 8 | 1687 | 199 | 1886 |
| WO1 % [2] | 0.42% | - | 0.42% | 89.45% | 10.55% | 100% |
| WO2 [1] | 39 | 0 | 39 | 1889 | 421 | 2310 |
| WO2 % [2] | 1.69% | - | 1.69% | 82.77% | 18.23% | 100% |
| SSGT [1] | 154 | 2 | 156 | 3887 | 797 | 4684 |
| SSGT % [2] | 3.29% | 0.04% | 3.33% | 82.98% | 17.02% | 100% |
| SGT [1] | 172 | 12 | 184 | 5960 | 1301 | 7261 |
| SGT % [2] | 2.37% | 0.17% | 2.53% | 82.08% | 17.92% | 100% |
| CPL [1] | 212 | 25 | 237 | 8669 | 1558 | 10227 |
| CPL % [2] | 2.07% | 0.24% | 2.31% | 84.77% | 15.23% | 100% |
| L CPL [1] | 109 | 21 | 130 | 7060 | 1036 | 8096 |
| L CPL % [2] | 1.35% | 0.26% | 1.61% | 87.20% | 12.80% | 100% |
| PTE [1] | 61 | 10 | 71 | 26367 | 1756 | 28123 |
| PTE % [2] | 0.22% | 0.04% | 0.26% | 93.76% | 6.24% | 100% |
| AUX SERV [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 233 | 1 | 234 |
| AUX SERV% [2] | - | - | - | 99.57% | 0.43% | 100% |
| TOTAL [1] | 791 | 95 | 886 | 63997 | 9492 | 73489 |
| TOTAL % [2] | 1.08% | 0.13% | 1.21% | 87.08% | 12.92% | 100% |

[1] Department of Defence 1998 Personnel Statistics [2] Calculated across ranks from Totals

**Coloured Personnel (1998)**

| Rank | COLOURED | | | TOTAL | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL |
| GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| GEN % [2] | - | - | - | 100% | - | 100% |
| LT GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| LT GEN % [2] | - | - | - | 100% | - | 100% |
| MAJ GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 1 | 31 |
| MAJ GEN % [2] | - | - | - | 96.77% | 3.23% | 100% |
| BRIG GEN [1] | 1 | 0 | 1 | 139 | 4 | 143 |
| BRIG GEN % [2] | 0.70% | - | 0.70% | 97.20% | 2.80% | 100% |
| COL [1] | 3 | 1 | 4 | 647 | 33 | 680 |
| COL % [2] | 0.44% | 0.15% | 0.59% | 95.15% | 4.85% | 100% |
| LT COL [1] | 25 | 1 | 26 | 1469 | 226 | 1695 |
| LT COL % [2] | 1.47% | 0.06% | 1.53% | 80.67% | 13.33% | 100% |
| MAJ [1] | 92 | 1 | 93 | 1502 | 433 | 1935 |
| MAJ % [2] | 4.75% | 0.05% | 4.81% | 77.62% | 22.38% | 100% |
| CAPT [1] | 92 | 36 | 128 | 1745 | 807 | 2552 |
| CAPT % [2] | 3.61% | 1.41% | 5.02% | 68.38% | 31.62% | 100% |
| LT [1] | 169 | 34 | 203 | 2179 | 737 | 2916 |
| LT % [2] | 5.80% | 1.17% | 6.96% | 74.73% | 25.27% | 100% |
| 2LT [1] | 35 | 11 | 46 | 398 | 180 | 578 |
| 2LT % [2] | 6.06% | 1.90% | 7.96% | 68.86% | 31.14% | 100% |
| CPLN [1] | 8 | 0 | 8 | 127 | 2 | 129 |
| CPLN % [2] | 6.20% | - | 6.20% | 98.45% | 1.55% | 100% |
| WO1 [1] | 118 | 0 | 118 | 1687 | 199 | 1886 |
| WO1 % [2] | 6.25% | - | 6.25% | 89.45% | 10.55% | 100% |
| WO2 [1] | 266 | 2 | 268 | 1889 | 421 | 2310 |
| WO2 % [2] | 11.52% | 0.09% | 11.61% | 82.77% | 18.23% | 100% |
| SSGT [1] | 695 | 17 | 712 | 3887 | 797 | 4684 |
| SSGT % [2] | 14.84% | 0.36% | 15.20% | 82.98% | 17.02% | 100% |
| SGT [1] | 1037 | 74 | 1111 | 5960 | 1301 | 7261 |
| SGT % [2] | 14.28% | 1.02% | 15.30% | 82.08% | 17.92% | 100% |
| CPL [1] | 1469 | 253 | 1722 | 8669 | 1558 | 10227 |
| CPL % [2] | 14.36% | 2.47% | 16.84% | 84.77% | 15.23% | 100% |
| L CPL [1] | 844 | 127 | 971 | 7060 | 1036 | 8096 |
| L CPL % [2] | 10.42% | 1.57% | 11.99% | 87.20% | 12.80% | 100% |
| PTE [1] | 1700 | 67 | 1767 | 26367 | 1756 | 28123 |
| PTE % [2] | 6.04% | 0.24% | 6.28% | 93.76% | 6.24% | 100% |
| AUX SERV [1] | 26 | 0 | 26 | 233 | 1 | 234 |
| AUX SERV% [2] | 11.11% | - | 11.11% | 99.57% | 0.43% | 100% |
| TOTAL [1] | 6580 | 624 | 7204 | 63997 | 9492 | 73489 |
| TOTAL % [2] | 8.95% | 0.85% | 9.80% | 87.08% | 12.92% | 100% |

[1] Department of Defence 1998 Personnel Statistics [2] Calculated across ranks from Totals

**White Personnel (1998)**

| Rank | WHITE | | | TOTAL | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL |
| GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| GEN % [2] | - | - | - | 100% | - | 100% |
| LT GEN [1] | 6 | 0 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| LT GEN % [2] | 75% | - | 75% | 100% | - | 100% |
| MAJ GEN [1] | 24 | 1 | 25 | 30 | 1 | 31 |
| MAJ GEN % [2] | 77.42% | 3.23% | 80.65% | 96.77% | 3.23% | 100% |
| BRIG GEN [1] | 108 | 3 | 111 | 139 | 4 | 143 |
| BRIG GEN % [2] | 75.52% | 2.10% | 77.62% | 97.20% | 2.80% | 100% |
| COL [1] | 588 | 30 | 618 | 647 | 33 | 680 |
| COL % [2] | 86.47% | 4.41% | 90.88% | 95.15% | 4.85% | 100% |
| LT COL [1] | 1276 | 212 | 1488 | 1469 | 226 | 1695 |
| LT COL % [2] | 75.28% | 12.51% | 87.79% | 80.67% | 13.33% | 100% |
| MAJ [1] | 1041 | 377 | 1418 | 1502 | 433 | 1935 |
| MAJ % [2] | 53.75% | 19.48% | 73.28% | 77.62% | 22.38% | 100% |
| CAPT [1] | 1134 | 554 | 1688 | 1745 | 807 | 2552 |
| CAPT % [2] | 44.44% | 21.71% | 66.14% | 68.38% | 31.62% | 100% |
| LT [1] | 1183 | 520 | 1703 | 2179 | 737 | 2916 |
| LT % [2] | 40.57% | 17,83% | 58.40% | 74.73% | 25.27% | 100% |
| 2LT [1] | 295 | 159 | 454 | 398 | 180 | 578 |
| 2LT % [2] | 51.04% | 27.51% | 78.55% | 68.86% | 31.14% | 100% |
| CPLN [1] | 82 | 1 | 83 | 127 | 2 | 129 |
| CPLN % [2] | 63.57% | 0.78% | 64.34% | 98.45% | 1.55% | 100% |
| WO1 [1] | 1488 | 197 | 1685 | 1687 | 199 | 1886 |
| WO1 % [2] | 78.90% | 10.45% | 89.34% | 89.45% | 10.55% | 100% |
| WO2 [1] | 1367 | 404 | 1771 | 1889 | 421 | 2310 |
| WO2 % [2] | 59.18 | 17.47% | 76.67% | 82.77% | 18.23% | 100% |
| SSGT [1] | 2434 | 691 | 3125 | 3887 | 797 | 4684 |
| SSGT % [2] | 51.96% | 14.75% | 66.72% | 82.98% | 17.02% | 100% |
| SGT [1] | 2847 | 809 | 3656 | 5960 | 1301 | 7261 |
| SGT % [2] | 39.21% | 11.14% | 50.35% | 82.08% | 17.92% | 100% |
| CPL [1] | 1981 | 592 | 2573 | 8669 | 1558 | 10227 |
| CPL % [2] | 19.37% | 5.79% | 25.16% | 84.77% | 15.23% | 100% |
| L CPL [1] | 1019 | 268 | 1287 | 7060 | 1036 | 8096 |
| L CPL % [2] | 12.59% | 3.31% | 15.90% | 87.20% | 12.80% | 100% |
| PTE [1] | 963 | 310 | 1273 | 26367 | 1756 | 28123 |
| PTE % [2] | 3.42% | 1.10% | 4.53% | 93.76% | 6.24% | 100% |
| AUX SERV [1] | 45 | 0 | 45 | 233 | 1 | 234 |
| AUX SERV% [2] | 19.23% | - | 19.23% | 99.57% | 0.43% | 100% |
| TOTAL [1] | 17881 | 5128 | 23009 | 63997 | 9492 | 73489 |
| TOTAL % [2] | 24.33% | 6.98% | 31.31% | 87.08% | 12.92% | 100% |

[1] Department of Defence 1998 Personnel Statistics [2] Calculated across ranks from Totals

## Appendix 7 SANDF Personnel Statistics 2007

**African Personnel (2007)**

| Rank | AFRICAN | | | TOTAL | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL |
| GEN [1] | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| GEN % [2] | 100% | 0 | 100% | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| LT GEN [1] | 4 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 7 |
| LT GEN % [2] | 57% | 0 | 57% | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| MAJ GEN [1] | 25 | 1 | 26 | 36 | 1 | 37 |
| MAJ GEN % [2] | 68% | 2% | 70% | 98% | 2% | 100% |
| BRIG GEN [1] | 67 | 8 | 75 | 148 | 17 | 165 |
| BRIG GEN % [2] | 40% | 5% | 45% | 89% | 11% | 100% |
| COL [1] | 230 | 43 | 273 | 707 | 113 | 820 |
| COL % [2] | 28% | 5% | 33% | 86.3% | 13.7% | 100% |
| LT COL [1] | 450 | 110 | 560 | 1452 | 354 | 1806 |
| LT COL % [2] | 25% | 6.1% | 31.1% | 80% | 20% | 100% |
| MAJ [1] | 678 | 249 | 927 | 1583 | 609 | 2192 |
| MAJ % [2] | 30.9% | 11.3% | 42.2% | 72.3% | 27.7% | 100% |
| CAPT [1] | 852 | 389 | 1241 | 1616 | 900 | 2516 |
| CAPT % [2] | 34% | 15.5% | 49.5% | 64.3% | 35.7% | 100% |
| LT [1] | 722 | 273 | 995 | 1058 | 509 | 1567 |
| LT % [2] | 46.1% | 17.4% | 63.5% | 67.6% | 32.4% | 100% |
| 2LT [1] | 170 | 103 | 273 | 226 | 166 | 392 |
| 2LT % [2] | 43.4% | 26.3% | 69.7% | 57.7% | 42.3% | 100% |
| CPLN [1] | 81 | 12 | 93 | 117 | 15 | 132 |
| CPLN % [2] | 61.3% | 9.1% | 70.4% | 88.6% | 11.4% | 100% |
| WO1 [1] | 406 | 43 | 449 | 2060 | 338 | 2398 |
| WO1 % [2] | 16.9% | 1.8% | 18.7% | 85.9% | 14.1% | 100% |
| WO2 [1] | 635 | 123 | 758 | 2029 | 452 | 2481 |
| WO2 % [2] | 25.6% | 5% | 30.6% | 81.8% | 18.2% | 100% |
| SSGT [1] | 2002 | 615 | 2617 | 4603 | 1221 | 5824 |
| SSGT % [2] | 34.4% | 10. 6% | 45% | 79.1% | 20.9% | 100% |
| SGT [1] | 4447 | 894 | 5341 | 6624 | 1359 | 7983 |
| SGT % [2] | 55.7% | 11.2% | 66.9% | 82.9% | 17.1% | 100% |
| CPL [1] | 6081 | 1119 | 7200 | 7473 | 1475 | 8948 |
| CPL % [2] | 68% | 12.5% | 80.5% | 83.5% | 16.5% | 100% |
| L CPL [1] | 3640 | 669 | 4309 | 4218 | 845 | 5063 |
| L CPL % [2] | 71.9% | 13.2% | 85.1% | 83.3% | 16.7% | 100% |
| PTE [1] | 15333 | 3139 | 18472 | 16906 | 3751 | 20657 |
| PTE % [2] | 74.2% | 15.2% | 89.4% | 81.8% | 18.2% | 100% |
| CO [1] | 28 | 31 | 59 | 30 | 56 | 86 |
| CO % [2] | 32.5% | 36% | 68.5% | 34.9% | 65.1% | 100% |
| AUX SERV [1] | 63 | 0 | 63 | 81 | 0 | 81 |
| AUX SERV% [2] | 77.8% | 0 | 77.8% | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| TOTAL [1] | 35915 | 7821 | 43736 | 50975 | 12181 | 63156 |
| TOTAL % [2] | 56.8% | 12.4% | 69.2% | 80.7% | 19.3% | 100% |

[1] Department of Defence 2007 Personnel Statistics [2] Calculated across ranks from Totals

**Asian Personnel (2007)**

| Rank | ASIAN | | | TOTAL | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL |
| GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| GEN % [2] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| LT GEN [1] | 1 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 7 |
| LT GEN % [2] | 14% | 0 | 14% | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| MAJ GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 1 | 37 |
| MAJ GEN % [2] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 98% | 2% | 100% |
| BRIG GEN [1] | 2 | 1 | 3 | 148 | 17 | 165 |
| BRIG GEN % [2] | 1.2% | 0.8% | 2% | 89% | 11% | 100% |
| COL [1] | 6 | 2 | 8 | 707 | 113 | 820 |
| COL % [2] | 0.7% | 0.2% | 0.9% | 86.3% | 13.7% | 100% |
| LT COL [1] | 16 | 11 | 27 | 1452 | 354 | 1806 |
| LT COL % [2] | 0.9% | 0.6% | 1.5% | 80% | 20% | 100% |
| MAJ [1] | 13 | 22 | 35 | 1583 | 609 | 2192 |
| MAJ % [2] | 0.5% | 1% | 1.5% | 72.3% | 27.7% | 100% |
| CAPT [1] | 31 | 11 | 42 | 1616 | 900 | 2516 |
| CAPT % [2] | 1.2% | 0.4% | 1.6% | 64.3% | 35.7% | 100% |
| LT [1] | 19 | 16 | 35 | 1058 | 509 | 1567 |
| LT % [2] | 1.2% | 1% | 2.2% | 67.6% | 32.4% | 100% |
| 2LT [1] | 7 | 8 | 15 | 226 | 166 | 392 |
| 2LT % [2] | 1.8% | 2% | 3.8% | 57.7% | 42.3% | 100% |
| CPLN [1] | 2 | 0 | 2 | 117 | 15 | 132 |
| CPLN % [2] | 1.5% | 0 | 1.5% | 88.6% | 11.4% | 100% |
| WO1 [1] | 63 | 1 | 64 | 2060 | 338 | 2398 |
| WO1 % [2] | 2.6% | 0.1% | 2.7% | 85.9% | 14.1% | 100% |
| WO2 [1] | 58 | 3 | 61 | 2029 | 452 | 2481 |
| WO2 % [2] | 2.3% | 0.1% | 2.4% | 81.8% | 18.2% | 100% |
| SSGT [1] | 120 | 11 | 131 | 4603 | 1221 | 5824 |
| SSGT % [2] | 2.1% | 0.2% | 2.3% | 79.1% | 20.9% | 100% |
| SGT [1] | 139 | 22 | 161 | 6624 | 1359 | 7983 |
| SGT % [2] | 1.7% | 0.3% | 2% | 82.9% | 17.1% | 100% |
| CPL [1] | 65 | 27 | 92 | 7473 | 1475 | 8948 |
| CPL % [2] | 0.7% | 0.3% | 1% | 83.5% | 16.5% | 100% |
| L CPL [1] | 27 | 5 | 32 | 4218 | 845 | 5063 |
| L CPL % [2] | 0.5% | 0.1% | 0.6% | 83.3% | 16.7% | 100% |
| PTE [1] | 33 | 12 | 45 | 16906 | 3751 | 20657 |
| PTE % [2] | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 81.8% | 18.2% | 100% |
| CO [1] | 0 | 5 | 5 | 30 | 56 | 86 |
| CO % [2] | 0 | 5.8% | 5.8% | 34.9% | 65.1% | 100% |
| AUX SERV [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 81 | 0 | 81 |
| AUX SERV% [2] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| TOTAL [1] | 602 | 157 | 759 | 50975 | 12181 | 63156 |
| TOTAL % [2] | 1% | 0.2% | 1.2% | 80.7% | 19.3% | 100% |

[1] Department of Defence 2007 Personnel Statistics [2] Calculated across ranks from Totals

**Coloured Personnel (2007)**

| Rank | COLOURED | | | TOTAL | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL |
| GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| GEN % [2] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| LT GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 7 |
| LT GEN % [2] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| MAJ GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 1 | 37 |
| MAJ GEN % [2] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 98% | 2% | 100% |
| BRIG GEN [1] | 5 | 0 | 5 | 148 | 17 | 165 |
| BRIG GEN % [2] | 3% | 0 | 3% | 89% | 11% | 100% |
| COL [1] | 30 | 4 | 34 | 707 | 113 | 820 |
| COL % [2] | 3.6% | 0.5% | 4.1% | 86.3% | 13.7% | 100% |
| LT COL [1] | 104 | 5 | 109 | 1452 | 354 | 1806 |
| LT COL % [2] | 5.8% | 0.3% | 6.1% | 80% | 20% | 100% |
| MAJ [1] | 153 | 31 | 184 | 1583 | 609 | 2192 |
| MAJ % [2] | 6.9% | 1.4% | 8.3% | 72.3% | 27.7% | 100% |
| CAPT [1] | 196 | 114 | 310 | 1616 | 900 | 2516 |
| CAPT % [2] | 7.8% | 4.5% | 12.3% | 64.3% | 35.7% | 100% |
| LT [1] | 148 | 89 | 237 | 1058 | 509 | 1567 |
| LT % [2] | 9.5% | 5.7% | 15.2% | 67.6% | 32.4% | 100% |
| 2LT [1] | 16 | 27 | 43 | 226 | 166 | 392 |
| 2LT % [2] | 4.1% | 6.9% | 11% | 57.7% | 42.3% | 100% |
| CPLN [1] | 7 | 0 | 7 | 117 | 15 | 132 |
| CPLN % [2] | 5.3% | 0 | 5.3% | 88.6% | 11.4% | 100% |
| WO1 [1] | 292 | 3 | 295 | 2060 | 338 | 2398 |
| WO1 % [2] | 12.2% | 0.1 % | 12.3% | 85.9% | 14.1% | 100% |
| WO2 [1] | 399 | 32 | 431 | 2029 | 452 | 2481 |
| WO2 % [2] | 16.1% | 1.3% | 17.4% | 81.8% | 18.2% | 100% |
| SSGT [1] | 899 | 131 | 1030 | 4603 | 1221 | 5824 |
| SSGT % [2] | 15.4% | 2.2% | 17.6% | 79.1% | 20.9% | 100% |
| SGT [1] | 1167 | 198 | 1365 | 6624 | 1359 | 7983 |
| SGT % [2] | 14.6% | 2.5% | 17.1% | 82.9% | 17.1% | 100% |
| CPL [1] | 876 | 180 | 1056 | 7473 | 1475 | 8948 |
| CPL % [2] | 9.8% | 2% | 11.8% | 83.5% | 16.5% | 100% |
| L CPL [1] | 343 | 100 | 443 | 4218 | 845 | 5063 |
| L CPL % [2] | 6.8% | 2% | 8.8% | 83.3% | 16.7% | 100% |
| PTE [1] | 1164 | 497 | 1661 | 16906 | 3751 | 20657 |
| PTE % [2] | 5.6% | 2.4% | 8% | 81.8% | 18.2% | 100% |
| CO [1] | 1 | 11 | 12 | 30 | 56 | 86 |
| CO % [2] | 1.2% | 12.8% | 14% | 34.9% | 65.1% | 100% |
| AUX SERV [1] | 11 | 0 | 11 | 81 | 0 | 81 |
| AUX SERV% [2] | 13.6% | 0 | 13.6% | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| TOTAL [1] | 5811 | 1422 | 7233 | 50975 | 12181 | 63156 |
| TOTAL % [2] | 9.2% | 2.3% | 11.5% | 80.7% | 19.3% | 100% |

[1] Department of Defence 2007 Personnel Statistics [2] Calculated across ranks from Totals

**White Personnel (2007)**

| Rank | WHITE | | | TOTAL | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | Women | TOTAL | Men | Women | TOTAL |
| GEN [1] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| GEN % [2] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| LT GEN [1] | 2 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 7 |
| LT GEN % [2] | 29% | 0 | 29% | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| MAJ GEN [1] | 11 | 0 | 11 | 36 | 1 | 37 |
| MAJ GEN % [2] | 30% | 0 | 30% | 98% | 2% | 100% |
| BRIG GEN [1] | 74 | 8 | 82 | 148 | 17 | 165 |
| BRIG GEN % [2] | 45% | 5% | 50% | 89% | 11% | 100% |
| COL [1] | 441 | 64 | 505 | 707 | 113 | 820 |
| COL % [2] | 54% | 8% | 62% | 86.3% | 13.7% | 100% |
| LT COL [1] | 882 | 228 | 1110 | 1452 | 354 | 1806 |
| LT COL % [2] | 48.8% | 12. 6% | 61.4% | 80% | 20% | 100% |
| MAJ [1] | 739 | 307 | 1046 | 1583 | 609 | 2192 |
| MAJ % [2] | 34% | 14% | 48% | 72.3% | 27.7% | 100% |
| CAPT [1] | 537 | 386 | 923 | 1616 | 900 | 2516 |
| CAPT % [2] | 21.3% | 15.3% | 36.6% | 64.3% | 35.7% | 100% |
| LT [1] | 169 | 131 | 300 | 1058 | 509 | 1567 |
| LT % [2] | 10.8% | 8.3% | 19.1% | 67.6% | 32.4% | 100% |
| 2LT [1] | 33 | 28 | 61 | 226 | 166 | 392 |
| 2LT % [2] | 8.4% | 7.1% | 15.5% | 57.7% | 42.3% | 100% |
| CPLN [1] | 27 | 3 | 30 | 117 | 15 | 132 |
| CPLN % [2] | 20.5% | 2.3% | 22.8% | 88.6% | 11.4% | 100% |
| WO1 [1] | 1299 | 291 | 1590 | 2060 | 338 | 2398 |
| WO1 % [2] | 54.2% | 12.1% | 66.3% | 85.9% | 14.1% | 100% |
| WO2 [1] | 937 | 294 | 1231 | 2029 | 452 | 2481 |
| WO2 % [2] | 37.8% | 11.8% | 49.6% | 81.8% | 18.2% | 100% |
| SSGT [1] | 1582 | 464 | 2046 | 4603 | 1221 | 5824 |
| SSGT % [2] | 27.2% | 7.9% | 35.1% | 79.1% | 20.9% | 100% |
| SGT [1] | 871 | 245 | 1116 | 6624 | 1359 | 7983 |
| SGT % [2] | 10.9% | 3.1% | 14% | 82.9% | 17.1% | 100% |
| CPL [1] | 451 | 149 | 600 | 7473 | 1475 | 8948 |
| CPL % [2] | 5% | 1.7% | 6.7% | 83.5% | 16.5% | 100% |
| L CPL [1] | 208 | 71 | 279 | 4218 | 845 | 5063 |
| L CPL % [2] | 4.1% | 1.4% | 5.5% | 83.3% | 16.7% | 100% |
| PTE [1] | 376 | 103 | 479 | 16906 | 3751 | 20657 |
| PTE % [2] | 1.8% | 0.5% | 2.3% | 81.8% | 18.2% | 100% |
| CO [1] | 1 | 9 | 10 | 30 | 56 | 86 |
| CO % [2] | 1.2% | 10.5% | 11.7% | 34.9% | 65.1% | 100% |
| AUX SERV [1] | 7 | 0 | 7 | 81 | 0 | 81 |
| AUX SERV% [2] | 8.6% | 0% | 8.6% | 100% | 0 | 100% |
| TOTAL [1] | 8647 | 2781 | 11428 | 50975 | 12181 | 63156 |
| TOTAL % [2] | 13.7% | 4.4% | 18.1% | 80.7% | 19.3% | 100% |

[1] Department of Defence 2007 Personnel Statistics [2] Calculated across ranks from Totals

## Appendix 8 Overview of Arms Deal Acquisitions

The table below outlines the equipment procured in the Arms Deal, the cost, the use of the equipment and the supplier, and the controversy attached to the equipment. It demonstrates that the stated purpose of the equipment did not (and does not) align with the stated security objectives of the State (particularly in terms of the key SSR objectives of reducing military expenditure and decreasing State arsenals), nor does it correspond to the peacekeeping mandate undertaken during the Defence Review. In fact, despite the Defence Review underlining the importance of peace support operations as the SANDF's primary mandate, and the statement in the 2008 Budget that argues that "landward forces are the backbone of South Africa's peace and stability initiative on the continent" (Holden, 2008:31), the arms deal focused exclusively on air and sea materiel.

**Overview of Arms Deal Equipment**

| **Corvettes** (Meko A200) |
|---|
| **Description:**<br>The "workhorses of the Navy", the vessels have search-and-rescue and "blue sea" capacity.<br><br>**Contractor/Supplier:**<br>**German Frigate Consortium** (Germany) providing the ship platform<br>**Thomson-CSF** (France)<br>**African Defence Systems** (South Africa) providing the combat suite<br><br>**Quantity:** 4 **Cost:** R6.92 billion<br><br>**Scandal:**<br>Thomson-CSF was alleged to have bribed Jacob Zuma, amongst others, while African Defence Systems has been exposed as a front company for Shabir Shaik. |
| **Submarines** (Class 209 1400 MOD) |
| **Description:**<br>Armed with spy capability, they are also equipped with stealth mode to protect coastal trade.<br><br>**Contractor/Supplier:**<br>**German Submarine Consortium** (Germany)<br><br>**Quantity:** 3 **Cost:** R5.35 billion<br><br>**Scandal:** No references found in Defence Review (or elsewhere) about credible threats in terms of coastal attacks. |

**Advanced Light Fighter Aircraft** (The Gripen)

**Description:**
The "multi-role supersonic combat aircraft" provides armed cover & support for land-based attacks, reconnaissance, air-borne dogfights and airspace control.

**Contractor/Supplier:**
**SAAB** and **British Aerospace** as joint British-Swedish Consortium (UK/Sweden)

**Quantity:** 28 **Cost:** R15.77 billion

**Scandal:**
While useful for conventional military operations, it is of little use within peace support operations, as Defence Chief Director of Acquisitions, Major-General Otto Schur admitted in 2007, given that transport capability is of greater importance in peace support operations.

Prior to the finalisation of the contracts, BAe (formerly British Aerospace) made a R5 million donation to the MK Veterans Association, of which Joe Modise was the Life President (Feinstein, 2007:155).

Part of the alleged deal was the purchase of a large number of shares in Conlog for Joe, a defence subcontractor likely to benefit from the successful bid. Modise became chair of Conlog within weeks of leaving office (Feinstein, 2007:155).

**Lead-In Fighter Trainer Aircraft** (The Hawk)

**Description:**
Providing flight training for the Gripens, the Hawks have limited capabilities for search & rescue missions, reconnaissance, and patrolling.

**Contractor/Supplier:**
**British Aerospace**(UK)

**Quantity:** 24 **Cost:** R15.72 billion

**Scandal:**
Chosen over the cheaper Italian Aeromacchi MB339[1], the UK's Royal Air Force (RAF), which uses the Hawk, found the Aeromacchi was 'far and away better than anything the RAF possesses'" (Holden, 2008:18-20). The original report emerging from the SCOPA investigation revealed that the Hawk was dropped from the shortlist in 1997 as, apart from its cost, it did not adhere to the Air Force's operational requirements. At the time (after pressure from Modise), the Chief of the Air Force stated that the Hawk would only be accepted if they were 'politically obliged' to do so (Feinstein, 2007: 215). In 2006, an Air Force Chief confirmed that the Defence Force had notified the procurement committee that "the investment in fighter aircraft was basically pointless. There were insufficient qualified engineers to maintain them or pilots to fly them at optimum operational efficiency" (Pottinger, 2008:58). It was also stated that "the Air Force still had a number of boxed Cheetah jets which still had 10 years of life in them" (Feinstein, 2007:232).

| **Light Utility Helicopter (30)** (Agusta A109M) | |
|---|---|
| **Contractor/Supplier:**<br>**Agusta** (Italy) | |
| **Quantity:** 30 | **Cost:** R1.95 billion |

Adapted from Cilliers (1998: 4), Feinstein (2007:155, 215), Holden (2008:18-20), Sylvester & Seegers (2008: 52-53), and Pottinger (2008:58).